International Organizations – Principals or Agents? Interparadigm Debate Between Neoliberals and Realists

Andrei Shenin; Aigerim Raimzhanova

doi:10.52536/2788-5909.2022-2.01

Authors

Andrei Shenin Narxoz University, Kazakhstan Author https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8468-4275
Aigerim Raimzhanova Narxoz University, Kazakhstan Author

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.52536/2788-5909.2022-2.01

Keywords:

International Organizations, Neoliberalism, Rational Design, Realism, UN

Abstract

The role of international organizations becomes especially acute when nationstates cannot establish consensus with regard to local, regional and global issues. Considering that international organizations are made of members with varying power dynamics, there is often criticism that they represent the interests of power actors and not a true consensus-building platform that would enable solving collective issues. The schools of realism and neoliberalism in the framework of International Relations attribute various roles to international organizations (IOs); while the first regard them as mere instruments of nation-states, the latter views them as crucial international players with autonomous status. This article critically evaluates various issues related to the efficiency and design of international institutions in the framework of this interparadigm debate and with consideration of the UN as a prime example. The analysis illustrates that further research in the field of IOs is imperative for both theoretical modelbuilding as well as practical developments in the field. Finding suitable models is a vital concern for all international organizations, regardless of their purpose, size and origin.

Author Biographies

Andrei Shenin, Narxoz University, Kazakhstan

Candidate of Historical Sciences, Deputy Director of Doctoral Degree Programs at Narxoz University, (Kazakhstan)
Aigerim Raimzhanova, Narxoz University, Kazakhstan

PhD in Philosophy, Director of International Development and Partnerships Office at Narxoz University (Kazakhstan)

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