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Current State of Kazakhstan-Iran Relations in Caspian Region

LIDIYA TIMOFEYENKO

Having a traditionally friendly intra-state dialogue with Kazakhstan in a context of political isolation is a high priority task for Tehran. An international pressure on IRI forces Iranian authorities to highly appreciate existing trade and economic relations, as well as RK's attitude upon Iran's nuclear program.

Being neighbors in the Caspian region, Astana and Tehran share similar approaches to many relevant problems of regional security. However, the parties have not reached yet the mutual understanding in defining an international legal status of the Caspian Sea, that is, first of all, stipulated by different political and economical role of the Caspian sea for RK and IRI.

It's necessary to note that Iran's policy on the Caspian Sea is characterized by the following basic aspects:

First, by participating in the negotiations of the legal status of the reservoir, Tehran systematically seeks to increase its influence on the geopolitical processes in both the Caspian and the Caucasus directions. That is why the Iranian authorities are sensitive to any attempts to exclude its representatives from the discussion on the Caspian problems. The most obvious example of such dissatisfaction is the situation around informal Summit of the Heads of Kazakhstan, Russia, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan in Aktau in September 2009. This event was considered by Iran as an attempt to resolve existing disagreements before the next Summit of

the Heads of Caspian States, which eventually took place in 2010 in Baku, while ignoring the interests of the Islamic Republic of Iran*;

Second, Iran is making efforts to reduce the level of involvement of external actors in the Caspian realities, actively opposing the attraction of the U.S. and EU states resources to the development of Caspian energy carriers, as well as to build and equip regional neighbors with national air forces. [1] For Tehran, any solutions about the Caspian Sea can only be taken by consensus of "Caspian Five", which effectively prevents the implementation of the projects on trans-Caspian oil and gas pipelines, lobbied by Brussels and Washington, until the final determination of the legal status of the Caspian Sea.

The principle of non-interference in the affairs of the third countries in the region, declared by Iran, has predominantly anti-Western character, herewith, its application towards the states which are more friendly minded to Iran, may be restricted. Due to the chronic shortage of foreign investment into the development of industrial, including mining capacities, the Iranian authorities tend to support any money infusion into the economy. Thus, Tehran is able to open a corridor of opportunities for its Asian partners, especially after the detection of hydrocarbon deposits in the Iranian sector of the Caspian Sea;

Third, Iran has recently begun transforming its own policy towards the region. Increasing importance of Caspian oil and gas components in the strategy of Tehran in the medium term will

* In order to avoid Iranian protests, Caspian problems were excluded from the agenda. At the same time Tehran received the official notification that the informal summit of Caspian CIS countries is being held to discuss particular problems in the relations between the countries of the Commonwealth.

lead to a rapprochement of Kazakhstan and Iran's models of development in Caspian territories. In such circumstances, *the problem of legitimacy* of mineral resources development in the Caspian Sea will become increasingly important, as well as transportation of the produced energy carriers.

This issue may actually arise while concerning the launch of large-scale oil and gas production in such structures as "Sardar Jangal" and "Sardar Milli," recently discovered by Iran. Despite the repeated statements by Tehran that these deposits were found in the Iranian part of the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan's authorities have already shown a willingness to start the dispute over their territorial affiliation. According to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the authorities have no information that would confirm the location and potential reserves of those structures. [2] Such statements indicate the intention to put forward territorial claims on Iranian deposits, which may appear to be cross-border.

The emerging situation offers additional prospects for a determination of the legal regime of the Caspian basin. With a favorable scenario, as well as a possible mediation by Kazakhstan, which unlike Iran has already settled the disputed issues over the development of the border fields, the Iranian authorities can "soften" their position and no longer impede the agreement of the Convention on the legal status of the Caspian Sea.

With the growth of the Caspian factor for Iranian energy sector, the protection over the objects of marine and land oil and gas infrastructure will have to be increased. Using this argument for increasing their own naval forces in the Caspian Sea is typical for coastal countries. It should be noted that Kazakhstan and Iran in many ways tend to share similar views on the issue of security in the region. At different times, both countries made proposals to create a separate policy paper [3], aimed at uniting the efforts of the "Caspian Five"

in the fight against terrorism, drug trafficking and other threats to stability.*

Nevertheless, the Agreement on Security Cooperation in the Caspian Sea, signed at the recent III Caspian Summit, held in Baku in 2010, has not stopped the process of militarization of the Caspian Sea, in which all countries of the region remain active participants. The potential threat of the increased military tension on the Caspian coast, in case of the US-Iranian conflict, forces Tehran to closely monitor the condition of alert system of the Caspian states' naval forces.

So Iran has not left unnoticed almost double increase of the outputs by the Fleet of the Russian Federation in the Caspian Sea,** not even speaking about Azerbaijan's active work on refurbishing the armed forces with modern samples of Israeli techniques. Against the background of these examples, launching of the first rocket-artillery ship-boat, built in Kazakhstan, has caused less resonance among the Iranian public. [4] However, as the Republic of Kazakhstan achieves the plans over the construction of domestic military ships,** Iran may begin to pay more attention to the development of Kazakhstan's naval forces, which may negatively affect inter-state co-operation between two countries.

Thus, we can conclude that despite the existing disagreements on the defining the legal regime of the Caspian basin, the implementation of the non-interference policy in the internal affairs allows Kazakhstan and Iran to maintain reasonably stable level of diplomatic engagement. At the same time Tehran expects to maintain a relationship of trust with Astana, regardless the situation around the Iranian "nuclear dossier" as well as the intensity of the Kazakh-Iranian trade.

Considering the socio-economic cooperation between Kazakhstan and Iran in the Caspian region, it should be noted that according to statistics, the trade turnover between Kazakhstan and Iran did not come up higher than \$ 2.5 billion per year over the last five years, which is clearly

* The idea of developing the Stability Pact in the Caspian Sea was announced by Foreign Minister of the Republic of Kazakhstan, November 22, 2005 at the 19th meeting of the Special Working Group in the Convention on the legal status of the Caspian Sea. Iran, in turn, offered to enter into Agreement on Measures of Confidence and Stability.

** Number of outputs in the sea for combat training of ship forces in 2012 increased from 85 to 156. At the same time the ship connections of the Caspian Flotilla performed about 200 combat exercise, which is 20% more than in 2011.

*** During 2013 Kazakhstan's Navy in the Caspian Sea will be augmented by two more ships with displacement of 240 tons, but with power, missile systems, and in 2014 the powerful 600-ton ship will be released to the water.

reflected in Figure 1. Although the data is for 2012 and it only reflects the situation for November, experts do not expect a significant growth in foreign trade, which suggests a downward trend in foreign trade turnover between Kazakhstan and Iran.




Figure 1. Indicators of external trade between Iran and Kazakhstan from January 2007 to November 2012 (million US dollars)

Source: Statistics Agency

At the same time we may trace the changes in the structure of export-import operations, namely, Iran increases gradually the supply to the markets of Kazakhstan, at the same time declining systematically the volume of exports from Kazakhstan. The most obvious result of this downturn was the complete cessation of Kazakhstan's oil and oil products deliveries to Iran in 2012. These missing items in the list of exports to Iran could not be compensated by the almost complete recovery of Kazakhstan's grain exports. In particular, "Ak Bidai Terminal", located in the seaport of Aktau, had difficulties with dispatching the grain cargoes, at the end of 2011 and early 2012,* as almost all transportation to the designated terminals were linked to Iran. However, in March last year, Kazakhstan was not only able to restore the grain cargoes, but also, as seen in Figure 2, increase the share of wheat exports significantly, enlarging the index from 40 to 622 thousand tons.

It should be noted that the imposed economic restrictions, as a result of which Iran was cut off from the international system of bank payments, and hence the opportunity to pay in U.S. and European currencies, are not the main cause of a slowdown in mutual trade.




Figure 2. Indexes of export of Kazakhstan's grain crops to Iran from January 2007 to November 2012 (tons)

This prompt increase of Iran's wheat imports was caused primarily by its desire to ensure its food security in case of tightening the sanctions regime. Herewith the rate of grain purchases can be expected to be reduced in 2013, as the volume of current reserves of Iran has twice exceeded the level of the annual grain consumption. Thus, Iran has imported 4.5 million tons of wheat since March 2012, while the level of consumption was only about 2-2.5 million tons. [5] In total with an average productivity of grain in Kazakhstan in 2012, the prevention of a sudden decrease in the level of trade for these goods would be the key issue for both countries.

With a further decrease in the volume of trade with Iran on major objects of Kazakhstan's exports, namely, metals** and grains, the issue on the reorientation of economic cooperation, as well as the simplification of customs procedures and banking becomes more relevant. This prospect has been

* In 2008, the export of crude oil and oil products from Kazakhstan to Iran amounted to about 1.3 million tons of raw materials, in 2009 this figure had been decreased to 1.2 million tones, in 2010 - to 503 thousand tons, and in 2011 - to 14.7 thousand tons.

** In 2011, 1.2 million tons of rolled metal were supplied from RK to IRI. According to October 2012, the figure was only 283 thousand tons.

discussed at the June meeting of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the foreign minister of Iran, during which the parties discussed the possibility of developing partnerships in industry and mining.*

Thus, the remaining problems in the financial sector of Iran, caused by international sanctions, as well as additional economic constraints on the part of the EU and the U.S., impede the volumes

in Kazakh-Iranian trade. Thus, Kazakhstan and Iran have agreed to increase bilateral trade to \$5 billions in the coming years. Actual embargo on payments in U.S. dollars and Euro for Iranian banks raises the question about other schemes of mutual settlements. It is primarily about an expediency of *increasing the number of barter transactions in foreign trade* between Kazakhstan and Iran, particularly on the key goods of the export group.

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* According to the Chamber of Commerce of Iran, the Iranian private companies are willing to cooperate in the provision of engineering and technical services. The Chamber also expressed its willingness to organize the transit of Kazakhstan's grain through Iran to the third countries.

Role of Public Diplomacy in International Economic Relations

TULEUTAI SULEIMENOV,
DARZHAN KAZBEKOVA

This article aims to analyze the importance and the role of public diplomacy in the context of international political economy. This is done considering the importance of modern trends, linked with the resolution of political and economic challenges at the national and the international levels. It is necessary to incorporate the grade and the global scale of risks into the strategy of development of clear and high-quality management of business relationships at all levels, not forgetting the real demands of economic development.

Modernity and all international developments it brings about, their relationship, and the nature and means of cooperation of various actors require that the world community has a clear understanding of their impacts as they affect the destinies of nations and make indelible imprints in the history of the present. Thanks to the achievements of the information revolution and the rapidly developing technologies of the 21st century, the mankind has been drawn into the flow of the entire world. As a result of any relationship is the quality and effectiveness of diplomatic negotiations where opposite sides seek to find common ground and mutual understanding. Diplomacy, as an integral part of international relations, reflects all changes and current key processes that take place in the modern time.

According to M. Lebedeva, initial "anarchic" international relations, following the Peace of Westphalia, suggests that states, being sovereign and independent, form their foreign policy, i.e. their objectives and priorities for the outside world, as well as the main activities. They are carried out first of all by means of diplomacy which over the centuries have been and continue to be the main instrument of foreign policy and the primary

means of regulating international relations. In the process of development of the political structure of the world diplomacy, new forms and methods of diplomatic work emerged. However, in recent years, with the emergence of non-state actors and the apparent change in the political structure of the world, the available diplomatic tools became insufficient, and it is necessary to think of how to meet the needs of a more difficult management of the modern political world. [1, 314]

The transformation of international relations, and the appearance of more and more powerful actors on the world scene, represented by international organizations, non-governmental organizations, transnational corporations or religious movements, contribute to changes of political views and regimes in countries and increase the influence of individuals and unrecognized states on international processes. In this context, we are primarily talking about globalization processes, which are quite actively embraced in all spheres of human activity.

According to A.Kh. Arystanbekova, globalization covers all aspects of life of the world community today and becomes a dominating factor in world politics and in international relations. Despite various opinions of scientists and politicians on when globalization began and what its genesis has been, this process is - in the contemporary history - associated with the beginning of the 1960s, and the scientific and technological revolution in information and communication technologies. Since the middle of the 1980s, the term "globalization" was used to describe the process of the explosive movement of capital and the integration of financial and exchange markets as a result of deregulation and the rapid development of new

technologies in the information and communication sphere. Thus, at the end of the 1980s, the concept of "globalization" belonged to the economic and financial sphere.

In the last decade of the 20th century, the political processes associated with the end of the "Cold War" and the increased ecological threats caused the general perception of a uniform planet. Together with the growth of economic interdependence, they led to the expansion of the concept of "globalization" in the scientific and political community, giving it not only economic, but also a political, historical, geographical and cultural character. [2, 10-11] M.Z. Shkundin, for example, characterizes the process of globalization as a social phenomenon which contributes to the emergence of national, state, ethnic, religious, ideological and other contradictions. These differences did not just slow down the development of the globalization process, but under certain conditions can lead to the exacerbation of contradictions up to a conflict. [3, 80]

In this regard Kishan S. Rana tries to find answers to a question – What then is so special about the twenty-first century? He provides an answer. I believe we are justified in the assertion that the start of the twenty-first century is a time of paradigm change in the way international relations are conducted. We examine the change elements, looking at the ways states deal with one another, in what has become globalized-diplomacy. Today, "world affairs are about managing the colossal force of globalization." [4, 11]

According to M.T. Laumulin, globalization is a major force promoting cooperation and economic development of the world in general, it doesn't interrupt the fragmentation of mankind. The effective market, though, demands an effective state. Although globalization undermines national sovereignty, complicates its tasks, limits the resources and the role of state corporations and empowers other subjects of the political process (multinational corporations, NGOs, network structures) to appropriate the power of the state, the state, nevertheless, remains the central actor both on national and on the international field. [5, 22]

It is important to propose such definition of public diplomacy which doesn't have scale and strategy of its realization. In fact, the processes of globalization, which have a direct impact on

the major areas of human life, bear a number of changes in the relationships between the states and in the methods of attracting the attention of various audiences. Today we can say with confidence that for the preservation of global communications, it is necessary to strategically rethink their management by an internal state system. It is important to analyze forms and ways of public diplomacy which are in close connection with the public. According to J. Melisson both public diplomacy and public affairs are directly affected by the forces of globalization and the recent revolution in communication technology. In an era in which it has become increasingly important to influence the world opinion, domestic and international communication with the public has become an increasingly complex challenge for foreign ministries. [6, 13]

The concept of public diplomacy was introduced by Edmund Gullion in 1965 at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy of the Tufts University. Gullion was the first who gave the concept its modern value, however, he was not the first who used this definition. In fact, the etymology of public diplomacy reaches back to 1856. At that time it was used in an article of the London newspaper "Times" about the American president Franklin Pierce. Public diplomacy is used here as a synonym for the access to the local population and indicates a relationship of respect at home and abroad. Already in the early use, opening towards and an open mind and respect to the policies of the president by the public are attributed a high value. According to A. Shvan, there are two essential elements contained in the concept: openness and image, both within and outside the country. [7, 121]

In the USA the concept was used for the first time in 1871 in an article of "New York Times" which was criticizing the capture of the Dominican Republic and instead argued for an "open, public diplomacy". This meant openness as a counterbalance to the frequent secret diplomacy at meetings, which was prevalent in the 19th century. Thereby, in his "Fourteen Points" for the peaceful resolution from 08.01.1918, President Woodrow Wilson proposed a real paradigm shift as these called not only for a system of international peacekeeping but also positioned that "there shall be no private international understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall

proceed always frankly and in the public view.” [8, 79] This description of public diplomacy, which is equivalent to an “open diplomacy”, was often used in the First World War and as a “*diplomatie publique*” in French, and was therefore adopted in the diplomatic language use. [9, 3] In the German policy context, this concept was introduced in 1918 when Chancellor Georg von Hertling spoke about “public diplomacy agreement” referring to the “Fourteen Points” of Wilson in a speech to the Reichstag on January, 24. Wilson, in turn, referred during a report for the Congress on February 11, 1918 that Hertling accepts “the principle of public diplomacy”. [10, 3] After World War II the concept of open diplomacy received a new impulse. In 1946, Henri Spaak, in his report as the President of the UN General Assembly at its opening meeting, referred to the new times of public diplomacy, while London “Times” called public diplomacy as “[one of the] of catch-phrases and slogans masquerading as principles of foreign policy.” [11, 4]

Since 1950, public diplomacy began to be used with reference to direct speech in the public in the international relations. In this regard, Lippmann wrote in 1953: “[one] might argue that practice of public diplomacy and of propaganda and of psychological warfare had become such a plague” [12, 5] – in the hope that the Cold War would be shifted from symbolical policy to the level of policy of reflection. This early analysis of “elements of showmanship” [13, 5], which was an adequate representation of the Cold War foreign policy at this early stage, shows that public diplomacy was already considered as an element of mediation of foreign policy. In the following year, the concept was presented, especially by Anglo-Saxon policy and the press, as a euphemistic synonym for propaganda. Public diplomacy was used further in the USA for all foreign operations with the aim of “winning hearts and minds” [14, 21], which were not addressed to foreign governments, but the public. Initially, it contained foreign cultural policy, public relations and marketing. Only with the change of the millennium the concept of public diplomacy entered in the international framework of both governments and the media, and non-state actors. [15, 21]

Public diplomacy aims at persuasion and changing of understanding of initially two opposing

sides, which, however, perceive a continuity of possible strategies and are in a narrow relationship with each other. This dualism is designated in research as political information (persuasion) and cultural communication (understanding). [16, 496-505] The persuasion strategy is based in a two-level way: basis for the tried influence of the foreign public is the desire of influence to belonging government “that is interests of public diplomacy of the pursued states”. [17, 497] In this form public diplomacy represents a version of policy of violence. Cultural communication, at the other end of the spectrum, “aspires to change the understanding in one long-term enclosed presentation of society.” Here it is possible to find the formation of foreign cultural policy which represents the second important sphere of public diplomacy. The big range of communication opportunities, actions and interests led some scientists to doubt the usefulness of the general concept of public diplomacy and to instead consider these under the concept of foreign cultural policy. This still would mean a desire to share in the diligence between good and evil, in order to hide the public policy aspects of violence in external communication. [7, 123]

According to A. Dolinsky, there was a second meaning of the term public diplomacy in the Russian language - diplomacy at the level of public organizations. This gave rise to a dangerous confusion: even among experts, it established a belief that public diplomacy is only a dialogue between non-governmental organizations. Meanwhile, public diplomacy involves a wider range of activities, from foreign broadcasting to educational exchanges. (This is why it is more convenient to translate the term as “public diplomacy”, not diplomacy at NGO level.) This inaccuracy is dangerous because the professional interaction between specialized NGOs on topics which are of great importance to bilateral relations - is still rather diplomacy in the sense of “track two” diplomacy between experts. It is a significant mechanism in international relations, however, it is generally not designed to interact with the general public. It is important to agree that we are talking specifically about public diplomacy as a system for dealing with foreign societies for political purposes, while the term “public diplomacy” should be understood as either a synonym or as one of its sub-clusters.

The restriction of public diplomacy to the dialogue of nonprofit organizations is a political error. [18]

The concept of public diplomacy has many definitions, however, in most cases researchers define them according to the needs of their own research interests, which leads to fragmented definitions that cover only a part of the spectrum. Today, there are different possible trends and concepts of public diplomacy. In the theory, we can see the following explanatory framework of definitions.

In the first group we include the group of most authors such as W. Olins, J. Melissen, Edmund A. Gullion, R. Sheldon and J. Stauber, Jr. Crocker Snow, Alan K. Henrikson, M. Butler, whose concept of public diplomacy is mainly focused on the process of influencing public relations, opinions of people and governments for the formation and mobilization of the foreign public and their decisions in one's own favor.

At the same time, another group of scientists tries to emphasize the aspect of a realization of public diplomacy abroad in the form of a communication. B. Hocking, H. Tuch, Jill A. Schuker, A. Michalski, A. Spiegel, Edmund A. Gullion, M. Lending, Jian Wang, Alan K. Henrikson define it as a communication process with foreign public in attempts to explain to other nations ideas and values, institutions and culture, the national purposes and the policy of a country. This can be labeled as "winning hearts and minds" of people. [6, 9-10]

A third group of researchers - P. Sharp, B. Scaria Amoretti, J. Melissen, P. Sharp, A. Michalski, Ingrid d'Hooghe, Sh. Riordan, Kishan S. Rana, C. Lord - are of the opinion that public diplomacy is the formation of the relations with actors of civil societies in foreign states, as well as the process of collaboration among non-governmental organizations within and outside the country. It is necessary to emphasize that the above-mentioned authors of the third group note the need for a process of public diplomacy, in which a direct relationship with the citizens of the domestic country is pursued in the first place to promote one's interests and values beyond national borders. As Sh. Riordan notes, effective public diplomacy at home may be an essential precursor to a successful public diplomacy abroad. [6, 191]

The fourth group of researchers - B. Hocking, Sh. Riordan, Ingrid d'Hooghe, J. Melissen, John

W. Wheeler-Bennett - included a factor of non-governmental organizations and other non-state actors. They are trying to put forward their ideas (message) to pursue the policy of their goals into the public diplomacy concept. For a proper creation and management of these ideas, messages are a key resource of the concept of public diplomacy strategy. [19, 41] An important task is the formation of the content of the messages, and the tools and actors of a public diplomacy strategy. For example, Sh. Riordan said that the messages of public diplomacy needed to be more sophisticated and subtle. Public diplomacy must engage in dialogues with a broad range of players in foreign civil societies. This requires a more open, and perhaps humble, approach, which recognizes that no one has a monopoly of truth or virtue, that other ideas may be valid and that the outcome may be different from the initial message being promoted. [20, 189] In addition, the authors emphasize the importance of the group setting up public diplomacy messages to specific audience [20, 189], thus emphasizing the importance of not only content specific ideas, which is not only accepted by public, but also their implementation.

Thus, on the basis of the above analysis of a wide range of interpretations of the definitions of public diplomacy, the authors propose the following definition, which presents its main fundamental point and reflects the present state of international relations.

Public diplomacy is a set of measures aimed at a broad audience of foreign countries that is associated with the implementation of economic and political interests with the aim of attracting and implementing foreign policy in the future. In addition, the policy of public diplomacy should be promoted domestically, since its initial supporters are the people who are primarily interested in its success outside of its borders.

The goal is not only to determine the definition of public diplomacy and its role and influence in international economic relations, but at the same time, the role of public diplomacy of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the world stage. It is important to consider that modern diplomats have to take into account not only the current global economic trends, which are important on a large scale, but also their impact on the national economic inter-

ests. Soft power [21] is one of the relevant policies for today. In the form of economic expansion, it displaces the policy of hard power, and requires, in turn, high-quality diplomatic assistance. [22]

In this context, the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan N.A. Nazarbayev stated very clearly that the highest form of collaboration is a partnership of civilizations in solving global problems of humanity, which is the basis of a multipolar world of the XXI century. [23, 16]

It should be noted that along with the traditional forms of cooperation the Republic of Kazakhstan, headed by the Leader of the nation, brings advanced initiatives to improve the well-being not only within the country but also encourages the international community to jointly address global challenges.

The Leader of Kazakhstan, being one of the most established reformers on the international level, like no one else understands the validity of such a concept as an elaboration of a consolidated opinion for the resolution of global economic questions. At the same he acknowledges the extent of his own responsibility before history, the previous chapter of which was full of dramatic events and the present of which does not raise confidence that the future will not be written in blood. [24, 43]

Public Diplomacy of Kazakhstan, which is based on a strategy of persuasion, clearly expresses the specific features associated with Kazakhstan. It seeks to declare initiatives on the negotiating platform, but most importantly to gather the political will and sound strategy to resolve the problems of the world, taking into account the level of risk.

The OSCE summit in 2010 in the capital of Kazakhstan has significantly increased the role of Astana in taking decisions about security and peaceful coexistence on the continent. Even more ambitious discussions on the complex problems of world economy, global financial system and other vital questions take place during the annual Astana economic forum. Due to this unique platform, the capital of Kazakhstan attracts the attention of the world society. The world society is not indifferent to views that are formed in the center of Eurasia in regard to the present and future principles of the global basis development.

The Kazakh President N.A. Nazarbayev has appealed to the worldwide community with a new of-

fer in his speech on the formal meeting dedicated to the anniversary of the Independence of Kazakhstan. In particular he noted: "At the beginning of 2009 in the height of crisis, I put forward an initiative of the world financial reform. In the articles "Keys from crisis" and "The fifth way" I spoke that cosmetic anti-crisis measures wouldn't save the world from new increasing waves of crisis. The subsequent events have confirmed these words. To date nobody could offer a world anti-crisis plan, which would be accepted consensually. Unfortunately, the G20 and G8 formats demonstrate their ineffectiveness. They even haven't started the discussion of the world anti-crisis plan..."

In accordance with this the Kazakh Leader has offered to strongly increase the number of participants who should start the search for solutions to the crisis in the world. The best world known analytics, scientists-innovators, experts and other specialists in economic, political and financial spheres could participate in this work directly through a new communicative platform named as "Project G-Global" by the idea initiator. Astana Economic forum was called to perform as a working platform for this global electronic network. "Bretton Wood" system, where a new idea of the world currency system reform got powerful wings of world-wide popularity.

The idea of a communicative platform "G-Global" was accepted with great enthusiasm by the active supporter of the Kazakhstan initiative, Nobel laureate in economics Robert Mundell. He stated: "I completely support the initiative of the Kazakh President, N.A. Nazarbayev in which he offered a new idea of how to fight the financial crisis. G20 and G8 have demonstrated their weakness in analysis and decision making." Robert Aumann, the Nobel laureate in Economics for 2005 finds Kazakhstan "a peaceful and very dynamic player at the global stage. Astana is the ideal place for holding a Conference that is called for considering questions to find solutions for the world economic crisis." Professor Aumann added that the conference in the format of G-Global "may promote Kazakhstan to the leading position in the fight with the crisis and this without doubt will be a positive result." [24, 172]

Distinctive features of public diplomacy of the Republic of Kazakhstan are the originality

and timeliness of the initiatives that are gradually turned into practice, relevance and a positive reception in the world. To date, negotiations and dialogue need to be more strategically thought out, reflect the realities of a globalizing world, meet the needs of society and to create concrete steps to address, first of all, economic problems without political pressure. As the Head of State of the Republic of Kazakhstan N.A. Nazarbayev stated at the meeting in 2012 about the results and objectives of the Strategy - 2050, the main principle is comprehensive economic pragmatism. [25] It should be noted that

the continued development of domestic economic capacity will lead to an increased need of an inflow of external financial resources into the national economy and of a stable external environment to provide external security, which in turn will minimize the scope of both external and internal risks. Moreover the role and the scope of the negotiating platforms help to create favorable conditions for the search for real practicable and applicable solutions. In this context, public diplomacy has a positive effect, which presents the basis for the emergence of new international structures.

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Current State of Central Asia: Actual Aspects of Economic Cooperation

DARIYA MUKHAMEDZHANOVA

In modern geopolitics and geo-economics Central Asia (CA) is considered most often as the economic and geographic region, political or cultural space and is virtually regarded as a single economic system.

Non-regional and regional economic actors estimate CA as a strategically important space, which:

- has stocks of the world's natural resources;
- has continental transit transport capabilities;
- represents the regional security complex.

The main problems of economic cooperation between the countries of Central Asia are attributable to:

- Firstly, the lack of coordination on economic interests of the Central Asian countries and a common vision of the problems and prospects of development in the region as the overall socio-economic system;

- Secondly, the absence of the concept of Central Asia as a regional economic system in the format of CIS and EurAsEC;

- Thirdly, the different strategic interests and approaches of external actors to the issues of cooperation with the countries of Central Asia.

Central Asia in the geo-economic space

CA's participation in the globalization process has primarily affected the geography of external trade.

External trade priorities of the Central Asian countries have changed dramatically for two decades; from the cooperation with the CIS countries to the developed countries and the developing world. During the period of 1995-2010 the share of developing countries in the export of Central Asia has increased more than three times, the share of developed - by 1.3 times, the share of transition economies was declined by 3 times (Fig. 1).




Figure 1. The structure of exports from Central Asia in 1995 - 2010, Million US Dollars

Source: UNCTAD Handbook of statistics, 2011 // <http://unctad.org>




Figure 2. Geographical structure of Central Asian external trade in 2010, in%

Source: EU Bilateral trade and trade with the world.//ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/regions/central-asia

The share of developing countries has also increased by 3 times in the imports of CA during the same period; the share of developed countries' imports has decreased slightly (by 2%); the share of transition economies has decreased almost twice.

External trading partners. Geographical structure of Central Asian external trade is now formed as follows: China - 26.1%; EU27 - 26%; CIS - 23%, including: Russia - 13%, CA - 5%, U.S. - 2.7% (Figure 2).

Investment flows. Referring to investment flows and considering their reduction from developed countries and the movement into developing countries and countries of transitional economies, we should expect further reduction in investment from the EU and the United States and strengthening of investment cooperation with Russia and China.

Thus, the region today is a zone of economic domination of Russia and China in the sphere of economic influence.

CA in the economic space of Eurasia

The participation of Central Asian countries in the process of regionalization on the continent is reduced to participation in two major projects in which China and Russia are the centers of economic gravity for Central Asia's countries: SCO project and the project of the Eurasian integration in the post soviet area in the formats of the CIS and EurAsEC.

The influence of China and the EU on Central Asia. China's influence on the Central Asian coun-

tries is carried out mainly through the participation of the parties in the SCO, which has become a key element of the emerging model of regional cooperation between the countries of Central Asia and China.

China's growing economic influence on the Central Asian countries is directly proportional to reduction of EU dynamics (the main regional partner throughout the entire period of the CA's independent economies formation), and reducing the share of the EU's participation in not only the turnover of the Central Asian countries, but also in world GDP, world trade, world investment flows.

The share of the SCO and China has increased in the global GDP over the 2000-2010 period - from 5.2% to 11.6 and 3.6 to 9.3%. In world trade - from 4.9 to 12.3% and from 3.7 to 9.9% respectively. The EU's share of global GDP decreased accordingly from 33.7 to 27.3% and in world trade - from 37.4 to 33.9%. The direction of global investment flows has changed. During the period of 2005 -2010, the reduction in the import of foreign direct investment (FDI) from the EU was 35%, while at the same time, the import and export of FDI in whole from Asia has almost doubled. From 2007 to 2010 the share of the EU in Central Asian turnover decreased - by 3.3%, in export - by 4.7%, imports - by 2.4%.

Central Asia as a regional system in the projects of the SCO, CIS, EurAsEC. A common characteristic of these formats of cooperation is, in our view, the absence of the concept of development for Central Asia as a single regional system, and

the existence of different approaches to solving as common regional problems, so the problems of Central Asia.

Currently, the most systematic approach to regionalization is being reflected by the principles and objectives of the Eurasian Economic Community creation. One of the main vectors of the Eurasian Economic Community - to ensure the dynamic development of the Community members by harmonizing social and economic changes in the effective use of their economic potentials to improve the peoples' living standards.

Besides, the EurAsEC space, unlike the CIS and SCO, is less asymmetrically with respect to the countries of Central Asia. Therefore, the only acceptable format of regionalization and economic integration of the Central Asian countries, at present, is the EurAsEC, especially considering the prospects of expanding the cooperation of the Customs Union between Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia (CU) with all the countries of the region.


Central Asia and EurAsEC

The main problem of the EurAsEC's economic space, in our opinion, is its fragmentation. Two economic spaces have been formed inside the

EurAsEC, which have different economic potential and a different meaning for the future of regional integration: the space of the Union State of Russia and Belarus, and the space, formed by the states of Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan), conditionally named as "European" and "Asian" fragments of the EurAsEC's general space. The consequences of the "Asian fragment's" collapse are not valued sufficiently for the economic security of the EurAsEC space.

The problems of fragmentation are being aggravated by the social differentiation in Central Asian countries according to the indicators of living standards and human development index (HDI). The Republic of Kazakhstan (RK) has the highest HDI in the region and the highest GDP per capita, exceeding the value of this indicator for Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan more than 10 times (Fig. 3).

Further differentiation of the CA region on socio-economic grounds could mean the worsening of poverty for the majority of the states, as well as reducing the quality of health care and education, growth of problems in the labor market. For the Eurasian economic space - the growth of unregulated migration flows and other related problems such as extremism, drug trafficking, the criminalization of society, infectious threats, etc.



* HDI – right axis

Figure 3. GDP per capita, population, and HDI of Central Asia's countries in 2011

Source: Human Development Report, 2011. Sustainability and Equity: A Better Future for All. //http://hdr.undp.org; Caucasus and Central Asia. The IMF report. 2012

Kazakhstan and Central Asian States

Kazakhstan's decisive influence on the processes of economic integration between the Central Asian countries is due to the following factors:

1) Kazakhstan is the largest and the most efficient economy in Central Asia. In 2011 Kazakhstan's share in total regional GDP was 68.5%

(with a 26% share in population of Central Asia). Kazakhstan's share accounts the main volume of total regional trade (67%) (Fig. 4);

2) Kazakhstan is a major intraregional trade partner for the countries of Central Asia. Kazakhstan's share in intraregional trade turnover between Central Asian countries varies from 46% in Turkmenistan, to 62.5% in Tajikistan (Fig. 5);




Figure 4. Trade turnover between CA countries in 2000-2011, Million U.S. Dollars

Source: UNCTAD Handbook of statistics, 2011. <http://unctad.org>




Figure 5. Share of Central Asian countries in intraregional trade in 2010, %

Sources: EU Bilateral trade and trade with the world. <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/regions/central-asia>

3) Kazakhstan is the largest trading partner for countries abroad among the Central Asian countries. Kazakhstan's share in 2010 amounted to 67.9% of China's trade turnover with Central Asia, 88% of EU's trade with Central Asia, 85% of the USA's turnover with Central Asia;

4) Kazakhstan is a main trading partner of Russia in Central Asia, it accounts to 55% of Russia's trade with the countries of the region;

5) Main regional investment flows are concentrated in Kazakhstan, which form 71% of FDI imported in the region (2011), and almost all of the investments exported from the CA (\$ 4.5 billion in 2011).


Thus, the economic policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan:

- First, forms modern character of foreign economic cooperation in the Central Asian region and its international specialization. Central Asia as for global markets is a region, global economic significance of which is due to the presence of natural resources. The main export of the region's commodity group is crude oil and heavy oil (49%

of CA's turnover), with Kazakhstan's share in regional exports - 99.1%, following by the importance are: natural and liquefied gas (9.3%), radioactive materials (4 %), metals (copper, iron, gold - 7.4%), iron ore, cotton, wheat, and others (Fig. 6);

- Second, determines the degree of actual integration for the countries of Central Asia and the prospects for regional economic integration. The degree of regional economic interdependence and the importance of the Central Asian Economic Area of the CA for countries of the region are reflected by the ratio of productive openness (RPO). The least integrated into the economy of the Central Asian region is Kazakhstan, the RPO of which is almost two times lower than the regional average values (Fig. 7).


It turns out that in the present conditions, in spite of integration initiatives, Kazakhstan is less than other countries in the region involved in the real integration. Although the Central Asian market still remains its importance for Kazakhstan's external trade policy in the formats of CU, EurASEC and CIS.



* Code of the commodity group: 41 - wheat and cereals, 57 - fresh or dried fruit; 263 - cotton, 281 - iron ore and concentrates, 322 - lignite (brown coal) and peat briquettes, 333 - crude oil and tar, 334 - heavy oil and tar, 343 - natural gas, liquefied gas, 525 - radioactive and associated materials, 651 - textile yarn, 671 - iron, ferro alloys, etc., 673 - products of non-alloy steel, 682 - copper 971 - gold.

Figure 6. Export of the Central Asia by major commodity groups in 2010, Million US Dollars

Source: UNCTAD Handbook of statistics, 2011. <http://unctad.org>



* RPO – right axis

Figure 7. Ratio of productive openness of the CA's countries in 2010

Source: UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics, 2011. <http://unctad.org>

Kazakhstan and the CA's countries need a common program:

1) the development of key regional markets and sectors that form the international specialization of the region (oil and gas chemical, energy, agriculture, water and environment, labor market, etc.);

2) implementation of the most important integrated innovative projects for the development of these markets (based on the new generation of technologies and new materials, including those obtained using a regional resource potential);

3) coordination of the key strategic interests for regional and non-regional actors in the region.

Today, the regional problems of regulating the migration and investment flows may become the problems of collective discussion within the SCO, CIS, EurAsEC and CU, as well as the formation of a regional export policy on exported goods, the global significance. Thus, if the share of Central Asia in world trade is 0.5%, while, for example, the share of Central Asia in world exports of radioactive and associated materials is 18.7%, exports of cotton - 12%, ferrous and non-ferrous metals up to 5%, the oil and gas - between 3% and so on for at least 10 - 15 export trade items.

Central Asia and Afghanistan

Trade turnover between the countries of Central Asia and Afghanistan is more than \$1.3 billion. The main volume of bilateral trade is exported from the Central Asian countries (96.7% of sales). Afghanistan's share in the total turnover of the Central Asian countries is 1.1%.

The importance of Asian market for Afghan economy is caused by necessity in energy resources and possibilities of their transportation. Incompleteness of the processes of economic reformation in Afghanistan and political instability are the main factors of restraining the growth of the mutual trade.

Geographical structure of Afghanistan's external trade is oriented on the countries of South Asia (SA) - Pakistan and India (23.3% and 6.4% of the country's trade respectively), and the United States (27.9%) and the EU27 (12.2%). Important trading partners of Afghanistan in the CIS are Russia (7% of Afghanistan's turnover), and the Central Asian countries (about 14%) (Fig. 8).

Commodity structure of the external trade in Afghanistan is formed by an import component.




Figure 8. Geography of Afghanistan's external trade in 2010, %

Source: EU Bilateral Trade and Trade with the World: [//ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations](http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations)




Figure 9. Export and import of Afghanistan in 1980 and 2010, Million U.S. Dollars

Source: UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics, 2011. <http://unctad.org>

The share of imports forms 93% of the country's trade. The development of Afghanistan's external trade relations performs due to the growth of commodity imports into the country against the decrease of the export volumes (Figure 9).

In the export of Afghanistan, regarding the major commodity groups, the supply of food and agricultural raw materials dominate by 57.6%;

industrial products form 34.6% of total exports, mineral raw materials, fuel and energy products are not exported. Pakistan is sent 26,8,0% of Afghan exports, India - 25.4%, U.S. - 15.3%, EU27 - 11.9%, Russian Federation - 3.5%, Iran - 2.3%. The largest consumer of Afghan goods in Central Asia in 2010 was Tajikistan (7.1% of Afghanistan's export).




Figure 10. Trade turnover of SA by the countries of the region in 2010, in %


Source: Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Report 2011 //http://www.unescap.org

The import of Afghanistan is dominated by industrial products - 32%. Food and agricultural raw materials have 17%, mineral raw materials, fuel and energy products - 1.2%. The largest suppliers of goods to Afghanistan are also the U.S. (28.7% of total Afghanistan's import), Pakistan (23%), EU27 (12%), Russia (7.2%), India (5.2%). In Central Asia - Uzbekistan (9% of Afghanistan's imports), Turkmenistan (2.9%), Kazakhstan (2.6%).

In SA trade turnover Afghanistan's share is 1,0% (Fig.10), in SA export - 0,1%.

Regional trade of SA has a generally different dynamic than the external trade of Afghanistan, especially with regard to exports. For example, if the share of world exports of SA grows, Afghanistan's share is falling rapidly. In 2010, Afghanistan's share of world exports and imports did not reach the level of 1980 (Figures 11,12).

The level of socio-economic development of Afghanistan. In 1980 GDP per capita in Afghanistan was much lower than the regional average in SA and the gap continues to increase (Figure 13).



* SA - right axis

Figure 11. The share of SA and Afghanistan in world's export in 1980-2010, %




Figure 12. the share of SA and Afghanistan in world's import in 1980-2010, %

Source: Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Report 2011 //http://www.unescap.org




Figure 13. GDP per capita in SA and Afghanistan in 1980-2009, U.S. dollars

Source: UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics, 2011. <http://unctad.org>

At the same time the share of Afghanistan's GDP in total GDP of SA has decreased (0.71% in 1990, 0.65% in 2010), and the proportion of the population in Afghanistan is increasing regarding the total population of SA (1.09% in 1990, 1.84% in 2010).

Global FDI flows in the SA region are focused on India, whose share in the regional import and export of FDI is 84% and 97% respectively. Afghanistan's share is only 0.4% of FDI entering the region. The unstable economic and political situation in Afghanistan is a major factor in the low investment attractiveness of the country and the practical absence of global FDI inflows from Kazakhstan and the Central Asian countries. Underdevelopment of the financial institutions in Afghanistan reduces the investment cooperation.

Regional cooperation between Afghanistan and Central Asian countries. Prerequisites for economic consolidation within the Central Asia and between CA and SA are formed:

- at the interregional level in the format of SCO (an important step towards promoting a regional cooperation was to provide Afghanistan with an observer status in the SCO) and international events (Istanbul Process, Regional Economic Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan, Tokyo and Kabul conferences, etc.);

- At the regional level in the format of the CIS and EurAsEC in addressing the issues of building the northern transport corridors (today goods are taken to Afghanistan through the common border with Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan), participation in other international energy projects, connecting the central and southern part of Asia, etc.;

- At the level of bilateral relations between the countries of Central Asia and Afghanistan as part of interdisciplinary projects of regional cooperation in the energy sector, the food market, the market of natural raw materials, the market of educational services, etc.

Currently, all the Central Asian countries are making efforts to deepen and expand bilateral format of economic, cultural and humanitarian cooperation with Afghanistan. Kazakhstan is ready to participate in the development of the specific projects in the field of railway transport, mining, agriculture, emergency management, telecommunications and energy infrastructure development in Afghanistan. Kyrgyzstan considers the export of agricultural products to Afghanistan. Turkmenistan and Afghanistan have agreed to cooperate in the service sector, energy, transport and communications, agriculture, development of social and economic infrastructure of Afghanistan, to improve international trade relations be-

tween the countries. Uzbekistan and Afghanistan signed a number of agreements on cooperation in the field of international transit, transport routes, railways, etc.

* * *

Thus, the integration on the former Soviet Union space and its acceleration can not take place without the CA, which importance in geopolitics, geo-economics and regional security is increasing.

The main problems of the economic cooperation between the countries of Central Asia are the lack of regionalization processes and the institutionalization of economic cooperation, the raw materials nature of international specialization of the region, the asymmetry of economic space, socio-economic differentiation, reducing the share of intra-regional trade in goods turnover between the countries of the region.

As for Kazakhstan, the further disintegration of the economic space within the CA may mean the destruction of economic relations in the regional markets of raw materials and food, creating preconditions for the emergence of threats to economic security on the borders of CU, the loss of status as a subject of regional significance and, finally, the inability to implement the "idea of Eurasianism."

Kazakhstan may affect the change of raw nature in international specialization of the region, the alignment of the socio-economic level of the region and strengthening regional integration processes.

Central Asian countries need a common concept of the region development as a single socio-economic system. Within the frameworks of this concept it is possible to adopt common programs: the development of key regional markets and sectors that form the international specialization of the region; the introduction of the integrated innovation projects for the development of these markets; coordinate the key strategic interests.

The concept of the region development and its participation in the global economy should be based on the principles of collective leadership in solving the common problems, and the collective assessment of the existing global policies toward the Central Asia. The basis of the collective con-

cept can be formed by the following conclusions and recommendations:

1. External actors, in particular the United States and China, are not interested in the preservation and development of Central Asia as a united socio-economic system; however, have their own anyhow executed goals and plans toward the region. Central Asian countries should be interested in coordinating the external and internal interests at the regional level.

2. The global economic significance of the Central Asia is stipulated by the presence of natural resources in the region; therefore, the countries in the region have the opportunity to resort to the methods of collective "resource diplomacy" in the interests of the region development.

3. Communicative capabilities of the region are unique. The demand for resources means for external partners the demand for building the associated infrastructure, therefore, the CA is interested to invest the formation of a regional transport and communication complex as the "cross-roads of communication" and in the future one of the most important components of international cargo and world trade.

4. Taking into account the priorities of the West related to non-economic methods of influence, the growth of military expenditures, the war against terrorism, the fight against drug trafficking, etc, the Central Asian countries need to have a unified position on these issues in the formats of regional associations. Otherwise, the preconditions for the intervention of the West into the economic policies of the countries of Central Asia become more intensive.

5. Socio-economic development of Central Asia is not included into the specific strategic objectives of external partners in the region. The problems on the alignment of socio-economic level of the Central Asian countries can only be resolved within the integration organizations, in particular, the EurAsEC. It is important to take into account that the formation of a uniform economic space of EurAsEC is an important factor of the development of integration processes in the terms of asymmetry of economic potentials of its participants.

6. Creating an integrated Central Asian energy market will attract investments to the region

for the implementation of international projects in the field of “energy of the future.” Within the framework of a concept of energy cooperation in the Central Asia, it is essential to have a common point of view on the future energy supply of the Central Asian countries, Europe and Asia in terms of security and ecology.

7. Interests of regional economic security and sustainable development of the region as a single socio-economic system require joint efforts within the existing integration associations.

8. The economic security of the CA can not be considered beyond the Afghan problem and consolidated approach of the Central Asian countries to its solving within the framework of regional integration associations involving Russia and China. The necessity for co-ordination of the economic policy toward Afghanistan by the countries of the CA is stipulated by the impossibility of the countries to find the solution of the problem on national economic security and reach the level of strategic regional partnerships.

Withdrawal of Troops from Afghanistan in the Strategy of NATO Countries

ANNA GUSSAROVA

Withdrawal of the NATO's combat troops from Afghanistan in 2014 occupies an important place in the world politics. Currently, the urgency of this issue is related to Washington's realization of unpromising use of force in the Afghan settlement.

At the same time, with the completion of the military operation in IRA, Alliance members are seeking for the ability to reserve the key positions, and enhance the level of cooperation with the Central Asian states, including in military-political sphere, due to the increase of visits by the representatives of NATO countries' Defense Departments in the current year.

Considering these trends, in the short term perspective, the countries of Central Asia are challenged to develop and adopt the measures, aimed at minimizing the negative impacts, as well as security threats and risks that the region may face during and after the withdrawal of coalition forces from Afghanistan.

Reasons to stop NATO's operation in Afghanistan

NATO's military operation in IRA has entered its final stage, despite the lack of significant progress in the Afghan settlement. Main reasons of the coalition troops' withdrawal from Afghanistan are based on the following factors:

- *The global financial crisis, observed at this stage, has worsened the economic situation of the United States.* In September 2012, the U.S. national debt has reached a level of \$16.015 trillion [1],

which was an absolute record in the history of the country. Reducing of the debt and reducing of the budget expenditures, which may reduce the threat of default, are one of the main points of the two parties' electoral programs. In this regard, measures on reducing the military spending, including the Afghan campaign, are in line with the overall budget cuts;

- *Public opinion has an impact on the political process in the United States.* According to an opinion poll conducted by Gallup Organization and CBS in March 2012, 55% of respondents do not have a clear idea of what to fight against in Afghanistan after the destruction of Osama bin Laden, but 78% of the population fully supports Obama's decision concerning the withdrawal of U.S. troops from IRA. At the same time, 29% of respondents (who voted for the Republican Party) supported the fact that U.S. troops should remain in Afghanistan after 2014, and in light of the upcoming U.S. presidential election in November 2012 the issue is one of the most important on the American agenda of the day;

- *Military methods of resolving the Afghan problem did not justify itself.* Escalation of the military contingent in IRA for safety provision did not bring the expected results. Therefore the current U.S. Administration had to explore other mechanisms for resolving the Afghan problem. Realization of socio-economic programs is being discussed along with the training of efficient Afghan security forces, including the strategy of "New Silk Road," CASAREM and TAPI energy projects, as well as negotiating with armed resistance, especially with the "Taliban" movement;




Figure 8. The US defense budget, \$ billion

* Excluding the cost of the Department of Energy and foreign military campaigns

Source: Growth in U.S. Defense Spending since 2001, U.S. Department of Defense FY2013. Budget Request 2012 //www.comptroller.defense.gov/budget

- Displacement of U.S. foreign policy priorities from Central and South Asia into the Asia-Pacific region. The adoption of the two strategic documents in the field of defense, as well as frequent visits of Secretary of State and Head of the Pentagon to the Pacific region in 2012, is a result of re-orientation in American foreign policy. Conducting of joint US-Japan military exercise at the moment of worsening territorial disputes between Japan and China confirms this thesis. It must be emphasized that the United States plan to deploy up to 60% of their Navy in the APR by 2020. Considering tasks of doubling the U.S. exports by 2015 [2], it is clear that the importance of Asia Pacific as the largest trading partners will increase.

Thus, the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan is the result of shifting priorities in the strategy of the United States. At the same time, for the Western countries and the U.S. in particular, the security issues in Central and South Asia, particularly in IRA, remain to be urgent.

The current state and possible scenarios related to the withdrawal of coalition forces from Afghanistan

Withdrawal of 130 thousand soldiers, 70 thousand vehicles and 120 thousand containers carrying

cargoes from IRA is the main task for NATO in short term perspective. Currently reverse transit routes coming from Afghanistan through Pakistan by the southern route, as well as on the territory of Russia and the Central Asian states on the Northern Distribution Network (NDN), can not fully meet the Alliance's requirements because of the certain constraining factors.

There is a high probability of blocking Pakistan route, which supplied 90% of non-military cargoes, addressed for the U.S. contingent, to Afghanistan in 2009. The tensions between Islamabad and Kabul on border security and unstable relations between Pakistan and the United States have questioned the reliability of the reverse transit for Pentagon, but haven't underestimated the advantages.

It should be noted that the temporary closure of the route by Islamabad has led to a re-orientation on the NDN (Northern Distribution Network), which caused the increase of transit cost by about \$ 100 million a month. Finally, representatives of the Alliance coalition forces, headed by the U.S., give the priority to the Pakistani route, which is the most optimal by terms of delivery and cost of transit cargos. Despite the fact that the Southern flow is the most profitable, the unpredictable politics of Islamabad does not exclude the possibility of re-closure of the route.

Taking into consideration the fact that the weapons and ammunition for military contingent in Afghanistan were supplied through the territory of Iran in the initial stage, it is hypothetically possible to assume that the Alliance' reverse transit would be going through Iran. However, cooperation between the U.S. and NATO with Iran on the return of Afghan transit is not possible because of fundamental disagreements on the nuclear program of Iran.

In this regard, the value of NDN is increasing, as evidenced by the frequent visits of Defense Ministers of NATO countries in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan in summer of 2012. At least two circumstances prevent the transfer of NDN to the reverse transit.

First, obligations adopted by the Central Asian States under the Collective Security Treaty Organization. The Charter of the Organization limits the placement of foreign troops and groups of military facilities on the territory of the its states [3]. In addition, Russia has secured a long-term presence in the region: a number of strategic agreements in the military field were signed in autumn of current year, the result of which was the preservation of Russian military bases in Kyrgyzstan till 2032 and Tajikistan till 2042.

Second, the adoption of "Concept of foreign policy" by Uzbekistan in August, current year, according to which no foreign military bases and objects can be located in the country.

So, considering all the circumstances indicated above, and also the absence of agreements on the reverse transit of lethal goods, it may be concluded that the process of NATO troops' withdrawal from Afghanistan is apparently to be carried out according to three scenarios.

Scenario I. Pakistani route will remain a key element in the process of completing the NATO operation in IRA.

Evidence of this can be a "Memorandum on the cargo transit for U.S. troops to Afghanistan and back" concluded between Pakistan and the United States in July 30, 2012 [4]. Signing a document of this kind reflects Washington's desire to stabilize the bilateral relations, including in the military field, and engage Islamabad in a solution of the Afghan problem. Provision of financial assistance (\$ 1.1 billion) to Pakistan within the Coalition Sup-

port Fund has been one of the measures taken by the U.S. State Department in this direction.

However, including the provisions about "transportation of arms and ammunition for the Afghan National Army" into the Memorandum became the main achievement of American diplomacy. We can not exclude that this paragraph can become a kind of basis for signing of the document concerning the reverse transit of military equipment from IRA. In addition, Obama's Administration is considering a question of compensation for military forces of Pakistan for preserving the value of transit in return. Consequently, in case of relatively stable US-Pakistan relations, the signing of an agreement on the reverse transit will be one of the top priorities for Washington.

Thus, the Pakistani route in the frameworks of the reverse transit may look as follows: from Chaman checkpoints (southern Afghan-Pakistani border) and Torkham (the northern Afghan-Pakistani border) containers are being delivered to the ports of Qasim or Karachi and then by maritime transport to U.S. air bases in Qatar ("Al-Uleyd"), Oman ("Sib" and "Masire") or UAE ("Al-Dzharfra") to Turkey (Inchilik). Despite the fact that air travel are the most expensive, the Pentagon after the end of Iraq war in the region has retained a significant number of military bases, which may be involved in reverse transit of equipment from Afghanistan.

Nevertheless, implementation of such scenario radically depends on overcoming the Afghanistan-Pakistan and the Pakistani-American contradictions. At the same time, the unpredictability of Islamabad makes it impossible to bet only on the Southern flow. Under this logic, the Alliance' task is to develop more effective measures to regulate this problem, one of which could become a change of transit route.

Scenario II. NDN becomes a priority transit route of Alliance' lethal cargos

In case of blocking the Southern flow, Northern network will serve as a certain guarantee for withdrawal of the NATO's military contingent.

At this stage, Washington and Moscow have not yet reached a final decision on the issue of mutually beneficial transfer of Ulyanovsk into the reverse transit, especially concerning the "lethal" cargo. However, if the Pakistani route is closed, U.S. will have to undertake some compulsory measures,

including more attentive approach to Russia's position in the Middle East and Eastern Europe. At the same time, several members of the Alliance have a bilateral agreement with the Russian Federation in the area of transit, in particular, the supply of German military cargoes to IRA by railways through Russia (2009), as well as the area of air transit of Swedish military cargoes from Afghanistan (2012).

The Central Asian countries are one of the most important parts of NDN. But the issue is about exactly which facilities in the region will be involved in the process of coalition forces' withdrawal from Afghanistan. **Reverse transit requires a broad network of logistics centers, which in the future will be the key objects of the infrastructure, created by the U.S., for trade and economic cooperation within the framework of the "New Silk Road" strategy.**

Currently NDN assumes multimodal transportation through the territory of the CIS countries and includes the following options of the withdrawal of weapons and equipment from IRA:

Option 1. According to the existing railway line Mazar-i-Sharif - Hayraton cargoes will go through Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Russia **by railways** to the Baltic ports (Klaipeda and Riga). At this stage, Termez-Hayraton transition (so-called bridge "Friendship"), which connects Uzbekistan to Afghanistan, occupies a central place in the transports and communications corridor, and its value on an upcoming date of the withdrawal of coalition troops will only be increasing.

Seizing of Uzbekistan's membership in CSTO, and also the railway link with Afghanistan, makes Tashkent an important element in the strategy of the Alliance, despite the fact that European states consider Uzbek route to be quite expensive;

Option 2. Cargoes may be shipped by air transport through the territory of Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Russia. In this case, such transit centers as "Manas", "Navoi", "Mary", Rostov-on-Don and Ulyanovsk become especially important. The combination of air and road transport is also possible.

"Manas". Over the entire period of NATO's presence in IRA the base played a key role in the transfer of troops to Afghanistan. In addition, the annual income of 60 million dollars, as well as a possible increase of the rental cost of the object,

is one of the factors that ensure a stable economic situation of the country. With all of this, in case if Russia provides more favorable offers of bilateral cooperation, including in the energy sector, and also taking into consideration the commitments within the framework of CSTO, it can be assumed that the airport "Manas" will turn into a civilian object.

Nizhny Panj. By force of signing Kyrgyz-Russian agreement on September 20 this year to extend the term of a joint military base for 15 years, the United States increase their military cooperation with Tajikistan, as an alternative of Kyrgyz route. In particular, the inclusion of Nizhny Panj, which connects Tajikistan to the Afghan province of Kunduz, into the transport network of NATO, is being actively discussed. Under the current route containers will be transported by road from Afghanistan through Tajikistan (Nizhny Panj Vahdat, Dushanbe) and Kyrgyzstan (Osh and Bishkek) to the "Manas" Transit Center (TC) and then by air transport to the destinations.

"Mary", Air Force Base. After the NATO Bucharest Summit, Alliance received a unique opportunity to use Turkmen route for supplies to Afghanistan. Containers from Turkey were sent to IRA through Georgia and Azerbaijan. This route allowed delivering the required cargoes bypassing Russia, which in turn was extremely attractive to NATO. At the present stage, the transit through the "Mary" is also viewed by Alliance as one of the possible routes for completion of the military operation in Afghanistan.

Option 3. NATO's cargoes can also be taken out of IRA by **maritime transport** over the territory of Central Asia. This option includes two Caspian ports: Turkmenbashi and Aktau.

Turkmenbashi. The way through the Turkmen port is in fact one of the shortest routes of transit: across the Caspian Sea to the countries of Eastern Europe or Turkey via Baku, Poti and Constanta. However, a well-developed maritime infrastructure in Turkmenistan is necessary for the implementation of this route.

In this regard, an active process of modernization of the port began in July, current year. The project is financed by the World Bank. In addition, the Latvian companies are expected to participate in the construction of the Turkmenbashi port's

infrastructure, as evidenced by the intensification of contacts at the highest level between Turkmenistan and Latvia. However, the main challenge that will face Alliance, in case of Ashgabat's inclusion into the strategy of the troops' withdrawal, is the status of permanent neutrality of Turkmenistan, enshrined in the UN General Assembly resolution in 1995.

Aktau. Kazakhstan port, as per NATO, is a possible alternative to Turkmenbashi in the process of coalition forces' withdrawal from Afghanistan. Supposed route might look as follows: cargoes go through the Central Asian countries from IRA to Aktau, then to Azerbaijan and Georgia. According to the information-analytical agency EurasiaNet.org [5], "during the period of 2009-2011 15430 containers were sent through the port of Aktau to Afghanistan, i.e. most of the goods transported by the NDN," but the information is difficult to verify. Despite the fact that the official discourse of NATO at the present stage has no idea about the involvement of Aktau, we can assume that the Alliance will resume again this rhetoric as the date of the troops withdrawal from the IRA comes closer.

Considering the complex of issues that exist in the frameworks of Caspian problems, increasing competition between countries (including, China) over Caspian energy resources and their transportation routes, as well as the existing commitments of CSTO member-states, the question of the possible use of Aktau's logistics hub for the transit of military cargoes of Alliance, requires a serious scientific study.

At this stage there is no clear assurance that the implementation of the presented scenario will be carried out on all designated routes. It is therefore advisable to consider another version of the situation, taking into account a number of factors. Considering the advantages and disadvantages of the above mentioned two scenarios, it is possible to form such an option.

Scenario III. Diversification of transport routes in the process of the coalition forces' withdrawal from Afghanistan, suggesting the synthesis of the southern flow and NDN.

Obviously, desiring to consolidate in the region, the United States will make every effort to reduce the potential influence of Russia on the process of reverse transit.

In particular, achieved in July 2012 Pak-US agreements on the cargo supply have already reduced the value of the route, passing through the territory of the Russian Federation. In this regard, the most likely routes of reverse transit are the following:

- Afghanistan - Pakistan - Qatar - Turkey. The most optimal in terms and cost transit route that combines the automotive, marine and air transportation;

- IRA (Kabul and Mazar-i-Sharif) - Tajikistan (Nizhny Panj) - Kyrgyzstan ("Manas") further by avia transit to destinations;

- Afghanistan (mainly Mazar-i-Sharif) - Uzbekistan (Hayraton) and further by air transportation to destinations, in case if the Alliance is not able to negotiate with Russia on the transit of lethal cargo. If NATO and Russia sign an agreement on this issue, then the reverse route by IRA's railways will start to work - Uzbekistan - Kazakhstan - Russia - Latvia / Lithuania.

The results of the analysis of NATO's strategy for the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan

Implementation of the reverse transit on NDN by NATO is a kind of a guarantee for Alliance in case of blocking the Southern flow. Despite the fact that the withdrawal of troops on the northern network is quite expensive, it will allow the coalition to solve several problems:

- make use of the objects of infrastructure in the Central Asian states including after 2014, if necessary for a long-term military presence in IRA;
- realization of Washington's geopolitical project "New Silk Road".

Through bilateral negotiations with the Central Asian States on the reverse transit through NDN, NATO exploits some economic issues. Providing territory for the withdrawal of coalition troops, the Central Asian countries receive substantial benefits, as well as additional incentives for further development of the economy and infrastructure. Russia, as the main initiator of NDN, is trying to make geopolitical benefits from the existing situation. In this respect, the subsequent interaction with NATO in the area of transit may seem very attractive for states of the region.

Close cooperation with the Alliance in field of military cargo transit carries a number of risks. First, the possible transfer of military equipment to some Central Asian States during the process of military withdrawal has the potential to cause a militarization of the Central Asian Region. Second,

the bilateral format of interaction between Alliance and Central Asia may be aimed at reducing the influence of Russia in the region, which in turn will lead to tension between the participating countries of NDN, and also violates the organizational unity of CSTO.

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Recent Research on Central Asia in Russia

MURAT LAUMULIN

T Introduction

his is a survey of what has been written in Russia about Central Asia, of the subject range and scope of problems that our Russian colleagues have discussed in their works, and of what they think about the region's future. For obvious reasons, the Russian public as a whole, and political scientists and politicians as its part, cannot remain indifferent to what is going in Central Asia. Until quite recently, Russia and Central Asia were parts of a single state; today they remain tied together by geographic and geopolitical proximity. For these reasons, the region is still part of Russia's information expanse.

The Russian Federation, which has scored quite a few foreign policy successes, is still facing old and persisting problems and is coping with the new challenges that crop up in the contemporary world. The integration initiatives formulated by Russia are hailed by some of its post-Soviet partners and rejected (or even undermined) by others.

Russia, which is seeking a stronger position in Central Asia, has to take into account the fact that China, an equal (or in certain respects stronger) economic and political rival, is also presented in the region. In this context, the West, as seen from Moscow, looks like the geopolitical counterbalance needed to trim Beijing's great and soaring ambitions.

Afghanistan and China are two factors that Moscow cannot ignore when pursuing its other-

wise independent Central Asian policy. It should be said that Kazakhstan has been and remains Russia's closest ally and strategic partner. In the context of Russia's relations with Central Asia, the interests of the sides are not always identical; however there are no contradictions between them on the most important issues, including geopolitics and strategic security. The positions and opinions of our Russian colleagues are highly important as factors directly affecting the Kremlin's Central Asian policy.

Russian Authors about the Region in the Late Putin Period

During Vladimir Putin's second presidential term, relations between Moscow and the West went from bad to worse; the Russian leaders blamed the fairly impertinent policy of the United States and its allies in Central Asia and across the post-Soviet expanse, for that matter. The political scientific and partly Orientalist community responded with political scientific and geopolitical assessments of the West's strategies.

Andrey Kazantsev's *Bolshaia igra s neizvestnymi pravilami: mirovaia politika i Tsentralnaia Azia* (The Big Game with Unknown Rules: World Politics and Central Asia) is one of the pertinent examples.* The author, who works at the Center for Euro-Atlantic Security, MGIMO,

* See: A.A. Kazantsev, *Bolshaia igra s neizvestnymi pravilami: mirovaia politika i Tsentralnaia Azia*, Nasledie Evrazii, Moscow, 2008.

Foreign Ministry of Russia, has formulated many well-substantiated geopolitical arguments. He proceeds from identifying Central Asia's place on a global scale and tries to resolve the following dilemma: is Central Asia a "temporary and short-term casus" or is it an important constant of world politics.

The author asks another question: will this international region fall apart or will it be "torn apart" to be joined to other regions (the APR, the Middle East, South Asia, etc.)? This question is prompted by the region's diversity and the highly fluid nature of all the elements of its identity (geography, culture, economy, and security), as well as the steady supply of all sorts of reformatting projects supported by the West (the Greater Middle East, Greater Central Asia, etc.). The author surmises that the Central Asian states do not, in fact, follow the commonly accepted political standards, values, and principles, to say nothing of any sort of coercion mechanism, which means that their regional identity remains highly vague. This means that the regional situation can be described as indefinite, unstable, and unpredictable.

Andrey Kazantsev has enumerated the main Western political-geographic projects related to Central Asia:

- (1) Strengthening the National Statehoods of the Central Asian Countries;
- (2) The "Turkic World;"
- (3) The Region's Internal Integration;
- (4) The Silk Road and "Alternative Integration" Across the Post-Soviet Expanse;
- (5) The Greater Middle East Project;
- (6) The Greater Central Asia Project;
- (7) Spreading and Increasing Euro-Atlantic Influence in the East.

The author has concluded: the "kaleidoscopic" projects of Central Asian reorganization and their consecutive failures speak of the Western coalition's extreme inconsistency and the low efficiency of its efforts in the region.

Andrey Kazantsev writes that the external forces are locked in a struggle over the region's identity in an attempt to tie it to one of the Eurasian geopolitical components (the post-Soviet expanse, the Islamic world, Europe, or the APR), the energy transportation routes and related policies being an outcrop of this struggle.

In the absence of internal stabilizing resources, the Central Asian countries have found themselves in a total crisis; torn apart by external rivals they cannot develop their region. All the regional players are puzzled by the "responsibility"/"free hands" dilemma. The relations between the external players are far from perfect: those that invest in regional stability are inevitably worried that others who saved their money will outsmart them. In other words, all the cooperating players, especially from different regional-civilizational "coalitions," combine cooperation with competition when trying to monopolize the most promising investment spheres.

The author has pointed out that the system of regional interaction taking shape in Central Asia is fairly complicated because the external players use different types of resources that are unevenly distributed among them: Russia and the United States, for example, have gradually become geopolitical rivals because they both relied mainly on military-political instruments.

The author has arrived at the following key conclusions:

- (1) The geopolitical vagueness, which is gradually growing as we move across the post-Soviet expanse from west to east, is rooted in the past.
- (2) The neo-patrimonial political system that has taken shape in some of the Central Asian countries may embezzle and waste considerable means supplied by external sponsors for development projects.
- (3) Some of the Central Asian countries, while easily agreeing to host integration projects, shun real responsibility; this means that their involvement in international structures or their withdrawal from them says nothing about the policy of the external players.

This book can be described as a collection of recommendations addressed to the Russian political establishment on how to proceed in the region. It should be said that Andrey Kazantsev is unduly critical of Russia's role in post-Soviet Central Asian history and obviously downplays Moscow's role. He is either ignorant of the variety of instruments and methods that post-Soviet Russia had and has at its disposal to retain its considerable influence in the post-Soviet expanse or deliberately passes over this information in silence.

The collective monograph Gody, kotorye izmenili Tsentralnuiu Aziiu (The Years That Changed

Central Asia) published in 2009 and edited by Director of the Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS), Vitaly Naumkin* is another important work of the late-Putin period. It continues the monograph (*The Fifteen Years That Changed Central Asia*) published four years earlier.** Both deal with similar problems and both are similarly structured.

The authors identified five groups of major problems. The first group consists of the problems created by the current transformations in Central Asia. The authors asked and answered several questions, such as: "Have the transformations ended or are they still going on? If they have ended, what state models have appeared?" to conclude that the political transformations in the Central Asian countries are geared toward consolidating national states.

The second group deals with the ideology and instruments individual experts or even research schools use to study the region. As could be expected, this chapter brims with criticism of Western ideologists; the authors point out that Western approaches are, at best, abstract and, at worst, ill-intentioned. The West strives to detach Central Asia from Russia which, in turn, regards the region as an extension of sorts of its own territory rather than a geopolitical abstraction.

This chapter contains recommendations related to the role of the external players: Russia should concentrate on fighting poverty; encourage the Russian language; learn to take local specifics and political culture into account; never resort to double standards; prevent NGOs and all sorts of funds from developing into a source of money for the local opposition; warn the ruling regimes against policies in which the elites will not be able to compete; and avoid formal assessments that have nothing in common with regional reality.

The authors pointed out that the transformations have placed the local countries in different groups: Kazakhstan is moving toward the status of a regional power, while Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have found themselves in an abyss of poverty.

At the same time, the authors conclude that despite the blunders and errors, none of the local

states has joined the ranks of "failed states" (even if the developments in Kyrgyzstan refute this conclusion as being too hasty). As distinct from the post-Soviet Caucasian states, the Central Asian republics demonstrated more stability. Some of the problems proved to be stubborn: so far it is unclear whether these states remain secular or are becoming Muslim. The worsening social and economic conditions and Western pressure are playing into the hands of the local Islamists.

The Central Asian regimes have one common problem inherited from the past: political and economic power remain closely intertwined. The authors admit that the West coped with the self-imposed task of uprooting all elements of socialism and the vestiges of the Soviet system, but the results proved ambiguous. While the West wanted to prevent restoration of the Soviet system and socialism (and the "Soviet empire") in any form (something which big corporations and the local regimes also wanted), the results proved to be precisely what the architects of the transformations were carefully avoiding.

Europe and Central Asia are close partners; to be more exact, Europe is the closest Western partner of Central Asia. The Central Asian states are OSCE members, but this is not the only reason why the two regions, separated by long distances, do not regard each other as the periphery. The fourth chapter looks at the problem of radical Islam. It is not a novelty: the local regimes inherited it from the last years of Soviet power and have already arrived at one of three ways of dealing with Islamists:

- (1) Total suppression of all Islamists (Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan);
- (2) Suppression of radical groups and a cautious dialog with the rest (Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan);
- (3) Cooperation with Islamists who are represented in all the power structures (Tajikistan).

Chapter Five sorts out the external factors of the political transformations and Central Asian security; Russia, China, the U.S., and the European Union are presented as the key players; Turkey, Iran, India, Pakistan, and Japan are not discussed. The authors do not beat about the bush: Russia is the main player in the region; its relations with

* See: Gody, *kotorye izmenili Tsentralnuiu Aziiu*, TsSPI-IV RAS, Moscow, 2009.

** See: *Piatnadsat let, kotorye izmenili Tsentralnuiu Aziiu* (1991-2006), TsSPI, Moscow, 2006.

Central Asia cannot be described as interstate because the historical, cultural, social-economic, civilizational, and geographic ties between the former metropolitan country and the region are still strong; the human (humanitarian) factor is still of colossal importance.

Russia is pursuing three main goals in the region:

- (1) Regional stability;
- (2) Reliance on the region's geopolitical potential to upgrade its international status;
- (3) International recognition of Russia's role in the region.

The sides prefer to downplay the factor of Russian-American rivalry, however it is too obvious to be safely ignored. America wants to squeeze Russia out of the region (and from the post-Soviet expanse, for that matter). This creates a paradox: Russia is guided by pragmatic considerations, while Washington is driven by ideological motives (at least during George W. Bush's presidency).

Russia's advantages in the region are the result of its regional policy, which the local regimes find understandable and predictable; unlike the U.S. and the EU, Moscow never moralizes, never applies double standards, and never flirts with anti-government forces. Russia looks at the Islamist alternative as an unacceptable strategic prospect, therefore, it harshly responds to its manifestations backed by certain forces in Pakistan and Arab countries.

The authors write that China is proceeding cautiously in its relations with the regional states. Beijing has borrowed the "soft power" concept from Washington and profits from it. America, in turn, tries to undermine Chinese policy by insisting on the "Chinese threat" theory, which is fairly popular in Russia and Central Asian countries. The authors predict that China is unlikely to remain an outside observer if radical changes in the region infringe on its interests.

The role and possibilities of the European Union in Central Asia are assessed much higher than America's; relations between the EU and the local states are not burdened by old ambitions. While the United States indulges in the export of democracy, Europe looks at the region as a cultural entity that should develop independently.

On the whole, the EU policy in Central Asia is described as "cautious restraint." According to European experts, write the authors, the EU's greater role in the region would have promoted stability and democratic values and would have counterbalanced excessive American, Russian, and Chinese involvement.

On the whole, the authors describe Western policies in Central Asia as "democratic messianism," which presupposes that there should be no alternatives and envisages only those variants from which the West and the loyal local elites would prosper. This has already been tested in Latin America, which plunged the masses into poverty and allowed the elites to indulge in shameless enrichment. This suggests the following: first, political liberalization should not outstrip economic; second, property has not been transformed: the state has replaced civil society, which split along the "rights-privileges" line; third, democracy in the region has degenerated into a set of democratic institutions.

The main conclusion: the historical example of post-Soviet Central Asia has refuted the generally accepted politological models of transit, which presupposes movement from authoritarianism to consolidated democracy of liberal type. Instead, political regimes of a new type have emerged; in the future, each of the local states will have to "stumble across" its own model of transformations. In her *Stanovlenie gosudarstv Tsentralnoy Azii: politicheskie protsessy** (Emergence of the Central Asian States: Political Processes), Prof. Irina Zviagelskaia (Institute of Oriental Studies, RAS) has concentrated, as the title of her monograph suggests, on the political history of the Central Asian countries. As a lecturer at Moscow State University with many years of teaching experience behind her, she naturally intended her book as a textbook for the steadily growing number of young people interested in the region.

Her book is not a political scientific or analytical effort in the true sense of the word. The first three chapters plunge the reader into the history of Russian conquests; colonization of Turkestan and the development of Central Asia and Kazakhstan as Soviet republics. Prof. Zviagelskaia reveals the

* See: I. Zviagelskaia, *Stanovlenie gosudarstv Tsentralnoy Azii: politicheskie protsessy*, Aspekt Press, Moscow, 2009.

historical paradigm of Central Asia's movement toward Russia; she concentrates on the problems of nation-building, political culture, the Islamic factor, ethnic and trade migrations, external impacts, potential and real threats, and conflicts during the post-Soviet period.

Put in a nutshell, her conclusions are the following: the region's future development trends are unclear and, most likely, different for different countries; Russia does not want to, and cannot, isolate the region from the rest of the world, although its cultural and historical ties with the local peoples should be preserved: "We cannot allow the natural and absolutely indispensable ties to become disrupted when the Soviet generation leaves the stage." This is very true.

China and its steadily mounting influence in Central Asia are too obvious to be neglected. It is not neglected by our Russian colleagues. I have in mind the monograph of S. Zhukov and O. Reznikova (Institute of World Economy and International Relations, RAS) called *Tsentralnaia Azia i Kitay: ekonomicheskoe vzaimodeystvie v usloviakh globalizatsii* * (Central Asia and China: Economic Cooperation in the Globalization Era).

The authors are convinced that the global context is the only relevant analytical framework within which the content of relations between China and Central Asia and their trends can be adequately assessed. China, which is moving fast toward a world Great Power status, is one of the most active participants in the current changes in the Central Asian economic expanse. The People's Republic of China relies on its market and non-market competitive advantages and the global and regional mechanisms of cooperation mainly within the WTO and, more and more actively, the SCO to become involved, to a great and increasing extent, in readjusting the vector of economic transformations in Central Asia to promote its national priorities.

The Central Asian economies, very much like the Eurasian economies, are facing a fundamental challenge: none can compete with China in the non-raw material branches, which negatively affects the economic future and economic structures

of China's regional and continental neighbors. The authors conclude that the Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous Region is rapidly moving to the center of economic activities in Greater Central Asia. Today, the consistently developing macro-region includes Xinjiang, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, neighboring regions of the Russian Federation and, to some extent, Tajikistan. It seems that in the future they might be joined by Turkmenistan and, to a certain extent, Uzbekistan. The XUAR is gaining weight through direct (mutually complementary economic structures in Central Asia) and indirect (Central Asia reaches China through the XUAR) factors.

The XUAR's great and growing importance as an economic hub of Greater Central Asia is represented by trade, investments, and construction of trans-border road and transportation infrastructure, all of this made possible because the region serves as a bridge between Central Asia and China's developed center and south and the preferential treatment the region receives from Beijing, which does not grudge economic resources to transform the XUAR.

The Russian authors have pointed out that economic cooperation with Central Asia is a byproduct designed, together with other measures, to whip up the development of the country's western regions and that China is mainly interested in Kazakhstan because of its fuel transit potential. The authors are convinced that Kazakhstan deliberately invited China to discuss the regional gas projects to force Russia to reconsider some of its gas-related conditions.

The book offers the following conclusions.

- First, in the next ten years, economic cooperation between China and Central Asia will advance at a fast pace, which fully corresponds to the global trend: China is becoming a powerful economic hub of the world.

- Second, as the flow of goods, services, investments, and technologies along the China-Central Asia line increases, cooperation and the profits from it will become more and more asymmetric because of the very different sizes of their economies.

- Third, for objective reasons, China's economic interests in Central Asia are concentrated in Kazakhstan, the region's leader.

* See: S.V. Zhukov, O.B. Reznikova, *Tsentralnaia Azia i Kitay: ekonomicheskoe vzaimodeystvie v usloviakh globalizatsii*, IMEMO RAS, Moscow, 2009.

- Fourth, China, very much like all the other global economic power centers, is mostly interested in the region's natural riches, particularly in the oil of Kazakhstan and natural gas of Turkmenistan.

- Fifth, China agreed to set up the SCO as a political instrument of its economic interests in Central Asia among other things; furthermore, the mechanisms of multisided democracy and rhetoric allow Beijing to apply "soft power" in the region.

- Sixth, China's domestic demand for raw materials is steadily growing, which will transform Central Asia into a raw material appendage not only of the European, but also of the Chinese economy.

The authors conclude by saying that adaptation to China's economic might is the main challenge for the region and that the mounting economic cooperation between China and Central Asia directly affects Russia's interests. They recommend that Russia's political leadership take into account the experience of economic cooperation between China and Central Asia when formulating Russia's long-term national development goals.

Central Asia and Russia

The monograph *Rossia v Tsentralnoy Azii* (Russia in Central Asia) is an excellent example of cooperation between Russian and Kazakhstan political scientists. Written by Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences Gennady Chufrin, who is well-known in the academic community, it was published by the Kazakhstan Institute of Strategic Studies (KISI).^{*} The author, who for many years headed the Central Asian study programs at IMEMO, was involved in interaction within the SCO, and supervised cooperation between IMEMO and its Central Asian partners, has edited two collective monographs. In 2008, a monograph appeared dealing with Russia's policies in the region *Novye tendentsii vo vneshney politike Rossii v Tsentralnoy Azii i na Kavkaze* (New Trends in Russia's Policies in Central Asia

and the Caucasus)^{**} to be followed by other collective effort entitled *Sostoianie i perspektivy vzaimodeystviia Rossii so stranami Tsentralnoy Azii i Zakavkazia*^{***} (The State and Prospects of Russia's Interaction with the Countries of Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus.)

The latest monograph by Gennady Chufrin, which develops the subjects discussed in the previous one, consists of three parts. The first provides a detailed analysis of the non-traditional security threats and struggle against them, as well as the disagreements and contradictions among the local countries regarded as one of the potential threats. America's regional policy is discussed in detail in one of the chapters in the context of Washington's foreign policy strategy and its specific military-political goals in the region viewed as a new frontier.

Another chapter looks at the CSTO and Russian-U.S. relations in the sphere of regional security. The last chapter of the monograph's first part deals with the impact of the Afghan or, to be more exact, AfPak factor on regional security. It should be said that the author agrees with the critics of American policy in the region and their results. The second part deals with the region's economies; trade and economic cooperation and other aspects of interaction between the Russian Federation and the Central Asian republics (migration, financial cooperation, transport and communications, and joint use of hydropower resources).

One of the chapters in the second part deals with relations between Russia and Kazakhstan. His detailed discussion brought the author to the conclusion that Russian-Kazakhstan cooperation is the backbone of regional integration and economic ties in the eastern part of the CIS.

The third part looks at the history, development, and current state of the SCO; the author concentrated on the evolution of its organizational structure, forms and methods of responding to security threats, economic cooperation within it, and the prospects for its further expansion. Gennady Chufrin believes that the organization

^{*} See: G.I. Chufrin, *Rossia v Tsentralnoy Azii*, KISI, Almaty, 2010.

^{**} See: *Novye tendentsii vo vneshney politike Rossii v Tsentralnoy Azii i na Kavkaze*, ed. by G.I. Chufrin, IMEMO, Moscow, 2008.

^{***} See: *Sostoianie i perspektivy vzaimodeystviia Rossii so stranami Tsentralnoy Azii i Zakavkazia*, ed. by G.I. Chufrin, IMEMO, Moscow, 2009.

hardly needs wider membership and, therefore, new members, and the status of SCO partner could attract not only Afghanistan, but also the U.S. and Japan. The author's conclusions suggest that recently cooperation between the Russian Federation and the Central Asian countries abounded in serious economic and political contradictions which called for difficult and painstaking negotiations.

The author sees four main reasons for what is going on in the region. Among them, he notes the objective difficulties in political and socioeconomic development, as well as the negative impact of international events of a regional and global nature. He also points to the inconsistent assessments by the Central Asian leaders of the scale and aims of their countries' cooperation with Russia, which they regard as hardly useful and effective.

The competitive potential of third countries rapidly coming to the fore in Central Asia, where relations with the West and the East are enthusiastically promoted, can be described as another factor responsible for the problems in cooperation between Russia and the local states. The author concludes by saying that Russia should pursue a maximally pragmatic policy in the region.

Political relations are geared toward regional and Russia's security ensured by the CSTO and the SCO, Moscow's two main instruments in this sphere. In the sphere of economic relations, Russia should maintain a maximally favorable climate, otherwise it will lose the last shreds of its influence in the region. The author is convinced that Russia can and should pose not only as a good economic partner, but also as an efficient guarantor of the local states' economic independence.

The bold and far-sighted conclusions of the Russian academic refute the clichés, myths, and sentiments prevalent in the West and among certain groups of Central Asian elites convinced that Russia is seeking control over the region to restore its colonial imperial rule.

It should be said that Central Asian studies are not the prerogative of the Moscow academic community. Konstantin Meshcheriakov's *Vneshniaia politika Rossii v Tsentralnoy Azii v 1991-2009 gody: osobennosti i problemy** (Foreign Policy of Russia in Central Asia in 1991-2009: Specifics and Problems) appeared in St. Petersburg. (A. Bissenbaev's *Ne vmeste. Rossia i strany Tsentralnoy Azii*** [Not Together. Russia and the Central Asian Countries] was also published in St. Petersburg; written in an essayist style it does not belong to the body of Russian historiographic works discussed here.)

Saratov is another Russian city where an interest in Central Asian studies is fairly great. A collective monograph appeared in 2011 dealing with the region's water and energy resources titled *Vodno-energeticheskie resursy Tsentralnoy Azii: osnovnye problemy i perspektivy**** (Central Asian Water and Energy Resources: Problems and Prospects.)

Moscow academics dominate the field: A. Bogaturov, A. Dundich, and E. Troitskiy made a highly interesting contribution to Central Asian studies with their *Tsentralnaia Azia: "otlozhenny neytralitet" i mezhdunarodnye otnoshenia v 2000-kh godakh. Ocherki tekushchey politiki* (Central Asia: "Postponed Neutrality" and International Relations in the 2000s. Essays of Current Policies); the same can be said about Dina Malysheva's *Tsentralnoaziatskiy uzel mirovoy politiki* (Central Asian Knot of World Politics).**** The authors point out that Russia's interests are closely connected with Central Asia's geopolitical role.

A collective monograph *Rossia-Kazakhstan-Evrosoiuz: realii i perspektivy vzaimodeystviia na Evro-Aziatskom prostranstve* (Russia-Kazakhstan-European Union: Realities and Prospects of Cooperation in Eurasia) published by the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation is a good example of international cooperation among the academic communities. *****

* See: K. Meshcheriakov, *Vneshniaia politika Rossii v Tsentralnoy Azii v 1991-2009 gody: osobennosti i problemy*, St. Petersburg, 2010.

** See: A. Bissenbaev, *Ne vmeste. Rossia i strany Tsentralnoy Azii*, Piter Publishers, St. Petersburg, 2011.

*** See: *Vodno-energeticheskie resursy Tsentralnoy Azii: osnovnye problemy i perspektivy*, SGU, Saratov, 2010.

**** See: A. Bogaturov, A. Dundich, E. Troitskiy, *Tsentralnaia Azia: "otlozhenny neytralitet" i mezhdunarodnye otnoshenia v 2000-kh godakh. Ocherki tekushchey politiki*. Issue 4, NOFMO, Moscow, 2010; D. Malysheva, *Tsentralnoaziatskiy uzel mirovoy politiki*, IMEMO RAS, Moscow, 2010.

***** See: *Rossia-Kazakhstan-Evrosoiuz: realii i perspektivy vzaimodeystviia na Evro-Aziatskom prostranstve*, FRL, Moscow, 2011.

Relations between Russia and Central Asia figure prominently in the works of A. Klimenko, D. Popov, and N. Serebriakova dealing with the SCO as a regional security factor.*

The Era of Dmitry Medvedev: "Resetting" and Its Political Scientific Echoes

Dmitry Medvedev's advent to power (even if formal) favorably affected the relations between Russia and the West; their resetting was very much in line with what Barack Obama also wanted. Do the foreign policy changes affect in any noticeable way the stereotypes and set ideas of the Russian academics?

In 2011, a collective monograph *Politicheskii protsess v Tsentralnoy Azii* (Political Process in Central Asia), the third in a series dealing with Central Asian topics, was published as part of the joint project of the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation (Germany) and the Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences. The international collective of authors analyzed the political processes unfolding in the region, the social and economic specifics of the regional states, and the fundamental changes that affected all spheres of life.

The authors of the introductory article (Arne C. Seifert and Irina Zviagelskaia) pointed to the sustainable authoritarian rule in the Central Asian states and a very specific type of clan-bureaucratic capitalism serving a small population group. The region demonstrates a very complicated intertwining of tradition and modernity, as well as the strong and mounting impact of religion on social life.

The authors believe that the current political developments reproduce not a Western model (or a set of its elements) based on the separation of personal and public relations, but a model in which power, authority, and influence largely depend on the individual's social status. This explains why political struggle is concentrated on problems of influence rather than on alternative political courses.

The authors have detected a certain similarity between Central Asian reality and the social

revolutions in the Middle East and North Africa; they point out that there is a fairly widely accepted opinion that the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt spearheaded at the authoritarian regimes serve as a model for at least some of the Central Asian countries with similar headaches: the growing number of educated youth with no adequate employment at home; painful urbanization accompanied by no less painful social repercussions of the developing market (frequently not market) economy; widespread corruption; poverty, etc.

The Central Asian problems differ from those of the Middle East: tension is fuelled by basic social and economic problems, although outbursts are ignited by the elites locked in rivalry over power and resources. This leads to mobilization on the regional or local basis (Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan).

Sergey Abashin's chapter in the reviewed monograph "*Tsentralnaia Azia: kak my ee vidim*" (Central Asia: How We See It) is of a conceptual nature. The author asks: do these countries constitute a single whole and what are their common descriptions? It should be said in all justice that much of what the author says here was said earlier in his *Natsionalizm v Tsentralnoy Azii* (Nationalism in Central Asia), which appeared in 2007.**

The author pointed out that the two versions of the region's possible configuration presented as alternative interpretations of the region's past, culture, and political interests—Central Eurasia and Greater Central Asia—were put on the table with the clear purpose of getting rid of the vestiges of the region's Soviet past. Meanwhile, the Soviet heritage is gradually disappearing; new geopolitical structures that represent certain old and much more solid relations based on culture, language, and religion have moved to the fore. This means, argue those who favor new names, that Central Asia, together with other countries, should become part of a region that from that time on should be regarded as a historical geopolitical entity. The expert community has gradually grown

* See: A.F. Klimenko, *Strategiia razvitiia Shanhaiskoy organizatsii sotrudnichestva: problemy oborony i bezopasnosti*, IDV RAS, Moscow, 2010; *Shanhaiskaia organizatsia sotrudnichestva: k novym rubezham razvitiia*, Compiled by A.F. Klimenko, IDV RAS, Moscow, 2008; D.S. Popov, "O probleme rasshireniia Shanhaiskoy organizatsii sotrudnichestva. Analiticheskii obzor," *RISI*, No. 4 (27), 2010; N.V. Serebriakova, *Shanhaiskaia organizatsia sotrudnichestva: mnogostoronniy kompromiss v Tsentralnoy Azii*, InfoRos, Moscow, 2011.

** See: S.N. Abashin, *Natsionalizm v Tsentralnoy Azii: v poiskakh identichnosti*, Aleteyya, St. Petersburg, 2007. ** See: A. Bissenbaev, *Ne vmeste. Rossiia i strany Tsentralnoy Azii*, Piter Publishers, St. Petersburg, 2011

attached to the idea, which is demonstrated by the names for all sorts of events, communities, and departments.

Dr. Abashin argues that the new idea about the region and its new names (in fact the difference between Central Asia and Greater Central Asia is purely stylistic) constitutes a problem because of the vague borders of this new cultural-geographic construct. Indeed, there is a more or less definite consensus that it should include five Central Asian states and Afghanistan, the rest depends on the whims of each specific author. The lists of candidates include Mongolia, Xinjiang, Eastern Iran, Northwestern Pakistan, Western Siberia, the Southern Urals, Volga Area, the Southern Caucasus, and the Crimea.

The author then turns to the “meaningful features” (social and economic characteristics and statistics) of each of the Central Asian republics to conclude that the local societies are stuck between “urbanized/rural” and “industrial/agrarian” categories with a prominent and prevailing rural/agrarian element. It should be said that in Central Asia, the lifestyle in many towns is more rural than urbanized.

This brings Sergey Abashin to certain conclusions related to the modernization/demodernization problem; he refers to the supporters of the classical modernization concept who believe that social and economic development inevitably leads to secularization. It is absolutely clear, however, that the processes underway in the Central Asian societies are not that simple: a large share of people have completely lost their interest in religion; the majority of those who regard themselves as Muslims have in mind certain cultural values rather than faith per se.

Those who regard themselves as faithful follow the minimal set of religious injunctions maximally adjusted to the demands of the mobile information society of our days. There are people who claim to be active believers (their ranks swelled after the Soviet Union’s downfall) and call on the rest to strictly follow the numerous religious rules. It should be said that this is not a backward move-

ment toward archaic spiritual practices, but a newly comprehended religiosity that stresses personal faith and personal responsibility.

Each of the categories, irrespective of their share in each of the Central Asian countries, represents a specific version of “inclusion” in the contemporary world. The local society is not a keeper of ancient traditions, but a dynamically changing community that has acquired new layers and creates new, hybrid forms of cultural identity. The author concludes with a discussion of the “world-system,” which pigeonholes the countries into “central” and “periphery”, and adds the “semi-periphery” category to them to describe a certain transition state. This classification relies on the fact that there are more diverse forms of predominance: redistribution of financial means, flows of people, commodities, technologies, cultural values, fashions, etc. On this scale, the Central Asian countries occupy a subordinate and dependent position compared to Russia (which is a semi-periphery state itself), China, the U.S., and Europe. At best, Central Asia has supplied the developed countries with raw materials and workforce in exchange for greater dependence on loans, investments, and political benevolence. In other words, the outmoded term “third world,” abandoned when the Soviet bloc collapsed, can be used to describe the “periphery” and the lower status.

Dr. Abashin points out that there is no single (nor can there be) opinion about the region. Diverse descriptions reveal a multitude of views and opinions about the region. The ideas about Central Asia greatly depend on the point from which an expert observes the region, the interests, real or imaginary, which are defended, and the mechanisms and methodologies applied.

The Institute of Oriental Studies, RAS, pays particular attention to Central Asia’s domestic policy.* In 2011, the Center for Strategic Assessments and Forecasting in Russia issued a report in which it pointed to possible connections between the events in the Middle East and Central Asia.**

The authors had to admit that Russia, one of the key regional players, has failed to restore

* See: *Razvitie politicheskoy situatsii v gosudarstvakh Tsentralnoy Azii v kontekste transformatsii*, IV RAS, Moscow, 2010; *Politicheskii protsess v Tsentralnoy Azii: rezul'taty, problemy, perspektivy*, IV RAS/TsSPI, Moscow, 2011.

** See: *Tsentralnaia Azia v geopoliticheskikh protsessakh, ee nastoiashchee i budushchee*, TsSOP, Moscow, 2011.

its former influence in Central Asia. In one of the chapters of *Vneshnepoliticheskiy protsess v stranakh Vostoka*, Irina Zviagelskaia (Institute of Oriental Studies, RAS) looks at the foreign policy process in the Central Asian states as part of the region's general rebirth and development that has been unfolding in recent decades and the role of external players in the region.* The author points to the closed nature of foreign policy decision-making as one of the specific features of the region's political regimes. She also mentions other similar features of the region's political culture, which combined modern and traditional elements: social hierarchy, solidarity groups, etc., and the multiple impact of what is going on outside the region on what is going on inside it and the foreign policy of its states.

The author deems it necessary to stress the following important fact: what the West, very much aware of the importance of energy sources, is doing in the Arab East (removal of elderly leaders, external reorientation, structural economic changes, etc.) should be expected after a while in Central Asia; the region and its neighbors should be prepared. Indeed, some of the Central Asian leaders have been at the helm as long as displaced Mubarak, Ben Ali, Saleh and Kaddafi, their regimes (authoritarianism that pretends to be democracy) being very similar to those in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan.

In other words, the Central Asian leaders and their regimes have grown old and become wornout during the 20-odd post-Soviet years: back in 1991, they bred limited enthusiasm; in stormy 2011, they could rely on fear of repression, fear of change, apathy, and post-Soviet conformism. Irina Zviagelskaia concludes by saying that a peaceful and organized transfer from these regimes to democracy is too complicated to be smooth; what is more, there has been no successful precedence anywhere in the world.

Aziatskie energeticheskie stsennarii (Asian Energy Scenarios), which is part of a series

published by the Institute of World Economy and International Relations,** looks at the energy problems and the region's role in the world export of energy resources. The authors have pointed out that Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan used their vast oil, gas, and uranium deposits to find a niche in the international division of labor as energy exporters. Many of them, however, failed to modernize their energy and transportation sector, which demands excessive energy-intensity of production and consumption. Very soon this will diminish their export advantages.

Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v Tsentralnoy Azii (International Relations in Central Asia), another fundamental work of Russian academics edited by A. Bogaturov, deserves special mention.*** This is the first attempt in Russia to present an integrated version of the history of the subsystem of international relations in Central Asia in the post-Soviet period. The authors supply an overview of the pre-history of international relations in the region and their evolution in the last two decades. The period between 1991 and 2008 received special attention because this was when international relations in Central Asia acquired new logic, new stimuli, and a new trajectory.

Rossia v Sredney Azii. Zavoevanie i preobrazovanie (Russia in Central Asia. Conquests and Changes) by Evgeny Glushchenko,**** which appeared earlier and dealt with more or less similar subjects, should also be mentioned here.

The monograph edited by A. Bogaturov pays much attention to the social, political, and economic processes underway in the post-Soviet Central Asian countries. The authors concentrate on the interaction between the regional states and the external world, which underwent great changes when the Soviet Union disappeared and new Russia emerged on the international political scene. The book analyzes in detail the relations with the world and regional actors (Russia, the United States, China, Turkey, the EU), as well as

* See: *Vneshnepoliticheskiy protsess v stranakh Vostoka*, ed. by Prof. D.V. Streltsov, Aspekt Press, Moscow, 2011.

** See: *Aziatskie energeticheskie stsennarii*, ed. by S.V. Zhukov, Magistr, Moscow, 2012.

*** See: *Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v Tsentralnoy Azii: sobytia i dokumenty*, Teaching aid, ed. by A.D. Bogaturov, Moscow, 2011.

**** See: E.A. Glushchenko, *Rossia v Sredney Azii. Zavoevanie i preobrazovanie*, Tsentrpoligraf, Moscow, 2010.

with Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran. The authors have said enough about the role these countries are playing in the very complicated and consequential geopolitical games and the prospects for their involvement in international regional cooperation in the 21st century.

The American formula Greater Central Asia (analogous to the Greater Middle East) received the full scope of attention. It presupposed that Greater Central Asia will cover not only Afghanistan, but also Pakistan, Bangladesh, and probably India. It should be said that these formulas are quite useful for analytical purposes.

This particular formula draws attention to a specific vector of American strategic interests; the authors absolutely correctly point out that the regional countries' foreign policy and the activities of their common organizations and consultative structures are very important for overcoming or neutralizing extra-regional threats and for more or less successfully addressing many of their domestic and interstate tasks.

The authors conclude that today those Central Asian republics that are still clinging to their "multivectoral" policies (President of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov is especially fond of this) have acquired another argument in favor of closer relations with Russia. The authors point out that in recent years the number of reasons to pursue full-scale and varied cooperation with Russia has been increasing. The stumbling blocks on this road (discussed in detail above) proved to be higher than many of the supporters of reintegration believed, one of them being the diminished international role and weight of Yeltsin's Russia and the imperfect decision-making mechanisms.

In Central Asia, "anti-imperialist" sentiments and the desire to find new foreign partners played an equally negative role. Kazakhstan's and Kyrgyzstan's new ties with China, Uzbekistan's with Turkey and the United States, Turkmenistan's with Turkey and Iran, and Tajikistan's with Afghanistan and Iran proved to be fairly strong. In these conditions, relations with Russia survived, but no longer as a priority; in some countries (Uzbekistan), they were pushed to the backburner. The circumstances gradually changed; under Putin, Russia regained its strength and influence,

including, among other areas, in the center of Asia.

The authors stress that Central Asia is very important for Russia in the context of economic and military security; the sub-system of international relations taking shape in this geopolitically highly important region will determine, in many respects, the image of the developing multipolar world.

Conclusion

The numerous and varied Russian studies of Central Asia suggest the following conclusions about Russia's security interests and concerns in the region:

- (1) military-strategic stability and recognition of Moscow's "special rights" to the region as a zone of Russia's national interests;
- (2) military-political and military-technical cooperation on a bilateral basis;
- (3) unwelcome influence or interference of third countries in the region;
- (4) regional stability (relations among the Central Asian states);
- (5) stability in each of the Central Asian republics;
- (6) dependence of regional stability on the Afghan developments.

The authors practically never admit (but not infrequently imply) that Russia does not have enough money, information resources, etc. to compete with the West's active policies; Russia does not have what is called soft power (its model is not culturally or otherwise attractive). This does not prevent Russian strategists and economists from developing far-reaching integration projects.

Kazakhstan is Russia's key strategic partner in the region, but Moscow does not always take its interests into account. This is confirmed by the methods by which the Customs Union was established, the events in Kyrgyzstan, Russia's relations with Uzbekistan, problems with jointly invested projects in other Central Asian republics, etc.

Today, China's consistently growing influence in Central Asia presents the main challenge for

Russia, which has long been concerned about the West's influence.

The scope of studies of Russia's interests and policies in Central Asia is not exhausted by the publications reviewed above; the same can be said about the region's other problems. A. Bogaturov, Iu. Morozov, A. Malashenko, M. Braterskiy, A. Grozin, D. Malysheva, A. Tsyganok, N. Fedulova, and many other authors write consistently and extensively on subjects related to Central Asia.

This far from exhaustive overview demonstrates that the Russian academic and political scientific communities have not lost an interest in Central Asia: in fact, today it is even greater than ever. This breeds hope that relations between the states and peoples, who are not alien to each other, will continue to develop. This is the main idea of most Russian authors.

Regional Conflict: Scenario for Central Asia

RUSTAM BURNASHEV
IRINA CHERNYKH

T Scenario planning and its tasks

This article has methodological nature and represents the statement of scenario planning methodology that was used by the authors within their work in a number of analytical and research institutions in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.* At the present moment there are quite a number of definitions for what is meant by *the scenario* in the forecasting of political and social processes.** One of the most relevant is the definition according to which the scenarios are the “hypothetical sequences of events, constructed for the purpose of focusing attention on causal processes and decision making points. They respond to two types of questions: (1) How exactly, step by step, could the expected situation arise? and (2) What are the alternatives for each actor at each stage in order to prevent, facilitate, or assist the process?” [1].

The methodological premise of political and social processes’ *scenario planning* is an acceptance of *the openness and alternativeness of the future as principal uncertainty of the future* and its dependence on the actions in the present. Accordingly, the point of scenario planning is the formation of mechanisms for “managing the uncertainty of the future” [2] on the basis of exposure of *predetermined elements* within the researched situation, and *key uncertainties*, and the formulation of alternative scenarios for the future, in all of which all the predetermined elements are necessarily presented and

key uncertainties take various states. Assessment of key uncertainties is based on two criteria: how the outcome is uncertain and how important it is. The most important and most uncertain trends become the basis of the developed scenarios.

Besides, the scenario planning is aimed to detect the factors established in the current processes and situations that may arise as mechanisms of impact on the future states. Thus, scenario planning is considered to be effective in the medium and high degree of uncertainty about the future, and [3]:

- identifies possible, the most likely options for the future;
- captures the risks in order to manage them;
- aims at the elaboration and adoption of decisions.

Taken together, the tasks of scenario planning can be brought to two:

- forecast and search: a description of the system and dominating trends of its transformation, identifying possible areas of changes in the situation and its detailed description;
- regulatory: identifying the ways of achievement the desired future states of the system through the identification of “break points of tendencies”, when the local action can influence the course of events, the planning and development of actions aimed at achieving the desired situation. Unlike the searching one, where the only initial situation is given along with the normative forecasting, there are two reference points: the initial and target situations.

* The article deals with the case of Central Asia. Given example, despite the fact that it is based on the consideration of the quite real, according to the authors, problem, is not the full version of scenario planning and is primarily illustrative. Blocks of text, brought by the authors as examples, are highlighted by filling.

** For example, a set of definitions and options for their typology. – See: Ahremenko A. Political analysis and forecasting. – M.: Gardariki 2006. – Pp. 280-284.

Defining the problem and research objectives

Scenario planning, as well as any study, begins with the formulation of the problem. Its original form can be extremely concise.

The formulation of the problem. Option A. Is it possible to change the regional security policy in Central Asia and Kazakhstan in the medium term?*

However, in order to solve the tasks of scenario planning the initial problem should be formalized; all the key definitions related to the research must be clearly identified. Typically, the most effective here is the choice of the theoretical context in which the analysis will be conducted.

Determination of the theoretical context. From our point of view, the most effective for the analysis of issues on regional security is *the security complex theory*** . However, this theory does not fully explain the security policy of developing (transit) countries (such as including Central Asian countries), and must be supplemented by the concept of *the weak states**** and idea of *the insecurity dilemma*****.

A regional security complex is defined as “a set of units (states) of international relations, whose major processes of securitization and desecuritiza-

tion are so interconnected that their security problems can not be reasonably analyzed or resolved apart from one another.” [4]

Strength/weakness of the state is fixed in at least three dimensions [5]: (1) infrastructure capabilities are the ability of public institutions to implement the most important tasks and to define the policy on its territory, (2) the possibility of coercion is the ability and willingness of the state to use the force against the challenges of its authority, (3) societal (identity) connectivity is the degree, where the population identify themselves with the nation state and undertake its legitimate role in their lives.

The dilemma of insecurity is a situation in which national security, defined as a *regime security*, resists to inconsistent requirements of various social forces. At the same time, “the more elites (modes) of weak states seek to establish a good state governance, the more they provoke the challenges for their authority from influential society groups.” [6]

In order to determine the security strategy of Central Asian countries and Kazakhstan, not only the fact that they are weak states***** is important, but also that their closest environment, within the frameworks of which the regionalization occurs (“Central Asia”),***** consists of the weak states. This, in its turn, determines that Central Asia can not be regarded as an independent regional security

* Consideration of Central Asia in terms of scenario planning is not new. — See: Borishpolets K., Chernyavsky S. Medium-term prognosis of the situation in the Central Asia // Bulletin of the MSIIR-University. — 2010. — № 4. — Pp. 28-32.

** For more details about the theory of regional security complex, see: Buzan, B. *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*. — Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991; Buzan, B., Wæver, O. and de Wilde, J. *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. — Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998. — Pp. 9—19; Buzan, B., Wæver, O. *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*. — Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

*** About the division of a State into strong and weak sides, see, for example: Buzan, B. *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*. — Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1991. — Pp. 96—107; Weinstein, J., Porter, J., Eizenstat, S. *On the Brink: Weak States and U.S. National Security*. — Washington, DC: Center for Global Development, 2004. — Pp. 12—13.

**** The idea of Insecurity Dilemma was first proposed in the works of Job, B. *The Insecurity Dilemma: National, Regime, and State Securities in the Third World in The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of the Third World States*. — Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1992. — Pp. 11—36; see also: Sorensen, G. *After the Security Dilemma: the Challenges of Insecurity in Weak States and the Dilemma of Liberal Values // Security Dialogue*. — 2007. — No. 38 (3). — P. 357—378.

***** As noted by the authors of this article in 2005, “the Central Asian states are weak, although not to the same extent. In summary, we can say that in more or less extent, they are characterized by low levels of social and political connection, narrow social base of supporting the existing political regimes, especially the “middle” class (in a less extent, it is typical for Kazakhstan) <...> National Identity here are weak and have to compete with other identities, especially ethnic, sub-ethnic and clan.” See: Burnashev, R., Chernykh, I. *Conditions for Securitization of International Terrorism in Central Asia // Connections*. — 2005. — Spring. — P. 134.

***** About the history of regionalization in the format of “Central Asia”, see: R. Burnashev Kazakhstan and Central Asia: the Construction of the Region. — In book: Republic of Kazakhstan: Achievements of Independence and a Look into the Future: Materials of the annual 9th Almaty Conf., dedicated to the 20th Anniversary of Independence of the Republic of Kazakhstan (Almaty, June 14, 2011) / Ed. S.T. Seidumanov, B.K. Sultanov. — Almaty: KISS under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2011. — 232 p. (Pp. 113-121).

complex. At the best, this is unstructured space, which has the functions of an isolator. [7]

Within such a theoretical context, formulation of the problem will acquire a detailed view and will include sufficiently well-defined concepts.

The formulation of the problem. Option B. Currently, one of the key issues for the countries of Central Asia is the formation of a security strategy and improving the efficiency of public administration in a situation of insecurity dilemma. Is it possible to change the security policy of one of the countries in Central Asia carried out with the purpose of overcoming the dilemma of insecurity and beyond the traditional schemes?*

Formulation of the problem from the point of view of a particular theoretical context sets a framework for the further analysis: What internal threats arise from the weakness of the Central Asian countries? What impact on their appearance does neighborhood have with other weak states? What actions are the most effective within the dilemma of insecurity? Besides, the theory restricts the spectrum of the trajectories of events by certain frames ("extreme vectors") by establishing a system of conceptual assumptions about the nature of the political situation and the interaction of its members.

Having defined the problem, it is necessary to select the one aspect that we are most interested in – to formulate the purpose of the study. One must assume that the more precisely and specifically the goal is set, the more likely is its full consideration.

The purpose of the study – to determine a regional security strategy of the weak state, located within the unstructured security complex, which includes only the weak states, aimed at overcoming the dilemma of insecurity and beyond the traditional schemes.

Defining the initial situation

The next stage of the scenario planning is a detailed study of the current situation; the selection of predetermined elements in it (the dominant tendencies and trends) and key uncertainties, as well as identifying possible directions of changes in the situation. Typically, the study of the current situation is held by the scheme of one of the situational analysis types. In this case, PEST-analysis, SWOT-analysis and situational analysis by the method of Y. Primakov are taken as an example.

Since the purpose of the study is the analysis of possible overcoming of the insecurity dilemma due to the actions at the regional level, the focus during the study of the situation should be on the factors that may increase the dilemma of insecurity, as well as the factors that can determine the foreign policy of weak states.

PEST-analysis. PEST is an acronym of four groups of factors that are taken into account when analyzing the environmental decision-making in the field of security: political, economic, social and technological.**

PEST-analysis, in addition to descriptive component is directed to the selection of predetermined elements and key uncertainties by answering the following questions: [8]

- which of the trends are predetermined (inevitable)?
- which of the forces will determine or significantly influence the nature and direction of the future?

PEST-analysis: the case of Central Asia. The main factors affecting the security policy in Central Asia are the following characteristics:

1. Politics. From the point of view of regional security complex Central Asia is an unstructured region of safety or mini-complex that serves as an isolator between the neighboring complexes. At

* Traditional schemes include: (1) at the national level – the development of the repressive apparatus, the formation of the contradictions between the security forces and associated elites, the formation of the patronage system, the manipulation of ethnic and other identity contradictions, as well as the democratic process, and (2) the international level – forming alliances with important external actors and alliances at the regional level. – See: Jackson, R. *Regime Security // Contemporary Security Studies*. – Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. – Pp. 192-194.

** Peter Schwartz (Schwartz, P. *The Art of the Long View*. - NY: Doubleday, 1991) recommends starting the scenario planning with STEEP-analysis, involving consideration also environmental factors. During the analysis of international processes equally important role plays the accounting of international legal aspects and the corresponding transition to the PESTLE-analysis.

the same time, Central Asia is a periphery of the modern system of international relations, in which the interests of the great powers are not manifested and, accordingly, do not overlap significantly. This situation may change in case of a regime replacement in one or more countries of Central Asia with the participation of one of the great or regional powers, during the anti-terrorist coalition troop withdrawal from Afghanistan or in case of launching a military campaign towards the controversy that emerged around Iran.

International structures that involve the countries of Central Asia do not form full-fledged security regimes and, therefore, do not provide effective guarantees for the safety of these states and regimes. However, the norms of modern system of international relations protect the countries of Central Asia from traditional security threats ("territorial extinction"). [9] Virtually, no conflict here has gone beyond national borders and has acquired the interstate dimension. Most revealing in this case is the conflict in June 2010 in the southern regions of Kyrgyzstan, where even Uzbekistan, who had every reason to intervene, had distanced itself from the conflict and limited itself to only a temporary acceptance of refugees.

All the countries of the mini-complex are weak. The degree of stability in the acting regimes of the countries of Central Asia is different. An important political factor is that none of the Central Asian countries possesses the mechanism of authority succession, which would be viewed as a legitimate one by the public and elites.

An important factor in shaping the political context of the Central Asian security is the transformation of international law and, above all, the actualization of the issue on humanitarian intervention based on the erosion of the concept of national sovereignty and the principle of non-interference.

2. *Economy.* Economies of Central Asia are weakly related to each other. Distancing is even heightened due to participating of different countries in different economies and trade regimes (Kyrgyzstan is a member of the WTO since 1998, Kazakhstan is a member of the Customs Union since 2010). The issues of transboundary rivers exploitation (including defining the functioning of the hydropower facilities, existing and being under construction, and ensuring their safety), a transit (the problem mostly concerns Tajikistan and Uzbekistan), legal and illegal labor migration are problematic at the present time. The most important factors in the economic sphere concerning the purpose of the study are:

- disproportion in the distribution of labor resources: the countries with redundant labor resources are quite clearly allocated in the region (Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan) and with lack of them – Kazakhstan);

- disproportion in the ratio of capable and incapable for working population (the share of the working population in Kazakhstan is 49.85%, in Kyrgyzstan – 42.64, in Tajikistan – 27.03, in Turkmenistan – 55.39, in Uzbekistan – 55.08);*

- sufficiently rigid socio-economic stratification of the population (relative exception – Kazakhstan) (Table 1).

Table 1. Indicators of socio-economic stratification in the countries of Central Asia

	Quintile income ratio			GINI index			Population with incomes below the poverty line (%)	
	UN (2000—2011)	CIA	The World Bank	UN (2000—2011)	CIA	The World Bank	UN (2000—2009)	CIA
Afghanistan	—	6,3	5,7 ⁵⁾	—	29,4 ⁵⁾	27,8 ⁵⁾	36,0	36
Kazakhstan	4,6	6,6 ⁴⁾	6,0 ⁶⁾	30,9	26,7 ⁶⁾	29,0 ⁶⁾	15,4	8,2
Kyrgyzstan	4,9	6,8 ⁴⁾	9,9 ⁶⁾	33,4	33,4 ⁴⁾	36,2 ⁶⁾	43,1	33,7
Tajikistan	4,2	7,8 ⁴⁾	6,9 ⁶⁾	29,4	32,6 ³⁾	30,8 ⁶⁾	47,2	53
Turkmenistan	7,9	12,2 ¹⁾	12,2 ¹⁾	—	40,8 ¹⁾	40,8 ¹⁾	—	30
Uzbekistan	6,2	10,6 ²⁾	10,2 ²⁾	36,7	36,8 ²⁾	36,7 ²⁾	—	26

1) 1998 2) 2003 3) 2006 4) 2007 5) 2008 6) 2009

* According to: The World Factbook // Central Intelligence Agency // <https://www.cia.gov>

Sources: Human Development Report 2011. — N.Y.: Palgrave Macmillan for UNDP, 2011. — 178 p.; The World Factbook // Central Intelligence Agency // <https://www.cia.gov>; GINI index // The World Bank // <https://data.worldbank.org>; Income share held by highest 10% // The World Bank // <https://data.worldbank.org>; Income share held by lowest 10% // The World Bank // <https://data.worldbank.org>.

3. *Society.* In the countries of Central Asia there are strong conflicts between the state, ethnic and religious identities. The role of generic and/or kinship and compatriot relations and appropriate “clans” is high, patrons-client communications, based on the determining role of the bureaucracy or the financial and economic

structures, and in some countries – the community (for example, at the level of mahalla in Uzbekistan) are also significant. Also important are the following factors:

- the presence of diasporas from the representatives of titular nations of other Central Asian countries (Table 2);

Table 2. Ethnic compound (%)

	CIA					National Statistics Agencies				
	Kazakhs	Kyrgyzs	Tajiks	Turkmens	Uzbeks	Kazakhs	Kyrgyzs	Tajiks	Turkmens	Uzbeks
Afghanistan ¹⁾	–	–	27	3	9	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Kazakhstan ²⁾	63,1	–	–	–	2,8	64,0	–	–	–	2,9
Kyrgyzstan ³⁾	–	64,9	–	–	13,8	0,6	71,7	0,9	–	14,3
Tajikistan ⁴⁾	–	1,1	79,9	–	15,3	–	–	–	–	–
Turkmenistan ⁵⁾	–	–	–	85	9	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Uzbekistan ⁶⁾	3	–	5	–	80	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a

¹⁾ 2011; ²⁾ 2009; ³⁾ 1999; ⁴⁾ 2000; ⁵⁾ 2003; ⁶⁾ 1996.

Sources: The World Factbook // Central Intelligence Agency // <https://www.cia.gov>; Demographic annual of the Kyrgyz Republic: 2006—2010. — Bishkek: National Statistics Committee of KR, 2011; Demographic annual of Kazakhstan: 2011. — Astana: Statistics Agency of RK, 2011.

- The high level of demographic pressure in the countries of Central Asia (Table 3);

Table 3. Demographic indicators

	Population				Population growth, %			
	UN (2011)	The World Bank (2010)	CIA 2012	National Statistics Agencies	UN (2010—2015)	The World Bank (2010)	CIA	National Statistics Agencies
Afghanistan	32,4	34,4	30,4	–	3,1	2,8	2,22	–
Kazakhstan	16,2	16,3	17,5	16,4 ²⁾	1,0	2,4	1,235	1,47
Kyrgyzstan	5,4	5,4	5,5	5,5 ¹⁾	1,1	0,8	0,887	1,09
Tajikistan	7,0	6,9	7,8	7,6 ¹⁾	1,5	1,4	1,823	1,15
Turkmenistan	5,1	5,0	5,1	–	1,2	1,2	1,143	–
Uzbekistan	27,8	28,2	28,4	29,6 ²⁾	1,1	1,4	0,94	1,50

¹⁾ 2011; ²⁾ 2012.

Sources: Human Development Report 2011. — N.Y.: Palgrave Macmillan for UNDP, 2011. — 178 p.; Population growth (annual %) // The World Bank // <https://data.worldbank.org>; Population, total // The World Bank // <https://data.worldbank.org>; The World Factbook // Intelligence Agency // <https://www.cia.gov>; Population // Official site of the Agency of Statistics of RK // <http://www.stat.kz>; Population // Official site of the National Statistics Committee of KR

// <http://212.42.101.124:1041/stat1.kg>; Macroeconomic indicators // Official site of the Agency of Statistics under the President of RT // <http://www.stat.tj/ru>; Demographic data // Official site of the State Committee of RU on Statistics // <http://www.stat.uz>.

- Necessary expenses of considerable resources on the socialization of young people. In Kazakhstan, the median age is 30.2, while 21.6% of the population is people under 15 years old. In Kyrgyzstan, the figures are 25 years and 29.3%. In Tajikistan – 22.6 years and 33.9%. In Turkmenistan – 25.3 years and 27.5%. In Uzbekistan – 25.7 years and 26.5% [10]. In Kazakhstan, the issue takes on an added dimension associated with the implementation of the program for the adoption of immigrants [11];

- Prevalence of the population practicing Islam (mainly Sunni Islam, the Hanafi madhhab). Due to low religious literacy of the population, simplified (fundamental) forms of Sunni Islam are also widespread. The close relationship between Spiritual Administration of the Muslims

of Central Asian countries and the governmental structures undermines the credibility and contributes to the popularity of alternative religious forms of organization, such as “Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami”, or the emergence of new structures, such as “Akromian”.

4. *Technology*. The base of technological capabilities possessed by the countries of Central Asia consists of the resources created within the Soviet Union and partly modernized in the period of independence. From the point of view of contemporary forms of regime change (the model of “Arab revolutions”), we must take into account the extent of modern means of communication (internet and mobile telephony), but if we consider the possibility of foreign policy changing, the military component becomes particularly important (Table 4).

Table 4. The power potential of Central Asian countries (2010)

	The armed forces, pers. According to The Military Balance						Military expenditures according to CIA		Mobilization resource (men), million, according to CIA	
	Land Forces	Air Forces and Air Defense	Internal troops	Border troops	National Guard	Navy	Million US Dollars	% of GDP	Available	Suitable
Afghanistan ¹⁾	90 800	3 000	80 000	18 000	—	—	492,3	1,9 ⁴⁾	7,06	4,05
Kazakhstan	34 000 ²⁾	12 000	20 000	9 000	2 500	3 000	2 214,3	1,1	4,16	2,91
Kyrgyzstan	8 500	2 400	3 500	5 000	1 000	—	62,2	0,5 ⁴⁾	1,46	1,12
Tajikistan ³⁾	7 300	1 500	3 800	n/a	1 200	—	226,5	1,5	2,01	1,49
Turkmenistan	18 500	3 000	n/a	n/a	n/a	500	1 175,7	3,4 ⁵⁾	1,38	1,07
Uzbekistan	50 000	17 000	19 000	n/a	1 000	—	3 073,7	3,5	7,89	6,57

1) there are significant forces, not controlled by Government; 2) including the units of the Ministry of Defense; 3) security forces also include the units of MES (3500 people; 4) 2009; 5) 2005.

Sources: The Military Balance 2010. — London: Taylor & Francis, 2010; The World Factbook // Central Intelligence Agency // <https://www.cia.gov>.

The main *uncertainties* for the policy making are:

- The format of changing the place of Central Asia in the system of international relations in case of Anti-terrorist Coalition's troops withdrawal from Afghanistan and/or the launch of military campaign in connection with the contradictions, which emerge around Iran;

- The development of social, socio-economic and political situations in the countries of Central

Asia in the short to medium term perspective (a possibility of the deposition of a government by the models of “orange” and “Arab” revolutions or the transformation of the situation in case of the replacement of a political leader);

- The format of changing the attitude to norms of contemporary system of international relations (to what extent it is possible to speak about them now) in case of deposition of a regime in one of the countries of Central Asia;

- The reaction of great and regional powers on the serious conflict between the countries of Central Asia.

The main factors, which have or significantly influence the situation in Central Asia are:

- The position of regimes in the countries of Central Asia regarding the internal and external policies;
- The position of great and regional powers.

SWOT-analysis involves the division of all factors, which affect the object of research, into four categories:

Internal (under control of researched object):

- *strengths* — features, which give the object some advantages over others;
- *weaknesses* * — features, which weaken the object.

External (not controlled by the object):

- *opportunities* — factors, which give additional opportunities to achieve the goal;
- *threats* — factors which may complicate the achievement of the goal.

Based on the formulation of a research problem we should focus on the main attributes of the state during the analysis of the situation in the countries of Central Asia, describing its strength/weakness (efficiency of state institutions, the monopoly on the instruments of violence within their state borders, the presence of consensus on the idea of the state in society), and also on its characteristics as a power (ability to realize the external influence).

The following is an example of the SWOT-analysis of Uzbekistan. Similarly we need to consider other Central Asian countries.

SWOT-analysis: Uzbekistan's case

1. Internal factors

1.1. Powers:

- the state retains control over the major news channels and communication technologies. The number of Internet users in Uzbekistan amounted to more than 4,689,000 people (15.86% of the total population) in 2009; 20,952,000 people have

an access to mobile telephony (70.88% of the population);

- the country has a well-developed transport infrastructure. Almost all major cities of the country are connected by the common rail network (exception — the Ferghana valley, connected with the rest of the country through the territory of Tajikistan). In military terms, it is worth paying attention to the aviation component of the infrastructure: Uzbekistan has 33 airports with a concrete or asphalt runways, 6 of which have a length of the strip over 3047 m **;

- a weak ability of violent intervention by power structures in politics remains in Uzbekistan, including through the contradictions between them. However, the country leaders have the ability and have shown a willingness to use violent means to maintain the regime (the most striking example — the events in Andijan in May 2005 and subsequent actions by the leaders of the country);

- Uzbekistan has significant, by the standards of Central Asia, the power potential. Reforming of the Armed Forces was held in the first half — the mid-2000s and is associated with structural changes (transition to Brigadier principle of organization, the formation of the military districts and the development of a system of interaction within various security agencies). The armed forces of Uzbekistan have the experience of warfare;

- considering the possibility of a consensus on the idea of the state, it is important that 80% of Uzbekistan's population consists of ethnic Uzbeks.

1.2. Weaknesses:

- Uzbek society is largely fragmented from the socio-economic point of view. Gini coefficient is 36.8%; 26% of the population receives the income below the poverty line, according to expert estimates, the total number of working-age population is 16,280,000 people (55.08%), more than 20% of them do not have a permanent job ***. Because of the low purchasing ability of the population, the domestic market is limited;

- the high role of kinship and compatriot relations and respective "clans" (currently five of such groups are identified: Ferghana, Tashkent, Samar-

* Sometimes are positioned as limitations.

** According to data of 2006, Uzbekistan has 8 airbases. — See.: *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment. Russia and CIS: Issue 18.* — Coulsdon, Surrey: Jane's Information Group, 2006. — P. 832.

*** Official unemployment rate — 1%.

kand, Kashkadarya, Surkhandarya and Khorezm.) The communities (at the level of Mahalla) and patrons-client communications are significant ones. They rely on the determining role of bureaucracy. The "functional" groups of influence are being gradually formed based on the latest;

- highlighted role of the bureaucracy leads to the erosion of state institutions and large scale corruption*. Along with the legal norms, stated by the law, there are powerful prescriptions in the country, regulated by historically established traditions (for example, a special role of elders (aksakals) and other authority figures in making decisions about some disputes at the everyday level) and the rules of the Hanafi mazhab (88% of the population is Muslim);

- due to a low religious literacy of the population in the country, simplified (fundamentalist) forms of Sunnism are widely spread. The close relationship of the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Uzbekistan with the governmental structures undermines credibility towards it and contributes to the popularity of alternative religious organizational forms, such as "*Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami*", or the emergence of new structures, such as "Akromian."

2. External factors

2.1. Opportunities:

- Uzbekistan as a country with sufficient resources may relatively freely implement regional policies, as Central Asia as the periphery of international relations and external forces (global and regional) demonstrate low willingness to intervene into the events in the region;

- availability of large Uzbek diaspora in all countries of Central Asia, tending to preserve their ethnic identity.

2.2. Weaknesses:

- conflicts in neighboring Central Asian countries (Afghanistan, possibly Iran);

- transit dependence on neighboring countries (first of all, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan);

- shortage of land and water resources, the dependence in obtaining the water from other countries in Central Asia (Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, in part);

- the existence of trans-national groups, aiming at changing the political system in Uzbekistan (IMU);

- the limitation of markets (exports), also due to the absence (destruction) of a single economic space in Central Asia.

3. Main uncertainties are:

- to what extent Uzbekistan is ready to use its force outside its territory;

- the behavior of security forces, religious, kinship and compatriot and "functional" groups in the case of the leader of the state replacement.

Situation analysis according to

Y. Primakov* involves three stages of the study:

- allocation of problematic blocks in situations which are to be analyzed (its decomposition)**;

- provision of each of the problematic blocks with diverse expert evaluations;

- creation of the final document, critically summarizing the given evaluations.

Allocation of problematic blocks: Central Asia's case. Allocation of the problematic blocks (allocation of issues, which are assigned to the expert) on the model of the situation analysis might look like this:

Elements of the supposed security system in Central Asia:

1.1. SCO

1.2. CSTO.

2. The position of regional and great powers:

2.1. Russia.

2.2. China.

2.3. USA.

* According to Transparency International, the level of corruption in Uzbekistan was 1,6 in 2011 (177th place out of 183 countries). — See: *Corruption Perceptions Index 2011*. — Transparency International, 2011. — 7 p. // <https://www.transparency.org>.

** About the methodic of situational analysis worked out by the domestic authors, headed by Primakov Y.M., academician, see, for example: Primakov Y.M. *Situational Analysis as Analytical Genre* / Primakov Y.M., Khrustalyov M.A. *Situational Analysis: Methodic* — M.: Scientific Educational Forum on International Relations, MSIR MFA of Russia, 2006. — P. 6—9; Iran: What is next? *Situational Analysis* (Yevgeniy Primakov, Supervisor) // *Russia in Global Policy* — 2003. — №2; Nuclear Program of KPDR: Perspectives of Development. *Situational Analysis* (Yevgeniy Primakov, Supervisor) // *Russia in Global Policy*. — 2004. — №1; Iraq's Crisis and Perspectives for Settlement. *Situational Analysis* (Yevgeniy Primakov, Supervisor) // *Russia in Global Policy*. — 2004. — №3.

*** Options of highlighting the problematic blocks see.: Borishpolts K. *Methods of Political Researches*. — M.: Aspect Press, 2005. — P. 129—130.

3. Mechanisms of the regime replacement:
 - 3.1. "Color revolution".
 - 3.2. "Arab revolution".
 - 3.3. "Palace coup".
4. External policy of the new regime.

"External policy of the new regime", the final document of the problematic block. Analysis of the situation suggests that in case of a regime replacement in one of the Central Asian states, its new management while overcoming the dilemma of insecurity may choose one of the four not mutually exclusive behaviors:

- maintenance of the existing external policy strategy;
- an alliance with one of the great or regional powers;
- initiation of regional alliance formation including only some countries of Central Asia, and possibly Afghanistan;
- realization of aggressive external policy.

The third and the fourth are fundamentally new ones. Their key idea is to improve infrastructural and forced opportunities of the state, as well as societal cohesion of the country by enhancing and changing regional policy – transforming it into a format of *coercive diplomacy* [12]. In addition, this model of behavior can reformat the balance of power in Central Asia, including changes in the existing state and regional borders.

In an effort to achieve its objectives, the state of the region, making a bet on coercive diplomacy, will use those aspects of international relations, which limit the possibility of effective implementation of land power in Central Asia by interested extra-regional powers and international institutions that is to avoid direct aggression as far as possible. Threats by force and low-intensive military actions will be carried out in controversial circumstances, with an emphasis on subversive activities and the initiation of civil disorder. The task is to make the actions: (1) to cause response actions by the competitor countries, which, from the point of view of international law, could be interpreted as aggression and (2) do not step over the line, beyond which military intervention of extra-regional forces may follow. Besides, actions that may be interpreted as aggressive will be implemented in response to the internal politics of the country, unacceptable by

the international community, which is a subject to aggression, and positioning itself as a "humanitarian intervention."

The final stage. Summarizing research activities determining the situation are:

The establishment of forecast presumptions (making decision on what should be considered, and what can be ignored) to narrow down a vast number of the considered options of action for each of the political actors, involved into the situation, to a reasonable number, which can be effectively covered within the analysis. Excessively rigid limitation of the considered factors reduces the range of considered hypotheses and alternatives and creates the possibility of choice, not being substantiated voluntarily, empirically and logically, dictated by the subjective preferences of the researcher. Many factors accounting leads to unnecessary complexity. It is necessary to keep a balance between the ability of the subject that makes the decision to consider a large number of factors, and the importance of these factors in relation to a researched problem and the obtained result: the study takes into account only the most significant factors influencing the choice of an alternative development by the subject of forecasting (the "movement" of the object on varying trajectory).

Implementation of assumptions, substantiated by the fact that, along with subjective limitation of the number of considered factors, there is also an objective, associated with the fact that in most cases it is impossible to know all the details of the investigated situation. Assumptions allow reducing the cost and efforts for determination of the exact value of a factor, to undertake an analysis using accepted valuation method, to narrow the scope of the analysis to manageable proportions.

Forecasting presumptions and assumptions.

Determination of the initial situation allows considering a replacement of a political leader (including the models of the "orange" or "Arab") as a basic premise for moving the security policy in one of the countries of Central Asia beyond the traditional schemes, in order to overcome the dilemma of insecurity. The uncertainty in the behavior of security forces, religious, kinship and compatriot, and "functional" groups, in case of the replacement

of the leader, is the point of the dilemma of insecurity. Thus, these positions are further considered as assumptions.

In order to simplify the analysis, two forecasting presumptions are introduced:

1. A possible format of changing the place of Central Asia in the system of international relations in case of the anti-terrorist coalition troops' withdrawal from Afghanistan and/or the launch of military campaign towards the contradictions that emerged around Iran, not further considered (taken into a separate study).

2. Leadership of at least one regional power centers is interested in reformatting of Central Asia.

Thus, the further major uncertainties are:

1. If the Central Asian countries carry out military actions aimed at creating a regional alliance around one of the regional centers of power (event group A):

- by the means of coercive diplomacy (A1);
- by the means of humanitarian intervention (A2).

2. If the countries of Central Asia use the force in the form of actions aimed at initiating a regional conflict (event group B):

- in the form of open aggression (B1);
- in the form of provoking aggression (B2).

3. The reaction of extra-regional forces to the events in Central Asia (event group C):

- support of the events (C1);
- forceful intervention to prevent the changes (C2).

Quantitative estimates of the uncertainties.

Determination of the situation allows gaining quantitatively determined (on an index level) assessments. Thus, as a result of consideration of the situation, some questions on the major uncertainties can be formulated to the experts, further analyzed in the format of the Delphi method, such as: "What are the chances that the new regime will be pursuing a foreign policy that is fundamentally different from that one existed before?" Herewith, the probability is usually assessed on a scale from 0 to 1 (or in interest rates in increments of 10

points), taking into account the relevant quality characteristics:

- 0,0 — "absolutely incredible";
- 0,1 — "almost unbelievable";
- 0,2 — "highly unlikely";
- 0,3 — "unlikely";
- 0,4 — "rather unlikely than likely";
- 0,5 — "equal probability";
- 0,6 — "more likely than not";
- 0,7 — "probably";
- 0,8 — "very likely";
- 0,9 — "almost inevitable";
- 1,0 — "absolutely inevitable."

Construction of the target situation. In case of the normative scenario planning, aside from the determining the initial situation, we must also define the target situation (perhaps several alternative situations):

- what characteristics the situation should have to become optimal for achieving these goals;
- what correlation should be between the resources of key actors;
- which alliances and opposition should arise.

The starting point of the normative model is the differences between the original and the target situations.

Structural analysis

The conducted study of the situation intends to identify possible directions of its changing. The main research technique here is the formulation of *alternative competing hypotheses* as forecast assumptions of the conducted situation's development, which are determined on the base of the study of major uncertainties variation; their relationships with each other and with the dominant tendencies and trends. The study of alternatives is the most important component of the process of the script development. The number of alternative hypotheses-forecasts determines the number of strategies, available for the subjects of scenario planning, and, accordingly, the number of scenarios to be considered.*

* "The strategy has some plan, so exhaustive that it cannot be broken by enemy action or nature, as anything that the enemy or nature can take, together with a set of your possible action, is a part of the description of the strategy". — See.: Williams, J. *Absolute Strategy, or Basics on the Theory of Strategy Games*. — M.: Sovetskoye Radio, 1960. — P. 34. From this point of view the terms "strategy" and "scenario" are extremely close.

Studying the interrelation of hypotheses and dominant tendencies and trends relies on structural analysis, for example, matrix analysis, logical processing or development of maps on interaction of factors.

Matrix analysis [13]. Matrix analysis aims to create a picture of the analyzed situation, taking into account not only the impact on the behavior of the object of forecasting of each factor individually, but also the effect of the integral factors interaction. The objectives of the matrix analysis are:

- identification of interrelated events (the construction of the adjacency matrix);
- identification of the nature of interrelation between events (the construction of the matrix interaction).

The matrix of adjacency and interdependence is based on the answer to the question: if the probability of the event A1 tends to one, will the probability of the event A2 change, and if so, how?

Matrix analysis. The matrix of adjacency and interdependence for the selected uncertainties in subsection 3.4 is as follows:

		A		B		C	
		A ₁	A ₂	B ₁	B ₂	C ₁	C ₂
A	A ₁		↑	↓	↑	↓	0
	A ₂	↑		↓	↑	↓	↓
B	B ₁	↓	↓		0	↓	↓
	B ₂	↑	0	↑		0	0
C	C ₁	0	0	↑	↑		↓
	C ₂	↓	↓	↓	↓	↓	

where: ↑ – direct, positive relationship factors; ↓ – reverse, the negative relationship; ↓ – relationship remains uncertain; 0 – lack of communication.

For further analysis only those groups of events, between which there is a relationship, are being selected.

Logical processing. The relationship of factors allocated under the matrix analysis, in the language of formal logic can be written as follows:

$$1) (A_1 \rightarrow A_2) \wedge (A_1 \rightarrow (B_1 \vee \neg B_1)) \vee (A_1 \rightarrow B_2) \wedge (A_1 \rightarrow (C_1 \vee \neg C_1));$$

$$2) (A_2 \rightarrow A_1) \wedge (A_2 \rightarrow \neg B_1) \wedge (A_2 \rightarrow B_2) \wedge (A_2 \rightarrow (C_1 \wedge \neg C_1)) \wedge (A_2 \rightarrow (C_2 \vee \neg C_2));$$

$$3) (B_1 \rightarrow \neg A_1) \wedge (B_1 \rightarrow \neg A_2) \wedge (B_1 \rightarrow \neg C_1) \wedge (B_1 \rightarrow (C_2 \vee \neg C_2));$$

$$4) (B_2 \rightarrow A_1) \wedge (B_2 \rightarrow B_1);$$

$$5) (C_1 \rightarrow B_1) \wedge (C_1 \rightarrow B_2) \wedge (C_1 \rightarrow \neg C_2);$$

$$6) (C_2 \rightarrow \neg A_1) \wedge (C_2 \rightarrow \neg A_2) \wedge (C_2 \rightarrow \neg B_1) \wedge (C_2 \rightarrow \neg B_2) \wedge (C_2 \rightarrow (C_1 \vee \neg C_1));$$

where: → — an implication (connective *if...so*);
 ¬ — a denial (connective *not...*); ∧ — a conjunction (connective *... and ...*); ∨ — a disjunction (connective *or... either...*).

As a result of bringing these relationships to a normal disjunctive form we may find the major competing versions of events.


For example, to analyze the situation 4 (reflecting the relationship of provoking an aggression with other key uncertainties) it is necessary to consider the options of further development: $\neg B_2$, $(\neg B_2 \wedge A_1)$, $(\neg B_2 \wedge B_1)$ и $(A_1 \wedge B_1)$. Similarly, each of the selected six rows is being analyzed. Together, logical processing reveals all the competing versions of further development.

Map of factors' interaction is based on the method of link chart construction or *mind map*. The map of interaction helps to visualize and structure the interactions between hypotheses in order to understand:

- what combinations of factors lead to a particular outcome of the situation;
- what "knots factors" play a key role in terms of choice one alternative or another by the object of forecasting.

Depending on changes in the state of one of the factors ("input"), we can trace changes in the probability of realization in the entire chain of other factors associated with it. In other words, we have a ready-made model for the creation of the system of development scenarios for the studied object.

Map of interaction between factors. Schematic representation of the further strategy of the state's behavior, making a bet on the 'new regional policy' in Central Asia:



The construction of event sequences.

Event sequences are compiled basing on the structural analysis as the actual scenario of the situation. In case of a group work, an interaction between experts can be performed:

- in the mode of business (step) game,^{*} within which each expert acts as one of the subjects of the situation;

- in the format of the Delphi method, where each of the experts, regardless of their colleagues, makes a script (set of scripts), which contains a step-by-step description of the likely further development of the situation, taking into account the key points identified during the structural analysis, and a comment-justification.^{**}

A special attention is paid to the technical side of the scenario – the answer to the question of what exactly actions will every subject of the considered situation use.

An option of the expert scenario: the use of coercive diplomacy (A1).

Coercive diplomacy aims to make an opponent (1) to wander from its goal (2), refuse the actions that have already begun to be implemented, (3) make fundamental changes in the system of government [14]. The reducing of the potential among

the competitors may become an additional motivation of using the coercive diplomacy for one of the countries of Central Asia: economic situation of the countries of Central Asia is determined, above all, by the degree of their social and political stability. Any action, creating an opportunity of even local destabilization may be a catalyst for reducing of the competitiveness and, therefore, the loss of existing economic (financial) benefits by a country.

Main types of actions corresponding to the outlined conditions in Central Asia can be classified as:

- “unmotivated” terrorist actions by the model of the actions in Tashkent in 1999, or taking of hostages with putting forward any set (including the absurd) of political demands by the model of the actions in Moscow (“Nord Ost”) or Beslan;

- illegal armed groups’ penetration into the country’s territory on the model of “Batken events” in 1999 and 2000 with possible establishment of control over one or more settlements on the model of events in Budennovsk in 1995;

- performances of marginalized people, accompanied by a demonstrative cruelty to specific groups (ethnic minorities, law enforcement officials, employees of local government agencies, migrant workers), intended to cause a rigid response

^{*} Frameworks for the players’ actions define the results of the previous analysis (in which the interests, goals, resources, tactics typical subjects of the situation are defined). Every decision must be justified by an expert.

^{**} In order to simplify the processing, all the documents should have a unified presence.

from the security forces (for example – the events in Andijan in May 2005);

- series of explosions at oil and gas pipelines, as well as similar actions on water and irrigation facilities aimed at destabilize not only the export of hydrocarbons, but also cause environmental disasters;

- provoking the disproportionate and illegal from the point of view of international law military actions, for example, through the organization of ethnic riots, the arrest of foreign citizens, provocations on the border, the nationalization of enterprises established with the participation of the country – an object of considered strategy.

Country subjected to such attacks, no doubt, will seek the support of neighboring states, which can be used as the basis for formation a regional alliance, transforming the political and economic borders of Central Asia.

Besides solving tactical problems outlined above, the consequences of coercive diplomacy for opponent country can securitize, thus enhancing the infrastructure and coercive opportunities of the state, using coercive diplomacy, and societal cohesion of the country.

The country following the coercive diplomacy will find the scenario to be negative, when being suffering under attacks will bring it into correlation with the initiating state. In this case, the coercive diplomatic actions will be perceived as aggression or provoking the aggression, which could lead to regional armed conflict and intervention of regional forces into the process.

The outcome of this stage of scenario planning is a compilation and analysis of the final situations for each of the gained scenarios as a static description of future situations that arise at the last step of each of the scenarios.

If the parameters of one or more of the outcomes of situations are found to be optimal for the decision maker, they will acquire the status of targets (the transition from a search plain to the normative one).

In the case of the regulatory scenario planning, the creation of scenarios of the directed transformation of the baseline to the target one is being implemented. Decision-making at this stage looks like thinking through what kind of actions it is necessary to implement optimal scenario and neutralize alternative one.

The development of any scenario involves the “feedback loop”: refinement of an original model of the outcome situation and a system of forward-looking presumptions, the adjustment of the target situation on the basis of compiled scenarios.

Developed scenarios can be evaluated from the aspect of their relative importance, which in this case refers to multiplication of a coefficient of probability of the scenario to a coefficient of its importance. The probability of the scenario realization is evaluated in the same manner as the probability within the situational analysis. A coefficient of importance of the event varies from 0 to 1 and reflects the degree of qualitative changes in the situation, coming as a result of this scenario.

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