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Editor-in-Chief
Bulat SULTANOV
Director of KazISS
under the President of RK

Deputy Editor-in-Chief
Marian ABISHEVA

Responsible for publication:
D. Uteshev, U. Nysanbek
Design & Layout:
G. Khatkuliyeva, A. Sadvakassov

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Address:
87-b Dostyk Ave.
Almaty 050010, Republic of Kazakhstan
The Kazakhstan Institute
for Strategic Studies under the President
of the Republic of Kazakhstan

Phone (3272) 643-404
Fax (3272) 644-995
E-mail: office@kisi.kz.
www.kisi.kz

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Kazakh Foreign Policy in Modernisation

BULAT SULTANOV

Director, the Kazakh Institute for Strategic Studies under the President of Kazakhstan

In his March 2006 State of the Nation address entitled "The strategy for Kazakhstan to join the world's 50 most competitive countries: ways of implementing", President Nursultan Nazarbayev confirmed that Kazakhstan would preserve pragmatism and continuity in its foreign policy and would pursue its traditional multi-vector policy.

In this connection, events that took place on December 2, 1991 – the next day after the first national election of the country's president – bring memories to mind: answering a question about whether the country's foreign policy priorities were aimed at the East or the West, President Nazarbayev told a news conference that Kazakhstan intended to have economic and political relations with all the countries in the world. The head of state said that Kazakhstan would not be limited to the Asian continent, but it should maintain a sensible balance between Europe and Asia.

President Nazarbayev believes that the multi-vector policy means developing friendly and predictable relations with all the states that play a significant role in world affairs and represent a practical interest to our country. Kazakhstan, because of its geopolitical position and economic potential, does not have the right to limit its involvement to regional problems only. "This would have been clear not only to our multi-ethnic people but to the entire international community too. Kazakhstan's future is in both Asia and Europe, the East and the West. By pursuing this policy we will be able to rule out any threats to Kazakhstan's security. We will also be able to strengthen favourable external conditions by carrying out economic and political reforms in this country," President Nazarbayev said.

The following factors should be taken into account in analysing the dynamics of regional and world development.

At the moment, there is no country in Central Asia or in the rest of the world that poses a threat to Kazakhstan's security and national interests. Regardless of complicated regional and global processes, our country has managed to sort out territorial and border issues along the entire perimeter of its state frontiers and has close partner relations with both its neighbours and leading world powers.

Kazakhstan has initiated important moves to ensure international and regional security. Our country has proposed that a pan-Asian forum – the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA) – should be set up to strengthen security in our huge region, which is not yet stable. Many experts believe that the CICA has promising prospects for becoming a key mechanism in maintaining collective security in Asia.

Our country has also initiated the creation of regional and sub-regional integration associations (the Central Asian Co-

operation Organisation, a Union of Central Asian States and the Eurasian Economic Community (EEC)). We believe the successful implementation of these integration projects will significantly improve the socio-economic development of Eurasian countries and guarantee their political stability.

Kazakhstan attaches special importance to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) which is a dynamic and promising organisation. The involvement of two permanent members of the UN Security Council, Russia and China, in this organisation gives it substantial political weight in the international arena. Pakistan also joined the initiative following Iran, India and Mongolia.

However, changing international and geopolitical processes pose new challenges to our country and the entire international community.

The main factors are active policies pursued by world powers in Central Asia, including Kazakhstan; a growing demand for energy resources; an emerging threat of terrorism, religious extremism and drug trafficking and other threats and challenges in the region.

In connection with these main issues, the world powers' policies in Kazakhstan are continuing to be energy problems, fighting terrorism, religious extremism and drug trafficking, economic cooperation and developing democracy. At the same time, each world power focuses on one topic or another depending on their interests.

That is why, the Kazakh president's State of the Nation address clearly set priorities in foreign policy:

- developing a strategic partnership with Russia based on wide integration processes within bilateral relations;
- strengthening mutually-beneficial cooperation with China;
- strengthening the level of confidence with the USA;
- developing cooperation with the USA;
- cooperation with the other Central Asian countries;
- developing relations with Muslim countries.

Russia, which is returning to Central Asia, is rightly regarded as the main priority of our foreign policy. Our border with Russia is the longest land border in the world. Over 1 million ethnic Kazakhs live in Russia and over 4 million ethnic Russians live in Kazakhstan (26.7% of the total population). Ethnic Kazakhs and ethnic Russians make up 84.6% of the total population in Kazakhstan. President Nursultan Nazarbayev is right to consider Kazakhstan and Russia as countries which are fated by history to be "eternal friends".

Another factor should also be taken into account: Kazakhstan's trade with Russia, which totalled \$9bn in 2005, accounts for a third of Kazakhstan's total foreign trade.

At the moment, three-quarters of Kazakh oil is being exported through Russia. Russia's LUKoil (which shares

19% of the Russian oil output and 1.5% of the world's total) intends to extract 35 million barrels a year in Kazakhstan in 2006 and 70 million barrels (some 10 million tonnes) a year by 2010. Rosneft is also involved in extracting oil in Kazakhstan (the Kurmangazy field).

The main aspect of the bilateral relations is to achieve the highest possible level of integration between our countries. Within the EEC, we are aiming to create single economic, customs, media and education spaces. President Nazarbayev believes that Kazakhstan and Russia can elevate the level of integration to 80% and then start to create a common market.

It is quite remarkable that the president's address stressed that there was no problems between Kazakhstan and Russia that could not be solved through a constructive dialogue and taking into account both political and economic interests.

China's strategy is changing quickly and it is aiming to boost its role in Central Asia. This stems from the rapid economic growth in China. Since 2000, China's contribution to the world economic growth (in purchasing power parity) outstripped the USA's contribution and was twice as big as the combined contribution made by India, Brazil and Russia. China is expected to preserve sustainable development until 2010.

Kazakhstan's trade with China totalled \$3,675.7m in 2005. The China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) occupies third place in Kazakhstan in terms of oil output (after KazMunaiGaz and Chevron). The first stage of the Atasu-Alashankou oil pipeline from Kazakhstan to China, stretching to 988 km and with a capacity of 10 million tonnes of oil a year, was completed in December 2005. The oil terminal at the Atasu station is capable of pumping western Siberian oil through the Omsk-Pavlodar-Shymkent pipeline and oil from the Kumkol group of oil fields through Kumkol-Atasu.

In October 2005, the CNPC paid \$4.18bn for PetroKazakhstan Inc., which owned the Kumkol oil fields and a refinery in Shymkent. The 700-km-long final sector of the Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline from Kenkiyak to Kumkol is to be completed in 2011. A Kazakhstan-China gas pipeline is also expected to be built.

The USA, despite Russian and Chinese attempts to "force it out" of Central Asia, has not abandoned plans to strengthen its position in the region. Having given up pinning its hopes on Tashkent as the main ally in Central Asia, Washington has switched to a new strategy – setting up the so-called Great Central Asia where a key role is delegated to Pakistan as an Islamic country and India as a country with huge human and industrial potentials.

For this purpose the US State Department has set up a special bureau for the first time to cover Central Asian and South Asian countries. The head of this bureau, Richard Boucher, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 16, 2006 that "the success of US policy on South and Central Asia has crucial significance for our national interests". At the same time, the USA regards Kazakhstan as a regional locomotive of economic growth and reforms.

Kazakhstan's trade with the USA stood at only \$1,870.5m in 2005, but US investment in the country totalled \$12bn by 2006. The USA provided Kazakhstan with significant financial assistance (\$74.2m out of the Central Asian total of \$236.7m in 2004). Most funds were spent on security, above all, protecting civil nuclear materials, technical equipment of the state border and so on.

The USA has the most powerful financial and economic and scientific and innovative potential in the world and is

ready to assist the rapid modernisation of Kazakhstan to enable our country to join the world's top 50 most competitive countries.

US Vice-President Dick Cheney said in Astana on May 6, 2006 that the USA regarded Kazakhstan as not only a reliable ally and important economic partner but also as a state that was making a significant contribution to ensuring mutual understanding and stability in the world in times of trouble. Kazakhstan is developing along the right path: the country has achieved great successes in both the economic sphere and politics. We are ready to cooperate with Kazakhstan on all aspects that help its development in the political and economic spheres, Dick Cheney said.

While expanding to the east, the EU has faced unpredictable problems and the "rebellion" of people in certain countries, as manifested in a failure to adopt the European constitution. As a result, the EU has significantly reduced its activities in Central Asia and has focused on programmes to support developing democracy, individual projects in Tajikistan and one-off actions. Although at a bilateral level it should be noted that EU countries are involved actively in the Kazakh economy. For example, Kazakhstan's trade with Italy was \$4,869.3m, with France \$2,956.1m and Germany \$1,709.6m in 2005.

The energy crisis in winter 2004-2005 caused by disagreement between Moscow and Kiev has boosted the EU's interest in Kazakhstan and Central Asia, in general. There is hope that Germany's presidency of the EU from 1 January 2007 will revive the activities of the EU in the Central Asian region.

Asian powers have also intensified their activities in Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan is paying great attention to India's active energy diplomacy aimed to create a new energy system in the world based on so-called pan-Asian solidarity. Its supporters believe that this system will be able to guarantee markets for producers and supplies for consumers on a long-term basis. India is showing great interest in the North-South transport corridor from Aktau in the Caspian Sea through Iran to the Arabian Sea. This project envisages a railway line to link Europe with India and South-East Asia via Russia, Azerbaijan and Iran. This leads to the possibility of linking Kazakh and other Central Asian oil fields with India by pipelines from Aktau through Turkmenistan or Iran.

Japan has also been interested in cooperating with Kazakhstan, mainly in developing uranium mines and supplying uranium. The Japanese Itochu Corporation intends to buy 3,000 tonnes of uranium from the Kazatomprom company over the next decade; Japanese nuclear power plants consume 8,000 tonnes of uranium a year.

Central Asia is a unique region. At first glance, the regional countries have much in common: religion, ethnic and cultural customs and traditions, similar mentalities and national languages. In this connection, attempts have been repeatedly made to promote socio-economic relations between the countries. Organisations (the Central Asian Union and the Central Asian Economic Community) were set up; multilateral documents (the 1994 treaty to set up a single economic space which provided for free movements of goods, services, capital and labour and coordinated customs and currency policies) were signed.

However, for various objective and subjective reasons these intentions have not yet been implemented, although the region still has many unresolved problems – the rational use of water and energy resources, transport links, unifying tariffs, illegal migration, the delimitation and demarcation

of state borders – that cannot be solved unilaterally. The solution of these problems will prevent radical feelings from developing in Central Asian countries and deprive various promoters of terrorism and extremism, who are keen to exploit the problems of the transition period, of the soil in which their ideas can take root.

We should not forget that even though Kazakhstan does not have the preconditions for the emergence of terrorist and extremist activities, thanks to the socio-economic and political reforms which have been carried out, there is still a complicated situation in the neighbouring countries, above all, Afghanistan. That is why, in terms of ensuring regional security, the priority for Central Asian countries is to cooperate within the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organisation to repel possible incursions by armed units from abroad and within the SCO to fight international terrorism, religious extremism and separatism.

Our country has been also paying great attention to developing relations with Muslim countries. This is explained by the fact that Islam has for centuries been the religion of the ethnic Kazakhs and other ethnic groups living in our country. In addition, developing Islam is closely interwoven with the necessity to develop the Kazakh culture. Islam has already grown into an independent factor in the system of modern international relations and influences many political processes taking place in the world politics and economy.

That is why, Kazakhstan advocates reviving and developing Islam within the general development of the culture and spirituality of Kazakhstan and holding a cultural dialogue and strengthening mutually-beneficial cooperation with Muslim countries, to help to promote moderate Islam and religious education in our country, on the one hand, and prevent a radical religious ideology alien to traditional Islam, on the other.

Kazakhstan has now established economic and cultural cooperation with all leading Muslim countries. Kazakhstan is a member of the Islamic Conference Organisation, and cooperates with the Islamic Development Bank whose financial assistance is an important element of foreign investment in the Kazakh economy.

Muslim countries, in particular Arab ones, are taking an active part in investing in the Kazakh economy. For example, Saudi Arabia has issued soft loans worth \$100m to Kazakhstan and other Gulf countries have contributed about \$40m. Saudi Arabia has allocated no-strings funds worth \$15m for developing the new capital, Astana, and Kuwait and Oman \$10m each. The Saudi Fund for Development has issued a soft 20-year loan worth \$12m to build the Astana-Karaganda road.

Thus, Kazakhstan's balanced foreign policy has created the necessary external preconditions for carrying out the strategy for Kazakhstan to join the world's 50 most competitive countries.

Central Asia's Relations with Russia and China: Security and Economic Cooperation Issues*

ASKAR NURSHA,

Ph.D, Head of the Department of Foreign Policy Studies

Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies under the President of Kazakhstan

Central Asian states gained independence because of the collapse of the USSR. And the 14 years that have passed since that time have been a period of exploration of the world by Central Asia and at the same time the exploration of Central Asia by the world - of its potential, people and the implications it could bear for international relations.

As a result, Central Asia has turned into an object of increased attention. Today, Central Asia is studied mostly from two perspectives. Firstly, from the point of view of the processes that have been occurring inside the region. The so-called "colour revolutions", notorious religious extremism and the energy riches of the region are among the key issues in the highlight. Secondly, Central Asia is viewed mostly as an apple pie or a part of a wider complex of contradictions between Russia, China and USA.

The dominant view of the expert community throughout this period has been that fear of Russia's monopoly has driven Central Asian states towards closer ties with the West. After September 11, 2001, when the United States inserted troops in Afghanistan and established military bases in the south of Central Asia, it appeared for a while that the idea of partnership in security would come true. In contrast, we watched how in July 2005 the US troops were asked to leave Uzbekistan. Another Central Asian republic, Kyrgyzstan, in early February 2006 upped the rent price for the Gansi US Military Base from \$2 million per year to \$207 million, adding to the U.S. concern that something was going wrong.

The broadening of the partnership between Russia and China, as well as between the two powers and the countries of Central Asia has been making foreign observers wonder. Establishing what connects Russia and China is a question that requires thorough analysis. Here I would like to consider the factors which currently push Central Asia to expand political and economical contacts with Russia and China.

A closer look suggests that the formation of a triangle can be explained by the contradictory and antagonistic processes taking place in the changing international security environment. The contemporary international situation is charac-

terised by the growth of military-political tensions between global and regional powers, the sharpening of competition between geo-economical centres, the increase in activity of terrorist groups, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and sensitive technologies. The irresponsible foreign political and national security strategies of the Great Powers promote further disrespect of the United Nations and a general crisis in international law. In line with these policies, regional powers, drawing important parallels and following wrong examples, set to increase military potential and prepare for a new military reconstruction of the world. I guess that we stand at only the beginning of the way leading us to the growth of global turbulence.

All these factors harm international security by spreading an atmosphere of international disorder and instability, and thus push small countries to search out reliable partners to build a system of regional security with, which could respond adequately to the challenges and threats of the 21st century.

The major factor that forces the countries of Central Asia to develop close relations with Russia and China is the national and regional security considerations.

SECURITY COOPERATION

There's no question that both Russia and China pursue far-reaching military-political and economic goals in Central Asia. The region plays an important role in the maintenance of their security and defence interests. It is also a strategic asset in their relations with other outside powers. We would not exclude the probability of tensions between these two powers and Central Asian countries if we review the situation in different ways. But today we speak about the serious interest of Central Asia in a policy of cooperation by Russia and China.

As we know, Russia plays a critical role in regional stability and security. Russia remains the most reliable partner of Central Asia; in many respects its presence and military opportunities are considered a deterrent to modern threats and challenges. The Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), which is guided by Russia, is still the primary

This article is prepared on the basis of the presentation made by Dr. Askar Nursha at the 'Terrorism, Geopolitics and Multinational Security Cooperation in Central Asia' Conference, held by the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) (22 - 24 February 2006, Honolulu, Hawaii).

security institution and a collective defence organisation in the area. This view is shared by the great majority of Central Asian states.

In the 1990s, the military successes of the Taliban movement in Afghanistan had been an important factor, which promoted the strengthening of Russia's regional positions. A common threat unified Russia and the countries of Central Asia. After September 11, 2001, the U.S.-led counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan eliminated this threat. In the long run it will bring certain advantages and will affect the situation in the region positively. However, Afghanistan is still an open door. Nobody knows what is actually behind that door and what might come through it. Experts hope it will be new opportunities for economic cooperation. But ordinary people expect terrorism and religious extremism, poverty, migration, narcotics trafficking and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Strategic uncertainty along the border with Afghanistan leads the countries of the region to the habitual defense policies.

Security cooperation with Russia benefits Central Asia's armed forces. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the former Soviet republics in Central Asia have created their own armed forces on the basis of the Soviet contingents deployed in their territory. Poorly equipped, lacking in modern weapons and combat aircraft, regional armies are inadequate for security needs. Their potential has been developing, but we must admit that their military capabilities will be limited for many years to come. Military-technical cooperation with Russia guarantees availability of Russian military products and helps to satisfy demand for armament modernisation on preferential terms. In addressing instability, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan hosted Russia's military bases. Uzbekistan and Russia signed an alliance relations treaty on November 14, 2005. Kazakhstan is probably currently one of Russia's most reliable partners in the post-Soviet area. Echoing the U.S. and NATO's operations in Afghanistan, the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization is about to establish its large southern coalition grouping in the region.

Of particular interest is the role China plays. Modern Russia is capable of strengthening its positions in Central Asia, but it does not have enough human and economic resources to allow it to dominate the region alone. Russia needs Chinese cooperation, which is also anxious with presence of the USA in the region. After the collapse of the USSR, China's ascendancy and population growth were seen as a potential threat to the statehood of newly independent states in Central Asia. In contrast, over the years our countries have made good progress in confidence building. It was made possible through mutual concessions and to a certain extent by a constructive and balanced stance taken by China that turned to a flexible course in response to the American military presence in the region. Freed from the burden of territorial disputes and an immediate "Chinese threat", China and Central Asia have an opportunity to follow a positive trajectory of enhancing stability and strengthening the coordination on important issues concerning regional security.

Partnership in the security sphere takes root in similar perceptions of trans-border threats and challenges. Russia, China and Central Asian states form trilateral anti-separatist alliances. The positions of the three sides on the given problem are practically identical. Based on a principle of reciprocity, Russia firmly supports the one-China policy and recognises Taiwan and Tibet as inalienable parts of China. In turn, China unequivocally supports the legitimacy of the actions of the Russian authorities in Chechnya. Kazakhstan has

largely focused its attention on the northern provinces of the country, populated mainly by ethnic Russians. Furthermore, Central Asian authorities banned activity by Uighur radicals after the series of unrest in neighbouring China's Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) as part of their effort to curb possible Uighur separatism in the region.

The problem of ethnic separatism in regional processes has been closely linked to the problem of religious extremism and terrorism. Both Russia and China share significant concern about radical Islamic groupings and the popularisation of political violence as means of political struggle in the region. It is an additional reason for the co-ordination of policies towards the Muslim republics of the former USSR.

The fear of instability in Central Asia is only part of the picture. Central Asian politics have been deeply influenced by the democratisation issue coupled with an acute power succession question. Regime change in Kyrgyzstan on March 24, 2005, and the Andijan events in May 2005 are indicative of the fact that democratic transformation in Central Asia may be accomplished by revolutionary and not evolutionary methods. Unlike Kazakhstan, which shows good governance, both Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan pioneered in unveiling, with variations, a bad scenario of ineffective authoritarian rulers, raising pertinent questions as to whether anti-regime movements had been prompted by internal social forces or developed with the participation of and under the surveillance of external forces. Frank statements by Eduard Shevardnadze, Askar Akayev and Islam Karimov found numerous supporters for the version about an external origin of their problems. The danger of coup d'état in the form of "color revolutions" has pushed Central Asian leaders to Russia and China, which have promoted themselves as more flexible in questions of democratisation and human rights. As the USA is being suspected of spreading the revolutions, the countries of the region have been seeking different poles of power in the north and in the east that could become a counterweight to external interference in their domestic affairs.

And their efforts were successful. Putting aside the doubts in the face of the cascade of coup d'états in the former Soviet Union territory and demonstrating increasing sensitivity towards them, Russia and China, in unprecedented tandem, reaffirmed their support to Uzbekistan and encouraged other leaders diplomatically, thus placing the "color revolutions" within the general context of instability factors.

In this situation we see a difference in perception. Russia and China have not supported the hard line of the US and EU towards Uzbekistan, claiming that a government crackdown on protesters was aimed at protecting of state security and political stability in the country. For the western powers, government troops in Andijan fired on unarmed civilians, so it was the excessive use of force by the dictatorship regime.

All this suggests that regional dependence of Central Asia on Russia and China in security issues, if unchallenged, will continue to increase. Given the heightened role of Russia and China in upholding regional stability, cooperation with them has to be sharply improved, particularly in the economic sphere.

ECONOMIC COOPERATION

The degree and the depth of cooperation by Central Asian states with Russia and China has also been dictated by economic considerations. There is strong economic ground that pushes the five Central Asian republics towards closer ties with their neighbouring superpowers. The initial

Central Asian drive towards Russia and China was shaped primarily by geographical considerations. With the end of the USSR, regional states found they were geographically and politically marginalised inside the Eurasian continental massif. The land-locked Caspian Sea in the west, the U.S. embargo policy towards Iran, and war-torn Afghanistan in the south set high limits on export and import opportunities. In the 1990s, the economic development of Central Asia was mainly limited to the Russian direction, which subsequently became a bridge linking the region with rest of the world. In those early years of independence it was vital to make the best possible use of all levers, including personal, bilateral and multilateral to advance key trade policy interests. More recently, uncomfortable with the level of Russia's influence in the economic sphere Central Asian states have started to place more emphasis on broadening economic ties with China.

Since then the region has become more accessible to international, and especially Western businesses, though it's too early to say if the contemporary relations of Central Asian states with Russia and China have nothing to do with geographical predisposition. But the emphasis is likely to change. More significantly, as China's economy continues to grow, Central Asian governments have moved to seize the opportunity to collaborate with their becoming prosperous neighbour. Today, China is one of the fastest growing economies in Asia and the world's biggest market. After the revision of its gross domestic product figures, economists say that China is close to attaining the world's fourth-biggest economy status. It grows faster and in GDP ranking has overtaken Italy, France and Britain. According to some forecasts, China will catch up with Germany by 2010, Japan by 2020, and by 2030 will have caught up with the United States.

Similarly, under President Putin, the economic situation in Russia is showing signs of normalisation and recovery, budget deficit is being replaced by surplus which appears to be enough to repay foreign debts. It implies that Russia, if asked, will soon be able to become one of the leading donors to the economies of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Economic connection with dynamically developing economies promises immense long-term potential economic benefits for Central Asia.

For China and Russia the practical aspect of contacts with Central Asia covers the economic interests of the two powers in the region, which is gradually opening up to foreign investors. Russia and China need to hurry up to gain advantages in the markets of Central Asian states and outstrip their American and European competitors. Another explanation could be that Central Asia is seen by the powers as a potentially unstable territory along their boundaries. By expanding investments and financial aid to the regional countries they seek to create the political and economic conditions for long-term stability in the region.

There are vast prospects for cooperation in the energy sphere, favourable to economies of each of the three sides. Since 1993 China has become a net-importer of crude oil, and over the last few years, together with the USA, shared the world leadership in oil consumption. After the beginning of the American military operation in the Persian Gulf, the vulnerability of seaborne energy supplies from the Middle East region became evident to China. The escalation of conflict around Iran could threaten not only the Iranian deliveries, but also the flow of petroleum and gas from Persian Gulf. Against the background of the steadily growing prices for

oil this made the Chinese government strive for contracts on long-term deliveries of oil and gas from Russia and the Central Asian territory, taking into account the geographical neighbourhood, competitive opportunities for Chinese companies in these markets, as well as the accessibility of huge deposits.

While China is seeking foreign energy sources to help meet its growing thirst for energy to fuel its economic growth, Russia and Central Asia are looking for a good opportunity to expand and diversify their energy supplies and thus correct a significant heel in western directions. China's oil demand in 2006 is expected to reach 6.98 million barrels per day (bpd). At the moment Kazakhstan exports about 800,000 barrels of oil a day.

2005 was a year of opportunity for the Kazakhstan economy. On December 15, 2005, the president of the republic, Nursultan Nazarbayev, took part in a symbolic inauguration of the 988-kilometer-long Atasu-Alashankou oil pipeline with an initial capacity of 10 million tons. It is the second and penultimate stage of the bilateral Kazakhstani-Chinese oil pipeline construction project. This pipeline will take oil from the western part of Kazakhstan directly to the Chinese market by crossing only one border and eliminating transit countries. Shipments are planned to begin in the summer of 2006.

Kazakhstan also plans to launch the construction of a gas pipeline to China along the same route. If this project is a success China will win considerable volumes of Central Asian energy resources for its side. Given that Kazakhstan is linked by pipeline to the gas fields of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, the pipeline will encourage Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan to start implementing a project laying pipelines to transport their gas to China. Pipeline construction projects are politically important for Central Asia. They help to weaken dependence on the northern transportation route and infrastructure.

Meanwhile, the launch of the project could significantly affect the situation in the region. The synchronous launch of two oil pipelines - Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Western Kazakhstan-China - can boost fierce competition between powers and thus have a negative impact on the development of the Caspian and Caucasian regions in general.

SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION

The increasing regional cooperation set the stage for institutionalisation of bilateral and trilateral ties between the Central Asian states, Russia and China. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization has been one of the most prospective structures among the other regional institutions of cooperation participated in by all three sides at the moment. The SCO was established in June, 2001. The main aim of the organisation has been the maintenance of regional stability, security and economic growth.

Its predecessor, known as the "Shanghai five", representing original five member states: Kazakhstan, China, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan, was created in 1996 to resolve regional border problems and promote confidence-building measures in the military sphere in border areas. The Treaty on Deepening Military Trust in Border Regions in 1996 in Shanghai and the Treaty on Reduction of Military Forces in Border Regions in 1997 in Moscow signed by the heads of states have made a significant contribution to regional peace and stability. The resolution of territorial issues noticeably improved the bilateral relations of China and Russia with the Central Asian states. Economic and

trade relations started to develop in a more intensive way. In 2001, Uzbekistan joined the organisation. The SCO created its counterterrorism centre.

What makes the Shanghai Cooperation Organization important to Central Asia? **First**, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is the regional forum that brings together government officials and experts of the Central Asian states, Russia and China. Arrangements achieved within the framework of the SCO are dictated by mutual interest in the maintenance of political dialogue and a regular exchange of opinions on key regional and international problems. The participants' interest to each other is caused by many factors: international weight and influence in regional politics, the size of their territory, their extensive natural resources, a capacious domestic market, labour and intellectual resources, industrial, military and military - technical potential.

Second, the commitment to dialogue is stipulated by a common interest in strategic stability in mutual relations in order to secure a favourable external environment for national development. The deepening of political cooperation in this light is a means of minimising internal, regional and international security risks, as well as a tool for preventing conflicts from arising. **Third**, the SCO includes Russia and China as member states. There are certain differences between the two powers' views of ways of developing bilateral and partnership relations with Central Asia. The SCO allows the coordination of the dispersed policy of its members, binding them by collective decisions. **Fourth**, the SCO intends to provide the umbrella conditions and mechanisms necessary for the development of trade and economic cooperation.

Political contacts become especially urgent in the face of risks proceeding from the negative tendencies in contemporary international relations (terrorism, extremism, narcotics trafficking, illegal migration). The powerful factor of the rapprochement of Russia and China has also been an activity by outside powers in the region. Meanwhile, the SCO is not a military block and it is not directed against other countries. India, Pakistan and Iran manifested their interest in participation to the SCO, and recently they got observer status in the organisation.

CHALLENGES TO REGIONAL SECURITY

In asking whether and to what extent relations with Russia and China range between being a challenge and promising an advantage to the regional countries, I would like to note a number of **challenges** that Central Asian states should keep in mind.

The **first** challenge is the rivalry between the powers. Contradictions between Great Powers on the world scene seem to be intensifying, setting the stage for fierce competition in Central Asia. This raises questions about the security interests of the regional countries sandwiched between the military bases of the powers.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia and China emerged as major players in Central Asia that set much of the regional security and economic agenda. Relationships with these powers have essential value for the regional balance of forces. Meanwhile, it is significant for the region to develop ties with our closest neighbours without damaging relations

with the West. Political dialogue between Russia and China, driven by the US unilateralist policy, is at an advanced stage. Both Russia and China consider Central Asia as a strategic rear area. It is also a buffer zone which removes the military threat on the part of geopolitical opponents to the south. However, there is the possibility these powers would exploit such opportunities to seal the region from outside influence. Objectively, due to their geopolitical position the countries of Central Asia are not interested in being involved in the two giant's defensive isolation strategy. On the other hand, Central Asia must not turn into geopolitical battlefield for the USA and its allies with Russia and China, by being a chain of strategic encirclement.

The next big challenge is the **economic vulnerability of the region**. Accession to the World Trade Organization reminds us of the things we have to remember. Economically, Central Asia is an underdeveloped region. Local production, with some exceptions, is not competitive on global markets. All that Central Asian states can currently export freely is raw-materials. Therefore there is a divide between the commitments to open market policy taken by a WTO member and the real domestic agenda. Reduction of tariff barriers must be implemented gradually and stretched in time; otherwise economic giants will threaten to undermine Central Asia's economic development.

Another problem is the **lack of regional vision**. The domestic political situation in the Central Asian states is complex. The problems of border disputes, the rise of religious extremism, ethnic tensions, competition for water resources, and unfulfilled demands for democratic reforms are among the serious risk factors for the development of the region. These negative trends may erode regional stability and create a pretext for external actors to interfere. Even if that isn't the case, restoration of the traditional Great Game in this region contradicts the political and military interests of the Central Asian states. There is no guarantee that the region cannot fall from one's clutches into another's.

Our purpose should be the formation of Central Asia as an independent geopolitical player. Unless the region is united politically, the Great Powers will be shareholders of Central Asia's weakness. The vacuum of power in the region must be filled with the states of region themselves.

The problem with that scenario is the lack of political will in the region's leaders and a number of unsolved intraregional disputes, which split Central Asia into several concurring zones with different geopolitical orientations. Today Central Asia is only the sum of its parts.

Currently, Central Asian states think in categories of nation-state building. This policy could have been justified either in another foreign political environment or if we were a state, located on an island in the ocean. However, in the age of accelerated globalisation the main characters of history have not been separate states, but the regions and commonwealths of states. While building a nation-state in Central Asia, we should simultaneously build regional alliance, switching from national patriotism to regional partnership ideology.

These, in my view, are some of the key issues in the relations of the Central Asian states with Russia and China that need to be mentioned.

Security and Stability in Central Asia: Differing Interests and Perspectives

(Summary of a Roundtable held in New York City on January 10, 2006)*

GEORGE D. SCHWAB,

President of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy

MICHAEL RYWKIN,

Professor, Project Director of Central Asia Project, National Committee on American Foreign Policy

INTRODUCTION

U.S. relations with countries in Central Asia were fundamentally affected by the attacks launched on the United States on September 11, 2001. To support U.S. operations in Afghanistan, the U.S. military negotiated significant access – over-flight and air base arrangements – with Central Asian governments. This initially produced a sense of common purpose and goodwill and generated concern in Russia and China. In 2005, events in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan resulted in the unraveling of some of those arrangements and an expansion of Russian and Chinese influence in the region.

Of the five Central Asian “stans,” Kazakhstan has experienced a moderate form of Islam, is least infected by militant Islamic fundamentalism, is largely pro-American, has a highly educated and technically proficient elite, and has a form of government that is gradually taking steps toward political reform. Moreover, Kazakhstan is rich in energy and mineral resources that have transformed it into a geo-strategic playground for its huge neighbours, China and Russia. In short, Kazakhstan’s significance dictates that the United

States should be engaged in encouraging the development of a middle class, as well as democratic forces in the country, and in exploring ways and means in which the countries of the region can cooperate in the struggle against militant Islamic fundamentalism.

IN SEARCH OF STABILITY AND DEVELOPMENT

2005 was a troublesome year. Reforms were slowed, sometimes reversed, and the vast majority of the population experienced little improvement in living standards. Nostalgia for the stability of Soviet times, for what the West regards as a failed experiment, is on the rise. A series of internal developments shook the area, bringing about political shifts and international realignments. The four major events in the region were the ousting of President Akayev in Kyrgyzstan – often called the Tulip Revolution – the Andijan riots in Uzbekistan, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) meeting in Astana, the new capital of Kazakhstan, and the presidential elections in Kazakhstan.

Popular discontent in Kyrgyzstan, though short of revolution, ended in the ousting of President Askar Akayev,

* The National Committee on American Foreign Policy (NCAFP) initiated a Project on Central Asia after 9/11 to focus on U.S., Russian, and Chinese interests in the five former Soviet Republics of Central Asia and on the common interests of those parties and others in the region. Notwithstanding important differences among them but mindful of the political, economic, and military significance of Kazakhstan to the region, the NCAFP decided to make Kazakhstan the initial focus of its inquiry and analysis.

In October 2005, NCAFP Senior Vice President Donald S. Rice represented the NCAFP at a conference in Washington, D.C., on “The Challenges of Kazakhstan: Regional and Global Impact.” It was cosponsored by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in cooperation with the American Chamber of Commerce in Kazakhstan. Mr. Rice was a presenter on the panel “Kazakhstan’s Strategic Involvement in the Fight Against Terrorism, Global Threats, and Maintaining Global Stability.”

On January 10, 2006, the NCAFP with the Dwight D. Eisenhower National Security Series hosted the day-long, not-for-attribution roundtable that is the subject of this summary (with policy recommendations), titled “Stability and Security in Central Asia: Differing Interests and Perspectives”, for a number of experts, academics, and military officers who are interested and involved in U.S. foreign and security policy in the Central Asian arena. Following the roundtable, the National Committee hosted a discussion of the same subject at the annual meeting of its members and guests.

The policy recommendations in this summary are exclusively those of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy.

spreading fear that regime change would come elsewhere in the region following the example of Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyz. Uzbekistan was shaken by popular riots in Andijan (in the Uzbek part of the overpopulated and impoverished valley of Ferghana). They were harshly suppressed by government forces. The regime of Uzbek President Islam Karimov, stunned by international condemnations, reversed its international alliances. Karimov put aside his distrust of Russia and sought refuge with Moscow and Beijing, the first indifferent and the second hostile to human rights causes. Karimov's move was welcomed in both capitals. Seizing the opportunity presented by the continued American preoccupation with Afghanistan and Iraq, Russia and China joined together to try to eliminate the post-2001 American presence in the area. In order to lure Islam Karimov away from Washington, Moscow conveniently overlooked the poor treatment of the Russian ethnic minority in Uzbekistan. A grateful Karimov not only closed the American military base at Khanabad but also allowed a Russian military presence (something Uzbekistan had refused since gaining independence) and adopted a militant anti-American stand in the international arena. Only a last-minute effort by Washington, reinforced by the expectation of financial rewards, saved the large American military base located in Manas, Kyrgyzstan.

Kazakhstan, uncomfortable with the American role in all the "color revolutions" in the former Soviet republics, tilted slightly in favour of Russia and China. First, it reinforced its participation in the SCO and then it allowed China to extend to the Caspian Sea oil-producing area its oil pipeline linking Sinkiang Province to less productive oil fields east of the Caspian Sea. Furthermore, Washington's reaction, reflecting hope that President Nazarbayev would show enough confidence in his own popularity and prospects for re-election to aim for less than the 91 percent of the votes that he received in the presidential election of December 2005, was prudent and did not affect mutual relations. Kazakhstan maintained its policy of achieving an overall balance between great power interests by maintaining its cooperation with the United States in the field of Caspian Sea security and normalising relations with the new leaders in Kyrgyzstan by offering financial assistance.

The U.S. preoccupation with operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and its inability to redirect its attention to Central Asia offers opportunities to Moscow and Beijing to capitalise on the situation and pursue their efforts to eliminate the U.S. military presence in the region and limit American oil interests there as well. Meanwhile Washington's predicament of finding the right balance between defending human rights and pursuing its own strategic interests in the area will remain a source of preoccupation for the competing powers in the region.

In general, the conference presenters emphasised that most Central Asians remain passive actors in the political sphere; they are more concerned with the daily necessities of life. There is "reform fatigue" in all of the republics, even without much reform. The "shadow" economy is still very active – in much the same way that it helped people throughout the former Soviet Union to survive the 1990s. Skepticism greets the rhetoric emanating from the West or from the regimes themselves. Many people don't believe that any opposition party or individual has the answers.

The opposition in each republic, whether it is open, as in Kyrgyzstan or Kazakhstan, or clandestine, as in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, or reduced to one party, as in Tajikistan, is unified by one overriding issue – the replacement of the president. Some standard promises are voiced by all opposition

groups: the elimination of corruption, fair and timely wages, better housing, education, and health care. But unity of action is difficult to achieve. Who can say that if an opposition leader were elected president, he or she would be able or willing to relinquish the authority vested in the presidency?

Some presenters were more positive than others about progress in Central Asia, pointing out that after 15 years of independence a lot has been achieved despite many obstacles. Central Asian states have strengthened their independence and created their own state institutions, working financial systems, currencies, military and security institutions, political partnerships, legal systems, and other institutions.

Also positive is the fact that the states of Central Asia have remained much more peaceful than many had predicted. The likelihood of violent conflict is still very low. There has been only one exception, the civil war in Tajikistan. But it was terminated, and the peace agreement signed between the conflicting parties was based on a power-sharing scheme in accordance with which the mostly moderate Islamic opposition was incorporated into political life. There was, however, a disagreement at the conference about the reality of power-sharing in Tajikistan.

On the negative side, the Central Asian states are said to be building their statehood on the basis of priorities that can lead to contradictions among different ethnic groups. Also, a return to tradition, especially in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, has led to a serious decline in education accelerated by the brain drain caused by the emigration of a large number of educated Russians and Germans. Social transformations are no longer influenced by the activity of the state but by its inactivity. The result has been another wave of migrations, this time by local nationalities going to Kazakhstan, Russia, and elsewhere for permanent or seasonal work and a growing sense that the lot of most people cannot be improved, especially in rural areas. Islamists have been quick to build on the situation. Moreover, the use of oil revenues leaves a lot of question marks. Many people in Central Asia share the view of a former Venezuelan minister of oil who said that oil is the "devil's excrement." It is feared that as the gap between the elites and the general population increases, more grievances will be felt and expressed by a majority of the people.

Another threat to development comes from clan relations and patronage networks that are either based on kinship or territory. They are very powerful and incompatible with modernisation and the democratisation process. Whatever happens in the future in any of these states, clan relations will remain the real basis of power for successors of the existing presidents.

Finally, relations among Central Asian states remain problematic. Eurasian integration, initially advocated by Kazakhstan's President Nazarbayev and subsequently endorsed by Russia's President Putin, is a concept on paper only. Visas are needed in order to cross borders. Part of the Uzbek-Tajik border is mined. Most people do not like this situation, which is one of the reasons why some Central Asians support the idea of a world Islamic caliphate that would not only open all borders among Muslim lands but would also replace the need for nation-states.

RECENT EVENTS - BY REPUBLIC

Kazakhstan Elections

During the discussion of the recent presidential election in Kazakhstan, it was pointed out that although the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the European Union (EU) had characterised the election as

“failing short of international standards,” they evidently judged it to be an improvement over previous elections, which they described as “falling far short.” It was said that the West must embrace “countries making efforts in good faith to hold free and fair elections.” Others maintained that Western media had documented numerous abuses of power and human rights’ violations as well as press and media restrictions in the months preceding the elections, and so one cannot simply excuse everything because “autocratic rulers have governed the lands of Central Asia throughout history.” Another comment was made that as elections come to pass, the electoral process will no longer be considered a singular event. In other words, it is expected that the political process will become active, engaged, and not ephemeral as it extends beyond the brief electoral season.

Turkmenistan Succession Problems

According to the presenters, Turkmenistan continues to be the most problematic state in the region. No reform has occurred, and the regime has stunted all prospects for civil dialogue, the development of civil society, and economic disengagement from centralised, monopolistic control. The chief concern is that the continued absence of the building of any social institution could paralyse an already stagnant, or moribund, economic situation. Turkmenistan has been consistently cited as one of the worst governed former Soviet republics. The potential for regime change may be near if speculation regarding President Niyazov’s (Turkmenbashi’s) poor health is to be believed. That, however, might be more destabilising for the region than mere regime change. A power vacuum could lead to competition between neighbouring states and great powers over the country’s hydrocarbon reserves. Intervening in the transition from President Niyazov to his successor might be too much of a seduction for the republic’s neighbours to resist. Conceivably Russia, Uzbekistan, and Iran could become involved in the realignment of Turkmenistan both internally and externally, and Kazakhstan might feel compelled to join the fray.

Tajikistan’s Slow Recovery

Tajikistan was judged to be experiencing a difficult recovery from the civil war. Indeed it can be maintained that the situation has degenerated inasmuch as President Rakhmonov appears intent on strengthening his grip on political power. Human rights organisations cite examples of politically motivated arrests, the curtailment of media independence, and minor protests that some fear may escalate. The economic picture is dismal and the prospects are dim given widespread corruption and reports of heavy cross-border drug smuggling from Afghanistan. According to a relatively optimistic view, there are more than 600 non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and some independent mass media in the country, and the government is building its policies on a multilateral basis. Mr. Rakhmonov, who was considered a weak candidate for president, has proved to be a successful leader and has managed to attract the support of many internal and external actors. Russian border guards were replaced by Tajiks last year. Other participants saw negative aspects. A new Russian base is being constructed almost as close to the capital as the one it is replacing. Drug seizures were down in 2005; for example, Russian troops scarcely intercepted anything in the first half of the year. In contrast, Tajik troops had substantial success, but large parts of the border with Afghanistan remain barely patrolled. The United Nations assists Tajikistan in combating drug traffic, but money still comes from the transit of drugs from Afghanistan.

Kyrgyzstan’s “Color Revolution”

The conference heard a description of the “color revolution” in Kyrgyzstan, which took place in March 2005. It followed sustained demonstrations throughout the country after the February 2005 elections because it had become clear that President Akayev was going to impose a referendum to extend his term in office. Spurred by an independent media attacking corruption, nepotism, and mismanagement, popular demonstrations undermined the regime, which began to falter. By the morning of March 24 the regime collapsed, and President Akayev was compelled to flee. Some participants warned, however, that the ousting of the president should not be greeted with much optimism. It has had little positive effect on the economy. Some of Kyrgyzstan’s neighbours are still uneasy about alleged U.S. involvement. The new leaders, many previously associated with the fallen regime, are confronting dire economic conditions and have had little time in which to improve the situation.

Uzbek-American Split

Uzbekistan’s turnabout and tilt back toward Russia in 2005 were widely discussed. It was argued that in view of his Soviet communist background, President Karimov knew only how to oppress all opposition movements, whether democratic or Islamist. His oppressiveness has given legitimacy to the Islamists, who label as illegitimate all the Central Asian regimes. According to the West and human rights groups, the harsh responses by the Karimov regime were solely to blame for Andijan. Other than voicing clichés such as “you need to open up; you need democratic reforms,” the West did not give help to Uzbekistan, much less offer guidance about how to undertake constructive change in a way that would not be advantageous to the Islamists. It was noted that the Algerian coup d’état was accepted by the international community despite the fact that it nullified election results. Moreover, it is not only recognised by the West but by many in Central Asia as well that economic development is a precondition for the development of democracy, and it is deficient in many states of Central Asia.

In analysing developments in the Uzbek-U.S. relationship, it was noted that President Karimov thought that 9/11 would help Americans to realise what he was facing. Despite President Putin’s personal efforts to try to stop him, Karimov signed a strategic partnership agreement with the United States, thinking he was in the same boat with the Americans who would be sympathetic to his oppressive measures or at least look the other way when they were imposed. The situation changed in Andijan on the afternoon of May 13, 2005, when Uzbek troops suddenly fired on a crowd of at least 5,000. The crowd, largely composed of women and children, contained armed Islamic militants who, the night before, had taken over a prison and attacked a nearby military barracks. Eyewitness accounts described the killing of many hundreds as the troops fired indiscriminately and the armed militants’ seized government hostages to shield themselves from the fire. The regime’s failure to conduct an investigation led Western powers and international organisations to demand an international investigation, which the Karimov regime continues to reject. It was not only Karimov who panicked. People around him told him that this was a terrorist uprising, and Russian senior government officials, just before Andijan and immediately afterward, claimed that they had clear evidence that some of the rioters were hard-core terrorists from Afghanistan. This assertion was part of the Russian intelligence and security services’ efforts to turn Karimov against

the United States. Many people in Uzbekistan, whether in government or in opposition, have said they believe that Americans were behind the riots in Andijan.

The Andijan context enabled SCO to take full advantage of the situation. Chinese and Russian leaders have clearly identified three evils - extremism, radicalism, and separatism - that concern all Central Asian nations. There is a sense that no one, including the United States, Europe, or even NATO, can give them the kind of support that Moscow and Beijing offer. In dealing with terrorism/Islamic fundamentalism, many Central Asians do not think they can get any real help from the United States despite the fact that U.S. forces not only toppled the Taliban but also killed "Jumaboi Namangani," the military leader of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Karimov's greatest threat. U.S. policy, as defined by President Bush in his second inaugural address, maintains that there cannot be stability without legitimacy and legitimacy comes only from democracy. It is a great slogan, but it just does not reflect what is going on in the region now.

The view was expressed that the situation will get worse in Central Asia over the next three to five years. Chinese, Russians, and Uzbek officials saw Andijan from the same angle, whereas the United States did not. The Chinese and the Russians, worried about potential Islamist uprisings, are giving support to President Karimov. When he left the meeting where he and President Putin signed a strategic agreement, President Karimov said that the relationship was not only strategic but *union* as well - a code word for Soviet-Union-style relationships. Though it was an exaggeration, it contained a message: Uzbekistan is returning to a military partnership with Russia that many thought would not be possible.

IMPORTED ISLAM

A broad discussion took place about the problem of Islamist inroads into Central Asia and especially into Uzbekistan. Attention was drawn to the fact that radical Islam was first exported to Afghanistan from Pakistan's northwest frontier after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. When Central Asia opened up in the late 1980s-early 1990s, a lot of people wanted to learn about Islam from imams and mullahs who flocked to the area, supported by Saudi Arabia, Iran, other countries in the Gulf, and even Turkey. Uzbekistan became the key country because of its population, location, and strong Islamic traditions. It was also brought to the attention of the participants that the bulk of Wahhabi imams who went to Uzbekistan in the late 1980s and 1990s were from a large Uzbek community in Saudi Arabia. They were descendents of tsarist-time émigrés or of former Basmachis (equivalent to contemporary Afghan mujaheddin) who took up arms against the Soviet regime after the October revolution until their defeat in the 1920s. They are said to number between 200,000 and 400,000.

Initially Karimov and almost everyone else in Uzbekistan and elsewhere in the region did not understand what kind of Islam was coming to Central Asia—an Islam of a different colour. Under Soviet rule the elites largely forgot about their own traditions, their own cultures, their own mixtures of Turkic and Central Asian traditions. Central Asian Islam, containing a lot of Sufism, was more spiritual than that of the Middle East. The kind of Islam that was beginning to engulf Central Asia was very much the Saudi Arabian Wahhabi version - very strict, very anti-Semitic, anti-American, and politicised. A recent attempt to counterbalance it by introducing moderate

Islamic schooling with a modern curriculum in neighbouring Tajikistan, financed by the Agha Khan Foundation, has been hampered by the Ismaili origin of the funds. The Ismailis are viewed as Shiia by the Sunni of Central Asia.

Hizb-ut-Tahrir, a transnational radical Islamist organisation, whose stated objective is to overthrow the existing world order and replace it with a kind of Islamic caliphate that does not have much similarity to the historic caliphate that disappeared with the fall of Ottoman Turkey during World War I. It is viciously anti-Semitic and anti-American. It was formed in the 1950s in the Middle East and subsequently became a global organisation. Since the war in Iraq, it has become even stronger: its messages are finding more resonance among disaffected Muslims throughout the world. It is even growing in New York and in other parts of the United States. This organisation is headquartered in London where it has been taking advantage of liberal attitudes toward freedom of speech and religion. It has been doing considerable damage to the reputation of European Muslims and is responsible for directing a lot of propaganda against the treatment of Muslims in Central Asia. Only after the July 2005 bombings in London did Prime Minister Blair acknowledge that this organisation should be banned. But a liberal atmosphere toward the group continues to prevail, and nothing has been done about it.

It was argued that an Islamic revolution is not likely to happen in Central Asia with the possible exception of Uzbekistan where the basis for Islamic mobilisation and grassroots support for Islamic culture are very strong. To people who are disillusioned by the Karimov regime's failure to improve their lives, especially in rural areas that have never received much from the regime, Hizb-ut-Tahrir is attractive. The ruling establishments exaggerate the Islamic threat to generate support and to explain the pressures that they exert on different groups. It was suggested that neither the elites in Kazakhstan nor in Kyrgyzstan thought their country had a radical Islamist issue. The Kazakh government, wishing to maintain good relations with Saudi Arabia, has had a difficult time barring radical Wahhabi preachers. Kyrgyzstan, seeing itself as a "poster child for democracy," felt immune. Islamic teaching was allowed, especially in the parts of the Ferghana Valley that belong to Kyrgyzstan and in the southern parts of Kazakhstan close to the Uzbek border, where Hizb-ut-Tahrir and similar groups have strengthened themselves over the last five years.

The Islamist threat, coupled with the color revolutions that took place in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan, has caused Uzbekistan to worry about what America and the West in general may be unleashing. Karimov said that Islamists like Hizb-ur-Tahrir are acting like power-seeking revolutionaries in Georgia. That was the situation that obtained when not only Karimov but other presidents as well began to get nervous as they perceived that the American push for democracy and the Islamist agenda were going in the same direction, though with completely different end goals.

ENERGY, PIPELINES AND ECOLOGY

The Caspian Sea Basin and U.S. Oil Strategy

The total Caspian region, including Turkmenistan, produces 1.8 million barrels of crude oil a day and exports about 1.1 million barrels a day. Kazakhstan alone produces 1.3 million barrels a day. This will grow to 3.5 million barrels a day by 2015, according to Kazakh government statistics. Kashegan, the giant offshore Kazakh Caspian field, alone

has the capacity to reach 1.1 million barrels a day. The problem is the imbalance between productive capacity and pipeline capacity and the need to unlock export routes for oil coming from landlocked Central Asia, and mostly from Kazakhstan. Accordingly, Kazakhstan's strategy is to have a multi-vector pipeline system that avoids dependency on one neighbouring country.

The recent controversy between Russia and the Ukraine shows that energy security is rooted in the diversity of supply. The pipelines that the United States championed in the last decade reflect its interests and those of other major oil consumers in achieving a diversity of supply through a diversity of supply routes. U.S. strategy has been based on supporting the construction of multiple pipeline routes connecting Central Asia with the outside world but avoiding Iran and Russia and allowing the Central Asian states to build something on their own. At the same time, the United States has been advocating that local economies diversify beyond their natural resource wealth, eventually leading to economic stability and democracy. It was observed during the discussion that despite Kazakh oil riches, the U.S. air base at Manas in Kyrgyzstan has to import oil from Russia and Turkmenistan instead of from the nearby refinery at Chimkent in Kazakhstan that was operated by Petro-Kazakhstan until its recent purchase by a Canadian company.

The U.S. approach was said to be working better on the opposite shore of the Caspian Sea, where Azerbaijan has two pipelines that skirt Russian territory—a completely rebuilt pipeline that runs from Baku to the Georgian harbor of Supsa on the Black Sea and can deliver about 200,000 barrels a day and the just completed Baku–Ceyhan pipeline that flows to an export terminal on Turkey's Mediterranean coast; its potential of 1.0 million barrels a day may be reached only in a few years when Kazakh oil flows across the Caspian Sea.

Thus the multi-vector pipeline system, even with increasing oil production in Kazakhstan, may face a problem of too many pipelines competing for limited supplies. Even the Tengiz pipeline of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium in Kazakhstan, which goes to the Russian Black Sea harbor of Novorossiisk, could top out, in the 700,000 or 900,000 barrels per day range, in a few years.

Chinese Deals

In December 2005 China completed the fast track construction of a pipeline running from Atasu, Kazakhstan, to its Sinkiang Province - a long pipeline but very limited in terms of capacity. It will initially carry 200,000 barrels a day and reach a capacity of 400,000 barrels per day within a few years. In 2005, however, China changed the classification of oil deals in the region, making it impossible for private investors to compete with the state identified oil firms now favoured by the government of Kazakhstan. Thus Canadian firms such as PetroKazakhstan are said to be on their way out. PetroKazakhstan has been sold for four billion dollars to the China National Petroleum Company. As a result, China owns between 10 and 14 percent of the petroleum reserves in Kazakhstan; the situation will change as new sources come online and further corporate and national firms invest or divest.

This year China became the number one trading partner of Kazakhstan, a status that is unlikely to change for a long time. China's next enterprise is a super-rail line through Kazakhstan, a cargo transport meant to solve problems arising from the difference in the width of track gauges used by Russian and

non-Russian companies. The idea is that the trains will pick up maximum speed in Kazakhstan and roll on to Berlin, taking 10 to 11 days off sea transport time - an attempt by China to reach industrial Europe through Central Asia. It is an interesting project, which may compete with the maritime route from the East to Europe, an initiative said to have been suggested by the Kazakh government, not the Chinese.

In summary, China perceives Kazakhstan, not the Middle East, to be its energy heartland. China's strategy will have a tremendous influence in the region. The March 31, 1996 Chinese Communist party Central Committee strategic paper (Resolution number 6, called the Strike Hard Campaign) dealt with Xinjiang separatism and the large-scale settlement of Han Chinese. It contained four paragraphs outlining Chinese intentions toward the handling of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. The Chinese were quite clear about how they intended to achieve influence. What has happened to date follows that strategy.

Russian Inroads

Recent Russian inroads into Central Asia, propelled by Russian oil and gas revenues, were given a great deal of attention at the conference. An agreement was signed between Kazakhstan and Russia last fall concerning the pipelines that go to Russia's Black Sea harbors, to Samara, and other places in Russia - all points in a game of geopolitical struggle for Kazakh oil. The Russian oil giant, Lukoil, acquired Nelson Resources. Russia's Gazprom, backed by President Putin, is primarily involved in Central Asian gas, blurring the line between the state and the corporation. There is a clear pattern of Russian inroads into other areas as well, for example, by the Russian company United Energy Systems. (In contrast, the energy from power plants being built in Tajikistan is intended largely for export to China.)

Russia has a very favourable deal with Western Europe where it has just increased its market share with respect to its exports of natural gas, now approximately 25 percent of Western European consumption. The goal is to make Western Europe more dependent on Russian gas. The former German federal chancellor, Gerhard Schröder, signed on to promote Gazprom's trans-Baltic pipeline initiative to reach Germany without crossing Poland and Ukraine. Another inroad for Russia was the building of the Blue Streak gas pipeline through Turkey, opening a new market for Russian gas. It was suggested that this project could not have been accomplished without massive bribes, illustrating, by contrast, the difficulties Americans would face in competing for such projects in the region in light of U.S. legal restraints such as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.

But Russia's successes are not without risk. The Russian national budget is overly dependent on income from Gazprom and Lukoil fees and taxes. Russia has failed to reindustrialise beyond the energy sector. Moreover, its gas revenues depend on its ability to obtain cheaply a large portion of the gas it needs from Central Asia. In 2004 it paid Turkmenistan one-seventh the price that Western Europe paid. The situation is marginally better for Turkmenistan now. Russia needs Central Asian gas in order to continue its aggressive stance toward Ukraine on a political level and toward Western Europe on an economic level. The view was expressed that Russia may well overplay its hand since no Central Asian leader can survive for long if he is seen as being too dependent on Russia as an "elder brother" - to parody the words that the Soviet Union used to describe its relationship with its "national republics."

Ecological Problems

There are three major ecological problems faced by Kazakhstan and other countries of the region. First of all is Kazakhstan's inheritance of the former nuclear polygon at Semipalatinsk located in its northeast territory. This polygon is known as a nuclear site where about 500 nuclear explosions took place over a period of 40 years between the end of the 1940s and the end of the 1980s. The contaminated area covers a territory of 300,000 square kilometers, which is roughly equal to half the territory of France. Kazakhstan is trying to deal with this problem, and UN member states have supported a number of resolutions on the issue. It is clear that this problem has three dimensions: humanitarian, ecological, and economic. A participant noted that Kazakhstan has not blamed any country for the situation; instead, it has sought moral and technical support from the international community to deal with the problems presented by this huge contaminated area.

Another problem is the continued drying up of the Aral Sea. The problem became well known as adjacent countries in the region coordinated their efforts to cope with it. Kazakhstan's efforts to replenish the northern part of the sea have yielded some success. But the problem is still there, and the attention of the international community must be drawn to this tragedy.

The third important ecological issue in the region that the conference discussed was water management. Kazakhstan is a downstream country; its internal water resources furnish only 60 percent of its needs. Accordingly, the water management issue is at the top of the agenda of cooperation among neighbouring countries, including China. This issue is quite contentious for Uzbekistan whose large, irrigated cotton economy is dependent on the headwaters of sources in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Turkmenistan is wholly dependent on water supplied by Uzbekistan for most of its agricultural needs and other enterprises.

GEOPOLITICAL PERSPECTIVES FROM COMPETING POINTS OF VIEW

Chinese-Russian cooperation aimed at curtailing the inroads that the United States has made into Central Asia since 9/11. Joint efforts began with the revival of the dormant Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), an economic as well as a political and strategic security alliance originally composed of China, Russia, and three Central Asian states. The key party in this organisation is the People's Republic of China. Largely at the initiative of the Chinese, SCO's anti-American move at the June 2005 Astana summit was aimed at fixing deadlines for the decommissioning of U.S. bases in the area. It is by no means certain that Russia or the Central Asian states would have tried to take such a stand without China's prodding. The main problem for the SCO is how long the balance between Moscow and Beijing can be maintained. How will growing Chinese influence affect Central Asian security? What kind of response can the West mount to China's challenge? Experts, particularly in the Asian countries, regard SCO as a counterbalance to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

The security agreement signed in 1992 in Tashkent under Commonwealth of Independent States' (CIS's) auspices among Central Asian countries and Russia remained the main safeguard against hypothetical external dangers and threats. But given its diminishing role, the CIS did not prove to be an effective military mechanism with the exception of its in-

tervention in the Tajik civil war. During the militant Islamist incursions into the region in 1999 and 2000 (in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan), there were widespread concerns about the organisation's practical value.

Another issue discussed was the economic, military, and demographic situation of the Russian Federation. How long, it was asked, can Russia be expected to fulfill its security obligations in Central Asia as well as in the Caucasus? What has President Putin done to carry out his intention to restore Russian influence in Central Asia as well as in the CIS in general? Russia has taken some steps toward achieving its goals by restoring some Soviet-era military bases, taking control of Tajikistan's hydroenergy resources and of Turkmenistan's gas export routes, achieving a rapprochement with Uzbekistan, and gaining Kazakhstan's participation in some projects. But Russia's ability to continue to project its influence in the area is dependent on its economy, which is over-dependent on oil and gas revenues.

Central Asian countries and their leaders are concerned about the U.S. military presence. Some, however, regard the American presence as a necessary counterbalance to China and Russia, particularly China. Nobody can ignore the great growth in Chinese influence, discount its future impact on the region, and dismiss the concern that its influence has engendered.

At the SCO summit of prime ministers, Beijing offered to invest more than \$900 million in the region in the form of Chinese technical engineering assistance, which would translate into the massive demographic presence of Chinese in the region. Russia and Kazakhstan rejected the proposal. The conference addressed the following question. Is the goal of China in Central Asia merely economic, as Chinese officials say, or is it political and geopolitical as well? Raising this issue poses additional questions about Chinese relations with Russia, the United States, and Central Asia.

U.S. INTERESTS AND POLICY

A key task facing the conference was identifying U.S. strategic interests in Central Asia – a region in the world that is geographically distant from the United States. The conference identified three interrelated U.S. interests in the area: security, energy, and reform. The most important issue is the future of the U.S. military presence in the area. Another issue relates to the question of whether the United States has a Eurasian strategy. During the Clinton presidency, a new role – that of “security manager” – was proposed for the United States in Central Asia. Establishing a U.S.-Russian Federation consensus about strategy would be very important for the region. But it would be complicated by the U.S. position toward specific color revolutions.

It was asserted that the United States has no economic policy toward Central Asia. For example, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) treats U.S. investments in Russian oil more favourably than those in Kazakhstan. Furthermore, the U.S.-Russian Investment Fund is 15 years old, but there is still no such fund for Central Asia. Recently a major Kazakh firm, Kazmis, was listed on the London Stock Exchange but not in New York. A point was made that in monetary terms U.S. assistance is very modest. Even the allocation of \$9.6 million for military cooperation for all of Central Asia for the coming year is relatively modest.

It was noted that the Afghan war continues to have a strong effect on U.S. security interests in the region. In Central Asia, the U.S. role in Afghanistan involves over-

flight rights, base rights, and emergency diversion rights - arrangements that are crucial to the American ability to execute the war. Next in importance from a security point of view is drug trafficking. Right across the border from Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan is 80 percent of the world's opium production that reaches the outside world through Central Asia. Most of those narcotics find their ultimate markets in Russia and to a somewhat lesser extent in Central and Western Europe; relatively little end up in the United States. Nevertheless, it is important for the United States to help others in the war on narcotics in order to obtain reciprocal security assistance.

There is a strong U.S. interest in preventing the states of Central Asia from becoming narco-states where anybody, including terrorists, can find a haven. For example, in summertime as they waged war in Afghanistan and carried out related activity in Pakistan, the commandos of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) crossed regularly into the Ferghana Valley in Kyrgyzstan. They have changed names a few times and have splintered but still operate in Central Asia, raising the possibility of providing transit for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as well as narcotics.

The U.S. State Department's decision to move Central Asia from the European section to the South Asia section engendered a great deal of concern among discussants. It was officially justified by bureaucratic concerns over having one assistant secretary dealing with 55 countries and the other with only eight. Nevertheless, it might have sent the wrong signal to individual countries that are trying to discern how the United States looks at the region. Being perceived as part of the West helps reformers in Central Asia. Kazakhs, for example, who discover that their country is no longer part of Europe, regard the revelation as a huge vote of no confidence.

The reorganisation was only a State Department bureaucratic change. Nonetheless it engendered considerable discussion about the potential significance a similar reorganisation by the Pentagon, the Treasury, or other departments of the U.S. government would have on other countries that also look at Central Asia and the Caucasus together.

An argument in favour of the move was put forward based on the necessity to stabilise Afghanistan by connecting the country to the outside world with roads, railroads, telecommunications links, and air routes to South Asia and Central Asia. That assertion gave rise to a discussion of Secretary Rice's initiative for integrating the infrastructure of Central Asia and South Asia along the corridor going through Afghanistan and then farther on to Pakistan and even to India. The idea of piping gas through Afghanistan to Pakistan and on to India, however, was seen by another presenter as unrealistic because southern Afghanistan is still far from stable and India's security experts do not want to be dependent on a pipeline that goes to Pakistan before it reaches India.

Infrastructure was then cited as another important topic. The United States would like to see Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan sell hydropower to Afghanistan, then to Pakistan, and perhaps to India. Others suggested that linking the entire region by fiber optic communications is critical. Much is already underway with direct or indirect U.S. assistance. The World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and USAID are working on hydropower transmission and generation and on all-weather roads linking the region. Secretary Rice announced a \$1.4 million initiative for infrastructure integration, which was seen by some participants as too modest.

USAID was said to be working on developing a regional energy market, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is building a bridge across the Pyandz River joining Afghanistan with the Tajik road network up through Kyrgyzstan and on into Kazakhstan. Washington, it was said, wants to see where and how the money can best be used and whether the countries can work together as well as with international financial institutions and other donors and investors, including Russia.

It was suggested at the conference that after 9/11, a lot of thinking in Washington was focused on American foreign policy and security policy, on mistakes made in the Middle East during the last 40 years of emphasising stability over democracy and of not getting unbiased information from the region, combined with little appreciation of Central Asian culture and preoccupations. Only in the last year or two has it become commonplace to talk about the importance of clans in Central Asia and about the unintended consequences of lecturing local officials about how to act.

The conference discussed the path that the former Soviet republics took after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Their direction was determined by where they had come from - not an auspicious starting point for becoming a democratic society. U.S. foreign policy toward the Soviet Union recognised the fact that it was a large area. As the region came apart, it became clear that it contained many different cultures and communities. Once the United States recognised the newly independent countries, it formulated its first objective: to prevent the Soviet Union from reforming itself.

Russia, according to the U.S. government, is the pivotal state in the region. If the post-Soviet transition did not work in Russia, Washington concluded, it would not work in a post-Soviet republic. Consequently, Washington had to make sure it got its Russian policy right. Central Asian policy derived from that point of view. Respecting the sovereignty of individual states and preventing Russia from dominating them were key objectives. The evolution of the post-Soviet era coincided with a particular juncture in history when the world entered the process of globalisation. That process changed the way in which nation-states interact.

Globalisation seems to punish countries that do not integrate into the world economy. U.S. policy was designed to encourage Central Asian countries to globalise and to adopt a legal and regulatory structure open to investments from around the world. In other words, Washington, on the one hand, urged Central Asian states to be sovereign and independent and, on the other hand, encouraged them to "globalise" and reduce restrictions that prevent interacting with other states—in effect, to "lower" their borders. But to protect an emerging nation's own interests, "higher" borders may be needed. In effect, U.S. policy advice was not very helpful. One example is Kyrgyzstan, which endorsed democracy and moved to adopt it. It was the first Central Asian country to move out of the ruble zone in response to American, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and World Bank advice, issue its own currency, and join the World Trade Organization (WTO). But Kyrgyzstan experienced the opposite of what it expected. It expected a great increase in trade after it joined the WTO. In fact, trade fell by about 30 percent the year after it was admitted. U.S. policy was not dynamic in the region. It continued to pursue the same objectives without paying attention to problems that had arisen. Many NGOs, sponsored in part by the U.S. government and in part by Western foundations, adopted mechanisms and ways of thinking that did not find fertile ground in the region.

After 9/11, the situation changed. The United States suddenly embraced Uzbekistan whose regime has been described by many in the Western world as brutal and authoritarian. Central Asian governments, especially in Uzbekistan, thought that the United States would understand the constraints they were dealing with. In contrast, Washington expected behavior that was not realistic. In effect, Uzbekistan was trying to implement a set of objectives that were different from Washington's.

What the Western world fails to recognise when it promotes reform and runs into reform fatigue is that some actors have rational interests for opposing reform. Based on that premise, it may be helpful to try to answer the following question. What policy would be effective in helping the United States achieve its objectives in the region? A view was presented (against objections from others) that the primary U.S. interest in the region is based on the role that Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan can play in assisting the reconstruction of Afghanistan. According to that point of view, U.S. interests in Kazakhstan - potentially a large U.S. trading partner in the future - are twofold: developing its trade relationship with Kazakhstan and providing assistance for the reconstruction of Afghanistan.

It was said that the United States had not managed to take advantage of the secular nature of Central Asian authoritarian regimes that are religiously moderate because of their adherence to the Hanafi school of Islam and its strong Sufi influence. It was suggested that even Uzbekistan should have been given some credit for what it was doing right in supporting secular government, not just criticised for what it was doing wrong. A participant quoted the NCAFP report on Kazakhstan, which emphasises that U.S. interests in the country should not be limited to oil, security, and counterterrorism but to Kazakhstan's vital importance to U.S. interests in the region; it is a secular Muslim state with a large non-Muslim minority and pro-Western sympathies that is undergoing speedy economic development and providing better standards of living for its diverse population.

Finally, it was argued that the United States ought to recognise that not all cultures are alike. Throughout Central Asia are clans that work outside formal political institutions that are not synonymous with democratic processes. For example, USAID workers have discovered after working with legislators to persuade them to enact specific reforms that the legislature does not make actual decisions. Decisions, it turns out, are made on the basis of things that have little to do with legislative structure or even with a constitution. As U.S. policymakers seek to promote economic and political reform in Central Asia, they must adapt to the cultural and practical realities at the most basic levels of local society.

RUSSIAN INTERESTS AND POLICY

It was asserted that neither Russia nor the United States has a policy in Central Asia. Instead, both indulge in reaction, either under-reaction or overreaction. Despite a measure of activism evident in Russian policy toward the region during last few years, Russia, it was noted, is not about to sacrifice its resources or to spend much money to pursue its interests beyond security.

It was reiterated that the main concern of Russia is security. Economics is second. Russia's increase in economic investments in Central Asia for the first time last year was attributed to President Putin's belief and that of his government that such investments can enhance Russia's security in

the region. The Russian Aluminum Company invested up to two billion dollars in Tajikistan's hydropower stations and a new aluminum plant that will use some of the power generated. Lukoil is active in Kazakhstan, and Gazprom is active in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Such a huge investment would have been unthinkable a few years ago. It was stated that the Russian Aluminum Company's investment would be a very risky project for a private enterprise. It was also noted that Russian companies investing in Central Asia are not without important foreign investors, including prominent oligarchs with Uzbek ties.

Drugs are considered a serious threat to Russian security. Russia has a real problem with drugs, drug trafficking, and drug addicts, especially in some depressed regions of Siberia, the Urals, and the north, where the price is low. Very little has been done to stem the flow of drugs from all directions, and the traffic continues to increase.

Islamic extremism and terrorism are also perceived as considerable threats to Russia. It was emphasized that perception is important to Central Asia. For example, it was suggested that even a bureaucratic decision such as the transfer of Central Asia from the European to the South Asian desk of the State Department could be perceived by Russia and Central Asians as a sign of American retreat.

Russia seized the opportunity from the growing U.S.-Uzbekistan split to fill the gap and occupy the niche that was left in Uzbekistan by the Americans. The Russian position in the area is also reinforced by the fact that large numbers of Uzbeks and Tajiks work in Russia and a large Russian minority still live in Kazakhstan. George Kennan was quoted as having said many years ago that the effectiveness of power, which radiates from every national centre, decreases in proportion to the distance involved. In this case, the distance is in Russia's favour rather than the United States.

Russia was said to understand the dangers emanating from the weak position of the Uzbek leader and from denying the fact that democracy cannot be imported into or imposed on Central Asia. It was suggested that cooperation between Russia and the United States would be in the interest of all, especially the states of Central Asia.

CHINESE INTERESTS AND POLICY

It was underlined that China has been consistent in its political concerns about the region, especially about the possibility that political change from Central Asia will spill over into the neighbouring Chinese province of Xinjiang. China shares a border with three Central Asian states: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. The part of China that borders on Central Asia is the Xinjiang Autonomous Region, the largest Chinese province. It accounts for one-sixth of Chinese territory but has a relatively small population in Chinese terms - around 19 million people. Forty-seven percent of that population is Uighur Muslim; 41 percent is Han Chinese. Other groups that live in this region include one million Kazakhs and smaller numbers of Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, and Tajiks. Moreover, more than 300,000 Uighurs live across the border in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. The Han population in Xinjiang has been growing because of efforts by Beijing to encourage the Han Chinese to settle in this region. Their presence has increased from only 10 percent in 1950 to slightly below 50 percent today. In essence, China is very much concerned about what is happening across the border because of overlapping populations.

One of China's first tasks after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the early part of the 1990s was to secure its borders with its Central Asian neighbours. The process of border demarcation was controversial in some of the Central Asian states (most recently in Kyrgyzstan where there were demonstrations against the process), but now it has largely been completed. In July 2001, the SCO emerged from the process of demarcating the borders and from confidence-building efforts by China, its three Central Asian neighbours (later, Uzbekistan), and Russia.

Concern about Islamic extremism and separatism is not new in China. In 1998 a police campaign, called the Strike Hard campaign, was directed against separatist activities in Xinjiang. Human rights organisations point to the systematic persecution of Uighurs by the Chinese government, and both the Chinese government and Uighur organisations have interests, for different reasons, in playing up Uighur separatist activities. It was stated at the conference that even the Chinese government would acknowledge that since the late 1990s there has been little indigenous Islamic radicalism in Xinjiang, belying concern about outside influence, including influence emanating from Pakistan and Afghanistan. In fact, the level of military presence maintained by China in Xinjiang does not indicate much concern about an indigenous Uighur terrorist threat. Nonetheless, China and its neighbours in Central Asia have found common ground in condemning "the three evils of separatism, extremism, and terrorism."

It was pointed out that to ensure stability in Xinjiang it is necessary to promote economic development and expand economic cooperation with Central Asia. Thus in March 2000 the Chinese National People's Congress endorsed a policy, called Go West, of developing China's inland provinces. Its centerpiece was the investment of more than five billion dollars in a 4,000-kilometer east-west gas pipeline linking Xinjiang's Tarim Basin with Shanghai. This pipeline has a capacity of 12 billion cubic meters per year and became operational last year. Xinjiang has been slated to become the center of China's oil and gas industry, both by developing its own resources, which contain one-third of China's oil and gas reserves, and by becoming a gateway to Central Asian oil.

Trade has been growing rapidly between China and Central Asia, but the monetary amount is still quite small. For example, half of Xinjiang's trade is with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. In monetary terms, it amounts to less than two billion dollars per annum. Nonetheless, Chinese investments in Central Asia have grown rapidly since 1993, when China became a net energy importer and began to seek alternative supplies. Recent difficulties in energy relations with Russia in connection with Siberian oil projects also play a role.

Since 9/11, the U.S. military presence in Central Asia has complicated China's geopolitical picture. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, SCO played a very marginal role. It lacked an office and telephones, which U.S. military commanders discovered when they tried to contact the organisation. Since then, its charter has been approved, and the organisation has become institutionalised. Its Secretariat is located in Beijing and is headed by a former Chinese ambassador to Russia. China participated in SCO peacekeeping and confidence-building military exercises with Kyrgyzstan in 2002, with Kazakhstan and Russia and Tajikistan in 2003 (as well as with Kyrgyzstan) and, most recently, in the summer of 2005, with Russia.

Since the emergence of the new leadership in China, Chinese policy has resulted in greater activism directed

toward energy diplomacy and greater attention to Central Asia. China's Communist party First Secretary Hu Jintao's first overseas trip in the summer of 2003 was to Central Asia. In Kazakhstan, many economic agreements were signed. China's first cross-border pipeline from Kazakhstan to Xinjiang became operational recently. It represents an investment of almost ten billion dollars, a huge commitment on China's part that may mark the beginning of a whole series of Chinese pipelines to other countries, including Russia.

Finally, China has endorsed efforts to contain democratic changes in Central Asia, especially of the "color revolution" type. Concerned by events in Bishkek and Andijan, Chinese leaders received President Karimov in Beijing, gave him the red carpet treatment, and pledged \$1.5 billion in investments, half in the energy sector. Since then, the Chinese have been very active throughout Central Asia, promising military aid to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (less than three million dollars but not so little compared with U.S. aid). The conference raised the question: What does all this mean for China and Russia in Central Asia?

Areas of agreement between China and Russia involve reducing the U.S. military presence in the region in order to constrain pro-Western political change as well as classifying violence in Chechnya and Xinjiang as terrorism, which would justify oppressive countermeasures. Russia has been resisting Chinese efforts to enhance multilateral cooperation within SCO, preferring instead to link Central Asian states bilaterally with Russia via CIS institutions. China would like to expand its access to Central Asian markets, and that could happen if SCO became a multilateral organisation such as the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). Finally, there is distrust of Chinese intentions in Central Asia and concern about the possibility of economic domination by China and population imbalances such as those between the Russian Far East and China. There is a feeling in Central Asia of being squeezed by the major powers that are pursuing interests not always compatible with the interests of the states in the region.

FOCUS ON TURKEY

Turkey is important for many reasons but primarily because it is a member of NATO. Since the Iraq war, Turkish-American relations have changed primarily because of the different approaches that Turkey has taken to the Central Command (CENTCOM) and the European Command (EUCOM). Turkey did not establish the same kind of cooperative arrangement with CENTCOM that it had with EUCOM. Concerning Iraq, Turkey shares the concern of many other countries, including China and Russia, that the United States is creating instability in the area. From the Turkish perspective, the United States initiated the war to achieve worthwhile goals but was not prepared for the post-Saddam situation. By extension, there is concern that the United States may do similar things in Central Asia, the Black Sea region, and other places in the area. Moreover, the Turkish military, even those who worked in NATO, are drawing closer to Russia. Turkey regards Russia as a partner in countering American moves in the Middle East that it disapproves of, including "color revolutions" and further interventions in the area. Turkish-Russian relations have gotten stronger. President Putin met Prime Minister Erdogan three times in 2005, and trends suggest that in a few years Russia may become Turkey's largest trading partner, replacing Germany. President Putin, it seems, would like to draw

Ankara away from NATO, inducing Turkey to become an observer if not an eventual member of SCO.

Many people in Turkey are very concerned that the United States does not understand the full scope of the Islamist danger — a concern shared by the Turkish military. There is a sense that Washington is naive about Turkish Islamist developments and their connections to the current Turkish government. The United States seems to have lost some of its focus on maintaining Turkish cooperation to fulfill its objectives in Central Asia. Moreover, Turkish cooperation with the Russians, especially on gas, could undermine the vision of creating the east-west corridor.

Finally, SCO dynamics and Turkish influence were discussed. SCO might not have fulfilled its potential, but the July 2005 summit in Astana was a turning point. It was said that had the summit not taken place in Astana but in another SCO capital, the final statement would have been even harsher toward the United States than the one that was issued. Moreover, Iran has become a SCO observer. By changing the organisation's dynamics, especially after the recent hardening of Iranian foreign policy, Iran's role can affect Central Asia within the context of SCO. India has also joined SCO as an observer, and it will be interesting to see which way India tilts. Recently there was an announcement that an Iran-India-Pakistan gas pipeline agreement had been signed. Opposing it has been a long-term U.S. policy. According to the conferees, efforts to pull India toward the West, whether by the United States or the European Union, depend on the direction that Turkey takes.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The U.S. strategic position in Central Asia, which greatly improved between 9/11 and the beginning of the war in Iraq and progressed further through the "color revolutions" in the CIS republics, has deteriorated - the low point being Uzbekistan's shift after the Andijan uprising and the Astana summit of the Shanghai Cooperative Organization in which Russia and China combined their efforts to push back U.S. inroads into the area. Those developments require a rethinking of U.S. policy objectives and strategy in the region to reflect changed circumstances.

There is a compelling need for a dynamic U.S. foreign policy in Central Asia — one that has made provisions for identifying and seizing opportunities and responding to setbacks with appropriate action, including damage control.

The republics of Central Asia cannot resist combined Russian/Chinese pressure without a larger commitment from the United States supported by the European Union. China will eventually overplay its hand in Central Asia, fueling local apprehensions and Russian suspicion. The U.S. government will be in a position to take advantage of such an opportunity if it presents itself as the Chinese and the Russians did at the SCO summit after regime change in Kyrgyzstan and the Andijan uprising had occurred. There is a broad sense that U.S. policy, seen to be supportive of regime change such as occurred in Kyrgyzstan, lacks follow-through.

With both Russia and China flush with trade surpluses and in a position to back their state-controlled firms, Western enterprises may no longer be able to compete on their own without government support. U.S. policymakers should examine economic areas of strategic importance to U.S. national interests for which government support might be made available to private enterprise in the form of tax in-

centives, credit enhancement, and other measures. Although support for human rights and democratisation is built into U.S. foreign policy, progress cannot be expected uniformly without regard for traditions and local circumstances.

The State Department's shift of Central Asian Affairs from the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs to the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs appears to be sending the wrong message. To many in the region the reclassification seems to denote the perception that Central Asia is not receptive to Western values. Considerable fence-mending is in order. The United States would articulate to good effect the connection between U.S. interests in Central Asia and its activities in Afghanistan by identifying and emphasising mutual interests.

U.S. policymakers should jump-start certain old initiatives and implement new ones. Such initiatives should include resolving the funding of the Manas air base in Kyrgyzstan, strengthening military-to-military programs, and playing a proactive role on environmental issues. It is regretted that the U.S. government has not called attention to the secular nature of the Central Asian regimes and to the moderate form of Islam adopted by a large majority of the population. Finally, there was a strong sense that increased educational and cultural exchanges between Central Asia and the West are essential to the furtherance of U.S. interests in the region.

Focus on US-Kazakhstani Relations

During the decade and a third that has elapsed since achieving its independence, Kazakhstan has become the leading state in former Soviet Central Asia in terms of such criteria as GDP, GDP per capita, privatization of the economy, volume of exports, rate of economic development, volume of energy production, effectiveness and transparency of the banking system, development of transportation, growth of technical education, and so forth.

The process of democratisation, though still unsatisfactory by U.S. standards, has been superior to that undertaken by each of the other post-Soviet republics of Central Asia. Opposition parties and groups, though restricted in their access to electronic media, are allowed to publish newspapers, to hold small meetings, to equip their offices with telephones and fax lines, and to travel abroad. Opposition leaders are more often harassed than jailed, although there have been some violent episodes. On the positive side, both the Kazakh political establishment and the opposition are conscious of the geopolitical position of the country, which necessitates maintaining a balance among Russian ambitions, growing Chinese influence, Middle Eastern Islamist inroads, and Western pressures. The principal disagreement between the U.S. and Kazakh governments relates to whether political and economic liberalisation can proceed simultaneously or whether economic liberalisation must occur first.

Kazakhstan is fast becoming a key energy producer — behind the Gulf States and Russia but on par with North Sea producers. Its production and known reserves are growing, and its role is steadily increasing. The country is doing what it can to diversify pipeline routes in order to decrease its dependency on Russian pipelines (and their often high transit fees) for its exports to the West.

Kazakhstan's armed forces, though small in number, are the best trained in the region. They receive assistance from the United States and other sources. The army is becoming professional, has a qualified officer corps, maintains close contacts with the U.S. armed forces, and participates in

the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. The training language of the army is still Russian, but an understanding of English is growing rapidly. The percentage of ethnic Russians in the armed forces, though declining, remains substantial.

Kazakhstan is ethnically, religiously, and linguistically tolerant. It shows little discrimination against non-Kazakhs, non-Muslims, or Russian speakers. Ethnic Russians, however, are less visible than in the 1990s, and since independence the ethnic Kazakh proportion of the population has increased from less than 40 percent to a majority. Concurrently the ethnic Russian representation in public institutions has declined. The urban population is predominantly secular, the Russian language still predominates, and mixed marriages are not uncommon - at least in the capitals. Affirmative action from Soviet times benefits native Kazakh job applicants to the detriment of Russians. It has reduced rather than eliminated opportunities for non-Kazakhs.

The principal political preoccupations of the present regime, which has been in power since independence, are internal political stability, the preservation of the country's independence through balancing relations with its great power neighbours, the war on terrorism, and narcotics traffic. The Confederation of Independent States (CIS) is dismissed as outdated, and a new Kazakh foreign policy doctrine is under consideration. Except for objecting to the levels of internal controls maintained in Kazakhstan in the name of stability, U.S. interests coincide with all other Kazakh policies.

Most governmental agencies and independent observers are concerned about the situation in the rest of Central Asia, especially about neighbouring Uzbekistan where they predicted an almost imminent danger of explosion triggered by declining standards of living, harsh rule, and the rise of religious fanaticism provoked by the desperate situation. The Kazakh government is concerned about the possibility of a massive influx of refugees into southern Kazakhstan in such an event. The stability of post-Turkmenbashi Turkmenistan is regarded as questionable, though less threatening to Kazakhstan given the relatively small common border. The situations in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are viewed as unsettled.

Russian ideas about enticing Kazakhstan into the ruble zone are dismissed as unrealistic. Kazakhstan sees itself as a partner rather than a client of Russia and perceives China, not Russia, as the fastest growing force in the area. The presence of American capital is welcome for its value and as a counterweight to Chinese inroads.

Kazakh officials maintain that the country is ready to become the locomotive of a Central Asian economic "union" by providing capital and assistance to neighbouring states. Given relations with Uzbekistan and the isolation of Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan's plans appear to be premature, awaiting regime changes in those countries. Kyrgyzstan, on the other hand, is a recipient of Kazakh aid, and Tajikistan may be a candidate as well.

Kazakh officials were very concerned about whether the U.S. secretary of state would certify Kazakhstan as a country that "has made a significant improvement in the protection of human rights during the preceding six-month period" as required by Congress before funds can be allocated. Although U.S. assistance to the Kazakh military is significant and Kazakhstan has benefited from other U.S. foreign aid funding, the officials were primarily concerned about the political impact of a negative decision, which could

discourage foreign investments and blacken the image of the country. (Subsequent to our meetings with Kazakh officials, Secretary of State Rice notified Congress that she could not make the certification but had granted a waiver in light of U.S. national security interests.)

Kazakh authorities are appealing to the United States for support of their candidacy to assume the chairmanship of the OSCE in 2009. Germany reportedly supports Kazakhstan's candidacy. This issue is important to the government because occupying the OSCE chair would buttress President Nazarbayev's prestige both domestically and internationally. It would also strengthen Kazakhstan's claim to regional leadership and remind the world that Kazakhstan is an important "European" nation.

Kazakh officials contend that the country's post-Soviet renunciation of its arsenal of WMDs, its secular attitude combined with its ability to maintain an atmosphere marked by the absence of religious tension, the lack of serious conflicts among ethnic groups, the positive feeling toward the West in general and the United States in particular, and especially President Nazarbayev's role in implementing those policies should be better appreciated.

To sum up: The United States and Kazakhstan share a vital interest in the continuation and ultimate success of Kazakhstan's political and economic transition to a mature, functioning, secular, democratic state. U.S. interests in Kazakhstan transcend oil and Kazakh support for the war on terrorism. They include Kazakhstan's strategic importance as a moderate, pro-Western, secular Muslim state that contains a large non-Muslim population that can serve as both a model and a stabilising force in the region; Kazakhstan's strategic location as a land bridge from Europe to East and South Asia; and its potential for being the engine of growth, investment, and economic development in Central Asia. As seen through the prism of the Bush Doctrine, Kazakhstan, of all the Central Asian countries, has the greatest potential for achieving a relatively fast-track transition from authoritarian pluralism to an acceptable form of functioning democracy.

U.S. policy should assist and not undermine the basic great power equilibrium that Kazakhstan is attempting to sustain in order to maintain its independence and pursue economic development and modernisation. It is in the interest of the United States to forge special relationships with Central Asian countries in order to contribute to the stability of the region. U.S. policy should be sensitive to the fragility of Kazakhstan's geopolitical position.

The United States must show more understanding of the Kazakh reality given that it has experienced only 13 years of independence; has pursued privatisation and democratisation for only a brief time; must accommodate a multiethnic, multi-tribal, and multireligious population; and has to confront instability in neighbouring states. Steady improvement, not rapid progress, should be the expectation. American pressure should be exerted but not overused. To promote mutual understanding, the United States must make an effort to explain to the Kazakhs how the American political system functions, something difficult for a society that has emerged from a Soviet system to comprehend.

The United States must continue to emphasise that American interests in Kazakhstan are not limited to oil, security, and counterterrorism. It also must communicate the fact that because Kazakhstan is a secular Muslim state that contains a large non-Muslim minority, is sympathetic to the West, and is undergoing rapid economic development that is providing a better standard of living for the diverse

population, the country is of vital importance to U.S. interests and those of the entire region as well.

U.S. interests would be served if Kazakhstan's burgeoning free market becomes the engine of growth in Central Asia and if Kazakhstan becomes more financially engaged in the Southern Caucasus. Kazakh's ability to play a leading role in the economies of the other republics of the region, as well as make investments in the Southern Caucasus, would have a stabilising effect on the region as a whole. According to all accepted criteria, Kazakhstan, as the leading state in former Soviet Central Asia, should be the centerpiece of U.S. efforts in the region. Its rapid development requires the informed attention of the U.S. government and the skillful formulation of an appropriate foreign policy.

The United States should encourage Kazakhstan to create an opening to the south through Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Afghanistan to Pakistan, India, and the

Indian Ocean. This opening would proceed slowly as trade and transport routes develop naturally in the wake of the Soviet Union's collapse. Trans-regional commerce between Central and South Asia will have a beneficial effect on world politics. Substantial progress has been made in rebuilding and augmenting Afghanistan's road network connecting South Asia, the Indian Ocean, and Central Asia. Railroads and pipelines are on the drawing board and could go forward if stability in Afghanistan is attained.

The United States should continue to support and encourage educational and cultural exchanges with Kazakhstan as a means of stimulating mutual interests and understanding. Kazakhstan has begun to increase its support for these exchanges, and the United States should advance this effort by facilitating the processing of visas and the acceptance of Kazakh students at U.S. universities.

Afghanistan and Central Asian Regional Cooperation: Problems and Prospects

MARAT NARIBAYEV,

Senior Research Officer, Ph.D, Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan

OVERVIEW OF THE CENTRAL ASIA REGION (CAR)

Historically, one should recall, the Central Asia Region was a single cultural and economic space. But in the 19th century its integrity was destroyed by external intervention. This is how Afghanistan, through this historical process, came to be a kind of dividing line between Central and Southern Asia.

The countries of Central Asia meanwhile occupy an important geopolitical position with significant economic and geo-strategical potential. Their territory is considered as a whole, as an independent and to a certain degree self-sufficient region.

The region possesses significant human, natural and industrial resources. More than 56 million people live here. Total gross national product of the region amounts to about \$64 billion. In the medium term, in the next 10 years, Central Asia can become one of the most dynamically developing regions of the world.

International experts see the development of the CAR countries for the period in question, up to 2015, in a reasonably positive light. According to the indicators of economic development, GDP growth will be running at up to 7 % per year, GNP per capita will be up to \$ 2,000, and the poverty level will be at about 23 % of the population).

DEVELOPMENT PROSPECTS FOR THE CENTRAL ASIA COUNTRIES' ECONOMY

Prospects of economic development for Central Asia depend on such strategic issues as strengthening the stability and promoting integration between the various CAR countries. This requires focusing efforts in certain priority directions, such as:

- Development of regional trade;
- Development of the power sector and power resources management;
- Strengthening the transport infrastructure to improve transit and international freight flows;
- Development of industrial processing of raw materials to increase the production of finished goods;
- Modernization and development of the agro-industrial.

All this points to a significant growth of macroeconomic indicators for the CAR countries based on the exploitation of its rich natural potential. The common borders, the presence of rich natural raw materials and the development of transport communications are all good preconditions for successful cooperation.

PROBLEMS THAT CONSTRAIN AND RESTRICT REGIONAL RELATIONS

Despite the progress achieved so far, regional cooperation in Central Asia still appears to be quite limited in the forecast period. There are several basic negative factors:

- Absence of precise coordination of efforts between the countries of the region and the world community on Central Asian development;
- Non-observance by the CAR countries of mutual agreements and arrangements for cooperation in strategic fields and key industries;
- Restrictions on implementing further structural and political reforms;
- Exacerbation of internal political instability in the CAR countries;
- Great differences in the economic priorities and legislations of the countries.

The maintenance of fair and rational use of the boundary rivers is one of the basic problems, because development of relations between the Central Asian states in the water sector defines the stability and security of the region as a whole. The issue of regional cooperation can also be an obstacle to the realization of further structural and political reforms and can strengthen the external negative factors, which in turn influence the security of the whole region of Central Asia.

THE TRANSITION OF AFGHANISTAN AND REGIONAL PROCESSES

Despite their common history, Central Asian countries develop unequally and sometimes unsuccessfully - each of them goes its way, realizing its own model of economic growth, using its own available resources.

In the case of Afghanistan, its geographical proximity and the difficult process of change which it is undergoing have a direct influence on the peace and security of the whole

Central Asian Region. This is the reason for the CAR's direct interest in the normalization of the internal situation in Afghanistan. It is very important to understand how the maintenance of stability in Afghanistan and the reconstruction of its economy can affect the development prospects for all CAR countries.

We should at this point stress the difficulties which must be faced in attempting to include Afghanistan's economy in the regional system and processes. these concerns include:

- Chronic internal instability in the country;
- Present economic isolation and backwardness;
- Growing manufacture and traffic of drugs;
- Special geographical, natural, and climatic features, etc.

It is evident that the reconstruction of Afghanistan's economy will be a difficult process in which many countries, not only from our region but also from around the world, should take a part.

For Afghanistan the 'Bonn process' ushered in a new stage of participation in the international community, marked in particular by the by the London conference on 31 January - 1 February 2006 which resulted in the Agreement on Afghanistan.

It is now necessary for the countries of Central Asia to support the measures taken by the Afghan government to accelerate the reconstruction process and to bring about democratic transformation in Afghanistan, and also to engage in a joint struggle against international terrorism and the manufacture of drugs. The inclusion of Afghanistan in the processes of regional cooperation with the Central Asian countries should increase its chances of early and efficient recovery.

The primary goal of this process should be the development of Afghanistan's economic infrastructure, providing access to resources that are necessary for the country to make real progress.

Therefore projects directed towards the solution of these basic problems are especially valuable. Plans to develop the power and communications sectors must be implemented. This should play a key role in the economic and political stabilization of the country. Then it is necessary to consider ways in Afghanistan can begin to sell its products in world markets.

The countries involved in this effort must first of all tackle existing obstacles and problems. They must formulate a common approach to dealing with priority issues. One of these must be the establishment of a free trade zone to serve as a basis for future regional trade. In this connection, it should be noted that relations between the IRA and the Central Asian countries remain at a low level.

KAZAKHSTAN AND THE RECONSTRUCTION OF AFGHANISTAN

Regional cooperation is a priority for Kazakhstan. It considers it necessary that Afghanistan should participate in the process of regional inter-action. However, this process should be aimed at promoting and strengthening existing relations, security and stability in the region. The position of the Republic of Kazakhstan is that the Central Asian Region should be recognised as one overall economic unit sharing common civilizing values.

Kazakhstan supports the Agreement between the Government of Afghanistan and the international community, accepted at the 2006 London conference, which covers the spheres of security, social and economic development, respect for the rule of law and the struggle against drugs.

The Republic of Kazakhstan not only approves the policy of President H. Karzai for consolidating Afghan society and transforming the country into a civilized democratic state, but it also supports the international community's efforts, directed towards stabilization of the situation for steady political and economic development of IRA.

Kazakhstan is ready to make a contribution to the reconstruction of Afghanistan's national economy. It has already made deliveries of diesel fuel, grain, etc.

Kazakhstan can promote the development and reconstruction of communications and the exploitation of the country's oil and gas reserves. Qualified specialists in the fields of the economy, industry, finance, transport and education stand ready to offer advice and assistance. Further expansion of areas of bilateral cooperation can be considered for the future.

Overall, it is possible to assert that the security, stability and reconstruction of Afghanistan's economy will promote stability and development of Central Asia region as a whole. This assumes that all countries in the region have an interest in securing the success of this process.

To this end, it is obviously necessary to use the potential of the existing regional organizations, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Organization of Economic Cooperation and others.

As an active and consistent participant in the multi-vector regional inter-action process, the Republic of Kazakhstan intends to support in every possible way the efforts of these regional organizations to ensure the stability, security and economic recovery of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.

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Central Asia and the USA (Central Asian Views on the Support of Democracy)

FATIMA KUKEYEVA,

*Professor of International Relations and Foreign Policy of Kazakhstan Department,
al-Farabi Kazakh National University, Kazakhstan, Almaty*

Central Asian views on relations with the United States are diverse, reflecting the multi-dimensional character of international relations and the variety of issues that concern both the United States and governments in the region. Today the new risks and challenges to national, regional, and international security include: international terrorism, the distribution of weapons of mass destruction, national and ethnic conflicts, illegal drugs traffic, and organized crime. I think another issue should be added to this list, namely, the problem of democratic development or "democratization," which in itself unites internal and foreign political issues regarding the stable development of countries.

United States policy concerning Central Asia has attached great importance to the support of democracy and the development of civil society in the region. American analysts and policymakers repeatedly emphasize that the lack of political and economic transformation is a threat not only for the prosperity and the freedom of nations in the region, but also for the security of Central Asia as a whole. Talbott's Doctrine declared that the ideas of democracy and market economy form the main factors of political stability and national economic prosperity.

- In the Freedom Support Act (1992), the US Congress, considering the new geopolitical situation which arose after the disintegration of the USSR, sought to prevent the spread of religious extremism in the interest of national security

- In 1997 Assistant Secretary of State Strobe Talbott emphasized the interrelation between successfully carrying out democratic reforms and the stability both inside, and outside the region. Talbott identified assistance to the development of democracy as one of the priority issues of American policy in Central Asia.

- In the international agreement for the "Silk Road Strategy" (1999), Central Asians, the United States and the European Union stressed the importance of human rights and democracy.

- During her visit to Kazakhstan in 2000, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright placed a special emphasis on problems in the field of democracy.

However mildly, the current Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice also stressed the importance of democracy in her visits to Central Asia in the Fall of 2005.

So, democratization clearly remains an important element of United States foreign policy strategy in Central Asia.

The events of September 11, 2001 made promotion of democracy one of the major geopolitical goals of United States Central Asian policy. In 2002 President Bush's administration adopted two principal policy initiatives. First, through the Freedom Act in Afghanistan the US intended to establish democracy and promote civil society as a means of eradicating terrorism. Second, the 2002 "US National Security Strategy" pledged the use of military, political and economic resources to promote open societies and the development of democracy in defense of US national interests.

Today the toughening of requirements for democratization in Central Asia by the American administration suggests that Washington considers this process as one of the major priorities for achieving victory in the global war with terrorism.

In this connection the promotion of democracy in the countries of Central Asia appears as a major factor of geopolitics.

Thus, American policymakers advise that Washington should balance US geopolitical and economic interests with the desire of Central Asian peoples to obtain democracy.

Central Asian analysts have been considering the role that the United States might play in supporting regional democratization. So, if the Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan researchers on the whole recognize the need for American support to promote democracy, they criticize the methods that the United States government has used to achieve this purpose. Tajik and Turkmen analysts in particular doubt the validity of Western-style democratic values in Central Asia.

In analyzing US policy in the region before the events of September 11, 2001 Kazakhstan experts came to the conclusion that the degree of democratization and the reformulation of the political system, as well as the process of shaping civil society, did not achieve the progress expected by the West. The Kazakhstan analysis met some coolness and disappointment from the American side.

To explain the "insufficient promotion of democratic reforms" in the states of the region, Central Asian authors specify the following factors:

- The Americans take a short-term view in supporting the establishment of real democracy. In the article «Problems and Calls for Democratization in Central Asia», L. Bondarets of the International Institute of Strategic Research under the President of the Kyrgyz Republic, emphasizes that «our opponents for some reason overlook the

* See: New Challenges and New Geopolitics in Central Asia: after September 11. - Almaty: KazISS, 2003.

fact that they consistently built [their own] democracies over long historical periods».²

- The absence of democratic institutions of authority, the lack of a liberal social mentality and the lack of experience with private ownership in the post-Soviet countries, all complicate the creation of a lawful state, market economic relations, and civil society – that is, the social and economic preconditions for democracy. These states follow a pattern of democratization “from above,” where authorities do not involve the citizens, or at best limit access to the process of political transformation.

- Furthermore, the presence of weak oppositions which have no clear strategy results in their political failure, preventing the constructive participation of political opponents in evolving democratic processes, maintaining a lack of unity and coordination both between and within oppositional groups. In the majority of the countries the opposition also has a weak financial base.

- The absence of a real opposition leads the state authority to try in every possible way to neutralize any potential opposition, such as by involving potential rivals in state posts, creating so-called “pocket” opposition groups, or in rare cases even compelling certain people to emigrate.

Nevertheless, the process of democratic transformation began simultaneously with the process of national revival and the creation of the newly independent states.

On the whole, recognizing the United States role in the democratization of Central Asian countries, Kazakhstan political scientists also point out contradictions in American policy. In particular they question a foreign policy line in which Washington pursues economic cooperation and military bases by dealing with authoritarian leaders, instead of pushing these governments toward democratic political reform. Taking into account the fact that representatives of the old Soviet and party elite (the so-called Nomenclatura) retained power even as a result of establishing newly independent states, Washington has concentrated more on dealing with the people in power than on creating new institutions of management. Although American politics continues to emphasize the traditional adherence to human rights, Kazakhstan analysts note that the slowed rates of transition to democracy overshadow the re-construction of civil society in Central Asia.

So, for example, despite the appeals of human rights organizations to consider Uzbekistan as a country “causing special anxiety concerning religious and other freedom” the United States did not hide its intentions to establish long-term relations and cooperation with the region, and in particular for the development of oil and gas deposits in Uzbekistan. But after the events of September 11, 2001 and the beginning of an American military presence in Central Asia, discussions about a “new Washington strategy in the region” started in scientific and social circles. The stress on assistance to democratic development acquired a new sound with the re-definition of Central Asian countries as the “first line of combating terrorism.” The programs of the US State Department provided direct support for independent mass media, the development of political parties, religious

freedoms, administrative reforms, education and health care financing.

However, traditional announcements about the United States interests in political stability, democratization and economic prosperity in Central Asia are linked with American strategic interests in the region. It is necessary to include the existence of authoritarian regimes in this policy, which means “to build a consensus on two incompatible factors.”³

As a result of Washington’s shifting priorities, Kazakhstan analysts developed doubts about the motives of United States foreign policy. One thesis argues that the United States asserts “responsibility for security and stability in the region using democratic rhetoric and economic control levers as the means of pressuring ruling elites with the goal of creating a net of political regimes which are effectively controlled by Washington”⁴. Murat Laumulin, one of the best-known political scientists in Kazakhstan, also considers that Washington formally proclaims democratization and human rights “as principles of American foreign policy, but in reality ... (they are) often used as methods of political influence and tools of pressure.”⁵

Thus Kazakhstan experts note contradictions in American policy concerning democratic development in Central Asia. To be precise, they criticize Washington’s strategy which appears to demonstrate that the United States, being interested in economic cooperation and military bases, prefers to keep authoritarian regimes in power, but not to push these countries toward the democratization of their social-political systems.

If before the removal of the American base from Uzbekistan and the events at Andijan the American policy on democracy and human rights issues suffered from serious contradictions, today we can observe an increasingly active State Department critique of Islam Karimov’s internal policy.

As relations with Tajikistan are considered through the prism of combating terrorism and the problem of drug traffic, so pressure is growing with the assistance of social organizations to liberalize the mass media.

In spite of the criticism by American investigators of the Turkmenbashi regime, there are practically no announcements by the State Department concerning the human rights situation in Turkmenistan.

Such policy is interpreted in the Central Asian states as duplicitous. Official Washington continues to assert that the US Administration is doing its best to support the democratization process in these states. At the same time, the United States began to determine its relations with the states of the region depending on their readiness to provide Americans with military bases and other facilities in their territories. In this context, further political and social reforms to strengthen democracy in the region appear as minor priorities. Therefore, Central Asian leaders decide that they have the right to ignore American appeals for democratic reform and to continue their pursuit of policies in whatever direction they find necessary.

As the well-known Kyrgyzstan political scientist N.Omarov remarks, it will be difficult for the United States to support the process of democratization if “regional partners

2 Проблемы и вызовы демократизации в Центральной Азии, Бондарец Л.М. // Политика. Политическая наука, Бишкек, 2005.

3 Центральная Азия до и после 11 сентября: геополитика и безопасность. – Алматы: КИСИ, 2002.

4 Н. Омаров. Состояние и перспективы межгосударственного сотрудничества Кыргызстана и США в 90-е гг. XX – начале XXI вв. // Политическая система США и вопросы демократизации в странах Центральной Азии.- Алматы, 2005.-С. 93.

5 М.Лаумулин. Политика США по поддержке демократии в Центральной Азии // Политическая система США и вопросы демократизации в странах Центральной Азии.- Алматы, 2005.-С. 31-33.

are corrupt and despotic regimes who live in fear of their own population".⁶

Proponents of the argument for a «special model of democracy» stress that democracy exists in different variations, and that possible versions of democracy beg one basic question: who will guide the democracy?

As R. Abdullo, the independent political scientist from Tajikistan, argues: «The rejection of totalitarianism does not at all mean the direct arrival of western-style democracy». ⁷ Researchers like Abdullo argue for the role of authoritarian governments in providing a smooth transition from the legacy of Soviet totalitarianism to a future democracy.

In a more anti-American vein, other researchers connect their aversion for Western values with the struggle against international terrorism advocated by the current Bush administration, which they see as the rigid imposition of alien social values and political cultures on Muslim peoples. From this point of view, the American approach to the democratization of society in the Central Asian states shows a lack of desire by current Washington policymakers to recognize and take into account the unique features of development in the region.

In response to Western criticism of authoritarian government in Tajikistan and other Central Asian countries, Abdullo opposes this absolute idea of democracy as something that must be the same everywhere, with his own idea that democracy is of great value but should be adapted to different circumstances in different times and places. He argues, for example, that "for Tajikistan now the main value is Tajik statehood. To achieve statehood today requires a republican form of management which is characterized by a dominant presidential authority with all the features of political life that follow from it to serve the country well".⁸

Concerning the Andijan events these authors believe that the United States position is irrational because the Americans call for an international investigation in conditions of increasing conflict between the local factions. As a result, opponents of American influence on the processes of democratization in Central Asia conclude that the United States uses the issue of democracy to promote its own dominance in the region.

These analysts consider that the slow rates of democratizing internal and external policy significantly encourage the growth of social movements or so-called "color revolutions" that have shaken the political systems of some countries, while installing a sense of concern in others.

Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan political scientists characterize the spring 2005 events in Kyrgyzstan as a "revolution", a "coup d'état" or the replacement of authority. It is necessary to notice, that Kyrgyzstan under President A. Akaev once had the reputation of the most democratic republic in Central Asia. The Kyrgyzstan political elite positioned itself as supporters of democracy. As opposed to Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan has remained aloof from the "Islamic revival." Post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan has followed the path of social and economic modernization – the development of free-market institutions and the creation of conditions for democratic society, while maintaining such impediments to development as tribalism, despotism and corruption.

Central Asian political elites should draw their own conclusions from the events in Kyrgyzstan. Thus, Kazakhstan which has set itself high standards for economic development, now faces the objective necessity to increase its standards of political development. American assistance can only speed up this process, but the requirement for political updating is objective.

After the so-called "revolution" in Kyrgyzstan, the Central Asian experts tried to discover the reasons for "color revolutions". The policy of external pressure for the purpose of speeding up democratic reforms is one of the versions actively discussed in political science circles. Opinions are divided between those who consider "revolutions" as a result of external influence by non-regional players, especially by the US, and those who suggest searching for the reasons in the internal situation.

Experts who support the first opinion believe in the impossibility of effectively integrating Central Asia as a significant geopolitical region in the global international system on the western example. They argue that the Central Asian elite has no other strategy than to promote the authority of its clan, paving the way for "color revolutions" from the outside. American pressure, they argue, prepares the social basis for "color revolutions" through the use of such methods as the critique of authoritarian regimes, charges of violating human rights and corruption, and the political use of financial, economic, technical or humanitarian assistance; informational pressure by supporting NGOs and opposition groups, and public relations programs to promote a positive image of the United States, etc.⁹

On the other hand, analysts who suggest finding the causes of "revolutions" in internal political and economic processes, specify the following factors: the crises of legitimacy of existing regimes; serious contradictions inside the ruling elite; active opposition and its populist slogans; the lack of authority for the use of force; and unresolved problems between the more advanced north and the more underdeveloped southern part of the country. These authors identify external interests in regime change as minor factors.

I think events in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan offer evidence for the presence of both internal and external causes.

First, the Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan political scientists fairly believe, that the present political crisis in Uzbekistan and the change of government in Kyrgyzstan are not a continuation of the democratic and peaceful revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia. The struggle between northern and southern clans for authority, low living standards, and as a result the dramatic level of social differentiation, the discrepancy in political consciousness throughout society, all these factors have been presented as a "color revolution." However, the situation in Kyrgyzstan merely imitate the attributes of events in Ukraine and Georgia. As to the Andijan events, Central Asian analysts recognize deep social problems that have existed for a long time with the extremely impoverished population, the most severe authoritarian regime and the strictly clan-structured society of this state.

⁶ Н. Омаров. Методологические аспекты самоидентификации государств Центральной Азии в глобальном пространстве // США и страны Центральной Азии: реалии и перспективы взаимоотношений, Алматы, 2004.

⁷ Р. Абдулло. Страны ЦА и США: эволюция взаимоотношений // Центральная Азия и Кавказ, 2005, № 6. С. 47-49.

⁸ Р. Абдулло. Страны ЦА и США: эволюция взаимоотношений // Центральная Азия и Кавказ, 2005, № 6. С. 50-57.

⁹ Халил Х. Государственная политика США в Центральной Азии на современном этапе // Саясат.-203.- № 11, С.11.

Second, analysts continue to discuss the problem of the Islamic component in the Kyrgyz and Uzbek events. Some political scientists simply equate the problem of the Islamic and secular components, because in Islamic countries (Uzbekistan, Tajikistan) any anti-governmental movement should be Islamic by definition. However, the initial version presented by the mass media, that events in Andijan were completely prepared by Islamic extremists, has not proved to be true, as participants did not have any connection with the radical extremist Islamic organizations.

Thirdly, some researchers consider that the regime change in Bishkek and events in Andijan are the result of the drugs mafia. Undoubtedly, the influence of drug-trafficking and the "shadow economy", including the drugs business, on the region as a whole, as well as on political processes in each country, does exist and demands additional study. However, it would be a mistake to evaluate the given events only through a prism of drug business interests.

Thus, discussing the causes of "color revolutions," especially the situation in Kyrgyzstan, analysts come to a consensus that the examination of internal and external factors leads to the conclusion that these events have been predetermined.

First, the internal factor - the cause of revolutionary explosions became the loss of popular confidence in the governments of the countries, the lack of a real democracy and the low living standard.

Second, for the most part the post-Soviet elites have been poorly prepared for transformation. Therefore, steps towards modernization and democratization, has resulted in most of these countries in the weakness of regimes and social instability.

Thirdly, the independence of the Central Asian states and their integration in the world community is occurring under the conditions of globalization, which in policy relates to democratization.

Fourthly, the geopolitical characteristics of the region generate problems: especially the closed transport space with limited outputs on world markets and the rather underdeveloped network of communications, especially external ones. The irregular distribution of water and other natural resources and of the population, numerous zones of ecological disaster, and the contrast between overpopulation and lack of living space in part of the region (Uzbekistan) and enormous empty territories and inhospitable living conditions elsewhere (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan).

These contradictions substantially amplify complex social and economic conditions, an aggravation of various political, ethnic, religious groups and clans struggling for power and the redistribution of property, and the increasing activity of the extremist and terrorist organizations, especially Islamic fundamentalists.

Finally, non-regional actors also play a role. The active promotion of democratic values should affect the political situation in the states of the region. The success of the Georgian and Ukrainian opposition has strengthened the decision of official Washington to promote democratization throughout the post-Soviet space. In March 2005, President Bush declared his intention to actively assist the "color revolutions" and to support a special rapid reaction unit to support new democracies. This declaration has stimulated an ambiguous reaction in the countries of Central Asia.

US policy regarding democratization in Central Asia invites the following conclusions:

As a result of globalization and the global reach of American interests, it is difficult to analyze processes occurring in Central Asia without taking into account the role of the United States.

The appearance of double standards in American policy allows authoritarian regimes to consider problems of democratization as minor or to entirely ignore them. The perception of a double standard mentioned by nearly all Central Asian analysts not only damages the proper understanding that democracy strengthens stability and security, and encourages the idea that instead democracy undermines security.

The double standard also leads to a growth of anti-American attitudes in the countries of Central Asia. Although in Kazakhstan we have a more open forum for information, where it is possible to hear various points of view on American policy in the region, Uzbekistan represents the apogee of anti-American propaganda apparent in Central Asia.

Washington probably prefers to maintain the existing forms of authoritative government in the region to avoid the establishment of what might be more democratic, but less predictable forms of authority.

Some directions in American policy appear in conflict. Where the State Department rigidly criticizes human rights conditions in the countries of the region, military policymakers seem ready to cooperate with any government that agrees to join in the so-called "war on terrorism." In fact, as the meetings of Secretary Rice with leaders of Central Asia demonstrate, the strategy of the USA in Central Asia has not significantly changed despite the events in Uzbekistan (Andijan) and Kyrgyzstan.

Certainly, in Central Asian states the American administration has a potential force for expanding the borders of democracy. An opposition is ready to promote the US efforts to distribute democracy in the countries of the region. These include average people (educated persons, representatives of middle and small business, students, local NGOs), who support the westernization of regional countries. They not only want to live in the US or Europe, but also have grounds to believe that, in case of political changes in their country within the next 10-15 years, this dream will come true.

The United States faces huge difficulties on its way to a "triumphal transition" toward democracy in the countries of Central Asia. It depends, on the one hand, on the need to base policy on a comprehensive regional vision. On the other hand, the policy in the field of democratization should be based on a consideration of the unique characteristics of regional states.

Distinctions in political and economic development make possible regional strategy only in the field of security, but not in democracy and human rights spheres which develop on a bilateral level.

The development of democratic political systems in Central Asian states, capable of serving as an example for other countries with large Muslim populations, will help the United States to achieve some of its strategic purposes in the region: the conduct of offensive war against terrorism; the struggle with radical Islam and drug traffic; efforts to strengthen the regional economy and the most significant state institutions; the consolidation of regional trading links and an adequate transport infrastructure.

Russia's Policy in Central Asia: Interests and Approaches¹

IRINA ZVYAGELSKAYA,

Vice President of International Centre for Strategic and Political Studies (Russia)

The political course of the Russian Federation in relation to the Central Asian states remains a branch of policy with a conceptual base and a system of priorities still in the making. On the one hand, Russia does not have an opportunity to play the role of a centre of gravity for the former Soviet republics. On the other hand, their formation as independent subjects of international relations has been accompanied by the formulation of their own interests, priorities and political orientations, which are far from being always in line with the Russian ones.

The main interests determining Russia's approaches towards Central Asia may be divided into two groups. The "positive" interests are those which promote the consolidation of the geopolitical positions of Russia itself, and can bring some benefits and economic profit. The "negative" interests are those threats and challenges facing Russia and which dictate the need for it to respond.

The first group of factors highlighting the Central Asian states' "usefulness" to the Russian Federation and accordingly conditioning its desire "to stay" in the region, includes: the possibilities of using the military-technical facilities in the territory of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan; obtaining raw materials for leading industries; preserving and expanding market outlets for Russian produce (which is fully competitive here); gaining profit from joint communication projects; obtaining cheap labour ready to work in unattractive branches of the economy; commercial and economic cooperation; the prospect of expanding its influence at the southern flanks of the CIS and beyond their limits; and maintaining Russia's great-power status.

One may consider Russia's "negative" interests in Central Asia to be as follows: combating the illegal drugs turnover; checking the growth of religious and political extremism; preventing developments that might eventually result in the region being transformed into a zone dominated by forces hostile to Russia and aggravating Russia's relations with the leading world powers. These interests induce Russia to pursue a "costly" policy for the sake of safeguarding its own security.

As practice has shown, Central Asia has become a region independently generating threats and challenges

to Russia's security, and simultaneously a transit corridor for threats coming from forces outside its borders. Since the Central Asian states gained independence, the region has faced a number of threats and challenges that have exerted a destabilising influence on the situation. Among them are the growth of extremism in the form of political Islam, drugs and arms trafficking, the disputed border issues, tense relations between individual countries, the degradation of the environment, the negative influence of a number of external factors, particularly the Afghan region, and others. Overall, this has created a rather high conflict potential in the region.

The transparency of borders, constant migration flows, and the contacts which had been formed back in Soviet times made Russia much more dependent on the evolution of the situation in the states of Central Asia than had ever been expected. These threats did not simply affect Russia, but spread to its territory, intertwining with the Russian domestic security challenges and fostering their intensification.

One can identify several stages of Russia's policy vis-à-vis Central Asia. The beginning of the 1990s was marked by a pronounced lack of interest. This can be explained by using the following logic: Russia was in need of swift reforms, and the Central Asian states with authoritarian regimes would only slow its progress.

From the middle of the 1990s and up to the late 1990s Moscow determined its role to be as a guarantor of the region's security and the region's defender from external threat. The civil war in Tajikistan was also a contributory factor in Russia to assuming the role of a mediator. Still, with all the importance of these roles for Russia itself and for the Central Asian republics, a concentration on military-political ties could not but help breed fears among them concerning the possibility of unilateral pressure, all the more so since Russia could not assume the functions that would ensure its attractiveness to those states undergoing the process of transformation. It could become neither a financial sponsor nor a trade partner ready to purchase low-quality raw material and manufactured goods for the sake of political dividends.

The US military-political presence has drastically changed the pre-existing balance of forces in Central Asia.

¹ Presentation at the 'Terrorism, Geopolitics and Multinational Security Cooperation in Central Asia' Conference, held by Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) (February 22 - 24, 2006, Honolulu, Hawaii). It is published in accordance with scientific cooperation between KazISS and APCSS.

After the war in Afghanistan the system of international relations in Central Asia reflected more signs of cooperation (often involuntary) than growing competition between Russia and the United States. The situation began to change, however, when it became clear that the United States had no plans to withdraw from Central Asia and when the self-assertive style of Washington began to threaten to relegate Russia to an increasingly marginal role (at both global and regional levels). Some specialists hold that the principle of unilateralism in the actions of the United States has contributed to the competition between the great powers in Central Asia. Due to a demonstrative effect of the US presence in the region, Russian policy there has also become more active. Russian companies, which had been very reluctant and showed no obvious interest in investing in the region (with an exception of oil and gas industry) are now present in promising spheres of production. Russia's return to the region has occurred in three main directions: (1) the establishment of military bases; (2) active efforts within the framework of multilateral security organisations; and (3) the development of bilateral interstate relations within this sphere.

There is only one line of cooperation where Russia has no competition: by accepting migrant labour, it provides the states of Central Asia with an estimated one billion dollars a year. Seasonal labour in Russia, for all its negative dimensions (the lack of rights of the migrant workers; their onerous labour conditions; their concentration in low-paid, low-prestige occupations), such jobs nonetheless afford the citizens of Central Asian states an opportunity to earn money and support their families, and thereby help to maintain social stability.

Nowadays Russian policy in Central Asia seems to have entered a new stage. There are signs that previous approaches to the post-Soviet states have been undergoing a re-evaluation. This re-evaluation was mainly caused by the phenomenon of 'orange revolutions' perceived by Russian politicians and experts as a new project worked out by Western political technologists with a purpose of bringing to power pro-Western regimes, less inclined to cooperate with Russia. There is no denial that fertile soil for social protest exists in many countries, but a conspiracy theory has also gained ground in Russia. The threat of an 'orange revolution' in Russia itself had to be taken into consideration, even though it was out of the question for the time being.

Several general conclusions stemmed from this reasoning.

1. Western policy vis-a-vis Russia and post-Soviet states has been more vividly marked by a double standard approach, especially with the present Georgian regime depicted as democratic or Kyrgyzstan under a new government given a higher democratic rating on the scale of the Freedom House.

2. The CIS has lost its importance. While from the very beginning it could not be perceived as a form of integration, it has still been a tool to keep new countries together thus making the process of their divorce less painful. Russian politicians started to stress a lack of interest in this organisation.

3. New revolutions have been organised by NGOs, so Russia should engage herself in the process of creating them in the post-Soviet states. Since the post-Soviet leaders have been leaving political scene Russia has to work more closely with a new generation of politicians in these countries.

The developments in Central Asia have only strengthened this reasoning. A growing concern can be explained by the fact that a few political and socio-economic trends in most developed Central Asian states resemble those in Russia. While in Russia there is no traditional society and its domestic politics have nothing to do with clan rivalry, still with the relations of the local oligarchs and political elite, the consequences of privatisation and a problem of power succession look more or less similar. In Kyrgyzstan, the first state in the region where elements of 'orange' technologies were tried, the "revolution" resulted in pogroms. According to the report by the ICG, "The disruption of the previous system of patronage and political allegiances, combined with a power vacuum at almost all levels of society, has brought other long-simmering disputes into the open, with often violent results. Ambitious local leaders, including the heads of criminal groups, have taken advantage to carve out a piece of the pie for themselves, often under the pretext of righting past wrongs. There are rumours that some in the new leadership may be finding it hard to resist temptation as well."² No matter what had been said about Akaev's entourage and the ruling family, those who organised the coup d'état are hardly more democratic. They were even unable to imitate a democratic revolution.

Uzbekistan was probably also on the list of revolutionary democratisations. In Andijan, the uprising marked by an Islamist trace was crushed. Russia did not lose its influence either in Kyrgyzstan or Uzbekistan but both events encouraged decision-makers to look more closely at the present Russian policy in the region, its goals and style.

It can be noted that Russia has placed an emphasis on bilateral relations with the local states. It still does not want to see the situation in the region through the prism of a new Great Game. Though the competition in the region among various outside powers is on the rise, it's not in the best interest of Russia to encourage rivalry in the area.

Still there are some geopolitical approaches to Central Asia, like the attempts to construct a new or expanding Middle East or Greater Central Asia (including Afghanistan), that are dictated by political reasons. An automatic incorporation of the states of Central Asia and the Caucasus into the traditional Middle East may have only initially reflected a certain reality expressed in their quest for national identity, in the attempts to revive their links with coreligionists and ethnically related peoples. But later on they came to occupy a special place in the system and structure of international relations, linking the opportunity for accelerated development mainly with the expansion of ties with the West. Raising the question that the Greater Middle East is united by common security challenges seems rather contentious. The project "Partnership for Greater Central Asia" also seems a purely political exercise since it tends to ignore the obvious incompatibility of the main political and economic trends in the Central Asian states and Afghanistan.

² Kyrgyzstan: A Faltering State// Asia Report N°109 – December 16, 2005, p.4

It's true that Moscow sees the situation in Central Asia differently to the US. It is not promoting democracy there. The states of Central Asia, which are at different levels in social and political development, have yet to develop a political model that would ensure a normal transfer of power by means of democratic procedures. While one should not deny the importance of the national elections and the manifestations of political pluralism found here, it is nonetheless necessary to recognise that these positive steps have had little impact on the character of the regimes, which have remained essentially authoritarian. The authoritarianism of post-Soviet states has been able to ensure a certain level of stability and control, but it cannot provide for an orderly succession and transfer of power. The departure of any leader could unleash a power struggle based on clan or regional interests, and that in turn could trigger new crises and even precipitate civil war.

The Islamists fighting for their own cause can be instrumental in the inter-clan struggle. True, they have their own agenda – the establishment of a Muslim state or even a Caliphate, but it's also true that political Islam has become no less powerful a means of public mobilisation than ethnicity. It has become instrumental in the inter-clan rivalry as well.

The Salafi ideas of the local Islamists were mostly imported from abroad. The revival of Islam in the region was marked by a keen interest in the teachings of Muslim thinkers but as Islamic tradition was interrupted under the Soviet rule, a lack of experience determined the uncritical attitude of the local people to the Muslim literature flooding into Central Asia. At the beginning of the 1990s, foreign missionaries greatly contributed to the re-islamisation of Central Asia - starting with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. According to Vitaly Naumkin, Saudi citizens - ethnic Uzbeks, whose ancestors left the area after the Bolshevik revolution - were the first to come to the cities and towns of the Ferghana Valley. Their radicalism was welcomed by local imams, representatives of informal Islam. Later radical Islamist organisations, like HTI, established their network throughout several countries in the region and managed to enroll many supporters and sympathisers. They rely on local funding, mostly donations, and are playing a noticeable role. The radicals can destabilise the situation by adding a touch of extremism to any social protest. "Velvet revolutions" in Central Asia would hardly be velvet.

Russia's policy in this context is directed by pragmatism and not by any ideological preferences. It deals with the present leaders and does not encourage changes, which might destabilise Central Asia, presenting an imminent threat to Russia itself.

India - Central Asia: Modern Economic Diplomacy Trends

DR. IBROKHIM R. MAVLONOV,

Head of Practical Diplomacy Chair, University of World Economy and Diplomacy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Uzbekistan.

(Former Ambassador of Uzbekistan to India: 1999-2005)

Abstract

The unique feature of the Indian economy has been high growth with stability and it has proved its strength and resilience. India's economic relations with Central Asian nations are showing a continuing positive trend. High-level visits have been exchanged on a regular basis. India's economic growth shows that India is not only a reliable business partner, but one of the most experienced countries in the Asian region that can, with its economic potential, promote active economic development in Central Asian region.

Introduction

India has strong historical relations with the Central Asian (CA) region (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan). Both India and Central Asia were two powerful centres of ancient oriental civilisation with a great deal of interaction. The historical past of both centres has a strong foundation of exchanges in cultural, political and economic spheres. The ancient Silk Road was a strong link between India and the CA region whether it was trade or people to people contact. In the present, India is seeking to evolve a similar and strong relationship with each of the Central Asian countries. There is a lot of common ground for the building of this relationship. Secularism and democracy are two features that are shared by the CA and India. Moreover, the CA has a positive and extremely friendly disposition towards India.

Today we can say that India's relationship with the Central Asian countries is excellent, underpinned by historic and cultural bonds and, since the independence of these countries, high-level visits have been exchanged on a regular basis. These have been complemented by industrial and consumer goods exhibitions, along with visits of trade delegations. India's economic relations are therefore showing a continuing positive trend. Efforts are currently being made to encourage Indian investors to enter the manufacturing sector in these countries through joint ventures, commensurate with their preferred policy. There is ample awareness in the CA of India's strength in a number of niche areas, including small and medium industries, and in human resource development. India's recent diplomatic thrust into Central Asia is keeping its future energy requirements and strategic positioning in mind, through bilateral visits and trade¹.

Considering the potential that the CA region offers and the insignificant Indian presence in that market, the Focus CIS Programme was launched by the Commerce & Industry Minister Government of India in 2003 at the time of announcement of the EXIM Policy on 3/31/2003. The Programme aimed to focus on countries in the CIS region, with emphasis in the first phase on 7 countries - namely Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. With a view to enhance India's trade with countries in the CIS region, including the CA, the scope of the Focus: CIS Programme has now been extended further, until the financial year 2007-2008.

Under this Programme, the Government of India extends assistance to exporters, business chambers etc. to visit these countries, organise trade fairs, invite CIS trade delegations to visit India and undertake various other promotional market activities. The initiatives taken under this Programme have received an encouraging response from the Indian trading community and are likely to further boost bilateral trade in the forthcoming years.

In the recent past, economic liberalisation measures adopted by the countries of the CA Region and India, the establishment of institutional mechanisms for mutual interactions and the development of fast/direct links to the CA Region have contributed to increased economic interaction between the countries of the CA Region and India. However, the full potential is yet to be realised. Recognising the need to enhance trade and to stimulate interest among the businessmen of both sides, a number of high level visits and a range of initiatives mentioned below have been undertaken.

In the seminar "Round Table on Trade with CIS Countries"² in New Delhi with exporters and senior diplomats from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan on the prospects for and problems of raising India's CIS trade and investment partnership, organised by the Federation of Indian Export Organisations (FIEO), Mr. Subhash Mittal, Convener of the FIEO Committee on International Trade and Export Promotion, noted that "India's exports to the CIS were worth US\$ 919 million and its imports were of the order of US\$ 843 million. Just the next year, 2003-04, he said, India's exports jumped to US\$ 1,021 million and imports to US\$

¹ India and Central Asia. Rahul Bedi. Frontline. Volume 19 - Issue 19, September 14 - 27, 2002 <http://www.fronnet.com/fl1919/19190600.htm>

² FIEO Focus on Raising Trade with CIS Countries. FIEO press releases. NO.FIEO/PR/30/05 - March 18, 2005 http://www.fieo.com/pressreleases/view_selected_press.php?delhiinfo=82

1,216 million". Percentage-wise, he said, "trade between India and the CIS had gone up sharply from a mere 2.75 to 29 between the years 2002-03 and 2003-04. India's trade with the Central Asian countries, he said, had expanded to a greater degree, recording above 50% growth since 2002-03. This development, Mr. Mittal said, showed that there was still very large scope for India and the CIS countries to increase their trade, and also that "we are not doing enough to exploit the opportunities that we have".

INDIA-KAZAKHSTAN

Traditionally, warm and cordial relations with Kazakhstan progressed smoothly³. Kazakhstan's outlook towards India has changed significantly in the last few years.

Some important visits: The second session of the Indo-Kazakh Joint Science and Technology Committee was held in Almaty in October 1998. Punjab National Bank opened its representative office in Almaty in October 1998. Mr. Karibzhanov, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Agriculture of Kazakhstan, visited New Delhi in March 1999 in connection with a Kazakh Investment Conference. Kasymzhomart Tokaev, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, came on a bilateral visit in August, 1999. The fourth meeting of the Indo-Kazakh Joint Commission was held in February 2002 and a Protocol on Trade, Economic, Scientific, Technological, Industrial and Cultural Cooperation was signed. The Minister of State for Small Scale Industry visited Kazakhstan in April 2002 to attend the Eurasia Summit and Enterprise India 2002 and interalia discussions were held about cooperation in the Small Scale Industry sector.

The visit of the President of Kazakhstan H.E. Mr. Nursultan Nazarbayev to India in February 2002 deepened the relationship between the two countries further. The visit of the former Prime Minister of India Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee to Almaty on June 3-5, 2002 provided an opportunity for consolidation and concretisation of the relationship in the areas of cooperation that were identified during the visit of President Nursultan Nazarbayev to India. Apart from hosting Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev⁴ on his state visit in February, India has also launched a regional "people-to-people" initiative by inviting diplomats, parliamentarians and opinion-makers from the CA to visit its industrial and technological centres and also to interact with senior politicians, officials and businessmen.

The Kazakh Industry and Trade Minister Mr. Adilbek Zhaksybekov visited India from September 15-18, 2004. The third meeting of the Indo-Kazakh Joint Business Council was held in Almaty on September 6, 2004. While FICCI participated from the Indian side, the Kazakh Chamber of Commerce and Industry represented Kazakhstan. Under the Focus-CIS programme, the Engineering Export promotion Council (EEPC) organised INDIATECH-2004 in Almaty on September 3-6, 2004 in collaboration with the Kazakh Chamber of Commerce and Industry and KITEX 2004, showcasing engineering products from 66 Indian companies. Shri E.V.K.S.

³ http://www.indianembassy.org/indiainfo/india_2000/chapters/chp28.pdf

⁴ India and Central Asia. Rahul Bedi. Frontline. Volume 19 - Issue 19, September 14 - 27, 2002 <http://www.flonnet.com/fl1919/19190600.htm>

Elangovan, the Minister of State for Commerce and Industry visited Kazakhstan from January 12-14, 2005. More than 50 businessmen accompanied the Minister. The business delegation comprised representatives from FICCI, CII, EEPC, the Pharmaceutical Export Council and the Chemical Export Council. The fifth meeting of the Indo-Kazakh Joint Commission was held in Astana, Kazakhstan on February 17-18, 2005. The Indian side was led by the Minister of Petroleum and Natural Gas, Shri Mani Shankar Aiyar and the Kazakh side was led by Mr. Vladimir Shkolnik, the Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources of Kazakhstan.

Economic Relations. The close political ties between the two countries encourage them to identify and pursue the strengthening of their economic relations. Exports to India and imports from Kazakhstan during 2000-2005 according to figures published by the Department of Commerce Ministry of Commerce and Industry of the Government of India⁵ are given below:

Country: KAZAKHSTAN
Dated: 2/10/2006 Values in US\$ Million

S.No.	Year	2000-2001	2001-2002	2002-2003	2003-2004	2004-2005
1.	EXPORTS TO KAZAKHSTAN	50.08	45.70	46.88	74.81	79.40
2.	%Growth		-8.74	2.58	59.58	6.14
3.	IMPORTS FROM KAZAKHSTAN	14.04	7.39	12.73	9.26	15.35
4.	%Growth		-47.33	72.14	-27.22	65.71
5.	TOTAL TRADE	64.12	53.09	59.60	84.07	94.75
6.	%Growth		-17.19	12.26	41.05	12.70
7.	TRADE BALANCE	36.04	38.31	34.15	65.55	64.05
	Exchange rate: (1 US\$ = Rs.)	45.6844	47.6919	48.3953	45.9513	44.9315

The majority of the commodities exported from India are tea, pharmaceuticals, medical equipment, machinery, Tobacco, consumer items, etc. and the majority of items imported by India are silver and silver-gold, asbestos, steel, aluminum, wool, raw hides, etc⁶.

Cooperation in other sectors: India's energy demands are expected to reach nearly 3.5 million barrels per day (mbd) by 2010 from the present 1.9 mbd. The most significant area in this regard is that of oil and gas⁷: joint exploration and production; improved and enhanced oil recovery in older fields; and building domestic and cross-border pipelines. Indo-Kazakh cooperation in the area of science and technology has made substantial progress. The other important area for bilateral cooperation is information technology. Kazakhstan has also invited Indian investment in pharmaceuticals, agriculture, transport, communications, construction, defence and hi-technology industries, and small and

⁵ Department of Commerce Ministry of Commerce & Industry Government of India. Export Import Data Bank. Country - wise. <http://commerce.nic.in/eidb/iecnt.asp>

⁶ India - Kazakhstan Economic and Commercial Relations. Source: Indian High Commission, Kazakhstan. <http://www.ficci.com/ficci/international/countries/Kazakhstan/kazakhstancommercialrelation.htm>

⁷ Opening remarks by India's Minister of Petroleum and Natural Gas, Shri Mani Shankar Aiyar. Astana, February 17-18, 2005. http://www.indianembassy.ru/docs-htm/en/en_Ind_Kazakh_t1702_2005.htm

medium scale industries for the production of garments, textiles and footwear⁸.

INDIA- KYRGYZSTAN

Since the establishment of diplomatic relations between Kyrgyzstan and India, warm and encouraging relationships have been kept up between the two countries. The Indo-Kyrgyz Joint Commission on Trade and Economic and Science and Technical cooperation and the Joint Business Council was formed to strengthen and support the bilateral trade and economic relations. They have had several meetings.

Some important visits: The President of the Kyrgyz Republic, H.E. Mr. Askar Akaev paid a state visit to India in April 1999. An agreement on the avoidance of double taxation, a treaty on mutual legal assistance in criminal matters, a cultural exchange programme for the years 1998-2000 and a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on civil aviation matters were signed during the visit. Vice President, Shri Krishan Kant visited Kyrgyzstan in August/September 1999. A team of scientists led by Mr. Meimanaliev, Kyrgyz Minister of Health, visited India in December 1999 under the bio-medical research programme between the Defence Institute of Physiology and Allied Sciences (DIPAS), New Delhi and the National Centre of Cardiology and Internal Medicine (NCCIM), Bishkek. A study team of four operators led by Deputy Director of the State Agency for Tourism and Sports of the Kyrgyz Republic was scheduled to visit New Delhi in the latter half of January 2000 under the ITEC programme. A business delegation from Kyrgyzstan visited New Delhi in May 2002 in connection with the third meeting of the joint Business Council.

During the visit the President of the Kyrgyz Republic, H.E. Mr. Askar Akaev to India on August 7, 2002, a wide range of bilateral and international issues, including political relations, trade and economic cooperation and the issue of Indian technical assistance were discussed⁹. Kyrgyzstan and India expressed their determination to increase the level of trade and economic cooperation between them and the need to devise new spheres of reciprocally beneficial cooperation in the IT, mining, fruit processing and engineering sectors.

Kyrgyzstan is attaching overriding significance to boosting cooperation with India in various directions¹⁰. According to Mr. Askar Akayev, the following are seen as top priority fields for cooperation with India: tourism, training of specialists, developing small and medium-sized businesses, the processing and mining industries and information technology.

Economic relations. There are several potential areas for Kyrgyz-Indian joint cooperation – food processing, information technology, tourism, pharmaceuticals, chemicals, cosmetics, engineering goods, electronics, banking services, and mining. Exports to India and imports from Kyrgyzstan during 2000-2005 according to figures published by the De-

partment of Commerce Ministry of Commerce and Industry of the Government of India are given below:

Country: KYRGYZSTAN

Dated: 2/10/2006 Values in US\$ Million

S.No.	Year	2000-2001	2001-2002	2002-2003	2003-2004	2004-2005
1.	EXPORTS TO KYRGYZSTAN	17.59	10.97	14.67	38.20	49.10
2.	%Growth		-37.66	33.71	160.49	28.54
3.	IMPORTS FROM KYRGYZSTAN	4.43	0.56	0.47	0.54	0.62
4.	%Growth		-87.44	-16.16	16.48	13.51
5.	TOTAL TRADE	22.02	11.52	15.13	38.74	49.72
6.	%Growth		-47.67	31.31	156.05	28.33
7.	TRADE BALANCE	13.16	10.41	14.20	37.66	48.49
	Exchange rate: (1US\$= Rs.)	45.6844	47.6919	48.3953	45.9513	44.9315

Cooperation in other sectors: Exchanges at business levels took place regularly¹¹. The third meeting of the Joint Business Council took place on May 2002 in New Delhi. The Kyrgyz delegation had a lot of one-to-one meetings with Indian businessmen and decided to cooperate in various fields of trade and economy, including machinery building, information technology, food processing, etc¹². The fourth session of the Indo-Kyrgyz JBC was held in Bishkek on September 7-8, 2004. FICCI from the Indian side and the Kyrgyz Chamber of Commerce and Industry from the Kyrgyz side participated in the JBC. In July 2004, a FIEO delegation comprising Indian companies that had interest in the areas of farming produce, tea, jewellery exports, gold and diamond mining, cotton processing, etc. visited Kyrgyzstan and had meetings with high level officials in the Kyrgyzstan Government and various agencies.

INDIA-TAJIKISTAN

Indo-Tajik bilateral relations have continued to deepen during recent years.

Some important visits: The President of the Republic of Tajikistan H.E. Mr. Emomali Rakhmonov visited India in 1995, 1999 and 2001. During visit in 2001 various agreements, including an Agreement on Long-Term Cooperation in Trade Economic Cooperation and Cooperation in the Field of Industry, were signed. A Memorandum of Understanding on Technical Cooperation and an Air Service Agreement were also signed. The Joint Declaration on Principles of Mutual Relations, signed by the visiting Tajik President and the Indian Prime Minister, charts out the future course of intensified cooperation between the two countries in diversified fields¹³. During the talks, Indian Prime Minister Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee conveyed to H.E. Mr. Emomali Rakhmonov that India would offer a

⁸ India and Kazakhstan: Significant Changes. K.R. Jawahar. February 24, 2002 http://www.subcontinent.com/sapra/research/centralasia/articles/ca_article_20020224a_html.htm

⁹ KYRGYZ-INDIA Joint Press Statement. Ministry of External Affairs Government of India. New Delhi. August 7, 2002. <http://www.mea.gov.in/pressrelease/2002/08/07pr1.htm>

¹⁰ Visiting Kyrgyz president vows to boost cooperation with India. Source: Kabar news agency, Bishkek, in Russian 1232 GMT 10 Nov 03. BBC Mon Alert CAU 101103/mk. <http://www.eurasianet.org/resource/kyrgyzstan/hypermail/200311/0017.shtm>

¹¹ Eurasia. Annual Report 2004 – 2005. Ministry of External Affairs Government of India. – p.46. <http://www.indianembassy.org/policy/30ar01.pdf>

¹² Fatima Sushnalo. Trade relations between Kyrgyzstan and India. Dialogue (A quarterly journal of Astha Bharati). April - June, 2002, Volume 3 No. 4. http://www.asthabharati.org/Dia_Apr02/trade.htm

¹³ India, Tajikistan Sign Joint Declaration. Press Trust of India (PTI). http://english.people.com.cn/english/200105/11/eng20010511_69644.html

grant of five million U.S. dollars to drought-hit Tajikistan to enable the latter to buy Indian goods and services for the stipulated amount.

Other recent visits from the Tajik side have been those of the Chairman of the Tajik Parliament's Upper Chamber and Dushanbe Mayor (January 2003), the Tajik Prime Minister in 1993, the Trade and Economy Minister (December 2001), the Tajikistan Minister of Trade's visit to India in December 2001 in connection with the First Session of the Indo-Tajikistan Joint Commission, and others. From the Indian side, the visits have been that of the Prime Minister (November 13-14, 2003) and other delegations.

Economic relations. With the establishment of diplomatic relations with Tajikistan, the institutional and legal framework has been created to facilitate trade and economic cooperation. As a result of various recent visits, a number of bilateral agreements in the sphere of trade, economic and technical cooperation have been signed between India and Tajikistan. These include: the agreement to set up an Indo-Tajik Joint Commission for Economic, Scientific and Technological Cooperation; an agreement for bilateral investment protection; air services agreement; and an agreement on long term cooperation in trade, economy and industry. The Indian co-Chairman of the Joint Commission is the Union Commerce and Industry Minister and the Tajik co-Chairman is the Minister for Trade and Economy. The first Joint Commission was held in New Delhi in December 2001. The second session of the Joint Commission was held in Dushanbe on July 8-9, 2005. Exports to India and imports from Tajikistan during 2000-2005 according to figures published by the Department of Commerce Ministry of Commerce and Industry of the Government of India are given below:

Country: TAJIKISTAN
Dated: 2/10/2006 Values in US\$ Million

S.No.	Year	2000-2001	2001-2002	2002-2003	2003-2004	2004-2005
1.	EXPORTS TO TAJIKISTAN	3.55	1.22	8.65	4.47	6.25
2.	%Growth		-65.54	606.12	-48.34	39.96
3.	IMPORTS FROM TAJIKISTAN	0.54	1.34	0.08	3.95	3.98
4.	%Growth		145.94	-93.91	4,751.83	0.61
5.	TOTAL TRADE	4.10	2.56	8.73	8.42	10.23
6.	%Growth		-37.47	240.69	-3.54	21.49
7.	TRADE BALANCE	3.01	-0.12	8.57	0.51	2.28
	Exchange rate: (1US\$ = Rs.)	45.6844	47.6919	48.3953	45.9513	44.9315

Cooperation in other sectors: An Indian delegation headed by the Joint Secretary (Eurasia) of the Ministry of External Affairs visited Tajikistan on May 7-9, 2004 and under India's aid programme 10 city transport buses were gifted to the city of Dushanbe. A US \$ 8.37 million grant extended to Government of Tajikistan was waived. A project under India's aid programme to set up a fruit processing plant in Dushanbe was completed and handed over to Government of Tajikistan in January 2005.

INDIA-TURKMENISTAN

India recognised Turkmenistan on December 26, 1991 and established its Embassy in Ashgabat on January 30, 1994. Both countries enjoy very friendly relations with each other.

Some important visits: The foundation of vibrant political relations between the two countries was laid with the

visit of the President of Turkmenistan H.E. Mr. Saparmurat Niyazov to India on April 18 – 20, 1992. Prime Minister Shri P.V. Narasimha Rao paid an official visit to Turkmenistan on September 19 – 21, 1995. President H.E. Saparmurat Niyazov made a second visit to India on February 25 – 26, 1997. An Indian scientific delegation representing Central Electronics Limited (CEL) and the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) visited Turkmenistan in June 1998 to study the possibilities of cooperation in the solar energy sector. A delegation from the Indian Oil Corporation (IOC) also visited Turkmenistan. India's External Affairs Minister, Shri Jaswant Singh, visited Ashgabat in May 1999. Agreements on the setting up of a Working Group on Energy and a Protocol for the development of cooperation between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the two countries were signed during the visit.

Important Bilateral Treaties and Agreements: A Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement was signed by the two countries on September 20, 1995. An Agreement on the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to taxes on income and on capital was signed in February 1997 and has been operational since July 2002. An agreement was signed in Ashgabat in September 1996 between the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Turkmenistan and the Indian-CIS Chamber of Commerce and Industry to develop cooperation between the economic, commercial and financial organisations of the two countries. The first meeting of the member states under the Trilateral Transit Agreement among India, Iran and Turkmenistan was held in Delhi on January 31, 2000. A MOU relating to air services operation between the two countries was signed on February 7, 2000 giving Turkmen Airlines the right to fly to Amritsar and Delhi. Presently, Turkmenistan is operating eight flights a week to Amritsar/Delhi. The Indian sectors are the most profitable for Turkmen Airlines.

Economic relations. Exports to India and imports from Turkmenistan during 2000-2005 according to figures published by the Department of Commerce Ministry of Commerce and Industry of the Government of India are given below:

Country: TURKMENISTAN
Dated: 2/10/2006 Values in US\$ Million

S.No.	Year	2000-2001	2001-2002	2002-2003	2003-2004	2004-2005
1.	EXPORTS TO TURKMENISTAN	2.71	4.35	10.29	19.21	14.63
2.	%Growth		60.51	136.55	86.64	-23.88
3.	IMPORTS FROM TURKMENISTAN	1.12	1.95	5.40	9.34	10.69
4.	%Growth		73.32	177.85	72.77	14.43
5.	TOTAL TRADE	3.83	6.30	15.70	28.55	25.31
6.	%Growth		64.26	149.31	81.86	-11.35
7.	TRADE BALANCE	1.59	2.41	4.89	9.88	3.94
	Exchange rate: (1US\$ = Rs.)	45.6844	47.6919	48.3953	45.9513	44.9315

Exports from India mainly consist of pharmaceuticals, machinery and equipment and imports consist of chemicals.

Cooperation in other sectors: The Government of India has set up an 'Industrial Training Centre' in Ashgabat under the ITEC programme. The project has been executed by Hindustan Machine Tools (International) Ltd, who provided a versatile range of machine tools worth US\$ 0.5 million for manufacturing a variety of dies and spare-parts for several

industries. The Centre is equipped with facilities for training basic skills, manufacturing tools and products required by different industries, prototype development and pilot projects and component manufacture. There is also cooperation in other fields such as railways, space, IT, biotechnology, infrastructure, mining etc. India has a joint venture called Turkmenistan-Ajanta Pharma Ltd commissioned in 1998 with a credit line of \$5 million extended by India in March, 1993 out of another credit line of \$10 million approved the same year.

On October 18, 2005 Mr. Rajiv Sikri, the Foreign Secretary of India, visited Ashgabat and had a number of high level meetings. "As Turkmen TV reported, negotiations were focused on areas of common interest such as the oil and gas branch, the fuel and energy sectors, transportation, the textile industry, agriculture, science, education, culture and healthcare"¹⁴. The Indian envoy stressed that the bilateral relations had grown steadily because of the historical ties between the two lands and the two peoples and also because of the policy of peace and friendship, a good neighbourhood and cooperation, pursued by the President of Turkmenistan. The sides expressed their readiness to expand their interaction in science and education through the implementation of joint educational and research programs. The creation of joint training centres was discussed. One such training centre already works successfully at Turkmen Polytechnic Institute.

INDIA-UZBEKISTAN

The relations between India and Uzbekistan were marked by traditional warmth and based on shared historical and cultural ties. Over the years there has been a steady exchange of high level visits between the two countries.

Some important visits: The President of the Republic of Uzbekistan H.E. Mr. Islam Karimov visited India from August 17-19, 1991. Agreements on Economic, Commercial, Scientific and Technical Cooperation and Cooperation in the spheres of Culture, Arts, Education, Science, Tourism, Sports and Mass Media were signed. The Prime Minister of India Shri P.V. Narasimha Rao paid an official visit to Uzbekistan in May 1993. Agreements were signed on trade and economic cooperation. An Indo-Uzbek Treaty on the Principles of Inter-state Relations and Cooperation was also signed during the visit. The Prime Minister announced the opening of an Indian Cultural Centre in Tashkent and a credit of US\$ 10 million for joint ventures. President Karimov paid his visit to India in January 1994. He was awarded an honorary degree by JNU and met Indian businessmen. During the visit agreements were signed on cooperation in economic and cultural matters, telecommunications and postal matters, and the establishment of the Indian Cultural Centre at Tashkent. In addition, the instruments of ratification of the Indo-Uzbek treaty on Principles of Inter-State Relations and Cooperation were exchanged. Uzbek President Islam Karimov visited India from May 1-3, 2000, on his next state visit. Nine agreements, including the Joint Declaration on Principles of Relations between the two countries, an Extra-territorial Treaty and an agreement for a Credit Line from India for US\$ 10 million were signed. President I. Karimov visited India from April 4-6, 2005. Twelve agreements/MOUs were signed. Four of them at the governmental level which are

for cooperation in a) military and military-technical areas, b) education, c) culture and sports and d) small and private entrepreneurship. Eight MOUs were signed between Indian and Uzbek institutions and companies in IT, banking, tourism and education.

Other important visits in recent times include the External Affairs Minister of India - May 1999 and November 2003, the Uzbek Minister of Higher and Secondary Specialised Education - January 2003, the Foreign Minister of Uzbekistan - February 2003 and October 2004, the Uzbek Deputy Defence Minister - April - May 2003. The Minister of State for External Affairs Shri E. Ahamed visited Uzbekistan on October 1-4, 2004 for the Birth Centenary Celebrations of the Late Prime Minister Shri Lal Bahadur Shastri in Uzbekistan.

Economic Relations. Trade relations between India and Uzbekistan are governed by the Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation signed in May 1993. It contains the normal features of trade agreements, such as mutual MFN treatment, promotion of economic, industrial, scientific and technical cooperation, including in the field of training of personnel, the active participation of small and medium sized enterprises in bilateral economic cooperation, and counter-trade, etc. India and Uzbekistan also signed an Agreement on Avoidance of Double Taxation in 1993 and yet another one for Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection in May 1999. The Inter-governmental Commission has met five times. Imports from and exports to India during 1996-2004 according to figures published by the State Committee on Statistics, Republic of Uzbekistan, are given below:

Year	Imports from India (in US\$ million)	Exports to India (in US\$ million)	Total (in US\$ million)
1996	31.45	10.91	42.36
1997	29.70	11.29	50.99
1998	16.38	5.68	22.06
1999	25.92	12.91	38.83
2000	14.45	10.85	25.30
2001	15.9	17.5	33.40
2002	15.4	25.1	40.50
2003	18.2	90.4	108.60
2004	27.2	122.9	150.1

Exports to and imports from Uzbekistan during 2000-2005 according to figures published by the Department of Commerce Ministry of Commerce and Industry of the Government of India are given below:

Country: UZBEKISTAN Dated: 2/10/2006 Values in US\$ Million

S.No.	Year	2000-2001	2001-2002	2002-2003	2003-2004	2004-2005
1.	EXPORTS TO UZBEKISTAN	9.39	6.53	5.08	15.14	19.66
2.	%Growth		-30.45	-22.32	198.33	29.80
6.	IMPORTS FROM UZBEKISTAN	10.58	17.27	20.54	27.70	29.43
7.	%Growth		63.16	18.96	34.82	6.25
11.	TOTAL TRADE	19.98	23.80	25.62	42.84	49.08
12.	%Growth		19.14	7.63	67.22	14.58
16.	TRADE BALANCE	-1.19	-10.74	-15.46	-12.56	-9.77
	Exchange rate: (1 US\$ = Rs.)	45.6844	47.6919	48.3953	45.9513	44.9315

As per trade statistics, pharmaceuticals have traditionally been the largest single item of Indian exports to Uzbekistan. Other items include tea, machinery, packaging material, plastic items, garments, knitwear, surgical items, and consumer

¹⁴ News: India, Turkmenistan for Closer Cooperation in Energy, Industry. <http://www.newscentralasia.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=1520>

goods. Uzbekistan's exports to India include the supply of machinery and services (which reflect the remittances of Uzbek Airways of its revenue from both passenger and cargo services from India). Other items of Uzbek exports include cotton, raw silk, raw wool, non-ferrous metals, agricultural produce, aircraft etc. The Government of India had extended three credit lines of US\$ 10 million each to government of Uzbekistan, from which US\$ 12.5 million was utilised out of the first two credit lines.

In July 2004, a FIEO delegation comprising Indian companies that had interest in the areas of silk, cotton processing, agro products, tea, jewellery exports, gold and diamond mining, etc. visited Uzbekistan and had meetings with high level officials in the Uzbek Government and various agencies. A 13-member FICCI delegation visited Tashkent on September 9-10, 2004 to participate in the 2nd Joint Business Council held on September 9, 2004. The delegation met the Deputy Minister of Health, the Deputy Chairman of the Agency for Foreign Economic Relations, officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other commercial organisations. Shri E.V.K.S. Elangovan, the Minister of State for Commerce and Industry visited Uzbekistan from 8 to 12 January 2005 as the co-chairman of the 5th Session of the Inter-Governmental Commission on Trade, Economic, Scientific and Technological Cooperation between India and Uzbekistan. The Joint Commission Meeting (held in Tashkent on 11 January) reviewed the bilateral cooperation between India and Uzbekistan in trade, economic, scientific and technological fields. The areas identified for cooperation are: transportation, construction, information technology, consultancy, food processing, textiles, pharmaceuticals, mining, joint ventures, culture and human resources. A protocol between the two sides was signed at the end of the meeting.

Cooperation in other sectors: Under the terms of an Agreement on Science and Technology Cooperation (1993), an Indo-Uzbek Centre for Promotion of Scientific and Technological cooperation was established in Tashkent in 1995. A work plan for science and technology cooperation was signed in 1998, and again in March 2004 for the period 2004-06. A MOU for cooperation in the field of agriculture was signed in 2000, under which a Work Plan for 2004 was signed, which was later extended to December 31, 2005. The computerisation of three Uzbek Post Offices was undertaken and completed by the Ministry of External Affairs/Telecommunications Consultants India Limited in May 2002. The total grant allocated for the project was US\$75,000. A MOU on the establishment of an Indo-Uzbek IT Centre in Tashkent with assistance from the Government of India was signed in October 2004. It is currently being implemented. Uzbekistan Airways operates four flights to and from Delhi and seven flights to and from Amritsar a week on a code-sharing basis with Indian Airlines.

CENTRAL ASIAN POTENTIAL FOR COOPERATION WITH INDIA

The emerging markets of the CA Countries display all the portents of being the new markets of the future. Since the nature of competition has undergone a significant change, carving out a niche in these markets, there is a need for concerted and focused efforts to ensure that all Indian organisations act cohesively in tapping the opportunities offered by this region:

- There is great potential for the expansion of trade and investment because this region (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan) is extremely rich

in mineral resources that need to be tapped, exploited and converted into value-added products.

- Furthermore, the countries of Central Asia represent investment markets where establishment of joint ventures in the core sectors can prove to be extremely rewarding. To benefit from these advantages, Indian industry will have to adopt medium and long term strategies rather than a short term strategy.

- The CA Countries are technically very advanced. To enhance cooperation with these countries, India needs to make concerted efforts for increased interaction between business entities so as to identify areas of bilateral interest and investment.

- The region is endowed with many different kind of fruits and farming produce thus offering a vast opportunity for cooperation in the food processing sector.

- The significant scope for cooperation in the tourism sector also needs to be explored.

- The CA countries are trying to strengthen and develop various sectors of their economy, thus creating scope for enhanced bilateral cooperation. In the present economic scenario in the CA region, an opportunity exists to enhance bilateral trade with the countries of this region. They have liberalised, growing economies and they need the streamlining of banking operations; the industrial units in CA countries now need upgrading/modification and are looking for foreign investment; and international organisations are making funds available to revitalise the economy of this region under various schemes.

- Above all, the people of this region are well aware of Indian products and culture and that could prove to be an added advantage in the efforts to enhance trade relations with countries in the CA Region.

INDIAN POTENTIAL FOR COOPERATION WITH CENTRAL ASIA

There are some important reasons as to why the CA countries are keen on building strong relationships with India on the economic front. Firstly, the Indian economy, for many years now, has grown at a stable rate without any drastic fluctuations.

Their forex reserves are strong and India is in a position to undertake huge investments. According to the Reserve Bank of India's Report on Foreign Exchange Reserves¹⁵, forex reserves have grown from US\$ 5.8 billion at the end of March 1991 to US\$ 25.2 billion at the end of March 1995. The growth continued in the second half of the 1990s, with the reserves touching the level of US\$ 38.0 billion by the end of March 2000. Subsequently, the reserves rose to US\$ 54.1 billion by the end of March 2002, US\$ 76.1 billion by the end of March 2003, to US\$ 113.0 billion by the end of March 2004 and further to US\$ 119.6 billion by the end of September 2004. As of December 9, 2005, the foreign exchange reserves had reached a level of US\$ 143.098 billion¹⁶.

A unique feature of the transition of the Indian economy is that it became the second fastest growing economy in

¹⁵ Report on Foreign Exchange Reserves. 2003-04 (covering period up to September 2004). Reserve Bank of India, Central Office, Mumbai. 2004.

¹⁶ Forex reserves increase by \$921 million. The Hindu. December 10, 2005. <http://www.highonserp.com/forex/index.php/2005/12/10/>

the world in 2003 - 04. If real GDP growth was 6.8% in 1998-99, up from 5% in the 1997-98 fiscal year¹⁷, then, according to the Central Statistical Organisation¹⁸ of the Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, real GDP increased by 8.1% during the first quarter of 2005-2006 against 7.6% in the first quarter of the previous year. In the second quarter of 2005-2006 the GDP growth averaged 8%¹⁹. India recorded one of the highest growth rates in the 1990s. The target of the 10th Five Year Plan (2002-07) is to achieve a growth rate of 8%.

India is the world's tenth largest economy and the fourth largest in Purchasing Power Parity terms. In Asia, India is in third position behind Japan and China. (UN Bureau of Census, July 2005 estimates).

India's economic reform policy was initiated during the early 1990's and since then foreign trade has grown steadily and assumed increasing significance. India's trade increased from US\$ 42 billion between April 1990 and March 1991 to US\$ 186 billion between April 2004 and March 2005. Major export commodities include: gems and jewellery; petroleum crude and products; ready made cotton garments including accessories; drugs, pharmaceuticals and fine chemicals; and machinery and instruments. The main destinations for India's exports were: the USA with a share of 16.74%; the United Arab Emirates 8.9%; China 5.79%; Singapore 4.79%; and Hong Kong with 4.61%. The CIS Region constituted a 1.32% share in India's total exports. India's major imports besides petroleum and crude products are: gold; electronic goods; precious and semi precious stones; and machinery excluding electrical appliances and electronics. India's major import partners were: China with a share of 6.3%; USA 5.88%; Switzerland 5.43%; the United Arab Emirates 4.28% and Belgium with 4.26%. The CIS region's percentage share in India's total imports was to the tune of 1.73%²⁰

India's major exports to the CA region are: fabrics; pharmaceuticals and fine chemicals; coffee; tea; tobacco;

rise; machinery and instruments; processed minerals; electronic goods; leather footwear and other leather goods; and miscellaneous processed items. India's major imports from this region are: fertilizers; news print; non-ferrous metals; iron and steel machinery except electrical and electronic; inorganic chemicals and other crude minerals.

The factors mentioned above confirm that the fundamentals of the Indian economy have become strong and stable. The macro-economic indicators are at present the best in the history of independent India with high growth, healthy foreign exchange reserves, and foreign investment and robust increase in exports and low inflation and interest rates. And in these achievements there is a significant share of Indian economic diplomacy.

The author has also commented on India's economic potential and bilateral cooperation between India and Uzbekistan in the International Seminar "India and Central Asia: from the Ancient Times to Contemporary Period"²¹ and in the Academic and professors seminar²², which was held in the Indian Institute of Finance.

I believe that in the next ten to fifteen years, India is expected to evolve as a major manufacturing economy on the one hand and to pride itself in a vibrant services sector on the other. The economy will witness an increased pace of privatisation of public enterprises as the central and state governments are likely to allocate higher financial resources towards the social infrastructure. The country is looking at exponential improvement in terms of both economic and social parameters.

Today I can say with confidence that the unique feature of the Indian economy has been high growth with stability and it has proved its strength and resilience. It once again confirms that India's economic growth shows that India is not only a reliable business partner, but one of the most experienced countries in the Asian region that can, with its economic potential, promote active economic development in the Central Asian region.

¹⁷ Economy of India. http://infopedia.ruv.net/ec/Economy_of_India.html

¹⁸ Central Statistical Organisation, Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation. http://mospi.nic.in/cso_test1.htm

¹⁹ Outcome of the review of the trends in receipts and expenditure in relation to the budget at the end of the second quarter of the financial year 2005-2006 and Statement explaining deviations in meeting the obligations of the Government under the Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Act, 2003. Ministry of Finance of India.

²⁰ FOCUS : CIS. A Programme for Enhancing Bilateral Trade Between India & CIS. <http://commerce.nic.in/fcis/FOCUS%20CIS%202005-06%20-%20INDIA%20&%20CIS.HTM>

²¹ I.Mavlonov. Uzbekistan and India: potential for cooperation and Economic Potential of Uzbekistan". Speech on The International Seminar "India and Central Asia: from the Ancient Times to Contemporary Period", March 1-3, 2004, New Delhi

²² I.Mavlonov. Uzbekistan and India: potential for cooperation, Speech and Presentation on Academic and professors seminar, 27th August 2004, Indian Institute of Finance (IIF), India

On Some Principles of the Preparation of the State to Work under the Emergency Conditions

A. BATTALKHANOV

*1st Deputy Director Scientific – Methodology Centre of Special Programmes»
Ministry of Economy and Budget Planning of the Republic of Kazakhstan.*

The growing number of countries, natural disasters, sharp financial and economic recession, and social or political shocks collide today with various crisis situations, including armed conflicts. To overcome such crises efficiently, it is necessary, first, to investigate the reasons that gave birth to their rise, and secondly, whenever possible, to predict them and to prepare for them.

One of measures undertaken by the state to overcome the consequences of the influence of extreme factors is the introduction of a mode of state of emergency.

At the present stage of the development of society in a geopolitical encirclement and in the Republic of Kazakhstan there are significant political-military and socio-economic changes, which have sharply strengthened the role of the factors that would cause a state of emergency to be placed on the entire country or its separate regions. These negative tendencies can have significant influence on the state of the internal safety of the country.

In the modern world, as the concept of safety becomes more and more difficult and multi-faceted, the theory of safety is improved [1]. The given circumstances require the appropriate adaptation and modernisation of all our security systems, including the reformation of how systems and structures respond when extraordinary situations arise - both their input to (if necessary) and their conclusion from the period of state of emergency.

The existing system response to extraordinary situations does not take into account the changed conditions and therefore is not enough. Besides that, the authorised body on extraordinary situations is only occupied with the scheduling and realisation of measures resulting from the warning and liquidation of extraordinary situations that are either natural or technological in character. The legal relations for extraordinary situations that are social or ecological in character are not arranged in any practical way. There are definite problems with the normal legal character. For example, it is considered that the protection of the population against extraordinary situations in the Republic of Kazakhstan is under construction considering the scale of the mobilisation of human and material resources [2]. However at a legislative level is not adjusted it in any way.

The protection of the population and objects and managing them during extraordinary situations is one of the top priority areas of state politics in many countries [2].

Taking all this into account, it is extremely important to find a qualitatively new pattern for government during state of emergency that, firstly, would answer today's realities, and secondly, would be adequate for the country's national interests [3, 4].

The purpose of reforming the state of emergency plans should be the creation and preparation of an efficient structure for the conclusion of the state or its regions from a state of state of emergency, irrespective of the reasons that called its introduction.

Thus a decision on the following problems is needed:

- 1) The specification of the factors which cause the state or its regions to enter a state of emergency;
- 2) The specification of activity of the state during the period of the state of emergency;
- 3) The definition of the structure of bodies of operative management of the state of emergency;
- 4) The specification and differentiation of the functions of state bodies on preparation of the state for work during the period of state of emergency;
- 5) Reforming organisational structure and the redistribution of the functions of bodies of the administration of government operations to transform them to work in the conditions of a state of emergency;
- 6) The mutual linkage of the preparation of the state and military for extraordinary circumstances to the provisions with optimisation of the expenses when it is conducted;
- 7) Improvement of the planning of the preparation of the state for a state of emergency.

The real provision of business, in the given sphere of activity of the state, testifies to the necessity for the classification and definition of measures undertaken by the state for the period of state of emergency:

- prioritise directions and principles for the further reforming of the system and structures of government during a state of emergency; and
- major factors resulting in the introduction of states of emergency.

It is possible to attribute the following to the list of priorities:

1) Conducting a complete system analysis of the state of business on the preparation of government for the period of state of emergency;

2) Conducting an analysis of the natural and technological in character accidents that may occur and the activity of state bodies on their liquidation;

3) Engineering the state programme to reform a control system for the state during the introduction of a state of emergency.

4) Improvement of the structure and activity of bodies of the operative management of the state of emergency;

5) Further engineering and perfecting the normative legal acts regulating the organisation of the system for the preparation of the state during a period of state of emergency;

6) Strict differentiation of functions of the central executive boards on preparation of the state for work during a period of state of emergency;

7) The definition of the authorised body that organises the preparation of the state to work during the period of state of emergency, independent of the character of the reasons that called its introduction;

8) The creation of a scientific and educational base on economic management in conditions where extraordinary situations have arisen, economic crisis or the introduction of a state of emergency under the new socio economic relations conditions or political-military conditions.

9) Perfecting a technique of scheduling and the ways of conducting the preparation of the state from extraordinary situations to an efficient output, and the ways of coordinating the activity of all institutes of the state during a state of emergency.

The basic principles of the preparation of the state to work in the conditions of a state of emergency are:

1) Close linkage with the measures for preparation of the country to work under the conditions of extraordinary and martial law;

2) The adaptation of bodies of administration of government to work during a period of state of emergency;

3) The creation of an optimum resource base to ensure the operation of the state or part of its territory is possible on the introduction of a state of emergency;

4) The efficiency of spent measures.

The factors resulting in the introduction of states of emergency in the state or its regions are divided into those that have derived from internal or external causes and by the nature of the derivation – man-caused or natural. The man-caused factors are divided into non-military or military.

The external factors could include:

1) The mass transition of the state border from territories of neighbouring states;

2) Actions by international terrorism directed towards changing the constitutional building;

3) Provocative actions on the part of other states with the purpose of enforcing the unity of armed conflict or war.

The internal factors could include:

1) An attempt to change constitutional structure by violent means;

2) Mass rioting and interethnic conflicts;

3) The blockade or capture of separate districts by extremist's groupings;

4) Local, regional and global extraordinary situations that are natural or man-caused.

The extraordinary situations are natural, technological or man-caused – for other factors refer to the factors of situations that are natural.

The list, and limits of the emergency measures applied in the conditions of a state of emergency, including the depleted list of temporary limitations of the rights and freedom of the citizens, the competences of the legal persons and the introduction of the extraordinary budget, are established by the decree of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the introduction of state of emergency.

Thus the Decree defines the order and durations of the general consolidation of financial resources, prioritises the basic directions for expenditure of the budget, remedies for the time of action of the extraordinary budget, list of the budgetary programs (subroutines), which financing stops during the time of a state of emergency, and also a list of obligatory or prime expenses.

The measures undertaken for a period of state of emergency are divided into areas of activity of the state: administrative and managerial; legal; force; economic; and prospecting, and based on the rank of the subject of the state arranging - both statewide and regional.

When a state of emergency arises the following administrative and managerial measures can be adopted:

1) The introduction of a state of emergency;

2) The enabling of structures managing the state or region where the state of emergency is entered;

3) The scheduling of the activity of state bodies of management during the period of state of emergency;

4) The management and control of the activity of inferior bodies of management;

5) If the chiefs of state organisations execute their duties inadequately during a state of emergency their duties will be discharged from them and acting appointments for these positions made on a temporary basis.

Legal measures undertaken during a period of state of emergency:

1) The special mode of entrance and departure, and also limitation of freedom of movement in the territory is enforced when a state of emergency occurs;

2) The prohibition of the conduction of assemblies, meetings, street processions and demonstrations, and also mass measures;

3) The prohibition of strikes;

4) The limitation of the liberty of the press and other mass media, temporary arrest of printed production, megaphones and multiplying equipment until the lifting of the state of emergency;

5) The suspension, after appropriate warning, of the activity of political parties, other public associations and mass movements interfering with the normalisation of conditions;

6) The temporary evacuation of citizens from regions that are dangerous to reside in, with obligatory grant to them of stationary or temporary living quarters or shelters;

7) The deportation, if necessary, of foreign physical persons.

The measures undertaken to ensure public order could include:

1) The strengthening of guards of the public order;

2) The limitation of the movement of vehicles and their examination;

3) The introduction of a curfew (interdiction to be in streets and in other public places without a specially given pass and ID documents, in a set time of the day);

4) Document checks, and in exclusive cases, with the available data suggesting possession of weapons by citizens

- personal examination, examination of things, dwelling and vehicles;

5) The prohibition of the sale of weapons, spirits drinks, gas (with temporary exemption for citizens' fires) and cold steel, ammunition, and use at organisations as well as hardware;

6) The expulsion of disorderly persons who are not inhabitants of the given district, to the place of their permanent residence or to the limits of the territory that is in a state of emergency.

Forces and remedies of law-enforcement bodies, national safety, other law-enforcement agencies, and Republican guards will be used to ensure public order and the life, health, safety, rights, freedom and legal interests of the citizens.

The measures undertaken by the state for accident prevention could include:

1) The strengthening of guards of protected and regime objects;

2) The organisation of guards of strategically important objects, military infrastructure and communications;

3) The translation of troops from a frontier service into an increased variant of the guards of the state border;

4) The reduction of Armed Forces, other troops and military formations on the raised degrees of a combat readiness;

5) The regrouping of troops;

6) Conducting hidden mobilisation of Armed Forces, other troops and military formations;

7) The advance of troops to regions where the task is being executed.

Economic measures could include:

1) The introduction of the special order of distribution of food stuffs and necessities of life;

2) The establishment of quarantine and conducting other sanitary and anti-epidemic measures;

3) The mobilisation of the resources of organisations irrespective of patterns of ownership, the change of the mode of their job, reorientation to the production of things necessary in the conditions of the state of emergency, other changes of industrial activity necessary for rescue and other pressing jobs;

4) In exclusive circumstances connected to pressing necessity of conducting the state under abnormal conditions - rescue jobs, the mobilisation of the able-bodied population into rescue teams and vehicles of the citizens for conducting the specified jobs is allowable;

5) Partial mobilisation of republic economy or separate administrative - territorial educations.

By a decision made by the government of the Republic of Kazakhstan, additional forces and remedies can be involved in order to ensure the reduction of damage to the economy by the liquidation of the consequences of spontaneous and ecological distresses, epidemics, epizootic events, large failures and accidents.

Prospecting measures are used by bodies of investigation and counterintelligence with the purpose of receiving information about the prospect of the development of the usual situation and the definition of a sequence of further actions.

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