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Chairmanship of Kazakhstan in the OSCE: Preliminary Results

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under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan*

Chairmanship of Kazakhstan in the OSCE in the past first half of 2010 passed in especially difficult conditions. All this period in different points of the world there were any events bearing in the catastrophic consequences of natural, anthropogenic and social character. The front pages of the world and local mass-media were occupied by such events, as set of various events from the places of accidents. In this context the concept of joint ensuring of the general safety, put in the basic documents of the authoritative international institutes, such as the OSCE acquires a special urgency.

Kazakhstan is the active participant of political, economic and socio-cultural processes happening in the world, and at present, using the chairmanship in the OSCE, raises ways of the modern problems decision on the agenda. Our country managed to stir to activity of the given structure of the European safety and to initiate discussions on a wide range of affairs as structurally-organizational character, and with the accentuation of attention to the most problem places in the liability zone of the Organization.

Kazakhstan has shown all gravity of its intentions on the post of the political leader of the OSCE, having designated the program on all-round strengthening of the Organization, to assistance of increase of its efficiency and ability adequately to react to the modern calls and threats, being guided by simple, accessible and effective principles, such as a mutual confidence, adherence to basic principles and values of the OSCE, an openness and honesty in the international relations and strengthening intercultural and inter-civilized dialogue.

Observing the general interests of all member-states of the OSCE, having defined the balanced and impartial approach to all available questions of the Organization, our country as its leader has taken constructive part in assistance to the decision of the “frozen” conflicts which by right it is possible to name one of the most complex and painful problems of the modern world. From the beginning of 2010 the operating chairman of the OSCE, the Minister for Foreign Affairs – State secretary K.Saudabaev

has visited the countries and regions where there is a disputed potential, has spent a number of negotiations with the administration of the states for the purpose of dialogue conducting between the parties exclusively in a peace direction. Simultaneously with it the Kazakhstani diplomatic representatives in OSCE had been carried out consultations and meetings with the leader of the European safety structures, specialized institutes of the United Nations, the regional international organizations.

All carried out actions against the background of the developed events have confirmed once again put forward by Kazakhstan the thesis about harmonization of the basic directions of OSCE’s activity. Influence elimination from the side of global calls and threats in the modern world should have the complex contents in itself. Equally with the military-political direction of safety, and also the balanced policy in the field of economic development of all member-countries of the OSCE, preventive measures on the universal environmental protection and creation of favorable social conditions and atmosphere of freedom are equally necessary for the society and individual development, observance of the rights and freedom of the person. In it there should not be a priority in division of problems on the character, scales, countries or regions. The problems which have arisen in one state, have in the basis as a danger of the military-political destabilization, and connected with it social, economic and ecological negative consequences, and also the humanitarian accidents which consequences extend from the local value to the regional scale, that as a whole will bring to erosion of all system of the international relations and global safety.

In this case it is necessary to consider developing situation in the neighboring Kyrgyzstan which it can characterize, as well as an acute political crisis in the conditions of the fragmentation of political groups and the population on the separate clan interests. At the moment the republic is faced with the knotty task on the stabilization of situations because of the following arisen problems:

- first, the country has not overcome the chronic social and economic backlog. It has led to migration of the active

and educated part of the population outside the limits of the country and shortage of qualified personnel in the republic. The impoverishment and marginalization of various strata of society became a consequence of it;

- secondly, Kyrgyzstan as the member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and EurAsEC had possibility to earn on the sale intermediation of Turkish, Chinese and other goods of member-countries of the WTO on the space of the CIS, together with it to develop adjacent manufactures and sphere of services. The customs union and strengthening of the southern borders of the given integration association will objectively create barriers in the given intermediation that even more will aggravate the economic situation in the country;

- thirdly, the trust at the world community, investors and even close partners of Kyrgyzstan are undermined. Now Kyrgyzstan can remain in private with the problems as it will be difficult to present political management to restore the state status quo.

Together with it in Kyrgyzstan there are large military bases of Russia and the USA which make to their contribution on ensuring Central Asian regional safety within the limits of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and in the settlement of the military-political situation in Afghanistan. It is known that between Russia and the USA there are disagreements on some questions, including on the separate positions in the OSCE. April events in Bishkek and their consequences can become the catalyst of the undesirable processes conducting to the disbalance of interests of the leading world centers of forces in region.

Operation of water-power objects at Naryn-SyrDarya cascade of the Hydropower station and other water storage basins located on the Transboundary Rivers of the Central Asia becomes other problem point. Accurate interstate coordination of distribution of water resources is necessary in this respect. However the political instability which has arisen in Kyrgyzstan can become the reason of occurrence of anthropogenic and ecological character threats which regarding interests of the region countries and the dense social and economic infrastructure in the high-water beds will aggravate and so uneasy mutual relations in the water sphere.

As a whole all it puts the whole spectrum of problems before the chairman of the OSCE, first of which a prevention of the civil military confrontation, the second - a non-admission of the further destabilization in the neighboring republic, the third - a tendency definition on the political stability and social and economic growth. Considering that Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan historically connect old good-neighborhood communications and brotherly relations, the Kazakhstani public and the management are strongly disturbed by the arisen situation. Besides the help and assistance to the Kirghiz people Kazakhstan also intends to use actively possibilities and resources of the OSCE for the assistance to an exit of Kyrgyzstan from the crisis.

This question has been discussed by presidents of Kazakhstan, Russia and the USA during meetings at the Global summit on the nuclear disarmament in Washington. Head of the state of the Republic of Kazakhstan N.Nazarbaev has shown active participation on armed conflict prevention between the conflicting parties in Kyrgyzstan. From the side of the Chairman of the OSCE during his visit to Bishkek for a situation assessment and development of an exit ways from the political crisis in the republic it has been declared readiness of the OSCE and further to support to efforts on restoration of a public order and supremacy of law in this country.

The example of active participation of Kazakhstan as the chairman of the OSCE in the permission of crisis situations in the organizational liability zone becomes indicative meaning that preservation of the international, regional and national safety are not separable from each other and are business of each state, irrespective of its territorial scales and geopolitical influence.

Now the world faces new forms of calls and threats whereas traditional kinds of danger to the stable development in many respects remain in force. In this respect the initiative of the summit carrying out of the OSCE is timely as it is necessary to pay attention of the world community at the actualization of complex strategy, approaches and preventive measures on the preservation of system of joint safety in the conditions of peaceful co-existence of the people and stable development of the states and regions.

Kazakhstan's Cooperation with Central Asian Countries

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Objectively speaking, Central Asian countries play one of the key positions in Kazakhstan's foreign policy strategy. Even though in terms of trade they do not play the roles played by Russia, China or the USA, they could potentially occupy more significant positions.

This is conditioned by an obvious factor of geographical proximity, which means interdependence in the transport and communications, water and energy spheres, which results in the similarity of a whole range of foreign policy and foreign economic problems and tasks.

Integration projects that emerged in Central Asia between 1990 and 2000 had failed to realise for various reasons. In particular, one of the obvious reasons was linked to the frequently changing priorities within regional initiatives.

At the same time, Kazakhstan remained a supporter of and active player in various regional organisations. Speaking in favour of boosting Central Asian cooperation, in 2005 Astana made yet another proposal to its southern neighbours to deal with issues of regional integration and floated its idea of the creation of Union of Central Asian States.

It was suggested that the Treaty of Eternal Friendship, which was signed by Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan should lay the foundation of this initiative. Astana invited Central Asian countries to build close economic integration and move towards a common market and a common currency in the future.

On 1-2 September 2006 at an informal summit in Astana, the leaders of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan again discussed regional projects that had already been considered in multilateral forums. Kazakhstan expressed its desire to become a regional trade, economic and investment locomotive. Astana's key package of proposals was to set up sectoral consortia such as water and energy, transport and food consortia, special border zones and joint investment structures.

Drafting coordinated approaches to regional water and energy problems is a topical issue. Kazakhstan, along with Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, is among the countries that face acute shortages of fresh water, the main reserves of which are in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. This factor is becoming increasingly considerable in the expansion of regional cooperation. Despite all Central Asian countries agreeing on the creation of an expert group to draft a formula for using water resources that is acceptable to everyone, regular meetings – both at the highest and the ministerial levels – have not led to the signing of a comprehensible agreement that would be accepted by everyone.

Generally, having received support for the idea of a possible interstate association from Bishkek and Dushanbe, Astana continued the negotiation process with Tashkent. In 2006 Uzbekistan boosted cooperation with CIS countries and joined the EAEC and the CSTO, which was particularly welcomed by Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.

Central Asian countries expected significant political and economic results from involvement in the EAEC, in particular, from links with Uzbekistan, but Tashkent did not become a fully-fledged member of this organisation and finally stopped its membership of this organisation in November 2008.

Tashkent's position impacts the efficiency of major regional projects. Uzbekistan is known to have problems with all its neighbours. Relations with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are complicated by the situation on the borders, visa regime, migration issues, transit and transport issues, water and energy and other problems. All this causes tension in relations between regional countries and demands constant attention.

The key issues of Uzbekistan's relations with its neighbours remain the same. They became subjects of talks and were put on the agenda of summits, but there has not been any significant movement. It is very likely that Uzbekistan will not be able to switch to a more intensive pattern of relations with its neighbours because of the current structure of its economy and also for political reasons. It

was proven by Uzbek President Islam Karimov's visit to Kazakhstan on 22-23 April 2008 when the Uzbek leader officially refused to back the Kazakh initiative of uniting into a Central Asian union.

Cooperation between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan is developing relatively rapidly, although there are a number of bilateral economic problems between them. In particular, transit issues, water and energy problems and the regulation of labour migration are always topical for Kyrgyzstan. In turn, Kazakhstan always raises the problem of its property in Kyrgyzstan and debts accumulated by Kyrgyz companies. Generally, these problems can be solved and do not mar the relatively close relations between the countries.

In 2007-2009, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan took certain political and economic steps to boost ties. Astana, in implementing its initiative to create the Union of Central Asian States, proposed to start gradually moving towards this idea on a bilateral basis at the initial stages.

Kazakh business people and managers of national companies have started actively cooperating with Kyrgyz colleagues to expand mutually beneficial trade and economic ties.

On 26 April 2007 during Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev's visit to Kyrgyzstan an agreement on the creation of the Interstate Council, headed by the heads of countries, was signed. The council is responsible for a whole range of bilateral relations – political, economic, cultural and security issues. Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiyev supported Astana's integration initiatives which will help regional economic cooperation.

In addition, the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs has been set up to successfully coordinate the activities of the Interstate Council.

An important indicator of the development of bilateral relations is Kazakh companies and the capital's involvement in the construction of the Kambarata hydropower stations and a number of other economic projects.

During the visit the countries also established the Kyrgyz-Kazakh Investment Fund with charter capital of \$100 mln, which should boost bilateral trade and economic relations. President Bakiyev's official visit to Kazakhstan on 17-18 April 2008 strengthened these trends and made it possible to specify a number of the above-mentioned joint investment projects.

Kazakh-Tajik relations are also developing relatively successfully. Astana is interested in investing in building hydropower facilities in Tajikistan and in its agriculture and metallurgy. Kazakh investment companies and funds have received official support from the Tajik government and are ready to invest funds in socio-economic projects in Tajikistan on a mutually beneficial basis.

The existing problems in the transit and migration spheres can be solved and it was stressed at a meeting of the two countries' heads of government in Astana on 23 August 2007.

The most important aspect of the climate in the region is the issue of building and operating hydrotechnical facilities and dams in the upper reaches of major rivers. The upstream countries – Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan – regard water as their national strategic resource and are trying to shift this issue onto the economic plane, whereas the downstream countries – Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – are convinced that this approach is artificial and express their concern over the stability of the water flow.

This problem has acquired particular acuteness in relations between Tashkent and Dushanbe. Kazakhstan treats problems faced by Tajikistan with understanding and expresses its readiness to fulfil projects to build hydropower stations but it also aims to seek out understanding on issues with Uzbekistan, which is, unconditionally, important for the success of the implementation of these initiatives.

From the point of the fulfilment of Kazakhstan's policy towards Central Asia, President Nazarbayev's visit to Tajikistan on 12-13 September 2007 was very important. Tajik President Emomali Rakhmon reservedly supported the Kazakh initiative to set up the Union of Central Asian States, but he particularly welcomed Astana's financial and economic efforts to boost bilateral and regional cooperation.

In a similar way as it took place in Kyrgyzstan, the visit resulted in the establishment of the Tajik-Kazakh Investment Fund with charter capital of \$100 mln.

The Tajik leadership has demonstrated interest in expanding regional cooperation. In particular, during his visit to Kazakhstan on 12-13 May 2008, President Rakhmon positively reacted to the Kazakh initiative on regional association and signed a memorandum on setting up the Interstate Coordination Council of Tajikistan and Kazakhstan and the Council of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the two countries.

As a result, Astana invited its Central Asian partners to consistently move towards close regional cooperation on a pragmatic basis taking into account the specifics of each country. In this context this strategy enjoys support from Bishkek and Dushanbe, while official Tashkent demonstratively rejected the Kazakh initiative.

That Ashgabat has become active also has had an impact on cooperation between Central Asian countries. Turkmen President Gurbanguly Berdimukhamedov launched a more intensive dialogue with his neighbours.

The new Turkmen leader's foreign policy debut traditionally started with an official visit to Russia and later to regional neighbours. In this context, relations between Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan became active between 2007 and 2009 – the Kazakh and Turkmen leaders held an unprecedented number of meetings as part of bilateral and multilateral cooperation.

The intensification of relations with Kazakhstan has both economic and political grounds. Obviously, the Turkmen president pays particular attention to the development

model and experience of Kazakhstan. Kazakh-Turkmen relations have been boosted as a result of mutual economic interests and their interest in expanding the geography of transport routes.

Intergovernmental consultations prepared work to implement agreements achieved at a meeting of the Turkmen, Russian and Kazakh presidents in Turkmenbashi on 12 May 2007.

Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev's official visit to Ashgabat on 11-12 September 2007 made it possible to detail the Caspian gas pipeline project, the North-South transport corridor and, as part of this corridor, the construction of a railway line with the involvement of Russia and Iran.

An important accord was the possibility of investing Kazakh capital in the Turkmen economy, including in the energy sphere. Clearly, both countries have shown interest in harmonising their energy policies, above all in relation to exporting gas to foreign markets. With a pragmatic approach there is room to expand cooperation to include neighbouring Uzbekistan.

All this shows that relations between Central Asian countries have currently changed significantly. Regional ties which had remained stagnant for a long time became active. Relations between Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have always been relatively intensive both

bilaterally and multilaterally, whereas cooperation with Uzbekistan is complicated with a range of political and economic problems. Meanwhile, Turkmenistan has been avoiding multilateral relations, taking part in few targeted international projects quite pragmatically.

The regional countries' relations with leading external players and relations between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan remain key aspects of the climate in the region. The solution of border, passport and visa control and trade and economic problems is still an issue for Central Asian countries.

The mutually acceptable distribution of water resources is a long-running problem and transit and transport and migration problems also always top the agenda of bilateral and multilateral meetings.

Kazakhstan has announced its desire to develop closer cooperation and intends to strengthen positive trends both politically (the establishment of interstate countries, bilateral and multilateral dialogue) and economically (investment in energy, transport and so on).

These efforts are not prompted by the ambitions of the leader, but the state of bilateral and multilateral relations between the regional countries.

This strategy is based on the objective necessity to ensure stability and security in the region and create favourable foreign economic and foreign political medium.

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan: Democracy Transition

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Today the new risks and challenges to national, regional, and international security include: international terrorism, the distribution of weapons of mass destruction, national and ethnic conflicts, illegal drug traffic, and organized crime. I think another issue should be added to this list, namely, the problem of democratic development or ‘democratization,’ which in itself unites internal and foreign political issues regarding the stable development of countries.

The weak states with the deficit of democratic structures, corruption, and the lack of political freedoms, violation of human rights, religious and ethnic conflicts, and incapability to combat internal and international terrorism are the main threat for stability of international community.

The conceptual framework suggested by Dr. Cheema is most helpful in studying Central Asian democratic transition. “The framework is based upon the premise that the there three essential dimensions that should be considered to study democratic governance... what makes up democratic governance (institutions, processes, and practices), how governance is democratic (key principles of democracy as a form of governance) and why governance becomes democratic (internal and external factors that influence the development and consolidation of democracy)” [1].

Analyzing the inter-influence of all these factors we can understand the ways of Central Asian democratic transition.

The Central Asian states are accepting democratic standards without any adequate traditions to build on. It is not always easy, especially for these states, to leave their original system and accept a new system.

Today, when building a new identity, the Central Asian states very often apply to the historical roots to find democratic traditions, like “steppe democracy”. It is positive, but historical experience of governance did not involve a system of delegating power in which all

members of the community could participate based on the same principles.

Stages in the Development of Central Asian States’ Political Systems

The main factors influence on Central Asian states political system formation after the gaining independence.

The democratization process in Central Asian states could be divided into three stages by its practical reforming of the political system and developing the theory of adopted democracy.

- a. Acceptance of the principles
- b. Development of a model
- c. Practice

The 1 stage: “Pro-Western,” democratic romanticism.

After the disintegration of the U.S.S.R., totally new states that had never been independent before appeared on the world map. Central Asia started to create their own political systems and develop a new ideology.

The ensuing ideological vacuum started to be misused by various groups trying to push through their own goals (political, religious, and nationalistic). As a result the new model started to be built within the political system, which was described as *democratic*. The Central Asian states after the gaining independence started to reform its political systems under the universal set up principals of democracy. Human rights, legislative elections, institution of the presidency, democratic standards, international law supremacy all these and other principles were fixed in the national constitutions.

Article I, Section I of the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan states the following: “The Republic of Kazakhstan proclaims itself a democratic, secular, legal and social state whose highest values are an individual, his life, rights and freedoms”. The Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic states in Chapter One, Section One: “The Kyrgyz Republic (Kyrgyzstan) is a sovereign, unitary, democratic Republic, constructed on the basis of a legal secular state”. In Section I, Chapter 1, Article 1, the

Uzbekistan Constitution states: "Uzbekistan is a sovereign democratic republic".

To the middle of 1990-s the most Central Asian states established political systems based on the institutions and processes of democratic governance. All of them have free election system, multiparty system and parliaments. Central Asian states responded to the first challenge of the conceptual framework- What makes up democratic governance.

But there are a lot of critics from both the Western observers (OCSE, scholars, HRW and others) and civil society (political opposition, mass media, non-governmental organizations) of the Central Asian democracies. They estimate that these states are democracies on paper, they are not in practice, i.e., democracy is *de jure* rather than *de facto*.

The Central Asian states during their transition could not fully correspond to the second challenge – How governance is democratic. Did these states thoughtfully choose democracy, or did they simply declare it?

In this context the contextual factors that impact on content and quality of democracy should be analyzed.

To explain the "insufficient promotion of democratic reforms" in the states of the region, the following internal and external factors should be specified:

- A rather quick transition. Instead of gradually transitioning from being members of the USSR, these countries had the exciting yet unenviable task of setting up a framework for government within a small amount of time.
- The absence of democratic institutions of authority, the lack of a liberal social mentality and the lack of experience with private ownership in the post-Soviet countries, all complicate the creation of a lawful state, market economic relations, civil society -- that is, the social and economic preconditions for democracy.
- A pattern of democratization "from above," where authorities do not involve the citizens, or at the best limit access to the process of political transformation.
- The presence of weak oppositions which have no clear strategy results in their political failure, preventing their constructive participation in evolving democratic processes, maintaining a lack of unity and coordination both between and within oppositional groups. In the majority of the countries the opposition has weak financial base.
- The absence of a real opposition between opposition authority leads to that authority in every possible way aspire to neutralize opposition, involving their leaders on the state posts, creating so-called "pocket" opposition or in rare cases compelling to emigration.
- Process of democratic transformations began simultaneously with process of national revival and creation of the new independent states.
- *The complicated geopolitical location with the different interests of regional and global powers*

The second stage. The main characteristics of this period: Popularization of the theory of the "special path" of each country

The second stage. The Central Asian experts and policymakers throughout the 1990s discussed the possible "special models of Central Asian political systems development". A number of developmental models were floated in each of the five countries.

All regional states have the similar level of political development and democratic reforms. It is explained by common historical, religious and cultural roots.

At the end of 1990-s Central Asian countries started to depart from the universal principals of democracy to nationalism. Declaring its loyalty to democracy, Central Asian political elite interpreted it as a special (particular) model for transitional states, suitable to their national context.

It was obvious that the establishment of a parliament and the organization of a democratic election do not necessarily lead to effective democratic reforms. The application of parliamentary democracy to Central Asian conditions has shown again that the implementation of universal principles should be correlated with internal / contextual factors.

For Central Asian society very strong delegation of power at the lower levels and a different method of social bonding (especially relative-based, tribal, and regional) are usual. And all these factors influence on the democratic process.

The idea of special path to democracy was in the discourse of all Central-Asian Presidents. They all believed the regional states should choose the model of democracy related to history, traditions, culture and mentality. They all argued the imposed Western model of democracy. They all insisted that situation was different from the developed democracies.

But independent experts of Central Asia saw the following reasons: the beginning of the gradual strengthening of presidential power, choice of an "Asian model" of political and socio-economic development following a thesis of "first the economy and then politics"; quick tempo of economic reforms with the preservation of the conservative political system.

The main characteristics of the third stage are Expansion of presidential powers and the established authoritarian systems.

Central Asian presidents give preference to "Asian democracy" for adaptation of the regional states to the democratic reforms. South Korea, Thailand, Singapore considered as universally recognized democratic states. Meanwhile their political systems are different from Western democracies. South Asian experience became preferable for Central Asia in compare with standard formulas from Washington and Brussels. Regional leaders decided to develop and practices their own adapted models based on universal democratic principles.

The third period, what the Central Asian states are experiencing is characterized as "enlightened autocracy," which is based on the thesis of gradual transition from

totalitarian to democratic regime. It means that existing (without democratic successor) leaders symbolize the stability and predictability.

Nowadays, under the Central Asian constitution in effect, regional Presidents are the heads of the states, top officials determining the major directions in its home and foreign policy, a symbols and guarantors of the nation and the state power.

Expanding and strengthening their power the Central Asian leaders armed themselves with the social justice slogan as an element of the social-democratic ideology of today.

Social justice as a party principle is fairly popular among the political public structures of Kazakhstan; it is one of the slogans of the People's Democratic Nur Otan Party and the Communist Party of Kazakhstan. *The very term "justice," which is written as "adolat" in practically all the local languages, appeared or appears in the name of the Democratic Party of Kazakhstan, the Social-Democratic Party of Uzbekistan, and the Social-Democratic Party of Tajikistan.* This shows that the term is popular among the political elites and ordinary people [2].

Expansion of presidential power influences on the quality of the institutions and the processes, which lead to the decrease of access, participation in the election, rule of law, transparency. Also traditionally democratic freedoms such as freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of religion and freedom of association are suppressed and/or severely limited. The presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan have consistently attempted to not only strengthen their positions but also to essentially concentrate within the executive branch. This has not only left the other branches comparatively weaker, but also left the other branches more and more dependent upon the executive as the source of their authority.

Proponents of authoritarian regimes believe the moderate and rational authoritarianism serves for Central Asian society transition to democracy. Thereby, according their ideology the political systems of regional states are the specific synthesis of democracy (as a ways and means, not a goal in itself) and national traditions.

But the problem of authoritarian regimes is their *pari passu* tendency both to totalitarianism and democracy and much turns on the leader personality.

Recognizing the internal and external factors of transitional period explained the reasons why the regional states are not able to implement the Western democratic model and move away from the universal set up of democratic values, it should be noted that there is a danger for justification of authoritarianism.

Central Asian regimes highlighted internal and external stability and security, but the problems of democratization are considered as minor or to entirely ignore by them. Nevertheless the Central Asian states have to continue to strengthen democratic institutions and keep democratization issue in their political agenda because

they are eager to become recognized members of international community.

The challenge. The point is how to combine the universal standards of democracy and national specific features of Central Asian society, what kind of democracy Central Asian states should develop.

1. To recognize that the main challenge for Central Asian scholars is to develop the scientific based model and concept of democratic constriction / design; to substantiate the unique democracy model appropriate both to the political culture of the Central Asian nations and to the universal standards

2. To recognize that the republics' political systems is not unique. From the view of a typology of political regimes, all Central Asian states possess authoritarian elements that have the same pluses and minuses as dozens of other, similar political systems throughout the world. Objectivity such regimes exist in the majority of post-Soviet states. It is the terminological issue.

The Cases: **Kazakhstan Nazarbayev's Model of Democracy**

President Nazarbayev: "We acknowledge that perhaps we have not yet reached the same level that developed nations have achieved – and it's not just us, but many post-Soviet countries. But people aren't ready for drastic changes. Their income, their wages are low. Therefore, we worry that democracy may be perceived as the opposite, as making people's lives deteriorate. It happened in Russia, if you remember. Forty percent of the people were poor and unemployed, but everywhere there was a talk about democracy. And in many regions democracy became associated with poverty and misery. When our neighbors in Kyrgyzstan tried to establish complete freedom of democracy, it led to such cataclysms that they still can't recover. We see this in Ukraine, we see this in Georgia. Our people see it. We say the economy first, then politics. We need to move gradually." [3].

In spite of the criticism of the Nazarbayev's regime, according Western experts, Kazakhstan is esteemed as the only Central Asian state with successful political and economic reforms. The economic and political stability, steady raise of living standards, multiparty pluralist system, and recognition by the world community are the Kazakhstani realities

But under objective and subjective reasons the democratization process in the state goes away from Western and Classical models and depends on internal situation. The existing democracy is called "Nazarbayev's model".

The main characteristic of the model is the combination of limited pluralism and possibilities for political participation with the existence of successful market reforms.

Evaluation of Kazakhstan's Democratic Development

The first stage 1991-1995

The second stage 1995 – 2005

Recent changes

The first stage (1991-1995) - from the moment of real independence up to the adoption of the Constitution of the independent Kazakhstan, concentration on overcoming the disintegration processes, the establishment of Kazakhstan's statehood, the transformation from the dictate of a one-party system into political pluralism, promoting the democratic evolution.

The second stage (1995 – 2000) the establishment and consolidation of modern democratic institutions and the formation of a new political culture on the basis of the Constitution adopted by the nation during the referendum in 1995. The national constitution permitted policy-makers to cover a long way not only in terms of the significant economic transformations, but also in terms of the political improvements. Establishment of stable foundation for the transformation of Kazakhstan into a country where real democratic institutions are working and where the citizens' rights and liberties are ensured, realization of a socio-economic strategy for developing Kazakhstan by 2030.

The third stage (2001- 2006) was the convincing demonstration of the correctness of the strategy: ensured the socio-economic breakthrough, regional leadership, the initial democratic traditions of Kazakhstan as a multinational and multi-confessional society have been established.

2007 – 2010 the new stage. Practical proposals on the key directions of political modernization. These proposals are the result of team work, taking into consideration the opinions of major social and political forces in the country. This work resulted in the legislative draft "On the introduction of changes and addenda to the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan"

Thereby president started to move for more democratic and institutionally stable form of political system with the power decent ration from executive to legislative branches.

According to Kazakhstani independent experts the political system passed through the following stages in its development [4]:

1991–1995: The Immediate Post-Soviet Period

Main Characteristics

- "Pro-Western," democratic romanticism;
- Retention of certain elements of the Soviet command-based administrative system;
- Exceptional political activity among the general population;
- The beginning of the gradual strengthening of presidential power along with the parallel curtailment of the influence of legislative organs of state;
- Search of an optimal model of socio-economic and political development.

1995–1999: Definitive Personification of State Power

Main Characteristics

- Constitutional enshrinement of the presidency's expanded powers;
- Popularization of the theory of Kazakhstan's "special path";

- Choice of an "Asian model" of political and socio-economic development following a thesis of "first the economy and then politics";

- The beginning of contentious confrontation between the government and the opposition.

1999–2001: Temporary Stabilization

Main Characteristics

- Quick tempo of economic reforms with the retention of the conservative political system;
- Expansion of presidential powers as an indicator of the established authoritarian system;
- Stability inside the political elite.

2001–2004: Growing Inter-elite Conflicts

Main Characteristics

- Disparity between the open economic system and the closed political system;
- Shifts in the balance of power among the domestic political elite, leading to schisms within the elite;
- Unification and activation of the Kazakh opposition and its increased clashing with the government.

2004–2007: Reaction to the Changing of the Elite in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan—Mobilization and Preparation for the Presidential Elections

Main Characteristics

- Legal changes directed at strengthening state control over Kazakhstan's informational and political space;
- Confrontation with the "third sector." Toughening of state control of local and international NGOs;
- Transformation of the party system, with the creation of new multi-party coalitions, both in the pro-presidential and opposition camps, and the dissolution and disappearance of a number of political parties.

In May 2007, parliament approved an unprecedented change in the laws that lifted the two-term restriction on the presidency and allowed Nazarbayev to be president for life. The five-year term of office existing since the constitutional changes of 1998 has thus become meaningless. Simultaneously, the president was given the right to officially head his Nur Otan party, thereby strengthening his presidential influence (through this party) in parliament, government and society. In the new elections, Nur Otan gained 88.4% of the seats.

The power ensuring the most effective management of society and state, and political stability and guarantee of the constitutional citizens' rights and liberties are the basis principle of Nazarbayev's democratic model. The positive characteristic of Kazakhstani political development is a lack of civil tension and conflict in compare with other post-Soviet states.

Kazakhstan has passed different stages and models of the political stabilization and now the Republic is in the process of searching new optimal stabilization model.

Three Models for the Transfer of Presidential Power

That is why the issue of the future state structure and transition from presidential to presidential-parliament form of government is directly wrapped up with the question

of transfer of presidential power. The future liberalization and democratization of Kazakhstani society depends on this decision.

According to experts the three main models for transfer of presidential power are the most probable.

- Russian (successor)
- Azerbaijani (dynastic forms for the transfer of power)
- Ukrainian, Georgian, Kyrgyz (victory of the counter elite)

Taking into consideration the political culture of Kazakhstani society the Russian model for the transfer of power is probably the most acceptable in Kazakhstan, which allow political stability in the country. The second (Azerbaijani) and the third ones (Ukrainian, Georgian, Kyrgyz) fraught with the serious consequences (high risk of redistribution of the property, inter-elite conflicts, civil war) both for political elite and ordinary people.

In spite of the results in Kazakhstani political elite agrees on the following issues: the necessity to support economic stability and to remain in the political version of democracy

Today Kazakhstan is in its way to "Plural authoritarianism", formally remaining in the procedural version of democracy. It is the evidence of the political elite desire to keep existing status-quo with the developing the tendency to liberalization.

Kazakhstani Opposition.

Political pluralism and a multi-party system are regarded today not only as the basic principles of a democratic society, but also as the fundamental prerequisites of democracy in general. In this context, Kazakhstan, which declares itself to be a democratic state, has been giving much attention recently to transforming the country's political sphere.

Oppositional parties are very critic to the democratic processes in the Republic. Kazakhstani opposition has its own peculiarities. Today there are ten political parties in Kazakhstan but only one of them—the People's Democratic Nur Otan Party—supports the government. The rest are regarded as the opposition. The parties' relations with the government, their political views, their actions, and the tone of their statements divide the parties into active and moderate.

The moderate are critical yet, on the whole, constructive when it comes to a dialog with the other parties and the government; the active are mostly driven by the idea consolidating the opposition bloc into a united front to stand opposed to the ruling elite.

The second constitutional reform made it possible to take a scholarly approach to the concept of opposition: before that the parties were excluded from cabinet-forming. The first years of independence (1991-2007) created a non-classical approach to the phenomenon of the opposition: it is commonly believed that in Kazakhstan the opposition stands against the government rather than the ruling party.

According L. Karmazina Kazakhstani political parties passed through the following stages [5]

During the first stage (1985-August 1990), the state's ideology crumbled and fell apart, the multi-party system became legitimized, and the people experienced euphoria over the imminent changes.

Numerous independent public associations with views on society and the state that differed from the official stance began to spring up. The most well-known of them were: the Nevada-Semipalatinsk International Anti-Nuclear Movement (Nevada-Semipalatinsk IAM, date of establishment—February 1989), the Memorial Society (December 1988), Adilet (April 1989) As of 1 March, 1990, there was a total of more than 100 registered and unregistered public associations, most of which were organized as clubs [6, Almaty, 2000]. The second stage and the third stage - the final confirmation of the institution of a multi-party system in Kazakhstan and its transformation into a customary attribute of life. The political parties are stating their views with increasing frequency and having some influence on the political processes in the country. People acknowledge that the ethnic problem is of a secondary nature and are moving away from populist democracy. Active inter-party building, development of a territorial party network, and improvement of the program base are underway.

When the fourth stage (September 1998-June 2002) began, the establishment and development of political parties entered a qualitatively new phase. In his Address to the People of Kazakhstan in September 1998, the president stated that the government's development policy was aimed at democratization and political liberalization. This policy, among other things, was aimed at strengthening the parties' role in the political system [7] The amendments to the country's Constitution in October 1998 and to the election law in May 1999 envisaged a new mixed election system. This improvement of the election system made it possible for the parties to compete at the elections in December 1999 not only indirectly, by routing for their candidates to the election districts, but also directly, by putting forward party lists for a single nationwide district. As a result, these elections saw the first real inter-party struggle.

As the republic's political history showed, the most significant and system-forming aspect for Kazakhstan was the restructuring of the pro-presidential forces and the creation of the Otan Party at the Republican Public Headquarters, which supported presidential candidate Nursultan Nazarbaev. This was done to prevent the votes from being spread among the parties of the pro-presidential camp, thus depriving these parties of the possibility of clearing the 7% barrier imposed by the proportional election system.

Although Otan appeared at a time of high competition, when the political spectrum was overflowing with all manner of parties, it already had clear advantages over its political adversaries from the very start.

And, finally, the interest in this party expressed by Nursultan Nazarbaev, who had not given particular preference to any of the political structures functioning in the country since 1991, turned into direct support of Otan when the president became a member of this party and its chairman.

All of this made it possible to classify Otan as an elite party with a serious future.

The development of Kazakhstan's party system entered the fifth stage in June 2002. It continued until 2005. At this stage the political parties swelled their ranks, unregistered party structures left the political scene, the political clout of the functioning parties grew, stronger opposition party organizations appeared, sociopolitical movements had less influence on political life, and there was further institutionalization of the national dialog between the political parties and the government.

Nur Otan indeed had the absolute majority in the parliament at that time and many ministers were its members. But according to the legislation in effect at that time the government was formed not from candidatures offered by the party of the majority, but by the president at the proposal of the prime minister.

In 2007 Kazakhstan entered the sixth, current, stage of party-building. Its starting point was the second constitutional reform of May 2007. The amendments to the country's Constitution resulted from the implementation of the National Program of Political Reforms that was launched in 2005.

The Cases: **Uzbekistan.**

The "Uzbek democratic model", stated by Uzbek President I. Karimov based on the following principles: national peace and harmony, security and territorial integrity. The state is the main reformer and guarantor (protector) of stability.

Evaluation of Uzbekistan's democratic development

Internal factors: political, economic, social, cultural and religious

External factors: foreign policy, membership in international organizations, integration process, regional and non-regional states positions/ interests

Chapter XIX, Articles 89 through 97, in Uzbekistan's Constitution describe the president's duties and functions. Article 89 states: "The president of the Republic of Uzbekistan is the head of state and of the executive branch in the Republic of Uzbekistan. The President of the Republic of Uzbekistan is simultaneously the Chair of the Cabinet of Ministers". He is also Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (Article 93, sub-section 16) and, according to Article 80 (in Section V, Chapter XVIII which covers the Parliament), the president of Uzbekistan has the right to "participate in a session of the Parliament of the Republic of Uzbekistan or one of its agencies". Indeed, that certainly extends the presidential arm. In the case of Kazakhstan, a referendum in 1995 gave the president even more power so that now only the president can initiate constitutional amendments.

What are the specifics of *social justice as interpreted in Uzbekistan* and how is it translated into the program and practical activities of the Adolat SDPU? [8] It is commonly believed in Uzbekistan that a democratic state should proceed, first, from the fullest possible account of popular mentality; second, from the nation's high spirituality and acute sense of social justice; and third, from the nation's striving toward education and enlightenment. To a great extent, the nation owes this to the traditions of enlightenment in the Muslim East, so-called enlightened Islam. In Uzbekistan *mahalla* plays the central role in the system of social democratization and realization of the key social principles, of which social justice is the main one. These factors largely prompted Uzbek society to dismiss the idea of "vouchers" promoted in Russia in the 1990s as another hypostasis of false egalitarianism of socialism, while the system of centralized distribution was described as "false interpretation of social justice."

Official Estimation of Uzbek's Achievements in Democracy

- Establishment of stable foundation for Uzbek model of democratic development,
- Adoption of the Constitution, transformation into multiparty political system
- Establishment of bi-cameral Parliament
- implementation principle of separation of powers
- Establishment of the national institute on human rights, including Legislative Chamber of the Oliy Majlis and National Center on human rights
- Development of the civil society institutes. (5,000 NGOs)

Independent Experts about Democracy in Uzbekistan

- One party political system
- Lack of opinions' pluralism
- Lack of the criticism of the government
- Lack of political opposition with the constructive criticism
- Stagnation in economy
- Significant reduction of NGOs

The Nature of the Islamic Threat

The peculiarities democratic development and civil society formation in Uzbekistan.

Islamic factor plays the significant role in the political life of Uzbekistan. Decline of the citizens' level of confidence in government might lead to social disorders in form of Islamic protest against secular authoritarian regime.

It is important to note that there is more dynamism in Uzbekistan 's religious establishment, than in their secular political and educational establishment.

Radical Islamic opposition is serious threat for existing regime. Events in Tashkent (1999), invasion in the Batken district of Kyrgyzstan (1999) and participation in Andijan events (2005) demonstrated the readiness to defend their convictions with force.

Three Models for the Transfer of Presidential Power

In this connection the issue of the President's power transfer is very topical.

There are the same models for the transfer of presidential power in Uzbekistan like in Kazakhstan. But victory of opposition in Uzbekistan may lead to the victory of Radical Islamic parties.

Uzbek Political Opposition within and outside Uzbekistan:

The opposition in political exile is not united. But I do not believe that this will play a major role in their success or failure. The Uzbeks are not going to import a political revolution. A successful revolution, of the "color" type must be made by forces almost entirely based within the country, with strong internal elite support, as well as a population willing to go out of the street. Even before Andijian, elite support for change was largely a "parlor" phenomenon, with the growing number of mid and even senior level administrators and policy-makers who lamented Karimov's "wrong turns" of 1997-1998, and 2003-2004, doing so in private. Now, post-Andijian and the dismissals and arrests of a few politically prominent individuals, the closet reformers have dug down deeper into anonymity, venting their displeasure in ever smaller circles. Uzbekistan does have a small, armed opposition, most in some ways connected to the remnants of a mutated Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and though numerically insignificant in a weak state like Uzbekistan they can be destructive, especially if they enjoy even the support of a few individuals from the security ministries.

CONCLUSION

Factors Impeding Democratic Progress

The internal and external factors of transitional period explain the reasons why the regional states are not able to implement the Western democratic model and move away from the universal standards of democratic values.

Internal factors: political, economic, social, cultural and religious

External factors: foreign policy, membership in international organizations, integration process, regional and non-regional states positions/ interests

The main peculiarities of democratic processes in Central Asian states:

1. Contextual factors as immature of civil society institutes make it impossible to control political decision-making and its realization, clans and social economic stratification, desire of political elite to keep the power at any cost could lead to social tension and conflicts (color revolutions)

2. Contextual factors as lack of consensus traditions between society and political elite, different interpretation of democracy and different degree of access are the reasons of conflicts on political process.

3. All these Contextual factors influence on the quality of Institutions and processes and force Central Asian political elites to work out the mechanism for the succession of presidential power and strengthening the role of political parties and civil society.

4. Using conceptual framework (Cheema, 2005), this paper finds that the reason of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan drift from their constitutional democratic lays not only in authoritarian regimes, but also in the combination of multiple factors both internal and external, that provides the most comprehensive explanation of these states failure to become full-fledged democracies. Internal factors such as political culture and external factors such as the influence of the international community also play major roles in the current state of affairs in these Central Asian states.

There is no one road to democracy. Countries are different. Each country has different set up of problems.

However there are universal sets of democratic values. The states need to build the national democratic institutions to promote values such as civil society, public election, media.

In Central Asia some progress has been made, but still long distance to deepen and sustain democracy.

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Chinese Diplomacy for Decision Border-Territorial Disputes: on Cases with India and Russia

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Territorially-border dispute and a question of definition of Tibet's political status as a part of the Peoples Republic of China, as well as concern of the Chinese party regarding possible support by the Indian authorities of the Tibetan refugees led by the Dalaj-llama in their international activity directed on branch of Tibet from China were considered as basic problems in bilateral mutual relation until recently. Though the formal decision of a problem of Tibet's status is fixed in bilateral "Declarations on principles of relations and widespread cooperation between the Peoples Republic of China and India" from 2003, it, however, does not mean that the named factor already never becomes significant for foreign policy of two countries again.

Occurrence of nuclear weapon in Delhi and Islamabad in 1998, taking into account the interests of China which is officially recognized as a member of "nuclear club" there was a zone of nuclear instability in Asia. Degree of risk of occurrence of the nuclear conflict in many respects depends on a political position of China in region.

Political strategy and tactics of China and India becomes a model of interaction of subjects of a world policy on a joint Southern, East and South East Asia.

The Chinese-Indian relations allow to reveal and to show in detail the practical and conceptual toolkit used by the Chinese management in the boundary policy, in particular methods of "the postponed dispute", "package deal", the concept of "conflict areas", "sharing of disputable territories", etc., till now remains in an arsenal of the Chinese diplomacy. The fact that China in practice does not show its interest in achievement of definitive mutually acceptable settlement of boundary questions as existence of such disputes in the future can be used

Beijing as means of pressure for the adjacent countries at the decision of regional strategic problems of the Peoples Republic of China is rather important.

In cases when attempts to reach the consent on settlement of boundary problems did not bring fast result on comprehensible conditions for China, or even better – directly on the Chinese conditions, diplomacy of the Peoples Republic of China used a method of "the postponed dispute", developed in the seventies of the XX-th centuries. This method is reduced for deducing border-territorial disputes anyhow out of frameworks of bilateral interstate relations with the adjacent countries and to postpone their discussion until "the conditions will be ripened".[1; 74-75]

Strategy of the Peoples Republic of China at this point of the issue is reduced to that "China at interstate disputes, especially territorial, is obliged to defend the sovereignty. There are three options. The best option is when a question is authorised on the terms of China; a mediocre option is to postpone dispute and to develop cooperation; the most unsuccessful option is keeping diplomatic and other pressure, to moderately support the conflict, not to allow the conflict to calm down on the terms of an opposite side.

But when it is necessary to use the most unsuccessful option, it is necessary to give special attention to intensity of the conflict. When we go on the conflict, we do it not for its aggravation, and for continuation of existence of the problem. If an opportunity comes up, we will return to a mediocre option. The top border of the most unsuccessful option is the situation which cannot destroy peace development".

The Chinese party in the seventies of the 20th centuries has started undertaking attempts to transform the Chinese-

Indian boundary question into position of “the postponed dispute”. China was not interested in a conflict situation preservation on border for continuation of existence of the problem, but at the same time it could not resolve this problem on the conditions. As a result, the Chinese management has chosen a mediocre option – to postpone dispute and to develop cooperation with India.

Dan Sjaopin spoke about the Chinese-Indian border dispute: “Even if we will not resolve it temporarily, it can be postponed at first, still it is possible to make set of affairs in trading, economic, cultural and other areas to develop contacts, to strengthen understanding and friendship. Bilateral cooperation still has huge prospects. We hope to be developed and we also hope that you will be developed as well”.

Trying to resolve territorially-border dispute with India, China will definitely consider as a situation in the country: political, public stability, economic development, conditions in frontier areas with India, and a modern international situation and it's own position there, and also a situation in Southern Asia and a conditions of the Chinese-Indian relations.

Strategy of the Peoples Republic of China consists in “modernizations of the country for the permission of the international and internal questions. If only the economy has grown, cumulative power of the state has increased then to appear in the world position and a strong basis for the permission of the international and internal questions. If the economy does not work, not only it is heavy to resolve the international dispute, but also and in the country there may be problems, it can lead to shocks and even to revolts and there might be new disputes.

Whether in the course of the permission of the international disputes we can stand before an impact of a hegemonism and a policy of dictatorship – whether mainly it is necessary we can look to achieve enough fast growth rate and to carry out our strategy of development”.

It turns out, the successful permission of the international disputes directly depends on increase in “a complex power of the state”, solving which elements are the economy, a science and technologies. The developed state China will have stronger positions on a world scene, its role and authority will increase. India will have deal with it at the resolution of dispute and probably then it will be possible to achieve maximum territorial concessions from India.

The important condition for the resolution of dispute also is degree of “maturity” of the Chinese-Indian relations, first of all, it is necessary to include degree of mutual understanding and trust between China and India on the most important questions in mutual relations – a boundary question, Pakistan, Tibet and race of arms, and also a situation in Southern Asia.

“Using “the postponed dispute” method gave ample opportunities of political maneuvering to China in conditions when border-territorial dispute continues to exist, rendering to the fact of the existence of certain psychological influence on the partner. Existence of such problem forces the partners of China to operate in mutual relations with it, and in the international affairs, especially on the questions, able to infringe on interests of the Peoples Republic of China, cautiously enough, from a constant caution on its reaction and to a situation round unresolved boundary questions”. However use of such method “cannot be equitable completely to the national interests of the country”. [1; 82].

In the period also occurs deterioration of the Chinese-Soviet and Chinese-American relations. China gradually appeared in isolation from the two leading powers of the world.

The boundary policy consisted that artificial problems were created for rendering of pressing the next states round boundary questions. And they were put so that their solving entirely would depend on the will of the Beijing leaders. Besides this general problem, the special purposes caused both a foreign policy situation as a whole, and character of mutual relations with any country were pursued in each specific case as well. [2]

Putting forward the huge territorial claims to India, the Chinese government has realized that India cannot accept them. The Chinese government tried to discredit by means of a boundary problem a peaceful image of India first of all among its neighbors and developing countries, and also to force India to make concessions in various areas. After exposure of India “following a former policy of the British imperialism”, China could count on closer relations with the countries of Southern Asia and on strengthening of the role among developing countries.

Bringing during this period a boundary attention to the question of “small neighbors” – Burma, Nepal, Pakistan, Mongolia, Laos – the Chinese management aspired to reach first of all general-political results. For the settled border the Chinese party expected from them the consent if not to accept with “understanding” to concern a course of Beijing on a certain circle of the international problems. Besides, the attempt to quickly “settle” boundary relations with a number of neighboring countries in the early sixties of the 20th centuries should, on plans of Beijing, show its “peaceful disposition”. [1; 62-63]

The boundary policy of Beijing represented not only the means of pressure for neighbors, but also preparation of direct territorial captures. At promotion of territorial claims the Beijing management aspired to seize economic potential and resources of those or other countries and

areas. Special value was given to those areas which were important in implementation of strategic plans of the Chinese management.

On January 23, 1959 the prime minister of the Peoples Republic of China Chzhou En-bark has officially declared for the first time that the Indian-Chinese border has been never formally defined.[3; 29]

In March, 1959 there was a revolt in Tibet which has been suppressed by armies of the Peoples Republic of China. The Dalaj-llama and more than six thousand Tibetans ran on territory of India and other adjacent states. The decision of Indian government to receive the Tibetan spiritual and secular leader and refugees has caused the sharp protest of the Chinese party in spite of the fact that the Indian authorities continued and continue to declare a recognition of Tibet as a part of China.

On 25 August 1959 there was a first Chinese-Indian armed incident which has received wide publicity around two mountain small villages – Migijun and Lontszju, on the east site Chinese-Indian border. After this incident the Peoples Republic of China has shown to India the considerable territorial claims.[4; 88,89]

The escalation of the conflict has politicized its character more and more, and a problem of the resolution got it gradually passed in big-times politics area.

In total, according to the Indian data, since June 1955 till July, 1962 more than 30 confrontations have occurred around the border. [3; 30]

On 20 October 1962 armed forces of the Peoples Republic of China on all extent of border have begun an approach to the Indian positions. In the east sector the Indian armies have suffered a great defeat and have departed on some tens kilometers. In the western and average sectors of borders the Chinese armies have encountered persistent resistance and have promoted on insignificant distance, having had thus heavy losses.

On 22 November 1962 the Chinese armies have stopped military operations on all line of border and soon in east sector have begun a withdrawal on initial positions to the north from “a line of Makmagon”. The Indian armed forces also have ceased fire.[4; 94]

According to the offer of Beijing, the Chinese armies should be taken away on 20 km in the central and western sectors from a line of the actual control, and the Indian armies – to remain on positions in 20 km from this line. The Indian armies should take positions in east sector on 20 km. To the south from a line of Makmagon India and China could base posts with not military personnel on either side of a line of the actual control. The Indian party has reacted negatively. [3; 37]

The Boundary policy of Beijing represented not only means of pressure for neighbors, but also preparation

of direct territorial captures. At promotion of territorial claims the Beijing management aspired to seize economic potential and resources of those or other countries and areas. Special value was given to those areas which were important in implementation of strategic plans of the Chinese management.

In 1953 the book of Lju Pej-hua “Short history of modern China” in which the maps of Kuomintang ideologists were copied has been printed out in the Peoples Republic of China. This “register” covered 10,5 million in sq. km. The areas of the next states that exceeded own territory of China (9,6 million in sq. km.).

The quantity of border disputes and collisions up to confrontations, happened on all perimeters of borders of the Peoples Republic of China throughout last ten with superfluous years, exceeds total of similar situations in other world. Meanwhile character of borders of the Peoples Republic of China, apparently, should favor as much as possible to an establishment of the world and good neighborhood on boundaries of China. The Neighbors of China on continent are mostly the socialist countries and the developing states.

The Chinese government asserts that all Chinese-Indian borders have been never officially established. All contracts about the borders, presented by the Indian party, the Chinese government divides into three categories: 1. The contracts whose existence is in doubt; 2. The contracts which absolutely not concerning an issue of definition of border; 3. Contracts which are illegal and void.[5; CR-157 and CR-158]

In China there are different views concerning conditions of the permission of territorial dispute with India. Any of these sights is not solving and dominating. As a result the position of China on a boundary problem becomes less certain and reserves a place for the auction. It is a position in certain degree also can play a whip and spice-cake role in relations with India.

The Soviet-American relations had a strong influence on the improvement of the Chinese-Indian relations. China has ceased to consider the USSR as the enemy. After improvement of the Soviet-Chinese relations, China aspired to normalize relations with – Mongolia, Vietnam and India.

As a result of the international discharge Beijing has ceased to play an appreciable role in the western camp in restraint of the USSR. In relations with the West countries have emerged old and there were new questions, therefore China has been interested in improvement of relations with the East countries.

Main objective of the Chinese foreign policy both in 1980, and in 1990th, there was a problem of creation and the preservation of a long-term external peace environ-

ment of the country favorable for the further economic development and modernization of the Peoples Republic of China. If to approach to the specified strategy from the point of view of geopolitics the aspiration of China to establish friendship with neighboring countries could be considered as the geostrategy directed on creation of buffer zones round its borders in which there would be no aggressive intentions.

Increase of influence of the Peoples Republic of China in the countries next to India that, along with process of normalization of the Soviet-Chinese relations, caused concern of Delhi, forced it to follow a way of carrying out of political dialogue, to reconsider the policy concerning China. The steps of the USSR and the Peoples Republic of China on settlement of mutual relations were painfully apprehended in India.[6] The great influence on improvement of the Indian-Chinese relations and change of a position of India on was territorially-border dispute rendered by refusal of Soviet Union in the late eighties to carry out of all obligations on the contract from 1971 between the USSR and India. As a result India could not count firmly on support of the USSR, take of an uncompromising position on questions at issue in relations from the Peoples Republic of China.

One of the most important problems in relations between China and India throughout last fifty years remains unsolved territorially-border dispute. Year after the war of 1962 mainly territorially-border dispute backed up the development of relations. Though during the visit of the prime minister of India Radzhiv Gandhi to China in 1988 the countries have made a break in relations: they have agreed simultaneously with search of comprehensible ways of the resolving of a boundary problem actively to develop relations in other areas, however territorially-border dispute as the reef, disturbs till now the development of relations, a trust establishment between two states. So, India has specified to one of the reasons of nuclear tests in May, 1998 the dependence of a boundary issue with China.

Unresolved territorially-border dispute is the important factor which weakens national safety of both countries, forces them to spend huge additional manpower resources and material means.

The overall objective of the Chinese government is and was maintenance of internal stability. The conflict between China and India could provoke a revolt in frontier areas Peoples Republics of China – Sintszjane and Tibet, and it, undoubtedly, very seriously would affect an internal political life in the country and could cause negative reaction among the developed countries. Instability in China also could aggravate conditions on border, and also in Sintszjane and Tibet.

Thus, in the nineties of the 20-th centuries China and India have developed a new course which provided implementation of two separate steps to the Chinese-Indian boundary question: the first step provided a maintenance of peace and stability along a line of the actual control by the conclusion of the corresponding agreements, the second – completely to resolve a boundary question when for this purpose will ripen conditions.

Signing of Agreements has not led to the permission of a boundary issue, as a result it could not be equitable to national interests of China completely. As a whole, it is necessary to recognize that the boundary policy of Beijing conflicted to long-term interest of China in stability strengthening in the given region.

In 60-70th years of 20 century, in known Soviet-Chinese disagreements the Chinese claims for 1540 thousand in sq. km also were born. The Russian territories, it is ostensibly unfair “sawn-off imperial Russia at China in a XIX-th century”. In China historians had been developed the concept “the lost earths” and “certain a historical duty” Russia to China which echoes, unfortunately, sound in the Peoples Republic of China and today from pages of some researches, popular editions and even school textbooks.

The Russian-Chinese border makes more than 4,5 thousand in km. The history of its formation covers the period from the end of 17 century prior to the beginning of 20 century In this time tens contracts have been signed, since the first official – the Nerchinsk treaty of 1689 Political feature of formation of the Russian - Chinese border was that it was established not as a result of large-scale wars, and during diplomatic negotiations.

Border between the states spent to 19 century when China was the weak state dependent on great powers. Therefore on many sites the Russian - Chinese border was spent not on a river water table as it is accepted in the international relations, and on the Chinese coast. The boundary river Ussuri is so rough that sometimes it changes a channel, breaking away the whole pieces of a land from the Chinese territory. The formed islands were considered as already Soviet territory. While relations between the countries were friendly, these questions managed to be settled, but when they have deteriorated, boundary problems became an occasion to numerous skirmishes (only in their 1967 was about 2 thousand). Most known of conflicts on the Soviet-Chinese border of a steel of event on island Damansky which cost tens lives and in which considerable enough military forces have been involved. Enmity has reached such scales that to the population was put some idea about preparation for possible war.

On 16 April 1982 L. Brezhnev has presented his well-known speech in Tashkent. He has declared absence at the USSR intentions to interfere with internal affairs of

the Peoples Republic of China and that in China there is a socialist system. He has spoken against a policy of "two China", has declared absence at the USSR any territorial claims to the Peoples Republic of China and about readiness of the Soviet party to carry on boundary negotiations.

Relations between China and the USSR started to improve while Gorbachev's governance. After the union's disintegration its successors had to run business with the Asian giant on their own. But even during reconstruction Beijing has clearly laid down to Moscow a condition: full normalization of relations is possible only in case of settlement of a boundary question and the decision of a problem of so-called disputable territories. By the way, these territories were "disputable" only for China. Interested in economic cooperation with the Peoples Republic of China, and also proceeding from quite clear reasons that with such the neighbor as China is better be not to having problems, Kazakhstan also has been compelled to agree for a recognition of the sovereignty of China over deserted spaces which during an epoch of the Soviet-Chinese confrontation were actually nobody's. But the fact of transfer of territories from the socially-psychological point of view had a painful character for our public opinion.

During a meeting in Beijing in May, 1989 Dan Sjaopin has in detail stated to M. Gorbachev thereupon the known version of "tearing away" from China Russia more than 1,5 million in sq. km of the Chinese earths. The USSR too "has taken" separate sites of the Chinese territory. When the Peoples Republic of China has been created, the Chinese leader continued, she has signed the new contract from the USSR, has established diplomatic relations with MHP, has shown aspiration fairly to solve boundary problems with Soviet Union on the basis of the Chinese-Russian contracts, though they and "unequal".[7]

During Gorbachev's visit both parties have paraphrased the Agreement between the USSR and the Peoples Republic of China about the Soviet-Chinese border on its east part and have come to the agreement that they will reduce the military presence at 100 kilometer zone adjoining the Soviet-Chinese border, to a minimum level answering normal, to a good-neighborhood between two countries.

The problem of demarcation of the Russian-Chinese border consists that the considerable part of east site of border in 4204 km passes in the general extent on the rivers the Cupid, Ussuri, Argun, Sungacha, Granite, Spacious, and is 3484 km. Besides, scale hydrographic works in interests of demarcation were spent for the first time for all history of the Russian-Chinese boundary differentiation.[8]

Experts total about 35 contractual certificates concluded in a 19th century and concerning establishment of

passage of border between Russia and China. The border on all its extent was made out legally by treaties, reports and other documents that basically did not allow an occasion to doubt its contract-legal basis.[9]

The problem of definition of a line of border on the rivers and an accessory of the islands, fallen to a lot of the Commission after coming into force of the Agreement of 1991 year has appeared how much hard. And the important place is not casual in the Agreement is given the questions connected with definition of border and an accessory of islands. Article 5 which fixes principles and criteria of an establishment of border on the navigable and non-navigable rivers is devoted this problem: on navigable – on the middle of the main waterway of the river, and on non-navigable – on the middle of the river or its main sleeve. As the basic criterion for definition of the main waterway its depth in a complex with width and radius of rounding undertakes. These rules of law are standard.

Practice of definition of border with China on the rivers has brought a lot of the new. Both parties did not have an experience in carrying out of scale joint hydrographic works. Instructions for carrying out of measurements were necessary to Experts-hydrographers. And they were not. The instructions applied in both countries, at times differ from each other. Uniform requirements were necessary. The parties have spent the hard coordination of the Joint instruction.

Time has shown that the Joint instruction has in detail enough defined all stages of works. However both Agreement 1991 and the Instruction contained the general criteria of definition of the main waterway and its middle on the navigable rivers and the main sleeve on non-navigable, and also the basic requirements of work.

On all Chinese survey vessels there were Russian observers. All stages of hydrographic works and their results were fastened by signatures of experts of both parties. The same scheme was used also by observers of the Peoples Republic of China at performance of works on the Russian courts.

For four years it was possible to the Demarcation commission to confirm state border on all extent of Argun and a boundary part of the Cupid, the border line on most parts of Ussuri that is more than 90 % of a river line of border is coordinated. For the first time the accessory of islands on these sites of the Boundary Rivers is defined in a bilateral order.

According to objective measurements the border anywhere does not approach so close to the Russian coast that Russia only narrow strip of water in width, all in 20-50 meters departed.

In 1996 all hydrographic works on the boundary rivers of the Russian-Chinese border have been completely

complete. Military seamen-hydrographers have carried out the state problem on demarcation of border with China have brought the big contribution to the permission of a problem of differentiation between our countries on the rivers.

Signed in Moscow on July, 16th, 2001 the president of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin and the chairman of the Peoples Republic of China Tszjan Zemin Treaty about good neighborhood, friendship and cooperation has fixed "absence of mutual territorial claims" at Russia and China and desire to continue negotiations "on yet its not coordinated sites". To the permission of these questions of the party (items 6) were obliged, to observe the status quo, that is operating Russian jurisdiction.

Speaking about the Russian-Chinese border, it is impossible to bypass a shared problem. How much, basi-

cally, those or other territorial compromises from outside Russia are justified and whether "the wave of the Chinese claims" taking into account management change in the Peoples Republic of China, existence there separate anti-Russian adjusted groups, other negative factors will fall in due course upon Russia new.

Hypothetically in China the official policy of "the lost earths" it is impossible to exclude resuscitation possibility. At the same time, proceeding from political realities, Russia neither today, nor tomorrow, in more long-term future does not presume "luxury" to have to itself China as the enemy or simply unfriendly state at itself on borders. Compromises 1991 - were 1999 justified: they have helped to translate the Russian-Chinese cooperation in new quality – strategic partnership, having made its real and powerful.

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Kazakhstan and NATO: Evaluation of Cooperation Prospects

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INTRODUCTION

For eighteen years now, relations between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization have been steadily progressing and are characterized by positive dynamics. Kazakhstan views strategic partnership with NATO as an opportunity to integrate into the international security systems in order to reinforce national security by making use of the enormous military, technical, and economic potential that this organization and its members possess. In its cooperation with NATO, Kazakhstan is mainly looking to establish mutually advantageous and equal partnership that meets the republic's present-day priorities in the military and defense sphere, in transforming and modernizing its armed forces, in counteracting the threats posed by terrorism and drug trafficking, in border security, science, and the environment.

Bilateral Kazakhstan-NATO cooperation is characterized by developed institutional mechanisms of partnership and a broad contractual-legal cooperation base. Kazakhstan is rendering NATO comprehensive assistance in carrying out the peacekeeping operation in Afghanistan, and subdivisions of the Kazakhstan armed forces are also participating in the post-conflict restoration of Iraq. Joint operational-tactical military exercises are held every year. In addition, Kazakhstan's official policy regarding the development of cooperation with the North Atlantic Alliance has always been consistent: membership in the Alliance is not an officially declared goal of Kazakh foreign policy. And, as domestic politicians point out, Kazakhstan does not have any plans to join NATO in the future [1]. Nor does the republic have any intentions of deploying the Alliance countries' military facilities or armed forces in its territory, as certain other countries of the region have done.

On the other hand, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO diplomacy has been keeping its sights on

Kazakhstan, and the Organization is making insistent attempts to draw the republic into the orbit of Western influence by enlarging the format of partner programs. As we know, in the 1990s, NATO placed the main emphasis of its Central Asian strategy on partnership with Uzbekistan, but in so doing it did not downplay Kazakhstan's role in any way. The thing is that Western strategists have always regarded Uzbekistan as an important element in the regional dimension, while Kazakhstan plays a principal role in implementing the Eurasian strategy as a whole [2].

NATO and Kazakhstan: Cooperation Stimuli

There are many reasons for NATO's interest in Kazakhstan.

- *First*, Kazakhstan, as a country in the center of Eurasia, is in a favorable geographical location between Russia, China, and the Islamic world, which is also important from the viewpoint of developing transnational transportation routes and military-strategic activity.
- *Second*, Kazakhstan has immense natural resource potential, including large supplies of fuel and energy resources, in which the world community is extremely interested.
- *Third*, Kazakhstan is the most economically and politically developed state in Central Asia and so acts as an axis of sustainable development of the entire region.
- *Fourth*, Kazakhstan conducts an active and stable foreign policy, while its multivectoral policy is aimed at diverse integration initiatives.
- *Fifth*, Kazakhstan, being an enterprising partner state in the CSTO and SCO and developing close partnership with NATO, is helping to enhance regional security.

After the Andijan events, cooperation between NATO and Uzbekistan abruptly declined, and the Alliance placed its main focus on Kazakhstan as a key partner. Of course, this step in Western geopolitics was not only of

demonstrative significance for the Uzbek partners, it also showed an increase in the Alliance countries' regional ambitions aimed at fortifying their positions throughout Eurasia. Kazakhstan is the only state in Central Asia that actively strives to have an impact on transformation of the post-Soviet expanse through its competent participation in various regional organizations. There is a general consensus that if Kazakhstan participates in a particular regional undertaking the success of the latter is guaranteed. So NATO is carrying out a whole set of political-diplomatic measures aimed at fortifying its position in Central Asia and intensifying bilateral partnership with Kazakhstan, transferring it to a strategic level and enlarging its format as much as possible.

Today Kazakhstan occupies a central place in the Alliance's regional strategy as a key Central Asian partner. The Organization's leadership highly evaluates the country's efforts to ensure regional security and Astana's support in fighting terrorism in Afghanistan. It also appreciates Kazakhstan's consistent initiatives to develop a contractual-legal basis of cooperation with the Alliance and build constructive relations. But partnership potential can only go so far: by intensifying cooperation with the West, Kazakhstan is not casting aspersions on its military-political obligations to Russia and the CSTO, nor is it downplaying the role of its relations with other states. Experts from the Institute for War and Peace Reporting think that "Kazakhstan is skillfully maneuvering between the interests of Russia and NATO in the region" [3]. Some experts think that "Kazakhstan could well play the role of a bridge between the Alliance and Russia with respect to smoothing out relations between them. For instance, it could find a positive solution to possible cooperation between NATO and the CSTO. Whatever the case, cooperation with the North Atlantic Alliance will provide Kazakhstan with greater opportunities to raise the level of its influence on international relations" [4].

However, despite all the available opportunities, visible advantages, and obvious achievements, there are also certain nuances in Kazakhstan's relations with the Alliance that require a more pragmatic approach on the part of official Astana. Based on national security interests and the current international reality, in the foreseeable future "Kazakhstan has the very important foreign political task of drawing up a sufficiently flexible policy that will be conducive to expanding cooperation with NATO and to fully performing its obligations within the SCO and CSTO, as well as its bilateral relations with Russia" [5].

This results from the fact that close military-political cooperation between Kazakhstan and NATO, despite all of its obvious advantages, also gives rise to many problems that are not only geopolitical and ideological, but also affect such issues as goals, combat proficiency, and military-technical equipping of the Kazakh armed forces. It also entails the possibility of being drawn into various conflicts through participation in peacekeeping operations under

the Alliance's auspices. On the other hand, there is also a high likelihood of NATO's image, which, as world political practice shows, is severely criticized, being projected onto Kazakhstan's foreign policy prestige, which is undesirable for the republic's international policy, particularly in its Islamic dimension. Today, these problems are progressing latently, but they have already been designated and, for external reasons that Astana has no control over, could well become a serious destabilizing factor in Kazakhstan's security and geopolitical situation.

Nor does the Republic of Kazakhstan's current Military Doctrine provide answers to this foreign policy dilemma. Indeed, it seems to be aggravating the problems associated with the multivectoral nature of military relations and obligations. This can largely be seen in a comparative analysis of the changes in the perception of NATO as Kazakhstan's international military partner and its role in the country's defense-building reflected in the contents of the RK's Military Doctrines of 2000 and 2007. In particular, in the 2000 document, cooperation with the Alliance is designated as "expanding cooperation with NATO in the military sphere under the Partnership for Peace program" in the subsection International Military and Military-Technical Cooperation of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Strengthening bilateral cooperation with the U.S., the Turkish Republic, and the FRG, which are active members of the North Atlantic Alliance, can be identified as an indirect aspect of Kazakhstan's interest in cooperation with NATO. Whereby partnership with NATO is designated rather vaguely and, on the whole, technically proceeds from the multivectoral nature of foreign policy.

The 2007 document significantly raises NATO's role in military-defense policy and designates clear outlines for cooperation and tasks aimed at expanding interaction with the Alliance in specific areas. In particular, whereas NATO was essentially mentioned only once in the previous version of the doctrine, in the current doctrine, relations with the Alliance are noted in six specific paragraphs and tasks relating to three sections of the document, in particular, The Military-Political Foundations of the Republic of Kazakhstan's Security, The Military-Economic and Military-Technical Foundations for Ensuring the Republic of Kazakhstan's Security, and International-Military Cooperation of the Republic of Kazakhstan [6].

As we know, the current doctrine was prepared with the active involvement of experts from Russia and the NATO countries, which, in fact, is not difficult to see from the text of the document itself, since the military policy of Russia and NATO is ideologically different. NATO's strong ideological and conceptual influence on the approach to ensuring Kazakhstan's military security is also obvious, which is confirmed in particular by the appearance of the term "institution of partnership" in the text of the military doctrine, whereby in sections that discuss relations not only with the Alliance, but also with Russia and China.

An analysis of the history of the development of Kazakhstan-NATO cooperation will make it possible to identify the reasons for such a significant change in perception of the Alliance and enlargement of its role not only in international military cooperation, but also in the country's defense-building as a whole.

A retrospective view of the establishment of interrelations between the Republic of Kazakhstan and NATO identifies several specific stages of progressive and logical development. Each of the stages has its own features and significance:

- *from 1991 to 1994*—beginning of bilateral cooperation and definition of its goals;
- *from 1994 to 2001*—identification of interests, expansion of contacts, and a search for optimal forms of partnership;
- *from 2001 to 2006*—significant activation, intensification, and expansion of military-political cooperation;
- *from 2006 to the present*—development of a special format of strategic partnership and enforcement of Kazakhstan's special role in NATO's regional strategy.

At the time the Military Doctrine of 2000 was drawn up, relations between Kazakhstan and NATO were at the second stage of their development, which was characterized by identification of interests, expansion of contacts, and a search for optimal forms of partnership. It stands to reason that despite the preliminary work that had been carried out by 2000 in bilateral cooperation, NATO was not regarded as a priority military-political partner and was only mentioned in the doctrine for multivectoral pragmatic considerations. Between 2001 and 2006, for reasons we are already familiar with, military-political cooperation between Kazakhstan and NATO underwent a significant boost, intensification, and expansion, and the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) signed in 2006 underpinned the special format of strategic partnership. This fact was also reflected in the Republic of Kazakhstan's Military Doctrine of 2007.

As the main military document noted, Kazakhstan, under the Individual Partnership Action Plan and Partnership for Peace program, is cooperating with NATO to prevent military conflicts and strengthen international security and stability. One of the main tasks in ensuring military security in peace times is equipping the Armed Forces and other forces and military formations with the latest types of weapons and military and special hardware, whereby in keeping with NATO standards. A gradual transfer of certain components of the military-defense system to high-tech types of weapons and military hardware that meet the world's best analogues and NATO standards is one of the main vectors of ensuring Kazakhstan's military security in both the military-economic and military-technical respects. International military and military-technical cooperation presumes "intensifying cooperation with the United States with respect to the technical modernization of the Armed Forces, transfers of military technology, personnel train-

ing, and improvement of the military infrastructure in the interests of ensuring military security in the region, participation in joint exercises, and exchange of experience in planning, holding, and comprehensive support of antiterrorist operations and peacekeeping operations under NATO's supervision, as well as in establishing regional centers within the framework of the Partnership for Peace program and training liaison officers"[7].

Main Cooperation Vectors between NATO and Kazakhstan

In keeping with the role NATO is designated in the doctrine, Kazakhstan's cooperation with the North Atlantic Alliance is multilevel in nature and implemented in different formats and within the framework of different programs. Kazakhstan cooperates with NATO under the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program (1994), the Planning and Review Process (2002), the Operational Capabilities Concept (2004), and the Individual Partnership Action Plan (2006). Military-defense issues and a whole series of political, humanitarian, educational, and other areas are part of the cooperation vector. Both a general and a detailed program of practical cooperation between Kazakhstan and NATO have been envisaged in the Individual Partnership Action Plan, whereby the country is the fourth CIS country after Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia, and the first in Central Asia to take part in this cooperation format.

Kazakhstan defines its participation in the PfP program through an annual Partnership Work Program, choosing measures that help to achieve the goals designated in the IPAP, which, in turn, is clarified and signed by the sides for two years. Today the Council of Euro-Atlantic Partnership (CEAP) and the PfP are giving Kazakhstan the opportunity to hold a political dialog and coordinate cooperation in a large number of areas, both military and humanitarian- scientific, including security and cooperation issues, peacekeeping operations, military reform, fighting terrorism, arms control, destroying antipersonnel mine supplies and other ammunition, small arms and other types of weapons, prevention of emergencies, cooperation in science and environmental protection, education and other spheres.

The Planning and Review Process (PARP) forms the basis of Kazakhstan-NATO cooperation in areas relating to the military-defense complex. The main areas of cooperation include raising the country's defense capacity, military reform, and reform of the security sector as a whole. Within the framework of military reform, there are plans to raise the Kazakhstan armed forces to a new qualitative level and turn them into a reliable tool for ensuring the country's military security. The reform is also aimed at creating a compact and mobile army with a high level of combat proficiency, developed rapid reaction forces, and special forces trained in anti-partisan, mountain, and desert warfare tactics.

In addition to military-defense aspects, cooperation between Kazakhstan and NATO also includes political tasks,

such as participation in NATO's corresponding measures to discuss stabilization of the situation in Central Asia and exchange opinions on arms control and on informing the Alliance and PfP program participating states about Kazakhstan's stance on various international issues and regional security problems, including the implementation of its own international initiatives under the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) [8]. Kazakhstan is actively supporting a political dialog with the Alliance, which includes regular visits to the republic of expert groups and senior officials in different areas of the PfP program. Kazakhstan was one of the initiators of the establishment of a CEAP subdivision, within the framework of which the leaders of antiterrorist departments could meet on a regular basis to exchange information and experience and engage in joint decision-making to coordinate activity in areas that are of common interest.

At present, important areas of bilateral military cooperation are training Kazakhstan commanding and staff officers (courses, seminars, exercises within the framework of NATO/CEAP) aimed at ensuring the proper level of interaction with colleagues from the NATO partner states when carrying out joint peacekeeping and other operations; study and comparative analysis of the latest Western types of military hardware, especially means of communication and command and control, as well as airspace control complexes; and the possibility of rendering Kazakhstan direct military-technical assistance, both using NATO's consolidated resources and the resources of the Alliance partner states.

Kazakhstan's participation in the CEAP and PfP offers a good opportunity to become integrated into the global security system and participate directly, without intermediaries, in international military-political cooperation. In this respect, joint work is continuing to establish a peacekeeping battalion capable of functioning in joint operations with NATO partner states. Peacekeeping is very important for advancing Kazakhstan's military-political position and interests in international affairs, and it also boosts the country's prestige on the international arena. In particular, Kazakhstan has provided a special battalion from the airborne forces capable at short notice of joining peacekeeping operations under NATO's aegis and based on the U.N. Security Council's special mandate. At present, the subdivisions of the Kazakhstan peacekeeping contingent have already participated in several military-tactical exercises along with the forces of the Alliance states.

The U.S. greatly assisted in creating and promoting the professional development of Kazbrig's peacekeeping capabilities. This is confirmed in particular by the fact that the battalion occupied a key place in the agreement on military cooperation and further support of this subdivision signed by the U.S. and Kazakhstan in September 2003. Washington regards these contacts as one of its priority foreign policy tasks in the region. Undeniable

support of the U.S.-led participation in the region's affairs is Kazakhstan's bilateral programs with Turkey and Great Britain. Despite the obvious success of Kazbrig, further systemic support and international assistance are required in order to achieve this subdivision's interoperability with the NATO forces. The range of this assistance could be expanded to include France and Germany: the former has signed a bilateral agreement with Kazakhstan on military cooperation; the latter believes that relations should be developed with the republic in the security field. The establishment of a new regional peacekeeping subdivision based on Kazbrig using Kazakhstan's capabilities and experience was one of the mechanisms that helped the Alliance to participate in reinforcing security in Central Asia. That is, Kazbrig has shown how successful military cooperation between the Central Asian countries and the NATO military machinery can be. There were essentially plans to use Kazbrig and, on a broader basis, Kazakhstan to attach the region as extensively as possible to the North Atlantic Alliance and the West as a whole [9]. In turn, Kazakhstan regards peacekeeping activity as an important component of its policy to strengthen collective and national security and as one of the main tools of early identification and prevention by political means of military crises and conflicts that arise.

Kazakhstan carries out training and exercises on its territory under PfP, and also takes active part in any measures conducted by other states. Kazakhstan and the NATO partner states are taking steps to organize a regional PfP learning center and the republic has been continuing to interact with NATO countries in improving the military training method. Participation in the Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism (PAP-T) presumes an exchange of intelligence and analytical preliminary work with NATO and improvement of national capabilities necessary for engaging in antiterrorist activity along the entire perimeter of the state borders.

In 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009, Kazakhstan held Steppe Eagle antiterrorist exercises on its territory, which have become a sort of tradition in bilateral relations and promoted an increase in the interoperability of Kazbrig and the NATO country forces. At the end of the exercises, the Kazakh subdivisions were certified by NATO for possible peacekeeping deployment. On the whole, military cooperation with NATO is oriented toward forming new types of armed forces that function proficiently and use the latest types of weapons and combat operation tactics in Kazakhstan, as well as those capable of rapidly solving various tasks in national and international security.

By offering their experience in military operations, the NATO countries help to relay the results of the democratic and institutional reforms going on in Kazakhstan to the defense and security sector through consultations with the Kazakhstan defense department. Based on its partnership with NATO, Kazakhstan has been continuing to develop

conceptual frameworks for reform of the security and defense sector and advance the main reform projects in the RK Ministry of Defense. In particular, Kazakhstan has accepted the goals of the Partnership Action Plan on the building of defense institutions, which helps, in particular, to create a system of efficient judicial supervision and corresponding administration mechanisms for different state structures in defense and security.

The republic's participation in the PfP Planning and Review Process has been helping to incorporate the Alliance's military standards into Kazakhstan's military sphere since 2002, as well as raise the interoperability of the Kazakhstan armed forces when interacting with the forces of the NATO countries. At present, the main accent of this initiative is placed on raising the capabilities of the airmobile and naval forces. Cooperation steadily progresses on a large military project aimed at developing Kazakhstan's naval fleet in the Caspian Sea to raise it to the latest standards and make it defense proficient. Strategic documents are also being drawn up for the naval forces and, at the same time, questions regarding the training of Kazakhstan naval servicemen in keeping with standards of the Alliance countries are being discussed.

Cooperation in NATO information programs is being actively developed. In so doing, the ideological and propaganda sector, in particular increasing access to information and raising the awareness of Kazakhstan society about NATO as an organization and about the advantages of Kazakhstan-NATO partnership, is one of the key areas in the Alliance's strategy toward Kazakhstan. With NATO's participation, seminars, conferences, and fact-finding missions to the organization's headquarters in Brussels are being systematically held. In 2007, NATO and Kazakhstan held a joint seminar for training Kazakhstan employees in the media and public awareness. In order to raise its influence in the republic's information sphere, the Alliance has opened a NATO Center of Information and Documentation and PfP Regional Center in the republic, and several NATO depository libraries are being created in Almaty and Astana. The Security Forum of the Council of Euro-Atlantic Partnership held in Astana in the summer of 2009 can also be regarded as another attempt to intensify the political dialog with Kazakhstan. This forum was the first to be held in the post-Soviet expanse and the fact that it was held in Kazakhstan confirms that NATO views Astana as a serious partner in resolving regional security problems, which almost all the Alliance's speakers talked about at the forum. For the same purpose, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly also held a Rose-Roth seminar, an interparliamentary dialog on urgent issues of Euro-Atlantic security. On the other hand, the increase in political contacts is very logical if we keep in mind that Kazakhstan is the only country in Central Asia with which NATO is establishing relations under the Individual Partnership Action Plan.

On the whole, interaction with NATO within the framework of the partnership programs has made it possible for Kazakhstan:

- *First, to institutionally consolidate its mechanisms of international cooperation in the military-defense sphere.* The only NATO Information and Documentation Center in the region has been created in Kazakhstan (2004), a NATO Representative Office has been opened (2005), and international Steppe Eagle exercises are held every year. More than 10 officers are serving at NATO headquarters. An agreement has been reached with the defense ministries of the U.S., Great Britain, and other NATO states on the establishment of several regional centers: peacekeeping with a strong engineering component; language training; and training of liaison officers. Instructors from the U.S. and Great Britain have already trained 24 Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and Tajik liaison officers.

- *Second, to ensure, for the first time, Kazakhstan's participation in international peacekeeping operations.* Training of Kazbrig servicemen in compliance with the Operational Capabilities Concept has made it possible to reach a good level of interoperability with the Alliance's subdivisions and obtain practical results in Iraq where Kazbrig was the only subdivision from Central Asia that successfully carried out the combat mission. The contingent destroyed more than four million units of explosives, military medics treated more than 500 Iraqi civilians injured in terrorist acts, and bomb technicians trained more than 200 Iraqis and servicemen of the international coalition [10].

An analysis of NATO's activity in the region and level of interaction with a particular Central Asian country makes it possible to single out Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan as the active nucleus of the Alliance's strategy in the region, while Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are "spare players" for NATO. It can be seen from the table that NATO has managed to achieve more significant results in political and non-military activity than in the military-defense sphere. And although the Alliance is making every effort to draw Central Asia into the orbit of its active military influence, the military-defense sphere, despite all the achievements, is the most limited for NATO in cooperation with the region's countries. This is primarily dictated by the interests of the Central Asian countries themselves, as well as by the active efforts of other regional power centers, particularly Russia. All of this again shows the differences and similarities in NATO's relations with Kazakhstan and the Central Asian states. It is obvious that the difference in formats of bilateral relations is generated by the difference in the role of each of the Central Asian states in NATO's regional strategy and, correspondingly, by the different goals and interests the Alliance pursues in each of these countries.

As a key partner of the Alliance in the region, but mainly following its own interests, Kazakhstan renders comprehensive assistance in carrying out both the anti-

*Comparative analysis of the levels and mechanisms of NATO'S current partnership
with Kazakhstan and the Central Asian states*

Programs, initiatives, and spheres of bilateral cooperation	Kazakhstan	Kyrgyzstan	Tajikistan	Turkmenistan	Uzbekistan
Council of Euro-Atlantic Partnership (CEAP)	+	+	+	+	+
Partnership for Peace (PfP)	+	+	+	+	+
Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP)	+	-	-	-	-
Individual Partnership Plan (IPP)	+	+	+	+	+
Planning and Review Process (PARP)	+	+	-	-	-
Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism (PAP-T)	+	-	-	-	-
Reform of the defense sector	+	+	+	-	+
Military education	+	+	+	-	+
Joint military-tactical exercises	+	?	?	-	-
Formation of peacekeeping forces interoperable with the NATO forces	+*	+	+	-	-
Participation in NATO operations	+**	-	-	-	-
Deployment of NATO countries' armed forces in the state's territory	-	+	+	-	- ***
Emergency civilian planning	+	+	+	+	+
Science in the name of peace	+	+	+	+	+
Virtual Silk Road	+	+	+	+	+
Political dialog and democratic reforms	+	+	-	-	?
Public awareness	+	+	+	-	-
Membership in NATO as the state's officially declared goal	-	-	-	-	-
Invitation to begin talks on membership in NATO	-	-	-	-	-

* Kazakhstan is the only state in the region that has created a permanent peacekeeping subdivision Kazbrig that is entirely interoperable with the armed forces of the NATO countries.

** Until the fall of 2008, Kazakhstan participated in operations on post-conflict settlement in Iraq.

*** Until 2005, armed forces of the Alliance countries were located in the territory of Uzbekistan.

terrorist operation of the U.S. and Alliance countries in Afghanistan, and the peacekeeping activity of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) under NATO's aegis and settlement of the post-conflict situation. In 2001, Kazakhstan consented to the Alliance countries transporting cargo by aircraft over its territory for rear support of the Afghan operation, and gave its permission for this aircraft to land at the Shymkent aerodrome in emergencies. Now Kazakhstan and NATO are still cooperating in land transit of non-military cargo for the ISAF active in Afghanistan.

The efficiency of Kazakhstan-NATO cooperation can be evaluated in the context of the statements by the Alliance's leaders to the effect that the Republic of Kazakhstan is a key NATO partner in Central Asia. In so doing, NATO recognizes the country's leader status in the region, as well as the results the republic has achieved in enhancing democracy and the economy. In this respect, Kazakhstan's role in the Alliance's Central Asian strategy cannot be overestimated, since today it is NATO's only stable bastion in Central Asia. By taking into account Kazakhstan's national interests in modernizing the military complex and

our republic's balanced policy aimed at drawing closer to the Alliance, NATO is able to retain its position, albeit limited, in the region.

In so doing, at present it is obvious that the sides are striving to continue productive military cooperation in which both of them are pursuing their own specific interests: the U.S. and NATO—geopolitical and military reinforcement in Central Asia and access to the region's energy resources, and Kazakhstan—access to advanced military technology and the possibility of taking active part in the regional geopolitical processes, as well as establishing a certain balance of power in the region. The results of the events of recent years show that Kazakhstan is Washington's and Brussels' only stable strategic partner in Central Asia, which indicates the rise in the republic's role in Western geopolitics. But drawing hasty conclusions about a possible sharp turn in the republic's foreign policy toward the West appear to be premature. The specifics and dynamics of Central Asian geopolitics impose certain conditions on the countries in the region with respect to building their foreign policy, in which there is no room for any "biases" or "zigzags" [11].

Cooperation between NATO and Kazakhstan in Ensuring Security of the Central Asian Region

It is clear that the diplomatic war going on between the U.S. and NATO and Russia and China to establish special relations with Kazakhstan has been continuing and each side has been trying to take the lead by drawing the republic into the activity of the CSTO, SCO, and NATO. All the same, even with the positive official rhetoric and all manner of diplomatic curtsies in Kazakhstan's direction, *Central Asia's main problem, which is the existence of an efficient and balanced regional security system, has still not been resolved.*

President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbaev notes that "consolidation and expansion of international cooperation in meeting the challenges and threats to security presume a multilateral approach. In this respect, Kazakhstan continues and will continue to reinforce cooperation with the Central Asian states to oppose these challenges of the present day, including by participating in joint exercises within the framework of the CSTO and SCO, as well as joint antiterrorist initiatives and operations with NATO"[12]. Kazakhstan's official documents and the statements of its head of state clearly place the emphasis on developing the republic's military-political cooperation. In so doing, the republic also wants to show a good example for the other countries of the region.

It appears that Kazakhstan's active participation in the CSTO and NATO programs will make it possible to create the necessary system of checks and balances in regional geopolitics, which, on the whole, is in keeping with the interests of all the Central Asian countries. On the other hand, the SCO's active policy, in particular its Chinese component, prevents bipolar confrontation from being established along the lines of the CSTO-NATO and forces the players to look for constructive ways to resolve the cooperation problems in Central Asia.

And it is obvious that *balanced cooperation between the Central Asian republics and the CSTO and SCO, on the one hand, and NATO, on the other, is a strategically optimal and rational way to ensure stability at both the national and regional levels.* Tough competition among the CSTO, SCO, and NATO could have an extremely negative effect on the region's states, which might give rise to the following: decreased control; aggravated challenges and threats to the region's security; acute imbalance of geopolitical forces and increased contradictions among the Central Asian countries; lower rates of their economic development and investment appeal; and disorientation and crisis in the foreign policy of the region's states.

In so doing, *in order to maintain stability in Kazakhstan and the other Central Asian states, the above-mentioned structures need to form a clear strategy of action in cooperation, as well as ensure that tough competition does not arise among them.* For example, *Kazakhstan, as a state that rationally maintains an equal balance in international military cooperation, can act as an initiator for creating a*

constructive dialog platform of consultations and cooperation among these structures, which will make it possible to avoid a crisis in the region. Further development of the situation will most likely be aimed at finding a balance between the level of integration of the Central Asian states into the international and regional security structures and preservation of their independence in decision-making on international issues keeping in mind national interests.

Scenarios for the Development of Bilateral Cooperation

In order to carry out a comprehensive and detailed study of Kazakhstan's partnership with NATO, it is expedient to compile a SWOT analysis for examining the strengths and weaknesses of Kazakhstan- NATO cooperation, as well as identify the latent opportunities and challenges in the current format of bilateral cooperation. The results of the SWOT analysis can be presented as follows. *Strengths:*

—Observing multivectoral principles in Kazakhstan's international military cooperation.

—Lowering dependence on politics and possible pressure from natural neighbors and the large regional power centers, Russia and China.

—Ensuring efficient implementation of Kazakhstan's national security strategy through cooperation with NATO.

—Improving the armed forces command and control system and creating new types of forces, for example, the country's naval forces.

—Modernizing the armed forces, creating a modern and proficient army, and equipping it with the latest high-tech types of military hardware.

—Acquiring and enhancing experience of carrying out combat action in present-day conditions by participating in international military programs and holding joint military-tactical exercises.

—Improving Kazakhstan's image and perception in the NATO countries as a potential cooperation partner in the non-military sphere.

Weaknesses:

—Cooperation between Kazakhstan and NATO is largely curbed by contractual obligations to the Russian Federation and CSTO.

—Kazakhstan belongs to the infrastructure of the CSTO security system, which includes protection of the entire air and information expanse.

—Intensification of military cooperation between Kazakhstan and NATO is limited by the military presence of the armed forces of the Russian Federation on Kazakh territory (Saryshagan, Baikonur).

—Transfer of the armed forces of the Republic of Kazakhstan to armaments and hardware of NATO standards requires large financial investments and bringing personnel up to the necessary skill level.

—The dearth of available information about cooperation between the Republic of Kazakhstan and NATO,

which creates a host of incorrect information, suspicions, and doubts in the political establishment and expert communities in neighboring countries, including in Russia.

Opportunities:

—Forming a balanced architecture of regional security in Central Asia based on the geopolitical system of checks and balances.

—Elaborating certain levers of influence in the regional and bilateral format on the policy of Russia, the PRC, and Uzbekistan in favor of the interests of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

—Developing an alternative international mechanism for guaranteeing the state's military security, as well as creating new conditions for supporting the entire national security complex.

—Raising the country's military-defense potential in keeping with world standards, as well as effecting a certain drop in dependence on the Russian military-industrial complex.

—Fortifying Kazakhstan's foreign policy position, as well as consolidating the democratic and institutional reforms in the country.

—Reinforcing Kazakhstan's international image as a stable state with sustainable development, which will reflect on the country's investment climate and inflow of foreign investments.

—Reaching a new level of development of bilateral contacts in non-military spheres of cooperation with NATO partner states.

Challenges and threats:

—Intensification of cooperation with NATO may entail the risk of a worsening in relations between the Russian Federation and PRC, or a reduction in possibilities in the CSTO and SCO.

—Incorporation of armaments and hardware of NATO standards into the armed forces of the Republic of Kazakhstan may create a situation in which the Kazakhstan army will use both Russian and NATO standards in its activity and this will have an effect on the integrity and interoperability of the armed forces.

—Projection of the negative atmosphere around NATO's strategic activity in the world onto Kazakhstan's foreign policy image, which, in turn, may generate certain threats to the country's security.

—Participation in international peacekeeping operations under the U.N.'s or NATO's aegis may draw Kazakhstan into prolonged, difficult-to-resolve, and complicated conflicts in different regions of the world.

—Reduction in cooperation with the Russian military-industrial complex and emergence of a certain dependence on arms deliveries from the NATO countries.

—Worsening of relations between Russia and the West could very likely have a strong impact on Kazakhstan's security.

—Cooling off in relations with the Central Asian countries, primarily Uzbekistan, as well as clear defragmentation

of the entire regional cooperation and security system in conditions of the Alliance's active demonstrative establishment of special partnership relations with Kazakhstan.

—A simultaneous crisis in relations with Russia and Uzbekistan, or other countries of the region, in the event of an increase in China's suspicions could be a factor that, at least, restricts Kazakhstan's diplomatic opportunities within the CSTO and SCO and, at most, disorganizes and leads to the ideological polarization of these security structures, which, on the whole, will have a negative effect on the entire Central Asian expanse.

On the whole, the SWOT analysis presented revealed both a whole set of opportunities for Kazakhstan, and a whole set of problems that are largely geopolitical in nature and if not given careful attention could threaten Central Asia's security with far-reaching consequences for the entire Eurasian geopolitical area. The analysis demonstrates that the NATO factor has a high obvious or latent impact on the whole of the regional environment, which seems to be very sensitive to any extremes in the geopolitical references of the Central Asian countries, in particular Kazakhstan's, as well as to any incautious actions in the development of close partnership with one or another of the sides.

Based on all the aforesaid and on the data presented of the SWOT analysis, we suggest taking a look at a few alternative scenarios of how cooperation might develop between Kazakhstan and NATO. These scenarios differ in degree of intensity and profundity of the republic's cooperation with the Alliance. In so doing, we would like to emphasize that the forecasts offered on the basis of the study carried out and the authors' views are hypothetical.

• First scenario. *Kazakhstan's active incorporation into NATO's collective security system and Kazakhstan's transformation into the Alliance's Central Asian outpost with the special status of a NATO non-participating state.* It appears that the following possible factors might have an effect on the likelihood of this scenario becoming a reality:

(1) Kazakhstan's inclination toward a pro-Western international policy in order to give a boost to the entire complex of bilateral relations with the Western states and obtain from them greater financial assistance, joining Western industrial-technological cooperation programs;

(2) Kazakhstan's striving to become less dependent on Russia's influence and geopolitics, as well as distancing itself as much as possible from the contradictions appearing in the Russia-West vector that are having an influence on the republic's geopolitical situation and its sustainable economic development;

(3) Kazakhstan's striving to maintain a key position in the regional processes, including by means of NATO resources, to increase its competitive advantages over regional competitors, in particular Uzbekistan;

(4) Kazakhstan's need to reinforce its national security in the event of hypothetical geopolitical, military,

economic, and other pressure on the republic in the future from Russia and China;

(5) raising the country's military-defense capabilities to meet world standards, as well as ensuring a certain decrease in dependence on the Russian military-industrial complex;

(6) improving the armed forces' command and control system, as well as establishing new types of forces, for example, the country's naval forces;

(7) Kazakhstan's striving to consolidate its foreign policy position, as well as reinforce the democratic and institutional reforms within the country.

Development of the situation in this scenario presumes maximum, to the extent possible, expansion of partnership relations with the Alliance without officially becoming a member of the organization and a diametrical decrease in activity in the CSTO and SCO with a progressive cooling off in military cooperation with Russia. In so doing, relations with Russia, China, and the Central Asian countries could be based on trade and economic cooperation, with respect to which Kazakhstan has no alternative. But if political and military relations with these countries wane, their economic contacts with the republic will also automatically deteriorate. Relations with the Central Asian states, primarily Uzbekistan, may cool off, and clear defragmentation of the entire regional cooperation and security system may occur against the background of the Alliance's active and demonstrative development of special partnership relations with Kazakhstan. But this will mean a sharp rise in financial and economic assistance from the West, as well as an invitation for Kazakhstan to participate in the trade and economic initiatives of the NATO and EU countries. Whatever the case, if Astana makes a sharp keel toward the West, Kazakhstan's room for diplomatic maneuvers in the region will significantly shrink, which will also have an effect on the country's international position as a whole. And a simultaneous crisis in relations with Russia and Uzbekistan, or other countries of the region, along with an increase in China's suspicions, could, as mentioned above, be a factor that, at least, restricts Kazakhstan's diplomatic opportunities within the CSTO and SCO and, at most, disorganizes and leads to the ideological polarization of these security structures, which, on the whole, will have a negative effect on the entire Central Asian expanse. If this scenario is developed, the U.S. and NATO will have an objective advantage, and given the current situation and using Kazakhstan as a key to Eurasian geopolitics may be able to greatly reinforce their regional positions and draw other Central Asian countries into their sphere of influence.

• Second scenario. *A balanced policy of Kazakhstan's participation in military-political organizations and its careful maneuvering among relations with NATO, CSTO, and SCO and the interests being realized in these structures by the U.S., European Union, Russia, and China.* It appears that the following factors might have an effect on

the likelihood of this scenario becoming a reality:

(1) Kazakhstan's striving to preserve and reinforce the status quo in the regional architecture of Central Asia in order to ensure geopolitical stability along the perimeter of its borders;

(2) Kazakhstan's pragmatic approach aimed at maintaining an equal distance from all the power centers and raising its independence in conducting its foreign policy;

(3) Kazakhstan's striving to create and maintain a geopolitical system of checks and balances in Central Asia in order to prevent the domination of one of the geopolitical forces, as well as find certain levers of influence in the regional and bilateral format on the policy of Russia, the PRC, and Uzbekistan in favor of Kazakhstan's interests;

(4) Kazakhstan's interest in not assuming additional obligations to Russia, the CSTO, SCO, U.S., and NATO, particularly in the military-political sphere;

(5) developing an alternative international mechanism for guaranteeing the state's military security, as well as creating new conditions for ensuring the enhancement of entire national security complex;

(6) Kazakhstan's striving to form an efficient, multi-level, and balanced system of collective security in Central Asia involving many international participants;

(7) Kazakhstan's need to maintain a belt of stability around the country in order to ensure sustainable economic and political development and retain its leading position in Central Asia.

Should this scenario be implemented, the situation will continue to develop in the same way it is today. If Kazakhstan takes a careful and balanced approach to multivectoral participation in collective security systems that have different ideological platforms and geopolitical strategies, the republic may be able to retain parity and balance in the region's geopolitics. In so doing, Kazakhstan, as the most active and developed Central Asian state, is capable not only of helping to form a balanced and efficient multilevel collective security system in Central Asia, but also of solving the entire set of its state tasks, among which an important place is occupied by national security and modernization of the military-defense complex, as well as retaining its leading position in the regional hierarchy. In this respect, the active participation of NATO and the CSTO with the SCO in Central Asia and their attempts to establish as wide and close format of partnership with Astana will give Kazakhstan an additional resource for implementing its goals. Retaining a stable situation in the region, as well as the equal activity of NATO, the CSTO, and the SCO will make it possible for Central Asia to develop along constructive lines. If this scenario is developed, there will be no objective advantage for any of the sides, but Kazakhstan and the Central Asian countries will still have the opportunity to maneuver relatively freely and retain their positions in the region, while NATO, the CSTO, and the SCO will also be able to take further active strategic part in conditions of non-intensive competition.

• Third scenario. *A drop in Kazakhstan's active participation in developing cooperation with NATO aimed at progressive minimization of its participation in the Alliance's regional initiatives and taking a restrained and distanced position in relations with NATO.* It appears that the following possible factors might have an effect on the likelihood of this scenario becoming a reality:

(1) Russia's uncompromising demand of Kazakhstan, as an ally, to specify its geopolitical position, military-political policy, and technical refurbishing of its capabilities;

(2) a change in Kazakhstan's foreign policy strategy and drop in its active participation in the global security system, since intensification of cooperation with NATO might entail the risk of a worsening in relations with the Russian Federation and China or a reduction in opportunities in the CSTO and SCO;

(3) incorporating armaments and hardware of NATO standards into the armed forces of the Republic of Kazakhstan may create a situation in which the Kazakhstan army will use both Russian and NATO standards in its activity and this will have an effect on the integrity and interoperability of the armed forces;

(4) NATO's attempts to use Kazakhstan as a tool for changing the configuration of regional geopolitics in Central Asia. For example, active stimulation of competition with Uzbekistan through Kazakhstan's demonstrative support in order to put pressure on the Uzbek regime and draw it into its orbit of influence;

(5) intensive pressure on Kazakhstan by the West in order to advance different interests and initiatives or effect extreme acceleration of the domestic reforms;

(6) projection of the negative atmosphere around NATO's strategic activity in the world onto Kazakhstan's foreign policy image, which, in turn, may generate certain threats to the country's security;

(7) participation in international peacekeeping operations under the U.N.'s or NATO's aegis may draw Kazakhstan into prolonged, difficult-to-resolve, and complicated conflicts in different regions of the world;

(8) reduction in cooperation with the Russian military-industrial complex and emergence of a certain dependence on arms deliveries from the NATO countries.

A motivated reduction in cooperation with NATO will in all likelihood entail a cooling off in relations with the West as a whole throughout the entire spectrum of relations. In so doing, the financial-economic aspect will become particularly sensitive, which will undergo a major cutback in order to put pressure on Kazakhstan. Automatic activation of relations with Russia will mean that Kazakhstan diplomacy becomes closely tied to Russia's policy, which, correspondingly, will have a restraining effect on Astana's ability to engage in independent foreign political maneuvering. On the other hand, Kazakhstan is a vital element of the West's strategy, which, in turn, will continue making attempts to return the country to its orbit of influence at all costs,

including both by applying pressure and by means of persuasion. Both NATO and the OSCE, EU, and several world financial institutions will be instrumental in this. In this event, it is highly likely that Kazakhstan will cease to be a linking bridge but turn into a boundary delimiting the ideological contradictions between the pro-Western and anti-Western groups of countries. In this respect, we can expect most of Kazakhstan's international initiatives, such as the CICA or the Congress of Leaders of World and Traditional Religions, to break down under the West's pressure. So based on all of this, we should anticipate a drop in security level in the region and a decrease in the efficiency of all the regional collective security systems as a result of the increase in competitive struggle among them. If this scenario comes to fruition, Russia (and the security structures developing under its aegis) will have an objective advantage, and in the current situation, using Kazakhstan as a key to Eurasian geopolitics, could significantly fortify its regional position.

Conclusion

It is obvious that the hypothetical scenarios that envisage active involvement of Kazakhstan in NATO's partnership system or a drop in the country's active cooperation with the Alliance could entail serious shifts in the geopolitical situation around Kazakhstan and greatly change the vector of its state development. Therefore they can be described as undesirable turns in the development of the regional situation for Kazakhstan. In so doing, it is very unlikely that they will come to practical fruition. It is also obvious that Kazakhstan's only option is to engage in a balanced policy, careful maneuvering, and equidistant participation in relations both with NATO and with the CSTO and the SCO. As a member of the CSTO and one of the important players in the SCO, Kazakhstan will have to pursue the only possible and rational policy of maintaining smooth relations within the framework of these two structures and at the same time intensifying and expanding its relations with NATO. And as domestic experts note, "even if there is no efficient cooperation among NATO, the CSTO, and the SCO, Kazakhstan can still cooperate more actively with NATO as a member of the two above-mentioned organizations, if nothing else because Russia and China are already used to Astana's foreign policy maneuvering. After all, this creates fewer problems for Moscow and Beijing than abrupt changes in Uzbekistan's foreign policy orientation caused by a change in mood in the country's leadership"[13].

The value of the hypothetical scenarios examined lies in the fact that they have designated a whole range of problems that Kazakhstan must either resolve in its policy, or prevent from developing in regional geopolitics and cooperation. On the other hand, the hypothetical forecasts again confirm Kazakhstan's importance in the geopolitical system of Central Asian coordinates the stable or radical

position of which could either retain the status quo or give rise to an entire set of unpredictable but serious shifts in the regional architecture. This has again shown the justification of NATO's high interest in Kazakhstan as a key partner in Central Asia. Based on Kazakhstan's example, it can also be concluded that the effectiveness of a particular collective security system in Central Asia largely depends on the position and potential of the region's countries themselves. The external factor, although it is important, is very limited here and may flare up in emergency situations, for example,

during conflicts or a sharp rise in regional tension. To sum up the existing problems and achievements of Kazakhstan-NATO cooperation, it is obvious that at present there are many more advantages and opportunities than problems and likely challenges. Whatever the case, when elaborating an optimal model of partnership, not only can the status quo be retained and the likelihood of a crisis in the region's geopolitics reduced to naught, but the entire set of relations with the Alliance can also be raised to a new mutually advantageous level.

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Strategy for Economic Reform of the Republic of Kazakhstan

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The grave socio-economic crisis of the late 1980s and early 1990s broke down the USSR and economic ties, and accelerated unemployment and inflation. It was time to take decisive steps to overcome the existing misbalance and reform the economy.

The first stages of the economic reform aimed at overcoming the crisis and ensuring stable development of the necessary institutes of the new economic system. From 1992 to 1997, the most important, backbone reforms were effected, including economic liberalisation, privatisation, the building of a market infrastructure, introducing the national currency and developing the financial system, as well as the tax and budget systems, and the attraction of foreign investment.

These reforms and anti-crisis programmes fostered the expansion of the market economy and formed the basis for macroeconomic stabilisation and the transfer to a new stage of development.

The Kazakhstan 2030 Development Strategy announced by President Nazarbayev in October 1997 was the most important factor in determining a logical route for the nation's progress. Later on, mid-term strategic plans and programmes were prepared in order to attain the priorities set by the Strategy.

From 1998 to 2006, the dynamics of the key macroeconomic indicators was stable. GDP, industrial production, investment, foreign trade, gross agricultural produce, and other economic indicators were steadily rising.

By 2007, the rate of economic growth averaged 10%. GDP per capita exceeded \$6,800 compared to \$1,445.9 in 1997 (an almost fivefold increase). Trade in the same period grew 5.4 times, including exports 6.6 times and imports 4.2 times.

As the economy stabilised, important macroeconomic measures were taken. These included the improvement of tax laws, the introduction of a savings pension system, the formation of a stock market, and

the development of a two-tier banking system. At this stage, a new objective was set: to diversify the economy, make effective use of environmental assets, and encourage the advancement of knowledge-intensive high-tech processing production.

The strategic approach to the use of the country's natural resources resulted in the creation of the National Fund in August 2000. Its purposes are to ensure stable socioeconomic development, accumulate finance for future generations (savings function), and ease the economy's exposure to unfavourable external factors (stabilising function). Today, the National Fund's reserve exceeds \$25bn.

The current stage of Kazakhstan's economic development is determined by the Industrial and Innovation Development Strategy for 2003-2015 prepared in 2002. This comprehensive programme aims at economic diversification and the transfer (in the long term) to a service and technological economy.

The diversification of industries and exports required the creation of special development institutions. The Kazyna Sustainable Development Fund and the Samruk Kazakhstan Holding for State Asset Management were set up to ensure the systemic and coordinated functioning of Kazakh national companies and government development institutions.

The main principles of the national holding and national management company are to enhance the competitiveness and economic activity of companies, to introduce the best corporate governance practices, and to assist the government in advancing companies.

The key activities of Kazyna are the development and implementation of the strategy to improve the competitiveness and export opportunities of small, medium and large businesses in Kazakhstan, create the conditions and stimuli for businesses to enter the global market, form export niches, and advance the nation's infrastructure.

The financial and innovation development institutions under Kazyna's management include the Devel-

opment Bank of Kazakhstan, the National Innovation Fund, the Investment Fund of Kazakhstan, the Corporation for Export Development and Promotion, the State Export Credit and Investment Insurance Corporation, Damu Small Business Development Fund, Kazyna Capital Management Fund, and Kazakhstan Investment Promotion Centre.

Kazyna's development institutions take a proactive part in the implementation of promising investment, industrial, and innovation projects in the framework of the Diversification of Kazakhstan's Economy through the Development of Clusters in the Non-Extractive Sectors programme (the Cluster Initiative) launched in 2004, and the 30 Corporate Leaders Programme prepared in 2007 to further modernise the economy.

The objective of these programmes is to consolidate the efforts of businesses and the government to create new production and upgrade existing production so as to ensure diversification and enhance the export potential of the non-primary sector in the medium term (before 2015).

Samruk Holding consolidated the government stakes in Kazpochta (the national mail operator), KEGOC (Kazakhstan Electricity Grid Operating Company), Kazakhtelecom (the national telecommunications operator), Kazmunaigas (the national oil and gas company), and Kazakhstan Temir Zholy (the national rail company).

The main purpose of the holding is to prepare and implement a strategy for the development of the real sector that would meet the country's interests, and to maximise the long-term value of the companies. The uniqueness of Samruk, which is the first such association in the CIS, is that it combines the stability of a government economy with the dynamism of a business-orientated company.

For objective economic and geographic reasons, Kazakhstan pays particular attention to uniform regional development, and effective territorial and economic organisation of regions. To this end, the Territorial Development Strategy until 2015 was prepared in 2006.

To strengthen the institutional base of this fundamental strategy, it was decided to set up regional development institutions in the form of social and business corporations. Compared to commercial corporations, their main difference is that they reinvest their profits to attain the social, economic, or cultural goals of the region in the interests of which the corporation has been set up [1].

In 2007, seven social and business corporations consolidating geographical regions were set up in Kazakhstan. Their operations have already produced results.

The strategic approach to the advancement of the socially orientated economy helped Kazakhstan form the conditions for quality economic growth, improvements in living standards, and the development of competitive sectors. Further efforts will aim at deepening diversi-

fication, strengthening production infrastructure, and enhancing government support for business activities. This solid base will help counteract external challenges more effectively.

The current stage of Kazakhstan's economic strategy is determined by the need to overcome the effects of the global economic crisis. The results that were earlier attained through the nation's economic policy allow one to conclude that the country will successfully pass this crisis stage.

As a part of the global economy, Kazakhstan was also exposed to the effects of the global financial crisis of 2007. In the autumn of 2007, the financial sector faced problems that resulted in cuts in lending for shared construction and to small and medium businesses.

The shortage of liquidity affected the rates of industrial growth, which fell to 4.5% in 2007. The government took urgent steps to stabilise economic development – \$4.6bn was allocated to improve situation in the financial sector.

The second wave of the financial crisis stepped out the global financial system, with an adverse effect on the real sector. This resulted in a significant slowdown in the global economy and a respective fall in the global demand for goods and services. To stabilise and revitalise the domestic economy, Kazakhstan's government had to take additional measures.

On 25 November 2008, the government of Kazakhstan approved the Plan of Action to Stabilise the Economy and Financial Sector in 2009-2010 (the Anti-Crisis Programme) financed from the national budget and the National Fund. A total of 2.2 trillion tenge, or about 20% of GDP, is expected to be injected into the economy.

The main operator of the Anti-Crisis Programme is the Samruk-Kazyna National Welfare Fund, which was set up in 2008 following the merger of the Samruk Kazakhstan Holding for State Asset Management and Kazyna Sustainable Development Fund. Samruk-Kazyna's main task is to foster the development of Kazakhstan's economy against the background of the global crisis, using the financial and other resources of national development institutions.

Today, the stability of the *financial environment*, which is the key element of the economy, is extremely important to our country. Finance is often referred to as the circulatory system of the economy, and every breakdown in this system adversely affects the activities of the whole complex.

A total of \$4bn was allocated to support the financial system. This money was used to additionally capitalise the four leading banks (Halyk Bank of Kazakhstan, Kazkommertsbank, Alliance Bank, and BTA Bank) through the purchase of additional issues of their shares. According to the capitalisation terms, the money will be used to implement projects in the real sector.

It should be emphasised that the government does not intend to nationalise the banks. Samruk-Kazyna will own up to 25% of their shares, and when the global financial crisis eases the government will gradually withdraw the state holding (on market terms).

Another important element of the support of Kazakhstan's financial system is the creation of the Distressed Asset Fund, also in the framework of the Anti-Crisis Programme. Its main task is to improve the financial condition of commercial banks by purchasing distressed assets and managing them, including sale in the market.

In 2008, the national budget spent 52 billion tenge, as the first tranche, to capitalise the Distressed Asset Fund. In 2009, the fund's authorised capital will be increased to 122 billion tenge, also from the national budget. The fund allows foreign investors to participate.

The second most important objective of the Anti-Crisis Programme is to resolve problems in the *real estate market*. The programme contains measures to revitalise the construction market. In particular, the government will purchase and complete properties that are at least 20% complete. Money will be provided to refinance mortgages with lower interest rates, for additional mortgage lending, and for the establishment of the Rental Housing Fund.

Local executive bodies (*akimats*) and social and business corporations will take a proactive part in the implementation of this objective.

The third task for the Anti-Crisis Programme is to support *small and medium businesses*. This is an extremely important objective for our country because small and medium businesses, being an engine of the economy, enhance its diversification and structural reconstruction opportunities.

To support small and medium businesses, the National Fund will spend \$1bn, which will be used to refinance existing loans of small and medium businesses and issue new ones. In this case, the interest rate will not be higher than it was before the crisis (not more than 14%).

Another factor that will encourage economic activity by the population will be the measures taken by the government to increase local content in large mining projects.

The Anti-Crisis Programme is also expected to provide funds to develop the *agro-industrial sector*. This is a very important objective for Kazakhstan because 47% of its population lives in rural areas. To implement this, the National Fund will contribute \$1bn, and the national budget a further \$3bn. This money will be used to develop processing industries in the agricultural sector.

An essential task of the Anti-Crisis Programme is the *implementation of innovative, industrial and infrastructure projects*. The National Fund will spend \$1bn on these activities, and another \$3bn is expected to be raised in foreign direct investment during 2009. The 30 Corporate Leaders Programme will also be pursued proactively.

Significant attention will be paid to infrastructure projects, which will help stimulate domestic demand and foster economic growth in the country.

In addition, the Programme states that the government will use its best endeavours to preserve the real incomes of people, and ensure the performance of the Head of State's order to raise social payments, pensions, and salaries to the public sector in 2009-2011. In other words, all social obligations will be discharged irrespective of the price of oil.

It should be emphasised that, in counteracting the global economic crisis, Kazakhstan is gaining respective experience. When external sources of financing are closed, strategic approaches and decisions are being found based on the country's own opportunities and resources. This gives us confidence that the country will progress further.

The comprehensive implementation of the Anti-Crisis Programme will help Kazakhstan resist the existing globalisation threats and overcome the crisis, moving to a totally new level of development.

The Economic Structure and the International Specialization of Kazakhstan

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In the modern system of the international division of labor (IDL) co-operates two groups of the countries differing on degree of influence on character IDL. The first group has rather forming international specialization in the world economy which was registered in the process of an existing international division of labor. To this group usually carry three types of the countries - industrially-developed (an information society), the newly industrialized countries (NIC) and the least developed countries (a subgroup of developing countries). The second group is made by the countries with the transitive economy, including Kazakhstan and other CIS countries. The character of the international specialization of the last one was defined in the process process of Restructuring the Soviet economic model and market model formation for the economic management. For economics of this group of the countries are still topical issues of its location in IDL system in the conditions of the global economy.

Tendencies are in the Macroeconomic and Barter Sphere

For the developing countries with a raw - materials orientation of the economy, carrying out structural reform and aspiring to define the place in IDL system, in our opinion, it assumes on the dimension conformity of economy to macroeconomic tendencies of the next decade in the sphere of the international commodity interaction.

First, the change of world trade structure is expected. New tendencies of the world trade development are connected with the development of knowledge economy, share increase in the world export of the medium and hi-tech goods of a manufacturing industry, expansion of service sphere and decrease in a share of fuel and other base re-

sources to 7-8 %¹. Within such structure contradictions between participants of the world trading market become aggravated: the developed countries more often represent itself as the basic exporters of the high technology goods, and the majority developing countries - as constant suppliers raw and power resources.

Secondly, it is changed demand for the basic export goods varies (in particular for energy and raw materials) from the side of various groups of the countries. The requirement of developing countries for energy, raw materials starts to exceed demand of the developed states. To 2020 the Asian states on volumes of oil consumption will come nearer to the USA, to the largest consumer in the world, for example, demand of China and India for oil to 2020 will almost double in comparison in 2003 and will reach 15.4 million barrels a day².

Thirdly, the offer of the basic export goods becomes more dependent on factors of the geopolitical stability of the basic raw regions, conditions of mineral raw material extraction, ecological consequences of manufacture and consumption of energy and raw materials. The growing demand for energy carriers and materials assumes increase in volume of investments³. However already now the investment process depends on ecological restrictions, for example, in electric power manufacture on which is the greatest share of emissions. On the other hand, the branch of manufacture has currently been generated based on use of renewed energy sources, in particular the wind and the sun power. So, in 2005 on the branch of alternative power were power 30 % of all global investments were necessary, and at the expense of it to 2020 it is supposed to provide more than 10 % of all made energy⁴. Thus, necessity of decrease in environmental pollution leads to reduction in power balance of an organic fuel share.

¹ Shishkov Yu. Russia is at the fork of the strategic road\ME and MO – 2007. - #12

² World tendencies in power//Strategy and competitiveness.-2008. # 5.

³ By estimations of the International power agency, only one petroleum industry (from 2005 till 2030) it is required to 4.3 bln. USD (at the rate of 2005).

⁴ World tendencies in power//Strategy and competitiveness.-2008. # 5.

According to the international expert estimations, the basic tendencies in the macroeconomic sphere will change both the competitive environment, and conditions of conducting international trade. The main changes will concern the following aspects of global interaction:

1. The centers of economic activity are moved to Asia. Owing to economic growth in the developing countries the next decade there will be almost billion new consumers. And a cheap labor, along with a growing demand for energy carriers and raw materials, will become major factors of formation of new large Asian exporters⁵ and attraction of new investments.

2. Economic borders of interaction between the countries exporters and importers of mineral resources become wider. The raw materials will be made all farther from the places of its consumption. So, the requirement for gas will be provided with the main pipelines or tankers (in a liquefiable kind). In search of new sources of oil deliveries the developed countries will be compelled to conduct its extraction in more difficult geological, geographical and geopolitical conditions.

3. The economy structure of the leading countries-exporters of power resources is diversified more and more. Along with the oil branch of the Middle East states develop the chemical industry and metallurgy. The United Arab Emirates become leading manufacturers of aluminum. Qatar hopes to win first place in the manufacture of diesel fuel.

4. The transnational corporation (TNC) role increases in structure transformation of power and raw branches. Economy on scales of manufacture of TNC receives at extraction of firm minerals, investigation and oil recovery⁶. Advantages of consolidation in the sphere of transportation and raw materials processing are less obvious. Here the innovative companies which are engaged in oil refining, biotechnologies, manufacture of non-polluting fuel have advantage.

5. The role of state regulation in the conditions of economic pressure increase of TNC reinforces on formation of raw specialization of the developing states economy and the ecological safety⁷ ensuring. Now under TNC control is to 2/3 international trades, including approximately 40 % are necessary on an intracorporate exchange. As a result highly integrated financial and industrial complexes have been formed which unite participants from the most different countries and cover almost all stages of manufacture and production sale.

6. It is changed the role of regional trading blocks in commercial relation expansion, liberalizations and uni-

fications of international trade rules, protection of the regional trading markets. For the last decade a transition from the traditional regional trading agreements to the transregional agreements happened covering a considerable quantity of affairs, exceeding the limits of the classical agreements and regulating spheres of a competition, investments, intellectual property, services, environment protection, space exploration, labor standards and etc.

Features of the Economy Structure

The modern economic characteristics of the Republic of Kazakhstan defining a condition and prospects of specialization in the international division of labor are:

- a transitive type of the economic development (from administrative command to market),
- the developing character of economy forming in the conditions of relative resource redundancy and technological backwardness.

In the conditions of a transitive stage in the country presence of stocks of raw material recourses, the extensive market of the world consumption of these resources became the basic and most accessible way of integration into the world economy. For today the formed economy structure of RK became the consequence, on the one hand a favorable economic conjuncture, on the other hand difficulties of the economic transition to the new market model of economy for the independent state.

The developed economy structure was basically generated in the period of a rise in prices for the basic export goods (mineral resources) and differs from tendencies of world economic structure formation. Specific characteristics of the modern economy structure of Kazakhstan are:

1. *Correlation in GDP structure of the industrial sphere and the sphere of the services has not almost changed over the last ten years which shares made up 42.8 and 52.5 % - in 1999, in 2004 - 42,5 and 53,4 %, in 2009 - 44.1 and 54.7 %, accordingly⁸.*

For the postindustrial structure of economy, first of all, is characteristically the change of proportions between industrial and nonmaterial spheres in favor of last⁹. Structure and character of services which were deeply integrated into the manufacture have changed and carry out functions on its service. Already now non-material factors – the science, education, medicine and various services provide from 70 to 80 % of volume of GDP in the developed countries. Along with reduction of the industrial production share in the world economic structure, reduction of absolute number occupied in the industrial sector of an economy

⁵ For example, China has all chance to become the largest exporter of steel in the world to 2015.

⁶ On three largest manufacturers of iron ore in the world 70 % of all sales volume are necessary. Especially actively consolidation of TNC occurs in the oil sphere.

⁷ For example, in Europe antimonopoly bodies study consequences of merging of the electric power, gas and oil companies and expand influence on formation of the international transactions in the power sphere

⁸ www.stat.kz

⁹ Structural shifts in the world economy branches in the historical retrospective review at first were showed in the fast growth of primary branches - agriculture and mining industry (the pre-war period); secondary — manufacture and construction (post-war decades); and, recently, — tertiary branches — an industry infrastructure, sphere of services.


and production of goods is observed as a whole at the simultaneously growth of occupied in the sphere of services, science, education, culture¹⁰.

Consistently mastering new progressive technologies, to the developed countries the largest countries of the world quickly come nearer as China, India, and many other Asian and Latin American states¹¹.

2. Growth in the sphere of manufacture of the mining industry share and building at decrease in a share of processing industries and agriculture (Fig. 1).

Drawing 1.

Change of a share of the basic branches of manufacture in GDP structure for the period 1998-2009, in %.



Source: Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the statistics //www.stat.kz

In the world economy it is going on a transition from the key branches which are resource-demanding to the science intensive branches. The mining industry share in all subsystems of the world economy constantly decreases owing to more economical and rational use of fuel and raw materials¹². Processing branches become the main in the industry structure (23 % in GDP and 83 % in the volume of the industrial production of the developed countries; 20 % and 73 % respectively in the developing countries)¹³.

3. Structure of investment in economy of Kazakhstan aggravating a raw orientation of economic development of RK.


Growth of gross inflow of foreign direct investments (FDI) is mainly in the crude oil and natural gas extraction, and also on the carrying out exploration and design-exploratory work (Fig. 2).

In 2009 more than 70 % of FDI accounted for the mining industry and carrying out of geological prospecting and researches, including for the oil and gas recovery

– 21.7 %. Such structure of investment has developed for Kazakhstan owing to features of the transitional economy. For the advanced countries the investment growth based on the high innovation of the manufacture is characteristic. For the CIS countries movement to normal reproduction with the support on the investment passes through a number of intermediate steps – investment and tentative growth, when the role of investments grows, but the volume of their influence on the manufacture is still insufficient; actually investment growth when investments become major factor of the development, but are quite often yet incapable to arm manufacture by the high technologies.

Drawing 2.

Change of structure of gross inflow of FDI in RK by the kinds of economic activities for the period 2000-2009.



Source: The balance of payments and an external debt of the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2009.//www.nationalbank.kz

*construction; transport and connection; financial activities

**agriculture; hotels and restaurants; education, public health and social services.

Against a background of inflow growth of FDI there is a decrease in investments into equipping and re-equipment of the domestic production. Kazakhstan and the CIS countries have high requirement for investments in view of the high depreciation of the equipment. However non-uniform inflow of investments to the economy of Kazakhstan, and dynamics as FDI is observed, and investments into the fixed assets (FA) tends to decrease (Fig. 3).

Though gross accumulation of the fixed capital in GDP characterizes investment activity in the country, and growth rates of investments into the fixed capital exceed GDP growth, in 2009 the investments into the fixed capital of Kazakhstan did not reach level of 1998, are not observed also positive dynamics of the development of the industrial production for the considered period.


¹⁰ The first country where the number occupied in the non-productive sphere exceeded number occupied in the industrial sphere, was the USA (1995). Today the USA keep world superiority on a share (2/3) occupied in the non-productive sphere.

¹¹ Krasnov L.V. External economic strategy of Russia: jerk in the global world//www.inecon.ru

¹² The production share of extracting branches in the industry of the developed countries makes up less than 5 % of GDP; in the developing countries — about 7 % of GDP.

¹³ Key industries are a mechanical engineering, an electric power industry and a chemical industry: the mechanical engineering and electric power industry directly are connected with NTP and provide 20 % of all production of commodities, the mechanical engineering in the developed countries provides 28 % of GDP, in the developing countries — 27 % of GDP.

Drawing 3.
**Growth dynamics of foreign direct investments
 and investments into the fixed capital
 of Kazakhstan for the period 2001-2009,
 in % to previous year.**



Source: Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the statistics //www.stat.kz


Thus priority branch of the investing of the foreign investment investing into the fixed capital (FIFC) there was the mining industry, which share in total amount of FIFC in 2009 made up 32.9%, and the manufacturing industry share – 7.8 %.

Dependence of Kazakhstani economy on the world economic conjuncture in the market of hydrocarbons characterizes balance of investment incomes.

Indicative for the estimation of investment balance condition is 2008 when at deficiency of balance of investment incomes in 17.5 billion USD and excess of the similar indicator of the base period by 47.2 %, the income from residents' foreign actives increased only by 1 %, and growth of non-residents' incomes from investments in Kazakhstan by 37 %. Incomes of direct foreign investors against a background of the favorable price condition of the oil market grew to 5.3 billion USD¹⁴.

Despite decrease in incoming of FDI in 2009, nevertheless, the positive trend of inflow of foreign investments into Kazakhstani economy and incomes of foreign investors for the period 2000-2009 is observed. (Fig. 4).

Drawing 4.
**Balance of the investment incomes (net)
 of RK for 2000-2009.**



Source: the Balance of payments and the external debt of the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2009 //www.nationalbank.kz

Thus, the investment and tentative growth is not characteristic for all industries of the RK, the primary exception is made by branches of the fuel and energy complex. So at the raw sector (extraction of crude oil and natural gas; extraction of metal ores; extraction of uranium ores; carrying out of geological prospecting and researches) in the structure of gross inflow of FDI were 72.8%(21.7%; 1.9%; 1.1% and 48.1%, accordingly) in 2009. Notably time is required on the country transition to the full-fledged investment growth.

4. *Changes in the goods turnover structure.* From 1998 goods turnover has increased more than in 7 times, and the export volume has increased in 8 times, and import in 6.5 times. The export and import share in goods turnover of Kazakhstan made accordingly 60.3 and 39.7 % in 2009.

In 2009 foreign trade turnover volumes, and also export and import were below corresponding indicators of previous year. Falling of demand for the end production became a major factor of recession in economy. In 2009 export falling was basically connected with the deterioration of market-determined price for oil. On other goods of the basic export nomenclature there was a reduction of a share of nonferrous metals and grain. Wheat export considerably decreased. Demand falling in the world markets lowered cost of the grain export. Import volumes decreased less considerably; even there was a revival of demand for the investment import dependent on investments in the extraction and transportation of oil and gas.

If mineral resources (74 %) take a considerable share in the commodity structure of export, that the investment goods (27 %) prevail in the structure of import of Kazakhstan¹⁵ – cars, equipment, mechanisms, and also the goods of the intermediate industrial consumption, including mineral products and base metals (20 % and 11 %, accordingly).

In the commodity structure of goods turnover the basic changes concerned export items. So, from 1998 export of mineral products increased from 43.5 % to 74 %.

5. *Growth of demand for the basic export goods, basically defined requirements of the EU countries and the CIS.* Last years consumption growth from the side of the Pacific Rim countries, including China (Fig. 5) is observed.


China becomes the basic foreign trade partner of Kazakhstan. In 2009 Peoples' Republic of China (PRC) became the second large importer of RK after Italy and the second exporter after the Russian Federation (12.6 and 13.6 %, accordingly). Judging by dynamics of mutual goods turnover, influence of PRC on the specialization of RK can become equivalent to influence of the Russian Federation.

Thus, the analysis of structure features of Kazakhstani economy allows making following assumptions concerning modern place of RK in the system of the international division of labor (IDL).

¹⁴ The balance of payments and external debt of the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2008 //www.nationalbank.kz

¹⁵ In import the group of the goods from shares to 5 % is made up by the following: products of the food industry, plastics and products of them, devices and optical apparatus, products of stone, gypsum, cement, asbestos, paper pulp and other industrial goods.

Drawing 5.
**Dynamics of goods turnover of RK with
 the basic trading partners during 2000-2009,
 in % to the general goods turnover.**



Source: Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the statistics
 //www.stat.kz

First, within last decade in the republic the raw model of economy was formed. It occurred under the influence of a number of factors, in which number:

- difficulties of the transition period, formation of independent economy,

- overcoming of negative consequences of the command-administrative management methods which remained from the previous economic model of RK as a part of the USSR,

- possibilities of the available raw-material base.

Secondly, despite unilaterality of the economic development, the developed structure of the economy allowed:

- to provide positive dynamics of economic growth of the country within last pre-crisis years,

- to create conditions for entry in the global economy and equal participation in a number of the international unions,

- to save up financial reserves.

Thirdly, the developed model of the economic development should and can finally become a basis for carrying out of structural reforms of the next decade.

Prospects in the International Division of Labor

The modern period of globalization assumes growth of «numbers of the states, exerting an influence» on the human development. Not to become the country with the imposed side of economic specialization, it is necessary for Kazakhstan to control «contours of multipolar economy». In our opinion, it becomes the main task of the external economic state administration in conditions when the modern world still represents «set of the national states» which significance the next decade only will amplify¹⁶.

Place of Kazakhstan in IDL depends on use of advantages «new, quickly changing the multipolar world economy in which some developing countries become strong economic powers; others gradually turn into the additional centers of the economic growth; and the third struggle for realization of their potential within the limits of this new system, where the North and the South, the East and the West – now only designations on a compass, they are not predetermined economic destinies¹⁷».

Prospects of the new multipolar economy are defined:

- the new centers of economic growth (new sources of world demand) and product market limits;

- new character of the commodity offer and limits of resource base.

Thus, prospects of Kazakhstan as the subject of global influence with the postindustrial orientation of economic specialization depend on new regions of global demand, expansion of participation in the manufacture of the goods of a growing demand and formation of new requirements.

New regions of demand. According to WB's forecasts in ten years a demand source will be not only the USA, but also other countries. World trade revival will occur at the expense of demand strengthening for import from the side of developing countries. Volumes of their import already now exceed on 2 % their record pre-crisis indicator for April, 2008¹⁸. The share of developing countries in global GDP at par purchasing ability has grown from 33.7% in 1980 to 43.4% in 2010. Formation of new regions of demand begins in Asia¹⁹.

So, the South East Asian countries, region with an average level of the income and a population almost 600 million persons, pursue a policy of multilateral regional cooperation, and also deepen communications with Australia, the North America and Europe on the basis of global system of deliveries. At the same time the next decade it is doubtful whether to overcome a disbalance between non-uniformly growing manufacture of the goods, accumulation of the capital and consumption in the West and the East. Overcoming of global demand recession, by some estimation, probably not earlier, than in 10 years as GDP of potential global consumers – India and China, concerning leading economy is insignificant.

For Kazakhstan there is a danger in the conditions of growing world and Asian demand, in particular China, to keep the tendency of raw export growth and existing type of the international specialization.

¹⁶ Zoellick R. End of "the third world"? Principle updating of versatility for the multipolar world//www.worldbank.org

¹⁷ Ibid

¹⁸ In spite of fact that import volumes of the developing countries make up about half of import volumes of the countries with high level of the income, they grow much faster rates. As a result, since 2000, on developing countries it was necessary over half of increase in volumes of world demand for import. Import of the countries with high level of the income is still on 19 % below the maximum indicator of earlier period//www.worldbank.org

¹⁹ From the point of view of purchasing capacity parity the share of Asia stably increased about 7 % in 1980 to 21 % in 2008. Now the Asian share markets make up 32 % from cumulative global capitalization of the markets that exceeds indicators of the USA (30 %) and Europe (25 %)//www.worldbank.org

The goods of the growing demand and new requirements. According to the experts of the UNO, the growing demand goods become power resources, the foodstuffs, fresh water²⁰. The requirement of mankind in the foodstuffs by 2050 can increase in comparison with 1999 in 26 times, in the power resources – in twice, in the fresh water – in 1.5 times. Presence of areas under crops becomes the important factor of provision of requirements for the foodstuffs²¹.

Consequently, the estimation of possibilities and consequences of satisfaction of growing world demand on power and foodstuffs is important.

Possibilities of Kazakhstani energy market are defined by stocks of rich resources for the world demand. As it is known in Kazakhstan in the manufacture more than 60 elements of the periodic table of Mendeleev are involved, 32 kinds of minerals are extracted. Kazakhstan takes leading places in the world on the level of the explored reserves of minerals, in particular hydrocarbons, uranium, iron ore and etc²². Kazakhstani fuel and energy resources (oil, gas, coal), and also some ferrous (iron, chromic ore, steel and ferroalloys) and nonferrous metals (copper, aluminum, zinc and lead) possess comparative international competitiveness now.

Occupying a foreground in a world mineral-raw-material base on volumes and the variety of minerals, Kazakhstan has real prospects to remain the world supplier of raw materials, mainly crude oil and gas, as in the medium-term, and long-term prospect at an existing world conjuncture, backward technical arms of a manufacturing industry branches and low financing of a branch science. Especially as there is a tendency of extraction reduction of raw materials leading powers.

Possibilities of the food market of Kazakhstan completely depend on existing natural-environmental conditions and world requirement for a foodstuff and are limited by the scientific and technical level of the domestic agricultural sector.

In the world economy the problem of food safety has started to press the problem of safety power on degree of urgency. Kazakhstan possesses considerable potential of agricultural resources, especially in the grain and meat market. By experts' estimates of agricultural sector, for example, export possibilities of Kazakhstan do not concede on meat as well as substantially surpass export possibilities on grain.

The total area of the agricultural land in Kazakhstan makes up 86 million hectares, of them 22 million — ploughed field. As to increase in areas under crops, that, according to Agency on the management of ground resources, the area of fallow lands on the republic makes up 5.5 million hectares, of them it is possible to use under the ploughed field to three millions.

Demand in the food world market "is warmed up" by India and China sharply increasing consumption of products earlier not salable, for example, of wheat; biofuel production under which the part of the areas under food grain is given; productivity decrease in the majority grain producing world regions.

Intensive consumption of the animal produce, especially meat²⁴, also repeatedly increases consumption of grain for fodder needs and reduces a share of the areas for cultivation of food grain. «Grain world's reserves have decreased to the lowest level for the last quarter of the century it indicates that advancing growth of consumption, instead of speculative actions ... are the main reason of rise in prices²⁵».

Possibilities of food market development of RK are limited by a technological level of the agricultural sector and level of the irrigated earth supply of the country. The problem of water resource distribution in the Central Asia gets scales of transnational value. Also the problem of potable water supply gets global scales.

New character of world commodity demand in the power and food markets becomes the important tendency of world trade for change of the international specialization of RK. In view of toughening of ecological standards demand for alternative energy sources and a non-polluting foodstuff increases. Conditions of development of new sectors of the power market and the market of the foodstuffs for Kazakhstan become ecological safety and preferences of own consumers and the basic trading partners in use of this or that group of the goods. For today Kazakhstan possesses certain advantages in development of sector of organic products and alternative power.

Thus, according to change of world demand the next decade the international specialization of RK will be formed under the influence of following tendencies:

- in parallel with growth of demand for traditional energy sources replacement of traditional kinds of

²⁰ Shishkov J. Actual of modern economy and archaic character of state regulation//the International processes, - 2010 8, - № 1 (22)

²¹ For a normal food of one person by vegetative food without use of pesticides and other chemical preparations than 0,07 hectares of an arable land are necessary on the average not less. As a whole areas under crops on the Earth while suffices. Complexities of these areas are non-uniformly distributed. In 1975 the population of the countries lacking an arable land, made up 175 million persons. By 2000 this number has increased to 450 million, and by 2025 it can reach from 557 million to more billion person. They should import the increasing volume of agricultural products// Shishkov J.V.

²² The share of Kazakhstan in the world's reserves of iron ore makes up 6%, uranium stocks make up 25% of explored reserves in the world. Oil stocks make up today 3.2% of worldwide, gas stocks make up 1.7% of world's reserves. The country wins first place in the world on the tungsten stocks, the second – on the stocks chromites and phosphorites, the third – manganese ore, the fourth – lead and molybdenum.

²³ Though specific weight of biofuel makes up 1.5% of the world offer of liquid kinds of fuel, on its manufacture in 2006-2007 50% of a crop gain of food cultures left.

²⁴ In comparison with the middle of the last century meat consumption counting per head has doubled.

²⁵ Klinov V.G. Structural crises and the world economic conjuncture// Russian external economic bulletin.-2008. № 10.

fuel with alternative non-polluting products will be carried out;

- interest to the technologies using renewed energy sources of the wind and the sun will increase;

- requirements for the production of the equipment for metallurgy, electric power industry and engineering personnel for these branches will grow;

- the international ecological requirements to the extraction and processing of mineral raw materials will become tougher;

- the probability of occurrence unpredictable on scales and consequences of ecological accidents will increase at use of new unchecked technologies of extraction and raw materials use.

Limits of the commodity offer expansion of Kazakhstan and type of the international specialization will depend more and more on development of cooperation relations with the countries defining economic growth and character of world demand.

The state role in affairs of the country participation in international division of labor rises. The power, metallurgy, food complex and sphere of services become the basic spheres of the structural reorganization of Kazakhstani economy. Kazakhstan should use available possibilities for the production of the goods world demand on which the next decade will grow.

System and structural reorganization of economy on the basis, the accepted strategic programs “Kazakhstan-2030”, «Kazakhstan - 2020», and also five years’ plan – “forced industrial-innovative development of the country” till 2014 become the basic feature of next decade for Kazakhstan. In our opinion, the forced industrially-innovative development it should begin with changes of the resource policy towards preservation of potential of not renewed natural resources, ecological safety, power savings and development of alternative power. In this direction there are real possibilities for maintenance of innovative break for development of all national economy.

Problems of the External Labor Migration in Kazakhstan at the Present Stage

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For Kazakhstan the problem of the international labor migration for today is actually as it makes essential impact on the home labor market. At the same time the threat from the point of view of national safety is that the labor migration to Kazakhstan has mainly illegal character. As a whole, the external labor migration in Kazakhstan is the difficult and multivector process caused by many factors. In 2000s the labor market of Kazakhstan became rather attractive to labor migrants, first of all from the countries of the Central Asia - Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Also Kazakhstan became attractive to a labor force from China, Turkey and Russia.

The world financial crisis for 2007 – 2009 was a little lowered by a stream of labor migrants, however their total number there is enough high, especially its latent part. So, number of legal labor migrants in Kazakhstan occupies a small part from the total number of labor migrants, however the tendency to increase in the given indicator is observed. According to Ministry of Labor and Social Protection of RK, in 2002 12 thousand foreign experts were involved, in 2006 already 40,9 thousand experts, in 2007 – 58,8 thousand, in 2008 – 61,4 thousand persons.

The estimation of number of illegal labor migrants is a complex task considering absence of uniform system of the account and the control in connection with the illegal character of the most labor migrants' stay in Kazakhstan. Besides, the Countries' Exporters of the labor force do not give the statistical data on labor emigration, including in communication by absence of conducting the corresponding account.

So, for example, in 2006 during carrying out of the single action on the labor migrant legalization, in

Kazakhstan 164,5 thousand persons were legalized, mainly citizens of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan. As the international practice shows, during carrying out of similar actions approximately 25-30 % of all labor migrants in the country are legalized. Thus, the total number of the labor migrants can make approximately 500 - 600 thousand persons that (Table 1) coincides with the official data of Ministry of Internal Affairs of RK.

Table 1.

Dynamics of number of labour migrants in Kazakhstan in 2005-2009

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Thousand persons in number (estimation)	250-300	450-500	500-550	550-600	400-450

Source: the data of Ministry of Internal Affairs of RK, expert estimations

In our opinion, taking into account economic recession, toughening of measures on struggle against the illegal migration, the total number of the labor migrants in Kazakhstan in 2009 made up about 400-450 thousand persons, or 5-5,5 % from the occupied population of the country.

The basic mass of the labor migrants can be divided into three basic groups:

- the seasonal workers working within 2-8 months. The basis is made up in the majority by builders and workers of agriculture - shepherds, collectors of a crop, pourers etc.;
- the second group - the labor migrants working in Kazakhstan during shorter time, less than 2 months are inhabitants of frontier regions, small-batch dealers;

• the third group are foreign citizens who live in territory of Kazakhstan long time, more than 8 months, being engaged shuttle and other kinds of business.


If first two groups consist of hired workers and completely depend on the employer last category represents independently occupied labor migrants who occupy a niche of businessmen of small and medium-sized business.

Thus, the overwhelming majority of the labor migrants on countries of origin are made up by citizens of the CIS countries - 93 % and 7 % - natives of the far abroad countries. Thus among the labor migrants citizens of the Central Asian countries prevail.

Employment of the labor migrants on spheres of the economy of Kazakhstan is basically defined by an estimation method. So, according to the data of various sociological researches, principal views of the labor migrants' activity are construction and commercial business, and also agriculture and sphere of services. At the same time, the single action on the legalization, spent at the second half of 2006, allowed to obtain more exact statistical data on spheres of the labor migrants' employment (Drawing 1). Considering stability of traditional employment of the labor migrants, the employment structure practically has not changed the next years.

Drawing 1.

***Distribution of the labor migrants
on the economic activities spheres in 2006 (in %)***



Source: the data of Ministry of Internal Affairs of RK

According to sociological interrogations, non-uniformity of gender and age structures of the labor migrants is observed. So, the greatest share of women is presented in the sphere of services and trade whereas in building and the industry men prevail. Thus among the labor migrants persons at the age of 25-39 years prevail, basically, natives of a countryside. However, last years the increase in a share of youth among the

labor migrants is observed. According to the International Organization for Migration, the average period of stay in Kazakhstan labor migrants makes up from 2 till 8 months, having average value 4,5 months.

Legal labour migrants are presented in Kazakhstan, basically, medium and highly paid workers in leading branches of economy. Thus, the large enterprises aspire to licensing of labour migrants whereas use of illegal labor migrants, basically, is extended at the small and average enterprises.

As a whole, analyzing modern labour migration in Kazakhstan, it is possible to note following positive influence on a national economy:

- decrease in shortage of a manpower, first of all in the sphere not qualified and low-paid work that positively affects trade, building and agriculture;
- decrease in the cost price of made production in those branches where, basically, the labor migrants are occupied;
- attraction along with low-paid workers and some number of highly skilled experts, in particular, in the sphere of the oil and gas industry.

At the same time, it is necessary to note presence of the following negative tendencies:

- informal sector of economy growth as the most part of the labor migrants is not registered and, accordingly, does not pay taxes. Presence of a significant amount of "free" money on hands promotes a fast overflowing of capitals and a labor in the sphere of the informal economy. As a result, non-payment of taxes in the budget of Kazakhstan causes an economic damage at the macroeconomic level;
- some increase in a competition for workplaces in a number of economy branches;
- loading strengthening on a labor market in the southern regions (oblast) of Kazakhstan – South Kazakhstan, Zhambyl, Almaty and Mangystau where the most part of the labour migrants is concentrated;
- remaining deficiency of a highly skilled labour at increasing inflow of not qualified labour migrants can strengthen structural unemployment on the labor market of Kazakhstan.

Along with the listed problems, outflow of currency from Kazakhstan to foreign countries thanks to remittances of the labor migrants is marked also. Thus, definition of total amounts of the labor migrants' remittances inconveniently in connection with the considerable share of informal monetary streams. As a whole, remittances of labor migrants became for a long time an integral part of GDP (gross domestic product) of the Countries-Exporters of the labor.

According to the World bank, in Kazakhstan a considerable part of the labor migrants – 41,2 %, bring home the earned money personally, send with friends (23,9 %) or relatives (14,9 %). Only 17,6 %, that is less than one fifth, periodically or constantly send money by mail.

According to official figures, in 2008 the volume of bank remittances of the labor migrants made up about USD 300 mln., having decreased in comparison with 2007 twice that is connected with economic recession in Kazakhstan, first of all, in building branch. By expert estimations, in 2009 remittances made up about USD 400 mln. that is connected with the beginning of an exit from the active phase of the economic crisis (Table 2).

Table 2.

Remittances of the labour migrants from Kazakhstan in 2005-2009 (bln. dollars of the USA)

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Bank remittances	0.8	1.1	0.6	0.3	0.4
Informal remittances (expert estimations)	2.5	3	2.2	1.3	1.5

Source: the data of the World Bank, UNO, expert estimations.

The most part of the earned money abroad is spent by the labor migrants in the homeland for the financial support of a family, a smaller part – on opening of the enterprises of a small-scale business. Thus, the labor migration serves not only a powerful source of receipt of hard currency in the donor country, but also slackening of social intensity in it.

As predicted by experts, in 2010 increase of remittances of the labor migrants is expected from Kazakhstan, on a tentative estimation – on 20 - 30 %. The given problem will directly concern the poorest CIS countries. Thereupon, probably, some increase in a consumer demand that will accordingly be reflected in the economic development of the countries which are the basic suppliers of a labor to Kazakhstan, such as Tajikistan, Kirghizia and Uzbekistan.

As a whole, the further development of the labor migration will depend on the following major factors:

- social and economic situation in the countries of the Central Asia which are the basic suppliers of the labor migrants to Kazakhstan. As process of new workplace creations in the given countries lags behind growth rates of the population, the tendency of the labor export not only will remain, but also will amplify;

- the further structural changes in economy of Kazakhstan and development of new competitive sectors. Liberation of a manpower resource will not solve the problem of a structural staff deficit connected with quality of workplaces. Besides, separate categories of labor migrants - workers of average and high qualification, will be in demand still;

- positions of Russia in relation to reception of an external manpower resources. In case of a migratory policy toughening and restriction of access on the Russian market, it is necessary to expect reorientation of a part of labor migrants to the Kazakhstani labor market.

On the basis of existing tendencies of development of the listed factors, it is possible to assume the further increase in volumes of labor migration to Kazakhstan in the medium term prospect.

In our opinion, the basic tendencies in the given sphere will be:

- by Agency of the RK calculations on the statistics, by 2015 in economy of Kazakhstan it will be occupied till 1 - 1,2 million labor migrants. In our opinion, on the basis of indicators of migratory and demographic process development in the Central Asia, the given figure is represented to the most authentic.

- on countries of origin, in the medium term prospect, growth of native share of Tajikistan, China and Turkey (in the oil-producing sphere) is possible. Thus prevalence among labor migrants of citizens of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan will remain in near-term outlook;

- growth of a share of labor migrants in the sphere of services, transport and trade will proceed. Appreciable growth of a share occupied in agricultural sector, especially seasonal workers is probable. The share of labor migrants also will grow in building, however, not so dynamical rates, as in 2003-2006

- the greatest migratory pressure from the side of labor migrants will be tested still by the southern regions of Kazakhstan, Almaty and Astana. Appeal of northern regions of Kazakhstan, especially in case of realization of large industrial projects and agriculture development in the given region also will grow.

Thus, feature of labor migration in Kazakhstan is that, it basically carries illegal character and is insufficiently supervised by the state. The structure of labor migrants is non-uniform on its ethnic and social composition, on a regional orientation and economic activities spheres. The basic Countries-Exporters of labor migrants to Kazakhstan are the countries of the Central Asia, Russia, China, Turkey. The main spheres

of employment of labor migrants traditionally are: building, service sphere, agriculture.

In the medium-term prospect probable the further increase in volumes of labor migration is represented to Kazakhstan that will be defined growth rates of economy and a direction of a migratory policy not only Kazakhstan, but also the labor Countries-Exporters. In whole, in case of unacceptance of corresponding measures, growth of a share of illegal labor migrants is probable.

As the international experiment shows, the most effectual measures on the regulation of labor migration economic tools perform whereas rigid prohibitive measures are basically inefficient. Thus, in our opinion, the principal direction of the further migratory policy of the state should be legalization stimulation as it is

possible more part of labor migrants. The important is also the further perfection of legislative and institutional bases.

As a whole, in process of the way out of the economic crisis, requirements of economic growth of Kazakhstan will dictate necessity of expansion of a labor market, creation of conditions for reception of growing quantity of labor migrants. In these conditions the policy in the field of labor migration should have complex and long-term character, combine economic feasibility of attraction of labor migrants with measures on protection of home labor-market of Kazakhstan. Thus, the given measures are necessary for coordinating actively at the interdepartmental and interstate levels.

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Central Asia in Modern Politics

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Throughout the two decades of independent development of the Central Asian states, world political science has formulated its own specific approaches to the region and acquired certain conceptions. Elaborated by the members of different schools and, particularly, of diverse political affiliations, the methods, ideas, and approaches, likewise, differ widely. From the very beginning, everything written about Central Asia abroad was stamped with ideological and geopolitical approaches, which means that all of them were politicized, albeit to different degrees. More likely than not, the roots should be sought in Sovietology: contemporary Central Asian studies (particularly in the West) have inherited too many birthmarks from it.

Classification of Scholarly Writings on Central Asia

How should we classify the varied and numerous scholarly writings on Central Asia? Classification by national schools was most effective at the early stages of contemporary Central Asian studies [1]. In the early 1990s, the British, French, (West) German, and American national schools predominated [2]. Later, Turkey, China, India, Poland, Iran, Pakistan, and others joined in the intensive studies of the political processes in the region and around it. Political literature of Russia and the other CIS countries (including those of Central Asia) is a special phenomenon.

This suggests a different classification method; everything that has been written about Central Asia can be divided into several groups:

- (1) works dealing with the regional processes, relations, and political developments of individual republics;
- (2) works dealing with the region's international status, the geopolitical processes around it, and the relations between the Central Asian states, on the one side, and the world and regional players, on the other;
- (3) works devoted to individual states of the region.

There is any number of definitive works dealing with the region as a whole and authored by G.E. Fuller, R. Dannreuther, M.B. Olcott, O. Roy, G. Gleason, F.E. Starr, and others. Collective works, which bring together

experts on a wide range of subjects who represent Western and Asian scientific schools and, not infrequently, post-Soviet academic science, are the most popular form of regional studies.

This can be described as globalization in science; in any case, this is a sure sign that the academic traditions are losing their national features, while the academic world in the West is becoming more democratic than before. Political interests and geopolitical engagement, however, are evident in latent or even open form in many works not necessarily written in the West.

Central Asia in the Mirror of Contemporary Political Science: Problems and Approaches to Them

In the West, studies of Central Asian politics knew several development stages, each of which, intimately connected with the regional processes, reflected what was going on in the region and around it.

The first stage (approximately 1991-1995) was dominated by geopolitics for the simple reason that Central Asia had been pushed onto the world political scene by the Soviet Union's disintegration, a geopolitical shift of grandiose dimensions. Martha Brill Olcott described this as a "catapult to independence,"[3] a happy term willingly accepted by the political analyst community. Western experts tried to identify the direction in which the newly independent Central Asian states were moving; whether they had completely ruptured their ties with the Soviet Union/Russia; whether the destabilization threat was great; and whether the attraction of the Islamic world was strong. In fact, these were recommendations rather than analytical works in the true sense of the word.

The very first works dealing with Central Asia (by G.E. Fuller, R. Dannreuther, G. Crichlow, M.B. Olcott, and others) clearly pointed to the threats and challenges with which the West would be confronted and which it should overcome: Moscow's restored control; Islamic fundamentalism; ethnic and religious disturbances; proliferation of WMD, etc. At this early stage, some of the authors offered the conclusion that the region had paid dearly for its stability (albeit highly relative): it had exchanged it for the road of democracy. This meant that

the Western politicians accepted that the region would embrace the authoritarian development model, which had nothing to do with the West's ideas of good governance for the simple reason that the alternative—militant Islamism—was even less acceptable, as the experience of Tajikistan had amply demonstrated.

These works contained an easily recognizable geopolitical message to Western strategists: the West should go to all lengths to support the post-Soviet Central Asian republics as independent states and channel their development in the desired direction. All instruments would suffice: democratic, institutional, political, economic, energy, transportation, etc. By the mid-1990s, the most far-sighted analysts guessed that Russia (the zigzags of Yeltsin's policies notwithstanding) would not leave the region. By that time the Western political scientists had become even clearer about the desired Western regional strategies: the West should be even more involved in the struggle for the region's resources, the Caspian pipelines in particular.

At the second stage (1995-2000), many of the Western analysts were bitterly disappointed with the region's development and its results. The West had failed to detach it from Russia and the CIS; it likewise had failed to plant the West's "normative values" (democracy, market economy, human rights) there. The sporadic efforts to integrate the post-Soviet expanse inevitably alarmed the West.

At the same time, some of the Western authors pointed out that the cultural, historical, economic, etc. unity of Central Asia was nothing more than a myth. The region was acquiring two models related to the two key republics—Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. On the whole, it had become clear that national states, each with their own specific features and their own domestic and foreign policies, were taking shape.

At that time, Kazakhstan was regarded as the region's weakest link; Martha Olcott was the most eloquent on this score: she predicted an ethnic split in Kazakhstan; engulfment by Russia was offered as another possible threat. This meant that the West should come to the rescue. Shirin Akiner was the first to provide the details of the process for transforming Kazakhstan into a nation-state and conclude that the republic was moving toward a pluralist model of state identity [4].

In the latter half of the 1990s, European, particularly German, authors developed a greater interest in the region. They tried to formulate the European Union's geopolitical interests in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the Caspian as regions of exceptional strategic importance and as a source of raw materials, particularly hydrocarbons. Specialists knew at this early stage that the European Union would find it hard to pursue a coordinated strategy in these regions in view of the presence of other active centers of geopolitical power.

Much of what was written at that time revised the roles of Iran and Turkey in Central Asia [5]; it was more

or less unanimously concluded that the West had overestimated the danger of Iran's expansion and export of the Islamic revolution. There was more or less unanimous disappointment with Turkey, which early in the 1990s had been seen as a leader, driving force, and "elder brother;" a moderate and secular pattern to be followed.

At that stage, the Western authors still kept Russia and its Central Asian policies in the focus of their attention. Much was written about Moscow's stabilizing role and the fact that it could block Western influence in Central Asia [6]. China and its Central Asian policies came to the fore: the Western authors realized that Beijing was quick on the uptake: it found a common language with the local regimes and, unlike the West, fully accepted them. By the end of the 1990s, some authors were disturbed by the fact that the Chinese had developed into another Great Game player in Central Asia [7].

There was the opinion that the states had achieved so-called authoritarian stabilization. On the whole, the regimes were described as "presidential," which relied on strong personal power ("strong presidentialism") [8]. Some authors preferred to describe authoritarianism as "sultanistic regimes" [9]. Typically enough, some authors had predicted velvet revolutions in Central Asia even before the Color Revolutions took place. They favored stability: the "iron fist" was expected to prevent social and political upheavals.

At this stage, Catherine Poujol wrote about Kazakhstan's duality or, rather, about the duality of its domestic and foreign policies which combined several principles, models, cultures, civilizations, and priorities [10] described as its strength and weakness at one and the same time. The author disagreed with the opinion that the republic had completed the post-Soviet development stage. In the future the republic might restore its former role of the Eurasian axis, a geopolitical mission of sorts, its pro-European development vector remaining all-important. Other authors, Sally Cummings among them, were convinced that Kazakhstan brought together the unitary state model and the authoritarian regime, which made it possible to neutralize the center/periphery contradiction as the main threat to its state-hood [11].

Some of the authors were evidently disappointed with Western policies in Central Asia in the 1990s; they were convinced that the Western strategy had failed because of the glaring gap between the Western normative values and the Western strategic interests when the former was sacrificed to the latter.

The third stage of foreign political studies of the region coincided with a new geopolitical up-heaval—9/11 and the arrival of the United States and its allies in the center of Eurasia. The political analysis and geopolitical studies which appeared in 2002-2005 were concerned, for obvious reasons, with the geopolitical shifts and their regional impact. The regional policies of the United States and the West (the so-called Talbott Doctrine) of the 1990s

were severely criticized from all sides. In the 21st century, Western political thought (it was Uwe Halbach who set the ball rolling) tried to convince the public that Central Asia was no longer a post-Soviet expanse and that the region had moved far enough from its Soviet past to make the process irreversible [12].

Those Western experts, however, who took the trouble to scrutinize the regional processes, discovered that the Central Asian states remained closely connected with their Soviet past. There was the opinion that by the mid-2000s they had completed the transit, something which not all academics were prepared to accept. Martha Olcott, for example, came forward with the "second chance" conception: the West should give the Central Asian countries a new chance and support the coming political changes [13]. Strangely enough, these recommendations coincided with the so-called Color Revolutions in the CIS. In fact, everything published shortly before Martha Olcott's book spoke of the same.

As distinct from Boris Rumer, Marie-Carin Gumpenberg does not believe that Kazakhstan has completed the period of transformations; she described the republic's political system as "formal pres-ident-ship"[14]. The "European statehood" conception which Kazakhstan embraced as its normative and civilizational development trend was another important factor. M.B. Olcott insisted on its "missed opportunities" theory; she looked at Kazakhstan as the best illustration of "missed opportunities, unfulfilled promises, and the road that was never covered:" the most contradictory and ambiguous interpretation of the republic's post-Soviet development [15].

Andrea Schmitz described Kazakhstan's political system as "cooptational:" part of the ruling elite was continuously "coopted" into the opposition, which preserved the stability very much needed for the economic and political reforms underway in the country. She described prevention of big political, ethnic, and social conflicts as the basic philosophy of the Kazakhstan state [16].

Boris Rumer has formulated the "end of transition" conception, which says that the Central Asian countries have completed the transit stage and acquired stable systems of economic and sociopolitical ties. Domestic and foreign factors, or even a regime change, will hardly affect them in a radical or even more or less noticeable way, which he describes as a source of the region's future troubles. Together with most of the American analytical community he believes that the United States alone can pull the republic out of the stagnating "post-transit phase" [17].

Islam and the related problems figure prominently in Western analytical conceptions; in fact, none of the analysts has ignored it; the question is: How deep is the Islamic influence in the developing Central Asian nation-states? The most competent of the authors describe Islam as one of the main elements of the Central Asian peoples'

new national identities that are taking shape before our eyes. This factor has a foreign policy dimension as well [18]. Sooner or later all authors dealing with the regional role of Islam inevitably arrive at the Islamic fundamentalism or radical Islam issue. According to Ahmed Rashid, the regimes which suppressed secular democratic parties and repressed practically all forms of Islam were responsible for the appearance of armed Islam in the region. His conception of the "Central Asian front of the West" describes the region as a new front of the struggle against militant Islamism, the victory of which will shatter the region and echo on the global scale. In fact, the author calls on the West to interfere in the regional developments under the pretext of fighting the Islamists and supporting the democratic reforms to establish its direct control there [19]. Some of the most far-sighted authors who have the region's cultural and political future close at heart are concerned about the obvious threat of ideological Islamization of the future generations. They insist that the regional governments should develop their nation-states in the spirit of state patriotism. Some of the authors look at the domestic developments of the Central Asian states from the point of view of ethnopolitics: these states aim at creating a nation-state as their final aim together with national unity on the titular nation basis.

Geopolitical works figure prominently in the contemporary political studies of Central Asia, the pride of place belonging to the New Central Asia conception coined by the Trilateral Commission. Its authors concluded that, at the dawn of the new century, the region confronted the world with qualitatively new conditions: today, the West has a much narrower leeway when it comes to interference in the region's developments. In fact, the Central Asian states have mastered the art of maneuvering on the international arena and have learned to exploit geopolitical contradictions in their foreign policy interests. Since Europe and Japan, along with the U.S., were likewise the Commission's members, it deemed it necessary to assess the geopolitical presence of both Brussels and Tokyo. The conclusions were far from flattering: the European Union's Central Asian strategy was described as "proto-strategy," while Tokyo's "Eurasian diplomacy" scored no success to speak of [20].

The events of 9/11 produced the "security manager" [21] conception in the American analytical community; put in a nutshell, it said that since the Central Asian states could not protect themselves against "international terrorism" and since the neighboring great powers, likewise, proved unable to protect them, the United States should shoulder the task. In fact, this justified, antedate, America's military presence in the region flawed in the summer of 2005.

This is complemented by the "strategic barrier" conception [22] which suggests that the United States should erect a strategic barrier of sorts on the CIS and Central Asian territories to cut Russia off from the post-Soviet

expanse. The wave of the Color Revolutions of 2003-2005 suggests that Washington embraced it.

Some of the authors (R. Allison and L. Jonson) formulate the "security sub-complex" conception which treated Central Asia as a periphery of the effective security systems rather than an independent security system (CSTO and SCO). They argued that the United States, Russia, and China look at the region as a mere periphery of their geopolitical and strategic interests [23].

Asian experts, Iranian analysts in particular, prefer the "geopolitical balancing" theory; the term describes the role of the regional powers, which being unable to compete with the great powers, are involved in geopolitical games of their own. Tehran itself is involved in these games to a much greater extent than any of the regional powers: it poses itself as the "natural patron" of the Central Asian states intended to protect them against the encroachments of the United States and Russia and, possibly, China and Turkey.

Most analysts were forced to revise, very much to their displeasure, Turkey's role in Central Asia. The new "elder brother" conception fell through; in 1991, Turkey was expected to set the pattern for its "Turkic brothers" in Central Asia. In the new century, the illusion dissipated: first, the Central Asian states declined the role of junior partners; second, Turkey's resources were too limited for any important geopolitical role in the region. Finally, Moscow let Turkey know that the region was a sphere of Russia's interests—it seems that Ankara had to obey.

Recently, Indian strategists seem to have embraced the Big Asian Triangle (Moscow-Delhi-Beijing) conception when dealing with Central Asia. This means that India will have to operate there together with Russia and China; its strategic aims being the region's strategic resources and defense against the Islamic world (as represented by Pakistan).

The SCO abbreviation puts in a nutshell all the theories, conceptions, and doctrines that the Chinese strategic institutes have produced so far. Beijing's interests in Central Asia are focused on this regional structure. China intends to preserve and strengthen the SCO, which can be described as its central strategic and geopolitical aim. Beijing is striving to extend its influence; it is determined to add an economic dimension to the SCO (particularly in the energy sphere), cement its regional position, and achieve regional dominance. On the whole, China aims to develop into a "soft hegemon" within, or even beyond, the SCO. This has never been openly admitted, yet we are obviously dealing with the "soft hegemony" or "soft leadership" doctrine [24]. Everything said in the 1990s about the geopolitical situation in the Caspian stemmed from the Great Game conception for the simple reason that the rivalry among the great powers was especially obvious in this part of the world. In the new century, the Caspian and everything related to it came to the fore: we have in mind the so-called Caspian Alternative.

From the geopolitical point of view, the Caspian-Central Asian region (or, broader still, Central Eurasia) should be transformed into a hydrocarbon alternative to OPEC: the United States and Europe are seeking less dependence on Arab oil. This explains America's resolution to lay the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline; the aborted petroleum-related love affair between America and Russia; Washington's obvious determination to control the region at any cost; Western fears of China's presence; the attempts to isolate Iran (and Russia for that matter) from Caspian oil, etc.

The Chinese dimension revived the problem of Europe's involvement in the big geopolitical game in the region. This sheds new light on the Stability Pact for Central Asia, an idea formulated by European (or German to be more exact) strategists. It was expected that the EU would be able to play a stabilizing and all-important role, similar to that it had earlier played in the Balkans. The European analysts proceeded from the region's highly promising energy-related future. The project, however, failed because the European Union, for want of convincing political arguments and instruments of power, has no important role to play in the Great Game. The failure of the European Constitution in 2005 (which meant failure of the idea of a single European state with a common strategy and foreign policy) merely confirmed this [25]. Several conceptual works appeared after 2005, in particular a highly interesting work by Shahram Akbarzadeh called *Uzbekistan and the United States. Authoritarianism, Islamism and Washington's Security Agenda*, [26] which described the worsening relations and contradictions between the United States and Uzbekistan as stemming from Washington's attempts to democratize its partner in the counter-terrorist war in Afghanistan; this ran against the grain of Karimov's determination to oppose liberalization which, he was convinced, created fertile soil for militant Islamism.

In 2005, French author Gael Raballand issued the book *L'Asie Centrale ou la fatalité de l'enclavement?* [27] in which he discussed the problems and geographic specifics of the region wedged between two large geopolitical forces in the Eurasian center. He points to the region's land-locked position, which deprives it of free access to the world supply routes and is, therefore, responsible for its geopolitical problems. A new work by Robert Legvold called *New US Strategy in Central Asia* [28] revises the old and formulates Washington's new approaches to the region. The book was connected, in a very logical way, with the Greater Central Asia conception coined by Frederick Starr at approximately the same time (it caused quite a storm in the academic circles) and with the suggestions of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy to the effect that the United States should revise its tactics and strategy in some of the Central Asian states.

Germany's political science is represented by Joern Graevingholt's work *Schlechte Re-gierungsfuehrung*,

Krisenpraevention und das Dilemma der Entwicklungspolitik am Beispiel Zen-tralasiens written in line with the European idea about the region as a conglomerate of authoritarian regimes which should be accepted for the sake of stability and security of the European Union in particular [29].

Kathleen Collins' *Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia*, which appeared in 2006, describes the so-called clan system as the key informal public institution of Central Asia. The author, however, has failed to clarify her own ideas about the local regimes and their nature. She is close to Max Weber's formula of the clan system as "patrimonial domination," yet fails to agree with the commonly accepted idea that the system is drifting toward "political clientelism." [30]

Adrienne Lynn Edgar published her *Tribal Nation. The Making of Soviet Turkmenistan* in 2006 as part of Princeton University's research program [31]. The book can be described as an effort to go back into the past to seek the roots of the clan and tribal system of Niyazov's Turkmenistan, the cornerstone of the notorious regime in the recently Soviet republic. Much of what is said drew objections from experts on Turkmenistan. R. Charles Weller's *Rethinking Kazakh and Central Asian Statehood* is best described as an attempt to move away from the traditional ideas and clichés about Central Asian societies (very popular in the West) using Kazakhstan as an example. Indeed, the author presented Kazakhstan society as much more dynamic, much more modern, and much more Western than it was depicted by the Western media and public opinion [32]. Two books were of an obvious economic bias. We have in mind Kelly M. McMann's *Economic Autonomy and Democracy* and Richard Pomfret's *The Central Asian Economies since Independence* [33]. The former contains a comparative analysis of the economic policy of Russia and Kyrgyzstan, two extremely different countries. The author associates the level of economic reforms in the two countries with the degree and speed of democratic transformations. Both economies and the corresponding regimes are described as "hybrid," as a combination of political authoritarianism and economic liberalism and vice versa: democratic institutions in the political system and sporadic state interference in the economic processes. Richard Pomfret is well known for his works of the 1990s which dealt with the post-Soviet economies of Kazakhstan and its Central Asian neighbors. This fundamental work covers 15 post-Soviet years.

In 2006, Prof. Starr of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and his academic group dominated Central Asian studies. Their publications dealt with all aspects of the region's economy and politics. Suffice it to mention *Clans, Authoritarian Rulers, and Parliaments in Central Asia* by F. Starr; *Islamic Radicalism in Central Asia and the Caucasus* by Z. Baran, F. Starr, and S. Cornell; *Anatomy of a Crisis: U.S.-Uzbekistan Relations* by J. Daly, K.

Meppen, V. Socor and F. Starr; *Central Asia's Economy* by M. Dowling and G. Wignaraja, [34] and others.

In 2006, the German academic community published several highly interesting definitive works, such as *Die Zentralasiatische Politik der Europäischen Union: Interessen, Strukturen und Reformoptionen* by Alexander Warkotsch [35]. His studies of the local regimes suggested several new terms such as "Demokratatur" (democracy + dictatorship) for the regime in Kyrgyzstan and "neototalitarianism" as applied to Turkmenistan. The author has pointed out that the European Union failed to achieve any of its strategic goals of the 1990s: poverty is as obvious as ever; the resistance to the reforms in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan is as strong as ever; the human rights record and democracy level are basically the same, while the energy-related interests of the EU are as vulnerable as before. The same applies to the security sphere. Alexander Warkotsch suggests that the EU should revise its Central Asian strategy and tactics in order to "regain the faith in the EU." He writes that in the security sphere Brussels should demonstrate determination and power rather than look like a "toothless paper tiger;" Brussels should look more confident when it comes to its energy interests and more realistic when invading the sphere of democracy. The author is convinced that the European Union should achieve closer strategic coordination with other international actors (NATO and OSCE in particular).

Dörthe List's *Regionale Kooperation in Zentralasien. Hindernisse und Möglichkeiten* has very much in common with what German economists wrote in the mid-1990s; the author confirms that the EU is still placing the stakes on regional integration (cooperation in the 2000s) of Central Asia as a means of the region's self-identification and self-determination despite the past negative experience [36]. In his *Rechtsreformen entlang der Seidenstraße. Aufsätze und Vorträge während der beobachtenden Teilnahme an einem gewaltigen Transformationsprozess*, Rolf Knipper looks at the way some of the CIS countries addressed legal reforms [37]. In 2006, the Friedrich Ebert Foundation introduced a very good practice of publishing books by local authors on Central Asia in German and Russian. The first of the books was called *Tsentral'naia Azia: vzgliad iznutri* [38] (Central Asia as Seen from the Inside). In 2007, the Fund published a work by Kyrgyz academics *Istoria i identichnost: Kirgizskaia Respublika* (History and Identity: The Kirghyz Republic) [39]. Another publication dealt with the Central Asian countries' extra-regional contacts [40]. This is an obviously useful practice which brings to the German-speaking audience ideas about the region that are alternatives to those imposed, wittingly or unwittingly, by Western authors.

In 2007, Frederick Starr of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute coordinated a large-scale project which produced an internationally authored volume entitled *The New Silk Roads: Transport and Trade in Greater Central Asia* [41].

The international collective included authors from Central Asia, Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, India, China, Turkey, and Russia. This continues, in a conceptual way, Prof. Starr's idea of Greater Central Asia, which caused quite a stir in its time. In the Introduction, he drew parallels between the Great Silk Road of the past and the present transport capabilities of Eurasia. He is convinced that today Western Europe, China, the Near and Middle East, and Hindustan can be reliably connected by transportation routes and that America is responsible for this and should contribute to the Eurasian system of transportation corridors.

In 2007, David Lewis published a book under the fairly pretentious title of *The Temptations of Tyranny in Central Asia* [42] as part of the Columbia University security series. The author proceeds from the assumption that the military and economic aid of the West, which allied with the local countries for the counterterrorist campaign in Afghanistan (they became America's key allies in the struggle), should have encouraged democratic changes and stability in the region. The author has concluded: Washington was tempted to enter into allied relations with the local "tyrannies" to achieve the strategic aims of its antiterrorist struggle yet failed to change the nature of the local regimes.

Th. Gomart and T. Kastueva-Jean issued a monograph called *Understanding Russia and the New Independent States*, [43] in which they summarized what had been done by the group of authors of the Russia and the CIS department of the Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI). They gathered between the two covers the analytical efforts of the institute's fellows and their colleagues from the CIS dealing with security-related geopolitical problems and the CIS (and Central Asia) international situation.

Central Asia attracts scholars outside the West and China. In 2007, for example, Indian and Kazakhstani academics published their joint work called *India-Kazakhstan Perspectives. Regional and International Interactions*. Prof. K. Santhanam and R. Dwivedi supervised the progress from the Indian side. The monograph deals with practically all aspects of bilateral relations, including international and the geopolitical factors [44]. In 2007, the regular publication *Central Asia and South Caucasus Affairs*, supervised by Prof. B. Rumer and Lau Sim Yee, which had been appearing under the aegis of the Sasakawa Peace Foundation and the Davis Center at Harvard University since 2002, was published for the last time [45]. Unfortunately, the Sasakawa Peace Foundation discontinued its funding of 15 year-standing.

In 2007, the German Federal Center of Political Education undertook a grandiose attempt to cover the past and present of Central Asia in one publication. Edited by M. Sapper, V. Weichsel, and A. Huterer, it appeared with the support of the legendary Osteuropa publication under the title *Machtmosaik Zentralasian. Traditionen,*

Restriktionen, Aspirationen [46]. From the very beginning, it was a grandiose project which provided the widest coverage of the problems and a matching 52-strong author group. The book presents the best of the best of German political science, yet it can be described as an international project with Anglo-Saxon (M.B. Olcott, E. Rumer and R. Allison) and French (S. Peyrouse and M. Laruelle) participation. The book, however, is dominated by German political scientists, which left its imprint on the selection of material and the nature of the problems discussed [47].

The Central Asia-Caucasian Institute published Erica Marat's work entitled *National Ideology and State-building in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan* [48]. The author traced how national ideologies developed in Soviet times in both countries and how new ideologies based on new national identities were built in the post-Soviet period. The author has rightly noted that the multinational nature of the Central Asian post-Soviet states created problems for the regional leaders busy building new identities. First, this limited the efficiency of the ethno-centric instruments; second, having been recognized by the international community, the local elites could not completely ignore the citizenship principle, whereby Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan progressed further than their neighbors; and third, all regional elites had to cope with the role and place of Islam in the new ideology.

In his *The Economic Aspects of the Chinese-Central Asia Rapprochement*, Sebastien Peyrouse discusses China's Central Asian policy [49]. He has identified four major problems in the sides' trade and economic relations. The first chapter deals with the history and nature of these relations; the author points to the fact that from the very beginning China was the dominant side. The role of checkpoints in transborder trade is another problem. Chapter three deals with Chinese investments in the region's economy and infrastructure. The Chinese are interested in four investment fields: ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, hydropower production; transport infrastructure; and telecommunications. The last chapter deals with relations in the hydrocarbon sphere, the key one in China's multi-sided regional strategies. He has also presupposed that the land-locked nature of Central Asia will be responsible for China's role in the region's future. In fact, in the 21st century China will play the same role as Russia in the 19th and 20th centuries [50]. Marlene Laruelle studied Russia's policies in Central Asia from the point of view of the impact of Russian nationalism on Moscow's tactics and strategy. Her work entitled *Russia's Central Asia Policy and the Role of Russian Nationalism* deals not so much with the region proper as with the domestic political processes and the struggle inside the Russian elite over Russia's policy in the region [51]. She has described Russia's return to the region in the 21st century and the related political and economic repercussions and has written that the Russia-

Central Asia agenda consists of three main points: so-called soft power (cultural influence and the tongue); the problem of the Russian and Russian-speaking diaspora; and migration. On the whole, she has concluded that all groups, trends, and circles of the Russian political elite (their disagreements notwithstanding) tend to look at Russia's presence (domination) in Central Asia as good and inevitable, each of the political forces operating with arguments of its own.

Two studies produced by the same Central Asia-Caucasus Institute deal with Kazakhstan.

The first of them, *Parliament and Political Parties in Kazakhstan*, was written by Anthony Bowyer [52]. The author introduced the text with a concise overview of the party and political system of Kazakhstan and its evolution; he acquaints the reader with the contemporary political landscape and concentrates on the so-called pro-presidential parties, Otan in particular, and on the "soft" and "hard" opposition. He has supplied two groups of recommendations:

- the first is for the country's leaders, while the second is addressed to the American government with a request for assistance in developing a civil society.
- The second, *Kazakhstan's Emerging Middle Class* [53] by John Daly, asks: What is Kazakhstan's middle class? The author has concluded that the middle class is the aim of the republic's economic policy. The government sees its task as protecting the middle class against numerous challenges and problems such as corruption and overcoming the wide gap between the rural and urban lifestyles, inflation, and the destructive effects of the global financial-economic upheavals. The vast hard currency reserves accumulated in Kazakhstan suggest the optimistic conclusion that the state will have enough money to support the middle class in the future.

Central Asia's avid interest in Poland is a recent phenomenon. In the past, the Polish People's Republic and the Soviet Central Asian republics belonged to the same geopolitical expanse, Pax So-vietica, a socialist universum of sorts. The stormy events of the late 1980s and the 1990s pushed Poland and Central Asia into different cultural-civilizational and geopolitical contexts. An analysis of Polish publications on Central Asian subjects shows that there is still a lot of academic interest in the region.

The Polish Central Asian studies are of an obviously political nature even though some of them touch on ethnographic or, rather, social anthropologic issues.

Polish studies of Central Asia are developing in keeping with several trends:

1. the region's history;
2. the theory and practice of systemic transformations;
3. political and social systems of the regional countries and development of the political elites and the opposition, the media and NGOs;

4. modernization of social structures, clashes between tradition and contemporary development; clan structures; cultural and linguistic policies, religion, etc.;

5. and history and the present day of the region's cultures. Over time, an interest in the economy and foreign policy of the local countries also grew.

Between 2000 and 2005, the Institute of Political Sciences published five collective monographs, each dealing with one of the republics; its history and social and political processes [54]. Twelve monographs appeared in the Contemporary Central Asia series published by the IPS WU series; the best of them being "*Walczący islam*" w Azji Centralnej. *Problem społecznej genezy zjawiska* by S. Zapasnik (2006); *Azja Centralna—problemy historii i współczesności*, edited by T. Bodio and others (2007); S. Redo's *Zwalczanie przestępczości zorganizowanej w Azji Centralnej* (2007); *Konstytucje państw Azji Centralnej* by T. Bodio and T. Moldawa (2007); *Region Azji Centralnej jako obszar wpływów międzynarodowych*, edited by B. Bojarczyk and A. Zietek (2008) and *Elites of Power in Central Asia* by T. Bodio and P. Zalenski [55].

The following Polish works deal with the problems of contemporary Kazakhstan: P. Zalenski's *Elity władzy politycznej Kazachstanu* (2006); P. Grochmal'ski's *Kazachstan. Studium politologiczne* (2006); A. Zamarajewa's *Kazachstan-Uzbekistan: rywalizacja o przywództwo w Azji Centralnej* (2007); A. Wierzbicki's *Ethno-politics in Kazakhstan and Other Countries of Turkic Community in Central Asia* (2008), and others [56]. Interest in Turkmenistan is a more or less recent phenomenon. In his *Turkmenistan. Un destin au carrefour des empires*, Sebastien Peyrouse of France has pointed out that the first decade and a half of the country's independence were closely associated with the ambitious personality of its president Saparmurat Niyazov [57]. The author is convinced that the clans and their role in the country's politics are an important element in the political life of Turkmenistan and that once independent the republic could not embrace the "European development" model the West presents as the only one conducive to democratic institutions and market relations. On the other hand, President Niyazov's responsibility for the allegedly special Turkmen development pattern should be clearly recognized. What looked comical or even pathological from the outside was a real drama for the republic's population.

Slavomir Horák and Jan Šir from the Czech Republic published their book *Dismantling Totalitarianism? Turkmenistan under Berdimuhamedow* two years after S. Peyrouse published his [58]. They have pointed out that the realities of the last days of the Niyazov regime differ greatly from the post-Niyazov context. Today, it is a much more open and liberal society; the odious bans and the worst of the excesses of Niyazov's time were removed, while the republic is gradually opening to the world. The authors proceed from the assumption that

Berdymukhammedov's regime is qualitatively new and stable and that the country's foreign policy has changed a lot. First, the republic has abandoned the isolationist policy of the past; the young president has inevitably been drawn into the great powers' struggle for hydrocarbon resources and their geopolitical maneuvering. The world, the West in particular, is interested in Turkmenistan's strategic importance as Afghanistan's close neighbor. President Berdymukhammedov promptly mastered the art of maneuvering among the interested sides—Russia, Europe, America, and China. The seemingly unexpected opening up to the world bred excessive and, according to the authors, unjustified expectations in the West of the new regime's liberalism. Outside interference for the sake of liberalization and improvement of the social climate is fraught with domestic instability.

The book by prominent American political scientist Ariel Cohen entitled *Kazakhstan: The Road to Independence* [59] is another important publication. The author writes that Kazakhstan could have never become an independent and successful state had it not been what is known in the Western political science as a petro-state. Normally, this is a negative definition, but in his work Ariel Cohen uses it in a positive sense. He has pointed to the fact that the builders of contemporary Kazakhstan concentrated not only on domestic (first the economy, then politics) and foreign policy (multivectoral policies and Eurasianism): they were guided by a detailed and profound energy strategy. They are determined to avoid the traps many of the oil-rich countries fall into either by nationalizing their oil industries or squandering their natural riches by distributing them left and right among transnational companies. A. Cohen is convinced that Kazakhstan has achieved a balance between the geopolitical forces and their interests, on the one hand, and a balance between the outside players and the country's national interests, on the other. The same applied to the relationships between the elites and the majority of the country's population which have acquired their shares of national wealth.

In her *Kazakhstan—Ethnicity, Language and Power*, Bhavna Dave from Britain describes the evolution and historical experience of the Soviet and post-Soviet periods as unique: the republic survived a series of experiments in its identity, while it managed to preserve its ethnicity thanks to its system of power [60]. She compares the experience of nation-building in Kazakhstan with a similar process in India and Malaya and concludes that in Kazakhstan this process was mainly limited to consolidation of the power of the local elite. The strengthening patron-client system transformed Kazakhstan into a patrimonial state. The Kazakhs became "the first among equals," a status not formally registered either by the Constitution or by law. On the whole, the Kazakhs as an ethnic group enjoy no special economic advantages over other nationalities (if we take the average statistical

rather than the Kazakh elite's standard of living). In their own country, the Kazakhs enjoy mainly psychological (rather than real) advantages, such as the state status of the Kazakh language, from which, however, the bulk of the population derives no profit.

The book *Central Asia: Views from Washington, Moscow, and Beijing* brings to mind a similar publication of the Tripartite Commission [61]; here, however, Russia replaced Europe, while China took the place of Japan. America is facing three strategic alternatives:

1. to continue the same course;
2. to abandon the idea of reforms in Central Asia and concentrate on the security issues and America's Realpolitik interests;
3. to devise a new strategy which will take into account the region's specific features and the new geopolitical realities.

Russia is obviously trailing behind the U.S. and China when it comes to preserving its political and economic influence. According to one of the authors, the Russian politicians who refused to abandon the old imperial style and paternalist rhetoric (in relation to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, two of the region's leaders, in particular) are to blame for the fact that the local states are leaving Russia's orbit. On the whole, Russia's influence in the region is limited in time; the situation may change if Russia manages to modernize the economy and the political-social systems in the region. The Chinese author believes that Central Asia is and will remain a unique region in which America, Russia, and China will cooperate for the sake of their common security.

The collective monograph called *Japan's Silk Road Diplomacy. Paving the Road Ahead* [62] testifies to the interest displayed by the Japanese academic community in Central Asia. The authors believe that their country should move away from its former policies of concerted actions with the West and economic aid to the region coupled with Tokyo's unwillingness to pay more attention to the democracy issues (something which the United States and Europe believe to be most important). At no time did the Japanese ruling circles regard Central Asia as critically important for the country's diplomacy and foreign trade. There is the conviction that in Central Asia Japan should not compete with Russia and China in any form whatsoever. The authors write that the rising economic influence of China and South Korea in Central Asia should no longer be ignored. As a North Asian power, Japan can offer its neighbors a joint Central Asian strategy which will amount to a united front in the region. The authors invite the ruling circles to formulate their geopolitical approaches in the form of Greater Eastern Asia (together with China and South Korea) or Eastern Eurasia (with the same powers and Russia).

Richard Weitz's *Kazakhstan and the New International Politics of Eurasia* is essentially the first Western work dealing mainly with Kazakhstan's international

ties and foreign policy [63] prompted by the fact that the republic has moved to the fore in regional economic and political integration. He has identified several factors on which the republic's ability to achieve its regional integration aims depend: transition to the "post-Nazarbaev" generation of political leaders; Kazakhstan's successful OSCE presidency; and the Eurasian countries' economic status. The author is convinced that the great powers—Russia, China, and particularly the United States—will strongly affect the process. Kazakhstan's Eurasian strategies and their realization are limited in many ways by factors outside its power: the continued threat of Islamic extremism and the future use of its hydrocarbon resources. Indeed, it is hard to realize its own strategy while Russia and China are working on theirs. Kazakhstan's growing economic and political might scares its Central Asian neighbors. In the future, Kazakhstan diplomacy will spare no effort to prevent a Chinese-Russian condominium in the region.

The Russian and Russian-language historiography of Central Asia is beyond the scope of this article. We deem it necessary, however, to mention at least one work: a monograph by Andrei Kazantsev, a fellow at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (University) of Russia's Foreign Ministry, entitled "*Bolshaya Igra*" *s neizvestnymi pravilami: mirovaia politika i Tsentral'naya Azia* [64] (The "Great Game" with the Rules Unknown: World Politics and Central Asia), in which he has analyzed the structure of international cooperation which took shape in the region in 1991-2008 and its impact on the regional policies of the world's largest state. He has concentrated on the problem of whether Central Asia, as

part of the world, is a "temporary and short-lived factor" or a long-term constant of world politics. The author is convinced that the regional states are pursuing multivectoral policies and are seeking cooperation with the largest possible number of partners. The "responsibility" or "the freedom of action" dilemma proved to be the central one for the actors involved in the region. The author proceeds from his conviction that the Central Asian states observe no generally accepted standards, values, or principles in their policies. The region has no mechanisms to impose such principles; for this reason the possibility of regional identity remains vague.

Conclusion

The corpus of recent writings about Central Asia is highly varied: none of the more or less outstanding issues remains outside the attention of foreign authors; nor have individual republics escaped scrutiny. Western political thought, on the whole, has not abandoned its former ideas, approaches, and stereotypes either at the methodological or at the ideological level. On the other hand, it offers new methods and abandons some of the clichés and old ideas. Very much as before, Central Asian studies are concentrated in Europe, the U.S., Turkey (albeit to a lesser extent than before), India, and China (the efforts of Chinese academics are worth special attention). There is another positive trend: more and more frequently foreign and post-Soviet authors are joining forces to produce collective monographs and joint projects which offer them a chance to share opinions, even if not always successfully [65].

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Constitutional Reform of 2007 and Issues of Political Modernization of the Republic of Kazakhstan

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The need for political reforms first emerged in the second half of the 1990s. The events of autumn 2001 showed that the need to further democratise the political system was increasing and was acquiring a more shaped and systematic nature.

In other words, it was clearly seen that the pace of political reforms was far behind that of economic reforms. The country and the government faced the problem of finding a formula for stability, which, in turn, demanded the creation of a mechanism for the coordination of the interests of major socio-political and social groups.

Kazakhstan had to make a choice.

The first scenario meant the preservation of the political situation as it was, i.e. freezing the process of political modernisation, and using government structures to ensure stability.

The second scenario required that Kazakhstan undergo a stage of political liberalisation and gradually switch to the classic model of democracy with a balance between branches of power, a functioning civil society, citizens' involvement in political decision-making and other attributes. For the country's sustainable development, the authorities, to their credit, opted for the second scenario.

It was for this reason that various platforms for dialogue were created in the country: first, the permanent conference on drafting proposals on further democratisation and the development of civil society, and later the national commission for democratisation and the development of civil society.

A presidential decree, issued on 20 March 2006, set up a state commission to draft and specify a programme of democratic reforms. The state commission faced a complex task: to draft a strategy for political reforms that would make liberal democratic transformations in the country systematic and irreversible and find a compromise on the vision of the country's future development.

In addition, it was necessary to identify the main problems that hindered political modernisation and find solutions to these. The commission completed its work on 19 March 2007.

New constitutional amendments, based on the results of this commission's work and recommended by the head of state, passed by parliament in spring 2007 opened wide opportunities to boost the entire political process in Kazakhstan. New ideas touched various aspects of political life.

On the one hand, this was in practical terms a fundamental reformation of the existing political model, resulting in significant expansion of the powers of the legislative branch, a new configuration of the party sphere, the development of real civil society and the non-governmental sector, all of which would ensure the direct involvement of wide-ranging groups of the population in political processes.

On the other hand, these changes laid the foundation for better coordinated operation of the government system because all central bodies of power will now be mutually dependent and mutually supplemented. In addition, the most vivid characteristic of the new political system will be the strengthening of the mechanism of

checks and balances in relations between the branches of power.

By involving parliament in the processes of choosing, agreeing and finally endorsing a candidate for prime minister, the president significantly strengthened powers of lawmakers and gave them the right to get involved in the formation of the executive branch. As a result, the whole cycle of endorsing a candidate for prime minister will be at an equal distance from the main centres of power mechanisms because the right of the final vote will be exercised by the political parties represented in the Mazhilis. This means that the responsibility for appointing a prime minister will be equally distributed between the president and the legislative branch.

In turn, the members of parliament represent various regional interests, the interests of different strata of Kazakh society and the main political and ideological forces of society. Generally, the wide spectre of political forces, as the architects of the constitutional reform intended, which will be presented in parliament, is an important condition for the national dialogue that is needed for Kazakhstan's sustainable development.

The new functions and powers of parliament include both chambers' right to take part in the formation of the Constitutional Council, the Audit Committee and the Central Election Commission. These functions will enable Kazakh society to get involved in the election process and the process of adopting the country's budget, define development priorities and will serve as an impetus to expand access to information, discussion and public argumentation of its vision on the development of the political, economic and social spheres of the country's life.

Prior to these amendments the development of political institutions in Kazakhstan was largely according to a trajectory set by the executive branch, but now with parliamentary involvement in appointing the Constitutional Council, the Audit Committee and the Central Election Commission, politically and socially active groups of the population involved in political parties will have a direct impact on the functioning of power.

The lawmakers, party factions and parliamentary groups will become the main players of the election process as the new powers of political parties (which, in line with the new amendments, will be elected to the lower chamber of parliament by a proportional system, i.e. on party tickets, and the number of MPs was increased by 30 people, including nine to be appointed by the Assembly of Kazakhstan's People) significantly increase the public's access to representation in branches of power in our country.

Another breakthrough aspect in the development of constitutionalism was the abolition of the ban on public funding of political parties, NGOs and public associations.

What is the point of this step? The constitutional provision for funding the entire range of political forces will legalise their activities, increase the efficiency of dialogue and cooperation with the government, ensure wider social representation in parliament and strengthen relations between government bodies and society on the most crucial issues of everyday life. Moreover, public funding will boost the population's civil activity and improve civic-consciousness.

Particular attention should be placed on the state's funding of political parties on the legislative basis. Public funding seems to have become the necessity of the time. On the one hand, this significantly narrows the field for hidden lobbying of interests of various groups within the country and practically abolishes the practice of funding from aid, because in the legal field political players, as a rule, will aim to act within the country's legislation.

On the other hand, there will be no grounds to accuse the state of directly supporting certain parties in during election campaigns because the state will offer support to all legally existing and promote their platforms when they achieve recognition by the electorate.

The Mazhilis's increased control over the work of the government following the constitutional amendments will prompt the government to raise the quality of its current and future work and make the principle of competitiveness an obligatory condition for the executive branch. The Mazhilis will be capable of raising a vote of no confidence in any member of government according to the principle of a simple majority, which will significantly increase the degree of responsibility of the executive branch.

Moreover, the government will not be able to rely only on its administrative powers because of a new provision which enables parliament to judge the government's work based on the report on the fulfilment of the central budget. The failure to endorse the report will also mean a vote of no confidence in the government.

In other words, the government's activities will largely be coordinated with parliament, making them not just transparent but also grounded. This is precisely what is described as the mechanism of checks and balances in action.

Along with powers, the responsibility of the MPs also grows. The provision of the absence of the imperative mandate of deputies was excluded from the constitution which should strengthen intra-party discipline and order and help parties develop as participants of the political processes and boost party factions and groups of deputies. At the same time, the experience in some developed countries shows that party factions are the main centres of intra-party discussions and debates, increasing the efficiency of the work of parties.

These changes could also be described as progressive because they have laid a new system of relations between MPs and their voters through the party political system. This means that a party member who becomes a deputy cannot discredit the work of their party in parliament or contradict it or themselves and cannot manipulate the will of voters who elect them as representatives and defenders of their interests.

Cutting the presidential term from seven to five years after 2012 and limiting the number of consecutive terms to two is the most important part of the constitutional amendments. Even though some researchers found that this amendment violated the rights of Kazakh voters and negated the very principle of democracy when the election of the head of state is dependent on time limits set by the terms of office, generally this state of affairs is the most preferable and acceptable in the present reality in Kazakhstan.

Increasing the number of senators appointed by the president by eight (taking into account the necessity to

present ethnic and cultural and other important interests of society in the Senate) will improve the positive perception of parliament's upper chamber by society because in Kazakhstan the image of a politician depends on their recognisability, reputation and socio-political activity in the perception of the conservative majority.

Powers assigned to the Senate, such as its consent to the appointment of prosecutor-general, chairman of the National Security Committee, chairman of the National Bank and its powers to adopt laws when the Mazhilis is dissolved, are a very strong argument in favour of boosting the activities of the upper chamber.

The Senate is in essence turning into a balancing component in the activities of the Mazhilis within the legislative branch in usual conditions and the main centre of power in force-majeure circumstances and situations, i.e. the backbone factor of stability and sustainability of the presidential-parliamentary form of government.