

CONTENTS



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REGIONAL SECURITY

Laumulin Murat

Central Asia and Post-2014 Afghanistan in the Security Context 4

ECONOMY

Mukhamedzhanova Dariya

CES and CA: the Dynamics of Economic
Development and Cooperation 15

Yessaidar Urzada

The Republic of Kazakhstan's Rating in the World
Grain Production and Export 25

Zhunnussova Gulim

The State's Role in Ensuring Food Security: Kazakhstan's
Realities (Practice) and International Experience 34

THEORY AND ANALYSIS

Syzdykova Yelena

Eurasian Integration in Research Tradition of the Customs Union
— Common Economic Space Countries Participants..... 41

Baimurzayeva Venera

Patriotism in the Value System of Kazakhstan:
Political Analysis 51

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Central Asia and Post-2014 Afghanistan in the Security Context

MURAT LAUMULIN

Its geographic location, domestic political complications, ethno-confessional diversity, and involvement in the global shadow economy keep Afghanistan in the center of the intertwining interests of state and extra-state forces. This threatens the country's immediate neighbors and even whole regions and explains the never weakening interest of Pakistan, India, Iran, the Central Asian Soviet successor-states, China, and Russia in what is going on in this country.

Introduction

In the last two years, the world political scientific community has been actively discussing the possible post-2014 developments in Afghanistan; as the event draws closer, all sorts of think tanks, funds, and institutions have been coming up with more and more scenarios.

The leading Western centers, such as the RAND Corporation, the Carnegie Endowment, the Institute of Central Asia and the Caucasus at Johns Hopkins University, Chatham House of the UK, and the Swedish Defense Research Agency (FOI), to name a few, are looking for every possible answer to the question: What will happen in Afghanistan after the Western pullout? The Friedrich Ebert Foundation of Germany set up a network of groups staffed with experts from the Central Asian republics, Pakistan, India, Iran, Turkey, China, and Russia to monitor the situation and forecast possible developments inside and outside the country after 2014.

Here are some of their scenarios; I would like to point out that under any of them the Central Asian countries will be threatened. In the geopolitical context, the developments in Afghanistan will undermine the security of a much wider region: South Asia, the Middle East, the CIS countries, and China. This explains why the problem remains high on the world agenda and why Pakistan, India, Iran, the post-Soviet Central Asian states, China, and Russia are closely following the developments in this country.

The Afghan Problem in the World Political Context

The United States relies in its Afghan policies on the "Pashtunization" strategy suggested by the RAND Corporation, which comprises two elements. The United States and its allies are determined either to capture or liquidate the most odious members of the anti-Western coalition of the Taliban and other radical, mainly Pashtun, groups, and then they intend to create a new structure of power out of moderate Taliban members (Pashtun fighters) driven by ethnic nationalism rather than religious fundamentalism.

In the last few years, the American expert community has been promoting the idea of decentralized democracy* in Afghanistan, which Washington is ready to accept under certain conditions. The centralized state will survive, while the regions will become autonomies with extensive rights and democratic institutions. The center should be strong enough to control the country's entire territory to

* The government in Kabul will remain in control of the country's foreign policy; it will have the right to declare war and apply anti-drug legislation; it will control customs services and mining, but will have limited rights in supervising trade between provinces.

prevent any attempts to destabilize Pakistan or attack the United States.

A “state of decentralized democracy” is a challenging task:

- First, the Taliban, which rejects democracy in principle, will oppose “decentralized democracy” as aggressively as it is fighting centralized democracy.

- Second, the administrative potential of the Afghan state is limited.

- Third, the anti-government and very influential figures in the Afghan provinces will hardly hail this variant.

In the past, Chatham House, a British think tank, devised a plan of conflict settlement in Afghanistan coordinated with the United States and the other NATO members, which mentioned, among other things, security, administration, development, and regional relations. Under this plan, the numerical strength of Afghanistan’s national army should be brought up to 134 thousand and the size of the police force to 109 thousand to be able to assume control over the country and ensure its security.

It was planned to set up an international reintegration fund to support those Taliban fighters who wanted to resume a peaceful life.

The third section of the same document envisaged much closer coordination between the Afghan forces (including ISAF) and neighboring countries (Pakistan in particular). It was expected that the special international fund would accumulate at least \$500 million.

It should be said that the Karzai government* put its own plan of reconciliation with the Taliban on the table, according to which those who moved over to the side of the government would acquire jobs, education, and security, the latter being the main point. Under this plan, those willing to embrace reconciliation could count on protection against their former comrades-in-arms, their past activities forgiven and forgotten.

Washington liked the plan on the whole; however, the price (\$1 billion) proved forbidding. The Afghans looked to the world community for donations.

Turkey, likewise, was interested in what would happen to Afghanistan and the Turkic Central Asian states in particular; it intended to make the problem a regional one in order to stir the neighboring states into more active involvement in its solution.

China is worried lest Islamists gain control over the Uyghur separatist movement. This will add vigor to the Islamic Movement of Eastern Turkestan, while the XUAR will become an outpost of terrorist activities in the region. In this event, Beijing will have to move from observation to action, in particular to economic interference in the Afghan conflict to weaken the Taliban. China is also interested in exploiting the country’s mineral resources.

India, in turn, wants its own mechanisms of involvement in Afghanistan. However, some experts think that Islamabad is deliberately maintaining tension in the Pashtun areas in case of another military conflict with India.

Russia wants to return to Afghanistan for several reasons; first, it needs security and is driven by geopolitical considerations: the problem of drug production in Afghanistan must be addressed and resolved, while what Washington is doing in this country should be observed at closer range. Second, Russia, as well as all other actors, is guided by economic interests: it needs markets for its military hardware and access to local natural resources.

Japan is also involved; it is acting together with the United States while also trying to reconcile Washington’s intention to draw it into America’s military actions and the political realities inside the country. Tokyo, however, is not limiting itself to cooperation with Washington: its diplomacy in Afghanistan has become more independent and more promising in view of the coalition’s pullout and inevitable concentration on postwar rehabilitation.**

Japan is claiming the role of a global leader in dealing with humanitarian, social, and economic problems; its active involvement in postwar rehabilitation in Afghanistan will bring it closer to Central Asia, ensure its energy security, enrich it with new experience in dealing with global problems, and increase its weight in the eyes of the world.

* According to many of the Western experts in Afghanistan, the term “moderate Taliban” used by Kabul is nothing but a myth. The attempts to integrate them into administrative structures are fraught with unpredictable repercussions.

** See: O.A. Dobrinskaia, “Tokyo: aktsent na nevoennye aspekty uregulirovaniia v Afghanistane,” *Azia i Afrika segodnia*, No. 11, 2012, pp.

Main Scenarios

The scenarios are numerous and varied, but none fits the U.S.'s main demands in the security sphere: the de jure and de facto split might become a reality. The Pashtun south may be detached from the north and the west with their predominantly Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazara populations. This will be most probable if a settlement deal with the Taliban gives it a free hand in the south, its historical foothold. It will turn these areas into safe havens of trans-border terrorism and radical movements.

In recent years, experts have discussed three (or four) possible scenarios.*

Scenario No. 1 looked ideal, but it was rejected right away: according to it, the coalition should have won relatively easily in a couple of years; it should have set up efficient state institutions, laid a solid foundation for civil society, and left the country. Even if realized, this scenario would not have protected the country against a gradually rekindled conflict with the Taliban.

Under Scenario No. 2, the coalition would leave without winning because a military victory (which presupposed control over the provinces, including those where the coalition was stationed) was unattainable, there was not enough money, and the coalition allies were unreliable. On top of this, the Taliban refused to talk to the "occupants" and their puppets. In the absence of positive shifts, Washington would be forced to abandon its plans of pacification and declare the mission complete. In fact, withdrawal would look like a defeat.

Scenario No. 3 was more realistic: confrontation with the Taliban would go on and on for an indefinite period of time, while final settlement of the Afghan Question would be indefinitely postponed; this is what the American Administration is doing.

The FOI experts came out with five possible scenarios of the Afghan post-pullout developments.

Under *Scenario No. 1*, "the Talibans get a share of the government of Afghanistan under two conditions:

- (1) The United States stays committed to Afghanistan, both financially and militarily, and
- (2) Pakistan supports the Taliban's decision to negotiate."

Scenario No. 2 presents "Pakistan as Afghanistan's New Big Brother. If the United States cuts its financial support to the government of Afghanistan, Islamabad could step in to fill the power vacuum."

Scenario No. 3 "War of Proxies": "The United States stays committed to Afghanistan, both financially and militarily. Pakistan supports the Taliban in order to keep its strategic depth inside southern Afghanistan." A "proxy war" between the American forces and the forces supported by Kabul would be a possible scenario. "Thus, if Pakistan decides to continue its policy of supporting the Taliban as a means to gain strategic depth in southern Afghanistan, and the United States decides to cut its aid to Pakistan, the conflict is likely to escalate. Without U.S. financial support, Pakistan has no reason to keep a leash on its proxies inside Afghanistan."

Scenario No. 4 is painfully familiar: it is a full-scale civil war. "The United States cuts its financial support to the government of Afghanistan. Pakistan supports the Taliban in order to keep its strategic depth inside southern Afghanistan."

Scenario No. 5, which the authors called "The American Dream," envisages that "the United States stays committed to Afghanistan, both financially and militarily. Pakistan breaks with the Taliban in order to prioritize its domestic problems." Afghanistan will be stabilized from the political-military point of view, while the threat of radical Islam will diminish. The United States and the world community will augment their effective aid to Afghanistan to revive its economy.

The FOI scenarios expect that Pakistan will be actively (positively or negatively) involved in the developments.**

In December 2010, the Learned Council of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences, met to

* For more details, see: M.T. Laumulin, "Stsenarii razvitiia Afganistana i pozitsii zainteresovannykh storon," in: Afghanistan: nastoiashchee i budushchee. Vozdeystvie na stabilnost i bezopasnost Tsentralnoy Azii. Materialy mezhdunarodnoy konferentsii, FFE, Almaty, 2011, pp. 109-121.

** See: Afghanistan after 2014: Five Scenarios, FOI, Stockholm, 2012, 100 pp.

*** See: I. Labinskaia, "Tsentralnaia Azia v kontekste afghanskoy situatsii," *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnoshenia* (IMEMO RAN), No. 5, 2011, pp. 3-16.

discuss Central Asia in the Afghan context. An international conference on the same subject was held in 2012. * The participants discussed possible scenarios and concluded that the situation in Afghanistan would largely be determined by one of the scenarios realized after (or during) the pullout.

Scenario No. 1, pessimistic (the Taliban-2): Afghanistan will be plunged into a civil war between an ethno-territorial Pashtun group, on the one hand, and a “second edition” of the Northern Alliance (Tajik-Uzbek-Hazara bloc), on the other. This strife will remove the Karzai government and bring to power the irreconcilable Taliban; this will bring back the situation of 1996-2001 when the country served as a shelter for al-Qaeda and international terrorists fighting under its aegis. They threatened Central Asia, Russia, and, in fact, the rest of the world. This will challenge all of Afghanistan’s neighbors, particularly the Central Asian states.

In view of the extremely weak armies and border guards of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, their CSTO and SCO partners will have to step in, which will increase social and economic tension in all the member states.

Scenario No. 2, optimistic (peaceful Afghanistan): it suits the interests of the people of Afghanistan and its neighbors, including the Central Asian countries. This will start the so-called Kabul process, launched in July 2010 at a Kabul Conference on Afghan Settlement. If implemented, the program of national reconciliation and reintegration and structuring of the system of state governance will allow the local administration to maintain stability. A coalition government patterned on the Iraqi model will rely on a consensus between the key political forces to represent, on the whole, the interests of the main political forces—the Pashtun and other ethnic groups.

The 2012 conference offered its own scenarios.

Scenario No. 1 (pessimistic): fiercer confrontation among ethnic groups up to and including a wide-scale armed struggle; it will be gradually gathering momentum as the main contingents of the United States and ISAF pull out of the country. This may bring irreconcilable Taliban to power, which will revive the situation of 1996-2001 when the country served as a shelter for al-Qaeda and international terrorism forces that threatened the world.

If implemented, this scenario will create all sorts of risks for the Central Asian states:

- The theater of civil war will spread to Tajikistan and Uzbekistan as Afghanistan’s closest neighbors;

- Internal destabilization might provoke ethnic conflicts in Central Asia;

- Refugees from Afghanistan will add to the social tension;

- The hot climate and water shortages will make the epidemiological and sanitary situation even worse;

- The Islamist underground will regain its vigor in Central Asia (and the Ferghana Valley, in particular); its “dormant cells” will join forces with the “comrades-in-arms” (militants of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and al-Qaeda-type groups based in Afghanistan) to carry out anti-government armed actions aimed at undermining the secular nature of the region’s states.

Scenario No. 2 (moderately pessimistic): the pullout of the Western coalition and possible retirement of President Hamid Karzai will be followed by a short period of fierce struggle for power among various political forces. The moderate Taliban will win.

In the short-term perspective, Central Asia will remain safe from dramatic repercussions promised by the pessimistic scenario. First, the Taliban will not try to capture territories in Central Asia or set up a Caliphate there; second, the Uzbeks and Tajiks of Afghanistan, who want to fortify their own positions inside the country, will not seek support outside it among the Uzbeks and Tajiks of Central Asia.

We should bear in mind, however, that in the long-term perspective the moderately pessimistic scenario might become pessimistic because of rivalry in Afghanistan or because of worsened relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan. This will make security threats to the Central Asian countries very real.

Scenario No. 3 (optimistic): if implemented, the programs of national reconciliation and reintegration in Afghanistan will create a foundation for a coalition government that will represent the interests of all the political forces and peoples of Afghanistan—both Pashtun and non-Pashtun (Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazara, etc.) Much will be done

to neutralize or even liquidate Islamist groups connected with the irreconcilable Taliban or al-Qaeda. This will deprive the religious extremists in Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as in the Central Asian states, of a great share of support.

If realized, this scenario would allow the Central Asian countries

- To strengthen their political systems in the absence of an outside threat of destabilization;
- To preserve the secular development vector and the historically shaped traditions of secularism of state power and political regimes;
- To develop mutually advantageous relations with Afghanistan in the sphere of energy supply and transportation.

There are also several alternative scenarios.

(A) The Central Asian states and Afghanistan will develop on the basis of the Eurasian Union. They will form a confederation of sovereign states with a common political, economic, military, and customs space based on the union of Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus, as well as several integration structures (EurAsEC, CES, the Customs Union, and CSTO).

(B) Implementation of the American megaprojects the Greater Central Asia and the New Silk Road, which presuppose closer economic and political integration of Central Asia and South Asia based on Western political patterns.

(C) Stronger economic and political influence of the "growing powers" (China, India, and Turkey) in Central Asia mainly based on economic relations. The Central Asian states will remain true to their multivectoral policy and will preserve close contacts with Russia, the EU, and the United States.*

What the Experts Think

According to Robert Blackwill, an expert at the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations, "Washington should accept that the Taliban will inevitably control most of the Pashtun south and east and that the price of forestalling that outcome is far too

high for the United States to continue paying... The United States and its allies would withdraw ground combat forces over several months from most of Pashtun Afghanistan, including Kandahar. The ISAF would stop fighting in the mountains, valleys, and urban areas of southern and eastern Afghanistan (although it would continue to provide arms, aid, and intelligence to local tribal leaders there who want to resist). Washington would concentrate its efforts, meanwhile, on defending the areas in the north and west of Afghanistan not dominated by the Pashtuns, including Kabul. Washington would enlist Afghanistan's Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras, and supportive Pashtuns in this endeavor—as well as its NATO allies, Afghanistan's various neighbors, and hopefully the United Nations Security Council.

"The Afghan Taliban would be offered a *modus vivendi* in which each side agreed not to seek to enlarge the territory it controlled, so long as the Taliban stopped supporting terrorism.

"Accepting a de facto partition of Afghanistan makes sense only if the other options available are worse," writes Blackwill. "One alternative is to stay the current course in Afghanistan. Another alternative is for the United States to withdraw all its military forces from Afghanistan over the next few years. But this would lead to a probable conquest of the entire country by the Taliban.

"A third alternative would be to try to achieve stability in Afghanistan through negotiations with the Taliban. NATO could seek to entice the Afghan Taliban to stop fighting and enter into a coalition government in Kabul."**

John D. Podesta, chair of the Center for American Progress, has elaborated the main principles of Washington's future strategy in Afghanistan: "...as the United States prepares to exit Afghanistan, it is focusing too much on security, overlooking the political elements of the transition. To leave behind a stable government in 2014, Washington needs to push harder for electoral reforms, negotiations with the Taliban, and a regional settlement involving Pakistan."***

* See: *Vyzovy bezopasnosti v Tsentralnoy Azii*, IMEMO RAN, Moscow, 2013, 150 pp.

** R. Blackwill, "Plan 'B' in Afghanistan. Why a De Facto Partition is the Least Bad Option," available at [www.foreignaffairs.com/print/66982 2/6].

*** [http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137696/stephen-hadley-and-john-d-podesta/the-right-way-out-of-afghanistan].

Experts of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute at Johns Hopkins University have offered a wide range of measures designed to stabilize Afghanistan to be implemented in three stages:

- (1) short-term, from 2012 to 2020;
- (2) mid-term, from 2010 to 2025, and
- (3) long-term, which will begin in 2025.

As could be expected, the plan follows the logic of the well-known Greater Central Asia concept of Frederick Starr. These, mainly long-term, measures are geared at transportation and energy supply projects.*

According to Chinese experts at the Center of Russian Studies (Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences), after 2014 Central Asia will face three real threats and three potential security challenges:

The first threat: "three forces" have been and remain the main enemy of Central Asian security.

The second threat: transborder crime, which greatly violates law and order in Central Asia.

The third threat: external terrorist forces, which penetrate the region and exacerbate the situation.

- *The first challenge:* struggle among the Great Powers in Central Asia complicates the security situation in the region.

- *The second challenge:* the power struggle at the coming elections makes the region's future vague and the situation unstable.

- *The third challenge:* sharper national contradictions threaten Central Asian stability.**

Experts of the Institute of South and Southeast Asian and Oceania Studies at the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations believe that the situation in Afghanistan may follow one of four possible scenarios.

(1) A civil war might be inevitable if no peaceful agreement among all the sides is signed (irrespective of whether the coalition forces pull out or stay put).

(2) In the most extreme case, a civil war and foreign interference may cause disintegration after 2014.

(3) If disintegration has been avoided, a civil war or political reconciliation may end in self-administration of the provinces.

According to Ivan Safranchuk, Deputy Director of the Institute of Contemporary International Studies, Diplomatic Academy, RF Foreign Ministry, the future of Afghanistan is not predetermined and still hinges on several variables:

(1) a basic compromise between the warlords and the effective government in Kabul survives;

(2) if it falls through, this compromise will open the road to regional and ethnic rivalry.

In the first case, the balance of power between Kabul and the provinces will be gradually redistributed in favor of the latter. "Ultimately, the Afghans should be given the opportunity to build a steady balance of forces at home, and then use these forces as a basis for political compromise. The role of external players, large regional countries, and immediate neighbors should not be obtrusive mediation. The Afghans will have to agree among themselves. The main requirement for all political forces in the country must be as follows: Afghanistan as a threat is not good for the country, which needs to be an integral political and economic part of the region. The external players, the large regional countries and closest neighbors should avoid nagging mediation."***

Experts of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs believe that the West can still win if the following key tasks are addressed and accomplished:

(1) Afghan national police force and Afghan national army should be set up.

(2) Afghanistan should acquire an effective state apparatus and carry out an efficient anti-corruption campaign.

(3) Afghanistan should achieve national reconciliation.

(4) Afghanistan should organize regional cooperation with Pakistan and Iran in particular.

* See: S.F. Starr, A.C. Kuchins, *The Key to Success in Afghanistan. A Modern Silk Road Strategy*, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program—A Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center, Johns Hopkins University-SAIS, Washington, D.C., 2010, 48 pp.; S.F. Starr, *Finish the Job: Jump-Start Afghanistan's Economy*, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program—A Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center, Johns Hopkins University-SAIS, Washington, D.C., 2012, 55 pp.

** See: Vyzovy bezopasnosti v Tsentralnoy Azii, pp. 84-89.

*** I. Safranchuk, "Afghanistan in Search of Balance," available at [http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/person/p_1260].

(5) Afghanistan should create conditions conducive to economic growth.

NATO based its Afghan strategy on the hope of achieving progress, at least in some respects, but, so far, nothing has happened.*

Experts from the Institute of the Far East, Russian Academy of Sciences, have reduced all possible post-2014 developments to four scenarios, two of them negative, one moderately negative, and one positive.**

The first scenario is fraught with possible Balkanization, which will become probable in the absence of an obvious victory at the concluding stage of Operation Enduring Freedom and also if the Americans fail to negotiate territorial delimitation with the Taliban and if vast areas escape the control of the Karzai government.

The provincial leaders and warlords, many of whom have no real trust in the Kabul authorities today, will gain strength.

The country may slip into another version of the Arab Spring with wide-scale criminalization and radicalization of the region's population and worsened national relations still further aggravated by Islamic extremism. Tajikistan inundated by the Islamist opposition so far stationed in Afghanistan will be plunged into the second wave of a civil war.

Secular power in the other Central Asian republics may collapse; this will do nothing for the international energy projects and will intensify the flow of drugs to the region, Russia, and Europe. There is no doubt that all sorts of terrorist groups will use this opportunity to step up their activities along the borders of the Central Asian countries and inside them.

Under the second (moderately negative) scenario, the Americans and the Taliban will agree to divide the country: the government armed forces will assume responsibility for the north and the west, while the Taliban will move into the south and the east of the country, something which the local warlords will accept.

Under the positive scenario, the United States will remain in Afghanistan; in this case the elite will close ranks around the government in Kabul; agreements with the moderate members of the Taliban will become possible. The Afghan army will fortify its positions across the entire territory, which spells defeat for the irreconcilable part of the Taliban. Social and economic problems will be addressed, while efficient mechanisms of control over drug production and trafficking will be set up.

Washington will do its best to alleviate the concerns of Moscow and Beijing about America's continued presence in Afghanistan. The international community, very much as usual, will side with the United States to persuade Russia and China to join the concerted efforts to rehabilitate and stabilize Afghanistan for the sake of regional stability. This variant is possible, but the United States, Russia, and China are unlikely to arrive at a consensus on America's presence in the region.

On the whole, if realized, most of the scenarios will negatively affect regional security and the national interests of the Central Asian SCO members and also of China and Russia, two key members, the positions of which are the strongest in the region.

Dr. Mariam Arunova of the Institute of Oriental Studies, RAS, has pointed out that the Afghan Question might become regionalized after 2014: the regional powers, including those acting within the SCO format, will increase their impact on Afghanistan. The possible SCO role was discussed in 2009-2011 at the meetings among the presidents of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Russia and of representatives of the heads of the executive structures of the SCO, CIS, EurAsEC, and CSTO, as well as at the SCO summit.***

Shah Mahmud, Ph.D. in Political Science, research fellow, and lecturer at the MGIMO (U), Foreign Ministry of Russia, has pointed out that the Taliban is far from a homogenous movement and that some of its members have already sided with the Kabul leaders. There are at least 400 former

* See: S. Harnisch, *Back to the Future: Germany's Afghanistan Policy after 2014*, Institute of Political Science, Heidelberg, 2013, 12 pp.

** See: Yu. Morozov, "Afghanistan posle 2014 goda: stabilnost dlia gosudarstv ShOS ili novy vitok napriazhennosti v Tsentralno-Aziatskom regione?" *Problemy Dalnego Vostoka*, No. 2, 2013, pp. 94-114 (Yu. Morozov, "Afghanistan after 2014: Stability for SCO States or New Tensions in Central Asia?" *Far Eastern Affairs*).

*** See: V. Belokrinitskiy, S. Kamenev, "Afghanistan i Pakistan: sostoiianie i perspektivy?" *Vostok-Oriens*, No. 4, 2012, pp. 165-170.

Taliban members in President Karzai's closest circle involved in the administrative processes; this also accounts for the current relative lull in the southern provinces (Kandahar, Helmand, etc.).

Shah Mahmud does not rule out post-2014 splits and violent disagreements among the local political forces, including the irreconcilable ones; he has in mind the old guard of the Taliban and the new generation of militants who refuse to accept the regime. Opposition between Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns may flare up to cause a split inside the politically active groups of population.

Victor Korgun, who heads the Afghanistan Sector at the Center for Middle Eastern Studies of the Institute of Oriental Studies (RAS), has pointed out that the pullout is complicated by a number of factors: the content and nature of the future bodies of power in which the Taliban and its allies will be obviously represented. Afghanistan's neighbors, particularly Pakistan and Iran, which have divergent interests, will strongly affect the transfer of power and responsibility for the country's security to Afghanistan.

Ruslan Sikoyev of the Institute of Oriental Studies, RAS, has offered his vision of post-2014 society. He concentrates on the role of the Muslim clergy as one of the most influential social groups flexible enough to be promptly adapted to the changing conditions and find a place in the structures of state power. His analysis led him to an interesting conclusion: the clergy has failed to capitalize on the integration potential of Islam since it is split into regional and ethnic groups.

As 2014 draws closer, the non-Pashtun ethnic groups are establishing positions they will retreat to in the event of war; they are ready to defend the social and political gains of the recent decades.

Indian experts are convinced that their country wants stability in Afghanistan, something which will become harder to attain after 2014. New Delhi believes that the involvement of Pakistani sub-state and non-state actors in what is going on in Afghanistan is one of the main factors causing the problems and slowing down normalization of the processes underway in this country.

Pakistan, on the other hand, looks at the Afghan problem as a Great Game waged by the great and regional powers. Islamabad fears that China, India, and the United States might fortify their positions in the region, the positions of Iran and India causing the greatest concern. Pakistan looks at the possible role of the Central Asian countries mainly through the prism of big geopolitics, "the pipeline politics" and its own interests.*

Pakistan prefers to initiate and implement a plan of the country's rehabilitation and stabilization on its own. It suggests that the OIC and Saudi Arabia should also be involved in the process and deliberately ignores China, Russia, SCO, and the EU, all of them with their own interests in Afghanistan. Islamabad is convinced that the U.S. should not insist on preservation of the state system for Afghanistan set up within the Bonn Agreements.

In an interview given on 21 September, 2012, Zamir Kabulov, Russian presidential envoy to Afghanistan, said that about 68 thousand U.S. military would stay behind in Afghanistan until the end of 2014. The Americans are prepared to pull out all units involved in the fighting; a certain number of American military, however, would stay longer to provide training for the Afghan troops at 5 to 7 training (in fact, American full-scale military) bases.

The American pullout is better described as a hasty and sloppy process: Washington was in a hurry to concentrate its might in the APR to balance out China. By the fall of 2012, half of the country had been transferred to the Afghan police and the army; by the end of 2012, they were expected to control 75 percent of the entire territory; by mid-2013, they would assume responsibility for the entire territory.**

According to Mikhail Konarovskiy, Deputy SCO Secretary General, Kabul and the external players should seek wider autonomy for the provinces, leaving the center in control of the key spheres such as finances, foreign economic trade and aid, domestic and foreign policies, the defense and security structures, etc. The author is convinced

* See: A. Durrani, "Post-NATO Afghanistan: Implications for Regional Security," *Russia in Global Affairs*, No. 4, 2012.

** See: Z. Kabulov, "SShA uydut iz Afghanistana, chtoby usilit prisutstvie v ATR," *Indeks bezopasnosti (PIR-Tsentr)*, No. 3-4, 2012, pp. 11—18.

that considerable or even radical shifts in political and ideological landmarks can hardly be avoided.*

Vadim Sergeyev, Third Secretary at the Department on Issues of Security and Disarmament, Foreign Ministry of Russia, believes that Afghanistan will remain an Islamic state. "It is very probable that, in a few years from now, the Taliban will take Kabul and restore the regime that existed in the 1990s under the name of Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan... The Taliban movement will soon come to power in Afghanistan once again. The Taliban movement does not pose a bigger threat to Russia than other Afghan armed groups. Cooperation with the Taliban can help attain two important tasks in Afghanistan today: turning the country into a stable and peaceful state and radically reducing illegal drug production." **

Dr. Dina Malysheva of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, RAS, looks at assistance from other countries and wider responsibilities for the local governments as two remedies that might reduce tension inside the country and prevent its spread to the neighboring countries and regions.

Wider involvement of the countries of South Asia and Central Asia in the Afghan settlement (together with U.N.) and their regional organizations dealing with politics and the economy, but not military cooperation, might strengthen regional security and open doors to those economic, energy, and transportation projects in which the Central Asian countries, Russia, China, Pakistan, India, and Iran united into SCO, BRICS, and the G-20 will work together with Afghanistan. These projects are unlikely to be implemented and the region will hardly return to normal if the United States/the West deliberately push out some of the countries (Russia, Iran, or China) from some of the projects (TAPI is a possible example). ***

Nikita Mendkovich of the Center for the Studies of Contemporary Afghanistan has forecasted that the 2014 pullout will rekindle the conflict. He has also written that the central government will prob-

ably remain in control even after the U.S. troops have left the country (the case of Iraq is an example). For a long time, however, the country will have to grapple with numerous problems, including the continued influence of warlords, corruption, deficient social and economic development, etc. It will hardly slip back into the year 2001 when it radiated a terrorist threat across the region. ****

Positions of the Central Asian States

What the Central Asian states think about the future of their region is highly interesting for the simple reason that what is going on in Afghanistan inevitably echoes in Central Asia.

Uzbekistan proceeds from two postulates:

- (1) the use of force will not bring settlement, and
- (2) the economy should play a more prominent role in the conflict settlement and the country's rehabilitation.

Tashkent moves in two interconnected directions: it is involved in economic projects and in diplomatic activities designed to pool together the efforts of Afghanistan's neighbors and the key external actors (the U.S., Russia, China, and NATO).

The Uzbek leaders are guided by the idea that a restored economy will inevitably reduce the conflict potential inside the country and that, therefore, the world community should concentrate on extending purpose-oriented economic aid to this country. Uzbekistan, in turn, is involved in building highways and railways, in the spheres of power production, construction, mining, education, and exchange of experts.

Tajikistan believes that its domestic situation depends on what is going on in Afghanistan and has pointed out that:

- The problem of Afghanistan cannot be resolved by the use of force;
- All interested countries should sign, at the U.N. level, an agreement on a "security belt" around Afghanistan to cut short illegal trade in weapons, ammunition, and technologies and limit, to a cer-

* See: M. Konarovskiy, "Afghanistan at the Threshold of Changes," *International Affairs*, No. 1, 2012.

** V. Sergeyev, "The USA in Afghanistan," *International Affairs*, No. 2, 2012.

*** See: D. Malysheva, "Afganskiy endspiel i regionalnaia bezopasnost," *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnoshenia*, No. 11, 2012, pp. 16-23.

**** See: N. Mendkovich, "Uroki na budushchee. Voennye itogi afganskoy kampanii NATO", *Rossia v globalnoy politike*, No. 2, 2013.

tain extent, the transit of military and quasi-military forces across its territory;

- The world community should fight drug production in Afghanistan and drug trafficking to the neighboring regions;

- Social economic, cultural, and political problems should receive special attention;

- Afghanistan should retain its territorial integrity and remain a centralized state.

Tajikistan is convinced that the Central Asian countries should arrive at a common and coordinated regional position on the Afghan issue. Special attention should be paid to their joint operations in Afghanistan's energy and foodstuffs market and mutually advantageous use of the infrastructural and transport potential of all countries, including Afghanistan. Dushanbe believes that geopolitical reorientation of the Central Asian countries southward (in a format close to the Greater Central Asia and the New Silk Road concepts) will contribute to the Afghan settlement.

Experts of the Tajik Research Center SHARK do not think that a reduced Western military presence in Afghanistan will greatly undermine Central Asian security, Tajikistan being the only exception. At the same time, destabilization in Afghanistan will negatively affect the situation in the Central Asian countries for several reasons: first, their security will cost more; second, many projects (energy and infrastructural, in particular) geared at progress and development will inevitably slow down.

The security-related programs Brussels, Washington, Moscow, and Beijing are implementing to help the Central Asian countries are not efficient enough and fall short of the announced targets.

A reduced Western military presence in post-2014 Afghanistan is not as important as the uncertain future of the country's statehood after the United States and its Western allies have formally transferred their direct security obligations to the Afghan government while remaining in the country and the region. This will make the security sphere less transparent and the tension greater.

This means that the latest geopolitical changes have created several serious challenges for the Central Asian countries: they must ensure their own security, realize new economic options, and

survive in the harsh regional rivalry and ups and downs of the game waged by the big actors—the U.S., Russia, China and EU—and new developing leaders—Iran, Pakistan, and India in Central Asia.*

Kyrgyzstan proceeds from two issues of fundamental importance:

- (1) Lack of resources and political instability inside the country do not allow it to be involved in economic cooperation with Afghanistan.

- (2) The U.S. Transit Center at Manas, one of the key elements of the Northern Route opened to support Operation Enduring Freedom, is in its territory.

Kazakhstan proceeds from its firm conviction that sustainable economic development of Afghanistan is the best guarantee against the threat of international terrorism, religious fundamentalism, and drugs, which are spreading far and wide from Afghan territory. The world community and the U.N. acting in close cooperation with the government of Afghanistan, which strives to consolidate society and build a civilized democratic state, should play an active and, more importantly, effective role in political settlement and rehabilitation of this country. It should become less dependent on foreign aid and more attractive to foreign investors; industrialization as a business project for transnational companies rather than foreign aid is the best answer.

Astana is concentrating on extending purpose-oriented economic aid to Afghanistan through the Kazakhstan-Afghani intergovernmental commission on trade and economic cooperation as one of the instruments. This means financial support, construction of social and industrial objects, development of infrastructure, personnel training, etc.

Kazakhstan is involved in multisided cooperation in the NATO-SCO-CSTO format; it is an active member of the Workgroup on Afghanistan at the CSTO Council of Foreign Ministers and the rehabilitation projects of the Contact Group on Cooperation and Coordination of Efforts of the SCO member states.

Astana believes that multisided structures should move in the following directions:

- Ensure post-conflict settlement in Afghanistan with the U.N. playing the key role;

* See: *Vyzovy bezopasnosti v Tsentralnoy Azii*, pp. 81-82.

- Help Afghanistan build an independent, neutral, peaceful, and flourishing state free from terrorism and drug-related crimes;
- Create a security belt along the country's borders;
- Liquidate the trade barriers, open new routes of transportation of commodities, and set up conditions conducive to investments.

Conclusion

Today, there are two opposite opinions about the ways and means for settling the conflict in Afghanistan.

(1) Peace and conflict settlement are possible only after complete pullout of foreign troops from the country, or

(2) peace and stabilization are possible only after the Taliban is completely routed.

Long-term forecasts about the Afghan developments are practically impossible; in any case this is a thankless task. The Western countries rely on military force to fully control the Afghan army, international assistance, etc. It seems that in the foreseeable future the Taliban will split into a radical and a legal wing, the latter most probably seeking a place in the country's political system.

Today, the political situation inside the country is vague; Kabul (urged by the Western allies eager to present to the world at least their relative successes in "democratization" and "stabilization") actively promotes its achievements.

Afghanistan, a sad example of failed centralized democracy, is moving toward disintegration. The Taliban feels completely at ease in some parts of the country, while the rest remains unstable under the rule of all sorts of leaders whom no one can control. If the Karzai government falls, the country will sink into anarchy and civil war. Centralized dictatorship is another, yet hardly plausible, option. In any case, the United States will try to prevent unwelcome scenarios; this means that it will remain involved in the Afghan conflict.

It seems that the military presence of the U.S. and NATO in Afghanistan will be gradually diminished, albeit at a slower pace than happened in Iraq: the United States will have to keep from 30 to 50 thousand troops in the country to prevent its complete destabilization.

The Central Asian countries will need safe borders to keep away crowds of terrorists and flows of illegal weapons and drugs. The SCO member states will seek opportunities to be involved in Afghan economic rehabilitation and energy projects (provided there are corresponding agreements) and bigger investments if there are fewer security risks.

This will call for new bilateral (between Russia and Central Asian countries) and multilateral (CSTO and SCO) agreements on cooperation in anti-terrorist struggle.

If the situation in Afghanistan goes from bad to worse, the Central Asian countries will have to spend more on their own security, which will do nothing for the region's investment climate. Afghanistan's south and east might become a training camp of radical militants.

The flow of illegal arms in the Central Asian countries will increase; the leading political actors and international organizations will become even more eager to draw the region's countries into their spheres of influence, which will stir up even fiercer geopolitical rivalry. This will probably transform the region into a "grey" security zone; today the possibility of this is assessed as fifty-fifty.

The CSTO countries, therefore, should close ranks in the face of the looming threats.

In the political, military, and economic spheres, the Central Asian states intend to do the following:

(1) Preserve stability after the pullout of the main coalition forces; prevent multicultural complications burdened with Islamic extremism; and upgrade Central Asian security measures. Everything should be done to prevent the south and east of Afghanistan from turning into a huge training camp of radical militants.

(2) Ensure secure pullout of the coalition forces throughout the Northern Distribution Network; strengthen the position of the Afghan army; prevent a civil war; keep radical forces outside the Central Asian republics; cut short illegal arms trafficking; and take control over drug production and drug trafficking.

(3) Help Afghanistan restore its economy, attract more foreign investments, and help implement energy and transportation projects.

Any of the scenarios discussed above might put an end to the current standstill; this will upset the balance of power in the world and affect all the actors with interests of their own in Afghanistan.

CES AND CA: THE DYNAMICS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND COOPERATION

DARIA MUKHAMEDZHANOVA

The geographical proximity of the countries of the region and the scale of integrating economies have the biggest influence on the dynamics of integration processes. Specificity of economic and political environment becomes a new factor of integration. Currently, economic and environment integration in the CIS is formed by CES countries (CU) and CA, which have different nature and extent of involvement in global and regional economic processes.

Impact of globalization has led to a geographical expansion of interstate relations between CES countries and Central Asia. CA's feature is that at the present stage the region is situated at the center of Eurasian economic space's security problems and appears to be a subject of increasing economic and political interests of the external forces. Meanwhile, on one hand, the tendency of the CIS priority vector decreasing in the trade policies, on the other, the weakening of the economic position of Russia and Kazakhstan on the background of economic and political activity of China and Western countries in the region, are becoming visible.

The countries of the CES and CA face the challenge of balancing between economic interests in the Eurasian Economic Area and its macroeconomic and social stability. In our view, the three countries of CES may affect expansion of potential convergence of economies in Central Asia and the CU and, focusing on the positive dynamics for development of the economies in Central Asia, change emerging negative trends of economic disintegration and social differentiation in the region.

Dynamics and development trends

According to the IMF, world growth will have achieved 3.5% by 2013. The main engines of global economic development are countries with emerging markets and developing countries. According to the findings of the international and regional reports, countries of CES and Central Asia have seen a dramatic rise and the economic prospects for these regions are assessed as favorable.

In general, the predictive value of the CIS economic growth will be in 2013 and 2014 — 3.8% and 4.1%, respectively. In Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in 2013 the expected growth will exceed 5.5%. In the CES countries economic growth in 2013 should be: in Russia — 3.8%, Belarus — 8.5%, in Kazakhstan — not less than 5%.


IMF recommends countries with emerging economies to take into account the dependence of the growth dynamics from external risks of worsening of the situation and risks of strengthening the internal imbalances. It is noted that the space to maneuver in politics should be restored. In our opinion, it is necessary to pay particular attention to essential creation of “the room for maneuver in the economy”, that is to ensure macroeconomic and social stability, the formation of similar dynamics of macroeconomic and social indicators on the spaces of CES and Central Asia,* as well as common vectors of foreign trade cooperation.

* Hereinafter CA is considered without RK.

Macroeconomic stability is determined by the growth rates of GDP, investment activity, domestic and external demand.

GDP indicators within CES and CA for 2000–2011 reflect the positive trend of economic development in countries considered, as well as regional spaces of CES and CA as a whole (Fig. 1).

Investment activity, as one of the important indicators of macroeconomic stability in the region, most clearly characterizes the difference of economic development between CES and CA. In terms of investment activity considered regions are incomparable:



* CA without RK

Fig 1. GDP dynamics for CES countries and Central Asia in 2005—2011. In % to 2000

Source: UNCTAD Handbook of statistics, 2012. <http://unctad.org>

- firstly, volumes of FDI inflows into the economy of CES and CA are incomparable;

- secondly, CES has a more dynamic growth in FDI inflows after the crisis (Fig. 2). In CA, since 2006, there is a decrease in FDI inflows into the economy of Tajikistan, and after 2009, into the economies of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan (Fig. 3). FDI in Kyrgyzstan has increased slightly. In general on CA, the positive dynamics of FDI inflows is provided by the economy of Turkmenistan;

- thirdly, the lack of FDI outward from Central Asian region represents one-sided dependence of the region on foreign investment.

Dynamics of foreign trade. External demand is one of the main factors of economic growth in CES and Central Asia.

Overall the turnover of CES countries and Central Asia is characterized by the same dynamic of growth (Fig. 4)


Export is growing more rapidly than import, in CES and in Central Asia (Fig. 5, 6). And in CES the export most dynamically increases in Kazakhstan,

but in Central Asia in Turkmenistan. The import increases in Belarus and Tajikistan, respectively.

Structure and dynamics of export-import trade flows in CES and Central Asia. In 1995–2011 the different driving dynamics of trade flows (for each product group) were observed in CES and CA. During the reporting period in CES, only a share in the export of fuel commodity group has increased sharply (from 40.2 to 59.1%), the share of other products practically has not grown or the dynamics on them was negative (Fig. 7).

In the CA export a sharp decline effected the export of agricultural raw materials, a share fell from 44.8% to 15.4%. For all other commodity groups in 1995 to an increase in the share of total exports was observed (Fig. 8). The largest share in exports of CA takes the fuel.

The structure of CES imports the negative trend is observed in the food group, in all other groups with respect to 1995 the dynamics is positive (Fig. 9). The share of machinery and equipment accounts to 39.5% of the CES imports.



* Russia — right axis

Figure 2. FDI inflows to the CES countries in 2006–2011, in US dollars million





Figure 3. FDI inflows to the CA countries in 2006–2011, in US dollars million

Source: UNCTAD Handbook of statistics, 2012. <http://unctad.org>



* CA — right axis (without RK)

Figure 4. Dynamics of trade turnover between the CES and CA countries in 2000–2011, in US dollars million

Source: UNCTAD Handbook of statistics, 2012. <http://unctad.org>

Central Asian countries, as well as the CES, experience the greatest need in machinery and equipment, the share of which is accounted to 31.2% of the total volume of imports (Figure 10). Negative dynamics in the region characterize the import indicators of food and metals.

Social stability depends on correlation between the dynamics of economy and population growth. The difference in social development

of economically interconnected spaces of the CES and Central Asia is now, in our view, the main threat to regional sustainable development.*

Firstly, the CES and CA have different dynamics of population growth with the positive dynamics of GDP. So, if in CES the population for the period of 2000–2011 decreases, in CA — on the contrary increases (Fig. 11).

* WEF described the increase in the difference of income among the most likely global economic risks in the next ten years.




Figure 5. Import and Export of the CES countries in 2000–2011, in US dollars million





Figure 6. Import and Export of the CA countries in 2000–2011, in US dollars million


Source: UNCTAD Handbook of statistics, 2012. <http://unctad.org>



* Commodity group: 1- food; 2 — agricultural raw materials; 3 — fuel; 4 — metals; 5 — chemical products; 6 — machinery and equipment; 7 — other manufactured goods

Figure 7. The structure of export from the CES countries in 1995–2011, in %


Source: UNCTAD Handbook of statistics, 2012. <http://unctad.org>



* the commodity group, see Fig. 7

Figure 8. The structure of export from the CA countries (without RK) in 1995–2011, in %


Source: UNCTAD Handbook of statistics, 2012. <http://unctad.org>



* the commodity group, see Fig. 7

Figure 9. The structure of import to the CES countries in 1995—2011, in %


Source: UNCTAD Handbook of statistics, 2012. <http://unctad.org>



* the commodity group, see Fig. 7

Figure 10. The structure of import to the CA countries in 1995—2011, in %

Source: UNCTAD Handbook of statistics, 2012. <http://unctad.org>



* CA — right axis (without RK)

Figure 11. The dynamics of the population in the CES and CA countries in 2000—2011, in thous. people

Source: UNCTAD Handbook of statistics, 2012. <http://unctad.org>

Secondly, the formation of the population in the countries of CES and CA has been implemented unevenly and with different dynamics, in the CES — due to the Russian Federation, in Central Asia — due to Uzbekistan.

Thirdly, social differentiation between the countries of Central Asia and CES continues to grow, as well as within the CES and CA (Fig. 12,

13). So GDP per capita in CES ranges from \$5715 to \$12,890, and in Central Asia — from \$935 to \$5740.

During the period of 2000–2011 GDP per capita of the CES countries increased more than 7 times, in CA — 4 times. Average value of this indicator in CES 6.4 times exceeds its value in the CA (Fig. 14).




Figure 12. GDP per capita in the CEA countries in 2000–2011, in US dollars





Figure 13. GDP per capita in the CA countries in 2000–2011, in US dollars

Source: UNCTAD Handbook of statistics, 2012. <http://unctad.org>



*CA without RK

Figure 14. GDP per capita in average in the CES and CA countries in 2000 and 2011, in US dollars thousand

Source: UNCTAD Handbook of statistics, 2012. <http://unctad.org>

In our opinion, the CES countries, in particular Russia and Kazakhstan, may affect the expansion of potential convergence for the economies of Central Asia and the CU and, focusing on the positive trends of dynamic development of the economies of Central Asia, to change the negative trends of economic disintegration and social differentiation

in the region. First of all, it is necessary to concentrate on the problems of the CA associated with:

- high population growth, affecting the growth of water deficiency and food shortages;
- loss of productive capacity;
- unfavorable investment climate;
- uneven socio-economic development.

Dynamics and priorities for cooperation

Global priorities. The developed world countries still share the main volume of exports and imports for CES countries (64.7% and 51.2%). One of the most obvious indicators that reflect the reduction of the integration potential for cooperation

between the CES and CA countries is a reduction of the share of transition economies in their exports and imports. General tendency of the Central Asia in the CES countries' integration into the global economy is a decline in the share of foreign trade for developed countries and an increase of the share for the developing countries (Fig. 15—18).




Figure 15. The share of developed, developing and transition economies in the export of the CES in 1995—2011, in %





Figure 16. The share of developed, developing and transition economies in the import of the CES in 1995—2011, in %

Source: UNCTAD Handbook of statistics, 2012. <http://unctad.org>



*CA without RK

Figure 17. The share of developed, developing and transition economies in the export of the CA in 1995—2011, in %




Figure 18. The share of developed, developing and transition economies in the import of the CA in 1995—2011, in %

Source: UNCTAD Handbook of statistics, 2012. <http://unctad.org>

Change of transition economies share in turnover, in our opinion, is the main tendency determining the prospects of cooperation between CES and CA. If for CA the CIS space still plays an important economic role, for the CES countries the transition economies, including Central Asia, lose their economic significance.

Continental priorities. Continental trade preferences of CES countries are distributed between the EU and APEC (52.3% and 25.5% of total turnover in 2012). The main directions of foreign trade cooperation for the Central Asian countries are EA (34.9%) and CIS region (32.5%).*

Foreign trade cooperation of the CES and CA countries with the developed countries is characterized by different dynamics of development. If in the total turnover of the CES with the developed countries no decline in the share of the EU is observed (in 2011 relative to 1995), in the foreign

trade of Central Asian with the developed countries the share of the EU in this period declined sharply in exports (from 35.6% to 9.9%) and in imports (from 30.0% to 15.2%).**

Concerning the developing countries of Asia in 2005-2011 their share in foreign trade of the Central Asian countries with the developing world grew at higher rate (14.2% — 35.9% in exports and 17.4% — 32.4% in imports) than in foreign trade of the CE countries with the developing world (57.9% — 68.4% and 15.2% — 22.1%, respectively).***

Major trading partners. Major trading partners of the CU countries in Europe are Germany (8.8 % of turnover in the CU in 2012) and the Netherlands (10.5%), in APEC — China (12.2%), in the CIS — Ukraine (6, 2%). The share of CA in CU turnover for the period from 2010 to 2012 is actually unchanged at 1.3% (Fig. 19).




Figure 19. The geography of foreign trade between the countries of CU in 2010-2012, in US dollars billion

Source: <http://www.tsouz.ru>


Russia and China are major trading partners of the Central Asian countries. The share of China in 2011 accounted to 32% of total turnover of Central Asian countries, which is 1.4 times higher than that of the CU (including, in the import — by 1.2 times, exports — 2 times).

Russia's share in the turnover of the Central Asian countries varies from 8% to 15%. Total share of the CU countries in foreign trade of Central Asian countries was — 23% in 2011 (Fig. 20), including, in imports — 26%, in exports — 17%.

* According to EU Bilateral trade and trade with the world.//ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/regions/central-asia

** According to UNCTAD Handbook of statistics, 2012.// <http://unctad.org>

*** Ibidem



* CA without RK

Figure 20. The geography of foreign trade in Central Asia in 2011, in %

Source: EU Bilateral trade and trade with the world.//ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/regions/central-asia

In the context of multi-vector foreign economic relations of the countries of Central Asia and the CES and the necessity to preserve the Eurasian (post-Soviet) vector of current economic cooperation not only activation of intra-regional cooperation seems urgent, but also the formation of the general directions for the foreign trade and investment cooperation.

* * *

Thus, the analysis of macroeconomic indicators of the CES and CA development leads to several conclusions about the general prospects and problems of regional development:

- positive dynamics of the CES and CA economic growth is a basic pledge of cooperation between the countries of CES and CA in the context of downturn in global economic activity and unsolved problems of overcoming the crisis in the developed countries;

- CES and CA are interdependent factors for sustainable economic development of the regional space;

- indicators of macroeconomic performance and social stability the most clearly reflect the similarities and differences between economies of CES and CA;

- the basis of macro-economic stability of CES and CA lies in expanding of investment flows and promotion of commodity exchanges;

- social differentiation between the countries of CES and CA is a major threat to regional social sustainability, including the CIS space.

CES and CA regional foreign trade priorities are characterized as follows:

- the general tendency is to reduce the share of developed and growth of the share of developing countries in commodity turnover;

- the main tendency is the change in the share of transition economies;

- stable dynamics in reducing the proportion of transition economies in export and import of the CES countries reflects the tendency of reducing the integration potential of cooperation with Central Asian countries;

- major continental trade preferences of the CES and CA are distributed between the EU and Asian countries. If a slight decrease in the share of the EU is observed in the CES turnover, then the dynamics of reducing the share of the EU and the growth of share of Asian countries in regional exports and imports is expressed most sharply;

- the lowest share of the CA countries in CES turnover (1.3%) and the fact that it has not changed since the beginning of CU functioning mean an insufficient degree of estimation by CES countries of the threats of economic collapse over the EurA-SEC and the CIS;

- a significant proportion of the CES countries in CA turnover (23%) reflects the presence of the exist-

ing potential for cooperation between these countries within the common regional economic space.

Russia and Kazakhstan could affect the expansion of the potential for the convergence of the CA and CU economies, being guided by the positive trends of dynamic development of the CA economies to focus (in the frames of EurAsEC, CIS or individual programs) on the CA problems associated with:

- increasing of the water shortages, food shortages, acreage reducing;
- loss of productive capacity;
- unfavorable investment climate;
- low level of socio-economic development.

In the context of the necessity to preserve the Eurasian (post-Soviet) vector for economic cooperation and coincident trends of foreign trade relations development the formation of the following seems relevant:

- the common commercial policy of the CU countries in relation to the CA;
- common foreign vectors of foreign trade interaction between the CES and CA countries in the direction of the East, the Southeast and the South Asia;
- investment projects as part of a general food and transport space of the CEA and CA countries.

A revision is required for the basic principles of cooperation between the countries of Central Asia and CES:

- Firstly, it is necessary to bear in mind the importance of different regions of Central Asia and CES in shaping of macroeconomic, social stability and their role in the formation of the "indivisible security space." The three of CES should be considered as a guarantor of social and economic security of the CIS and Central Asia, in particular, and Central Asia — in terms of economic security of the southern borders within the threat of geopolitical reformatting of the region;

- Secondly, the CES countries ought to create a new perception of the Eurasian integration processes aimed at ensuring macroeconomic and social stability and dynamic development of the common regional space;

- Thirdly, it is necessary to create a viable economic assessment to material and financial capabilities of the CA countries in addressing global and region-wide problems in the area of transit, environment, and problems of the raw materials and food markets, as well as evaluating the required degree of the CES countries participation in joint projects.

The Republic of Kazakhstan's Rating in the World Grain Production and Export

URZADA YESSAIDAR

Food security is a global problem of the modern world, the main role in its ensuring belongs to crops, which are basic consumer products. Wheat, rice and corn predominate in the structure of food consumption. Accordingly, the world grain market is focused on these crops, its volume grows annually. Due to the increasing global demand the grain production grows, and in 2011 amounted to 2295 million tons, 50 million tons higher than in 2009. While grain consumption increased to 2280 million tons, 90 million tons higher than in 2010.

The rapid growth of the world population significantly increases the demand for main grain crops, which production is growing at a slower pace and do not have time to meet the needs of a growing population. Because of the decline to alarmingly low number of carryover grain stocks there is a constant and significant increase in food prices, which leads to a reduction in consumption among the population of the poor and developing countries, and, in some cases, to mass starvation.

Currently available 700 million hectares of areas under grain are insufficient for 7 billion people on the planet. For every person on earth there are only 0.1 hectares of grain crops, two times less than in the 60-ies of the last century. Growth of productivity, which provides an increase of the grain production, almost exhausted its possibilities. For 1990 and 2010 an annual growth of productivity has decreased compared to 1970-1990 doubly from 2.2 to 1.1%.

Today, the world leaders — grain producers are China, USA, India, the European Union countries. In recent years, grain production in the CIS countries has been increased, including Kazakh-

stan, which in a short time entered the ten largest producers of wheat, with significant opportunities to improve its rankings. In the ranking of the leading exporters of wheat, the republic firmly occupies the sixth place, and its potential can improve the position to the fifth place (Russia) and come close to the fourth (EU-27).

Methods

Improvement of the methodology and practice of scientific research and determination of grain rating of Kazakhstan in this article is based on systematization of the data about the trends, participants, volumes and prices on the world grain market. With this purpose, methods for monitoring of the materials from media and the Internet, database analysis, content analysis of documents have been used.

Results

World cereal production in 2011 reached 2295 million tons, including corn — 600.7; rice — 587.8; wheat — 584.2; barley — 131.2; sorghum — 61.1; oats — 24.8; rye — 19.8 million tons. The largest producers of grain crops are China, the U.S., the European Union and India. China produced 456 million tons, the U.S. — 384 million, the EU — 286 million, India — 226 million tons of grain. In the fifth place on grain production is Canada, where the production of basic grains in 2011 was 63.1 million tons [1].

In the structure of grain crops the production of wheat occupies an important place, which has increased in 2012 compared to 2011 by 67.2 million tons and amounted to 651.4 million tons. Most wheat was produced in the EU — 131.8 million

tons (22% of total world production), China — 118.0 (20%), India — 93.9 (16%), United States — 61.8 (10%), Russia — 38.0 (4%), Canada — 26.7 (4%), Australia — 21.0 (4%), Ukraine — 15.5 (3%), Argentina — 11.5 (3%) [2].

Kazakhstan at the end of 2012 reduced its positions in comparison with 2011, when in the ranking of the world's leading producer of wheat it took the sixth place, now it only managed to close the top ten leaders. In 2012, the country produced 9.84 million tons of wheat.

Kazakhstan is firmly entrenched in the top ten of the world's top producers of crops, primarily

for the position — the production of wheat. It has got quite strong positions on other crops.

The most of the country's acreage — 78% or 16.3 million hectares is occupied with crops. On average in the republic 13 — 20 or more million tons of grain are produced annually, in gross collection it firmly occupies the third place in the CIS after Russia and Ukraine.

Despite a significant decrease in the total cultivated area compared to 1990, the area of grain crops shows a steady upward trend since 2004. Next Table 1 gives data on changes in acreage of grain [3].

Table 1 — Adjusted sown area of grain crops in 1990—2012.

Years	Total adjusted sown area	Grain crops (including rice) and leguminous crops
1990	35 182,1	23 355,9
1991	34 935,5	22 752,5
1992	34 839,9	22 595,8
1993	34 060,4	22 250,4
1994	31 662,4	20 710,3
1995	28 679,6	18 877,7
1996	25 644,1	17 187,6
1997	21 843,7	15 651,4
1998	18 610,4	13 526,7
1999	15 285,3	11 392,5
2000	16 195,3	12 438,2
2001	16 785,2	13 208,7
2002	17 756,3	14 022,7
2003	17 454,2	13 872,6
2004	18 036,4	14 278,0
2005	18 445,2	14 841,9
2006	18 369,1	14 839,8
2007	18 954,5	15 427,9
2008	20 119,2	16 190,1
2009	21 424,9	17 206,9
2010	21 438,7	16 619,1
2011	21 083,0	16 219,4
2012	21 494,8	16 244,0

Comparing the data in 1990 and 2003, the first year of aul support in Kazakhstan, a significant reduction in the total sown area should be noted from 35 182,1 thousand hectares to 17 454,2 thousand hectares, by more than twice. Then, in 2004 begins the progressive growth of the acreage. In 2012, it increased compared to 2003 to 50

406 thousand hectares and was 21 494,8 thousand hectares.

Area of grain crops sowing in 2003 compared to 1990 decreased by 9483,3 thousand hectares, amounting to 13 872,6 thousand hectares. Since 2004 there has been a growth of grain crops acreage. As a result, in 2012, the sown area of grain

crops in Kazakhstan amounted to 16 244,0 thousand hectares or 78% of the sowing for the yield.

With a total reduction in sowing acreage and grain crops sowing, the gross grain yields in 1991 and 2010 are fully comparable. So, if in 1991 there were produced about 12 million tons of grain, in 2010 at a significantly smaller area about 16 million tons have been collected. Even more revealing is the comparison of the gross grain yield in

1990, which amounted to 28 487,7 million tons and in 2011 — 26 960,5 million tons.

The growth in grain crops production in 2010-2011 was achieved by increasing the productivity, in other words, not extensive, but intensive factors slowly start to work. For example, grain yield in 2011 at 5.7 t/ha higher than in 1991. The dynamics of these indicators is presented below in Table 2. [4]

Table 2 — Production and grain crops yield in 1990-2012.

Years	The gross grain yield (thousand tons)	Grain yield (c/ha)
1990	28 487,7	12,2
1991	11 991,9	5,3
1992	29 771,7	13,2
1993	21 631,0	9,7
1994	16 454,1	7,9
1995	9 505,5	5,0
1996	11 237,3	6,5
1997	12 378,0	8,7
1998	6 395,5	5,6
1999	14 264,3	13,0
2000	11 565,0	9,4
2001	15 896,9	12,2
2002	15 959,9	11,5
2003	14 777,4	10,8
2004	12 374,2	8,8
2005	13 781,4	10,0
2006	16 511,5	11,7
2007	20 137,8	13,3
2008	15 578,2	10,1
2009	20 830,5	12,6
2010	12 185,2	8,0
2011	26 960,5	16,9
2012	12860,0	8,6

As can be seen from the above data, the production of grain in Kazakhstan during 1990-2012 is characterized by instability due to the strong dependence on climatic and weather conditions. After all, it is a fundamental feature of the grain market, which is characterized by high volatility and variability of gross grain yield, as at the global level, so at the individual country level. For Kazakhstan, it is fundamentally important feature as the main area of grain crops are concentrated in the zone of risky agriculture. The same dependence is shown by the harvest dynamic associated

with the unpredictability of the weather conditions. For example, for the period 2002-2012 the maximum harvest of grain crops in Kazakhstan exceeded the average 2.1 times.

In the structure of grain production Kazakhstan has significant regional differentiation. Leaders in the grain production in the country appear three regions — Akmola, Kostanai and North Kazakhstan. All of them in 2003-2011 increased the acreage of grain crops. And if in 2003 Akmola region was a leader in the areas of grain cultivation, in 2007 it was overtaken by Kostanay region.

In 2011 Kostanay region continued to lead in the areas under legumes — 4 303, 0 thousand ha, followed by Akmola region — 4 278,9 thousand hectares, in the third place — North Kazakhstan — 3 894,3 thousand hectares.

In other areas, for which grain sowing is not a priority sector, by contrast, there has been a reduction of sowing for grain crops. In 2003-2011 they decreased in the Aktope region — from 645,6 to 588,5 thousand hectares, in the East Kazakhstan — from 569,1 to 520,6, Zhambyl — from 384,9 to 234,2, West Kazakhstan — 626,5 to 394,5 and Karaganda region — from 823,4 thousand to 693,6 thousand hectares. [5] As for the other regions, the reduction of grain crops acreage touched them slightly.

The gross grain yield increased in the period of 2003-2011 mainly due to the expansion of crop areas in the main grain sowing regions, because any significant changes in improving yield capacity were not noted. In 2003-2011, the gross grain yield in Kostanay region increased from 3337,6 thousand tons to 7 900,0 thousand tons, in Akmola region — from 3112,2 to 6597,6 thousand tons, and in the North Kazakhstan — 3 047,3 thousand tons to 7 879,4 thousand tons.

In grain production in Kazakhstan in 1995-2010 some structural changes took place. Proportion of wheat significantly increased — from 68,7

to 80%, barley decreased from 23,4 to 13,9%, oats — from 2.6 to 1.1%, rye — from 0.9 to 0.4, buckwheat — from 0.6 to 0.3%, millet — from 0.4 to 0.2%, and corn grew from 1.4 to 2.6% [6].

In 2011-2012, on the contrary, there is a tendency of increasing the share of other crops in the structure of total production. This can be judged according to the dynamic of acreage changing. For example, winter barley crops in 2000-2011 increased from 8.8 to 9.3 hectares.

Although the differences in the areas of crops are small, it is possible to notice a stable trend. In some years, for example 2007, winter barley crops occupied more than 20 thousand hectares. The same trend was observed for winter rye. On winter rye the dynamic is expressed more clearly, since 2000 its crop area increased from 26.9 to 59.8 thousand hectares in 2009. In 2011, the area of winter rye is almost back to the level of 2000 (27.2 hectares). [8]

These fluctuations are related to climatic conditions, when there is drought in a country, area of winter crops grows.

In the structure of grain crops wheat occupies 86% — the main cereal grown in Kazakhstan.

In 2012 compared to 2011 as a result of diversification of sowing crops structure the acreage of wheat has been reduced from 300 thousand hectares to 13.5 million hectares. [9]

Table 3 — Dynamics of wheat acreage in 2003-2012.

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Republic of Kazakhstan	11 361,9	11 956,6	12 647,9	12 425,5	12 892,3	13 476,1	14 751,0	14 261,7	13 848,9	13 464,0
Akmola region	2 987,9	3 192,2	3 262,8	3 320,8	3 487,4	3 664,8	4 075,8	4 080,9	3 962,4	3 935,4
Aktobe region	496,4	586,7	604,6	598,5	541,8	546,7	654,7	633,5	523,1	452,4
Almaty region	259,1	253,3	266,2	261,8	229,6	218,1	200,3	228,0	215,4	194,3
Atyrau region	0,1	0,2	0,3	0,1	0,1	-	-	-	-	-
Western Kazakhstan region	470,7	505,8	526,7	356,3	328,1	332,1	456,1	402,0	304,2	283,3
Zhambyl region	263,2	249,7	269,7	238,1	184,3	161,9	113,6	132,7	123,7	109,3
Karagandy region	723,6	754,7	773,5	582,9	610,0	606,1	638,5	656,8	596,3	541,4
Kostanay region	2 717,8	2 786,3	3 149,8	3 307,1	3 671,7	3 844,6	4 211,0	4 023,4	4 018,1	3 950,5
Kyzylorda region	11,0	10,2	12,8	10,7	9,8	8,2	7,0	5,3	6,7	5,9
Southern Kazakhstan region	182,2	184,4	194,6	210,1	170,4	144,0	151,1	167,5	168,2	127,7
Pavlodar region	426,4	397,1	408,5	389,8	421,2	446,2	470,8	361,4	417,2	400,7
Northern Kazakhstan region	2 417,2	2 602,8	2 756,5	2 751,1	2 854,2	3 086,1	3 373,7	3 233,4	3 155,2	3 107,5

Eastern Kazakhstan region	406,1	433,2	421,0	397,7	383,2	416,9	397,9	336,5	358,2	355,1
Astana	0,2	-	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,4	0,3	0,3	0,2	0,6
Almaty	-	-	0,4	-	-	-	0,2	-	-	-

In 2003—2012 acreage of wheat in Kazakhstan has expanded from 11 361,9 thousand to 13 464,0 thousand hectares. Today Kazakhstan is on the 6th place in the world for wheat sowing areas.

In terms of regions Kostanay, Akmola and North Kazakhstan regions have the most area under wheat. For 2003-2012 there was a marked increase in the acreage of wheat in these regions. So, in Kostanai region they increased from 2 717,8 to 3 950,5 thousand hectares; in Akmola — from 2 987,9 to 3 935,4 thousand hectares; in North Kazakhstan — from 2417,2 to 3107,5 hectares. Over three regions the growth was 2870,5 thousand hectares, including Kostanai — 1232,7; Akmola — 947,5 and North Kazakhstan — 690,3 thousand hectares.

On 1.09.2012, the volume of cereals and legumes stocks stored at all sites in Kazakhstan amounted to 8 million 877 thousand 728 tons. In the reserves structure the wheat took the main part, it was available 8 million 499 thousand 694 tons, including milling — 8 million 266 thousand 375 tons.

Stocks of corn amounted to 8072 tons (food — 670 tons), rice — 17,198 tons (food — 16,499 tons), barley — 198,224 tons (food — 58,811 tons), rye — 14,766 tons (food — 11,797 tons), oats — 52,510 tons (food — 9379 tons), buckwheat — 6488 tons (food — 5224 tons), millet — 13,192 tons (food — 11,569 tons), a mixture of grains — 34,197 tons (food — 2608 tons).

The balance of production and consumption of grain in Kazakhstan shows that the provision of the domestic market with our own production is about 157%. On average about 14 million hectares of crops are sown and 13.0 -14.0 million tons of grain are produced in Kazakhstan, with an average yield of 10 kg/ha, including wheat, which occupies 80% of the gross, or about 10.0 — 11.0 million tons. Grain production per capita in average for the last 3 years was 880kg. The produced volume fully meets the needs of the republic in the grain, including the creation of the state reserve, fodder and seed funds, and there is

a possibility to export it in a volume of 4-5 million tons per year.

The President of the Republic of Kazakhstan N.A. Nazarbayev in his historic address “Strategy Kazakhstan — 2050. New political course of the established state” speaking about the priorities of AIC development, stressed the necessity to drastically modernize the sector and said that the country has the potential to become a leader of the world food market. To do this it is necessary to: “Increase the acreage. Provide significant recovery of yields, primarily due to the introduction of new technologies”[10].

To solve the tasks set by the President, a Program on development of the agroindustrial complex of the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2010-2014 was launched, providing the increase the production of crops, which by 2014 should reach 19 million tons. Today, the domestic demand of the country are about 7 million tons of grain, in the future they should reach the level of 11 million tons due to increased consumption of a growing population. [11]

World leaders in the grain production are considered to be China, India, the U.S., the EU and Russia. However, control of the world market of grain belongs to the U.S., Canada, the EU, Australia and Argentina. These countries are accounted for the vast majority of the world's grain trade — 84 %. As is known, the ratio of available stocks of grain and the average needs of the population and its share in the world trade are an indication of the impact on the world grain market. Over a long period leading position belonged to the U.S., their share accounts annually to about 28 % of the trade. Next in the ranking are follow Canada with 17%, the EU and Australia with 15%, and Argentina, which occupies 11% of the global grain trade.

Ukraine and Russia significantly strengthened their positions in global exports of grain, which in 2011 surpassed Canada. In the digital equivalent the U.S. exported 73 million tons of grain in 2011, Argentina — 32 million, Australia and Ukraine — 24 million, Russia and Canada — 20 million tons [12].

Depending on the factors of grain demand and supply there is a movement on the world grain market. However, the traditional structure of the grain market today is actively affected by new participants, successfully competing with the formers and establishing a new pricing and export policy. Among them the Republic of Kazakhstan is becoming an important player. Over the last decade our country integrated into the world grain market, successfully demonstrating its ability to react quickly to changes in its environment, which is the main condition of market relations.

In 2012-2013, the volume of the world grain trade was about 290.6 million tons. Almost half of it was wheat trade — about 135.5 million tons. According to the October report, United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), leading positions in the export of wheat belong to the U.S., which even slightly increase its presence in the global grain market to 29%. In second place is still Canada, which controls 17% of the wheat market. Compared to 2011 the position of Australia has increased by 1 point, whose share in the export of wheat was 16%. The EU countries are in the fourth place with 15%. Russia moved to the fifth place with 8%. Kazakhstan in the rating of the world's leading wheat exporters took the sixth place, providing 6% of the world grain trade. [13]

China and India, which are major producers of grain in the world, focused on ensuring the domestic needs of very large population, and even are forced to import large amounts of grain. For example, in 2011 China imported 5 million tons of grain with the level of consumption of 451 million tons in the domestic market. This is the most

significant amount since the mid-1990s, when the country declared a goal of achieving the grain self-sufficiency.

That's why their impact on the world grain market is insignificant in making supply, but only in terms of increasing the volume of demand.

The U.S. fully meet their domestic needs and actively influence the formation of market conjecture in terms of the pricing policy formation. As the world cereal production structure is built in a such way that the most developed countries have a major grain reserves and accordingly are also major exporters. Another part of the countries is forced to resort to massive imports of grain, which makes them dependent on the U.S. and European countries.

In the season 2012-13 the largest importers of wheat were Egypt, which accounts for 16% of global imports, Brazil and Indonesia — 11%, Japan — 10%, Algeria — 8%, South Korea and Mexico — 7%. Russia due to lack of its own wheat, is also going to import one million tons.

Reduction in wheat production in Australia and Russia due to adverse weather conditions, and thereby reducing of the exports, lead to the strengthening of Kazakhstan's position on the global grain market, and especially wheat one. Annual export of wheat (including flour) in 2003-2011 was about 6.8 million tons. Due to the qualitative characteristics of grain having a high content of gluten (23-28 %) in wheat of the third class, it is in great demand in the world market. Table 4 presents data on dynamics of wheat export from Kazakhstan during the 2006-07 and 2012-13 marketing years. [14]

Table 4 — Dynamics of grain and flour export in Kazakhstan in 2006/07-2012/13 MG

	2006/07	2007/08	2008/09	2009/10	2010/11	2011/12	2012/13
Grain export	6,9	7	3,3	4,8	3,2	8,3	9,5
Flour exports in terms of grain	2,1	2,1	2,8	3,6	2,4	3,8	2,5
Total	9	9,1	6,1	8,4	5,6	12,1	12,0

As you can see, the dynamics of grain exports is characterized by significant differences depending on the production, which is characterized by a high dependence on the weather conditions. For

example, if in good years the export of grain was 7-9.5 tons, in the draught year 2010/11 MG it had fallen to 3.2 million tons. Flour export is much less subject to seasonal fluctuations, since the pro-

duction of flour in the lean years, is carried out not only from the new crop, but also out of the stock.

Kazakhstan's grain is now exported to more than 25 countries in Europe, Asia, Africa and the former Soviet Union. Key consumers in the CIS countries are Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and others. In Europe — Belgium, Italy import grain from Kazakhstan. In Middle East and North Africa — Jordan, Turkey, Sudan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia.

In a percentage term the largest importers of Kazakhstan grain are the countries of the Central Asian region and Russia. Of specific note is a fact that exactly the Russian Federation receives from 8 to 30% of grain exports from Kazakhstan. At the same time, Russia's demand for Kazakhstan's grain is constantly growing.

The government actively helps promote grain exports to new markets, so in 2011-2012 15 billion tenge have been allocated from the national budget to subsidize the transport costs of the grain transportation for export to non-competitive areas (by transit through the territory of the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China and separately into PRC). Government support enabled the dispatch of over 2.5 million tons of grain for export. In May 8, 2012 at a meeting of the State Commission for Economic Modernization of the Republic of Kazakhstan a decision was made to allocate additional funds in the amount of 15 billion tenge for the dispatch of 3.75 million tons of grain in the same directions.

Today, Kazakhstan has expanded the government measures to support agricultural and industrial complex and ensure its competitiveness. So, a new Program of agricultural complex development for 2013-2020 has been developed, which provides an analysis of existing and introduction of new and effective measures of the state support. "The main goal of the program is to create conditions for improving the competitiveness of agricultural and industrial complex subjects of the Republic of Kazakhstan. To achieve this, the measures will be taken in the following four areas:

- financial recovery;
- increasing the availability of goods, works and services for AIC subjects;
- development of state support systems for AIC subjects;

- enhancing the effectiveness of the state regulation of AIC." [15]

Total expenditure stipulated in the republican and local budgets for the implementation of the Program in 2013-2020, will constitute 2986.9 bln tenge.

Program on development of the agricultural and industrial sector in the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2013-2020 (Agribusiness 2020) stipulates to increase grain exports to 10 million tons.

Forthcoming accession of Kazakhstan to WTO will lead to increased competition in the global grain market and can be a significant factor influencing the production and export of grain in the country. Negative consequences and a loss of competitiveness of the grain sector are possible, due to enforced restrictions on the implementation of various measures of agrarian policy, including domestic support to agriculture, tariff quotas and the level of customs duties.

Under these conditions, the positive perspectives may stay in the format of interaction efforts of the Customs Union countries + Ukraine. An establishment of the Customs Union (CU) of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia seriously strengthened their common position on the global grain market. The CU countries become major leaders in the export of wheat and other grain crops. Growth of grain production gives our states an opportunity to become an important player on the world grain market.

The CU countries + Ukraine (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine) in recent years have strengthened the positions on the global grain market. In 2006-2012 the CU + Ukraine share in the world trade was in average: barley — 36.3%, wheat — 21.5%, corn — 7.7%.

While reserving the average gross yield of grain in Russia of about 90 million tons, in Ukraine — 50 million tons, Kazakhstan — 17 million tons, Belarus — 9 million tons, the share of these countries in the world wheat exports may rise to 25%, in the export of barley — up to 38-40%.

In perspective, the CU countries + Ukraine, upon conditional modernization of their grain farming, have a great potential for increasing both nominal volumes of exports and share in the world trade. Our countries, possessing rich grain resources can significantly help to solve world food problems.

With joint efforts the CU + Ukraine may have a significant impact on the pricing policy and volume of the world grain market. For this, the CU countries need to pursue a coordinated policy that establishes unified game rules on the grain market and suggests diversification of production, processing, especially deep one, and transportation of grains and products made from it. Such a policy will also help to solve the problem of overproduction or, in contrast, low grain harvest.

While this is only the prospects, and leaders in the world grain market, as already mentioned, are the five largest producers of grain crops — the U.S., European Union, Canada, Australia and Argentina. Russia sometimes achieves the number of the leaders, but stable anchoring in this “club” has not happened yet. Kazakhstan is ranked sixth in the world in the export of grain and the first in supplying flour. Belarus has a chance to gain a foothold in the top ten producers of rye grain but its potential is not as significant as have the other members of the Customs Union — Russia and Kazakhstan. However, already now the combined grain potential of the CU countries can exceed the volume of grain production in the United States.

Combining of grain resources of the three countries looks as even more ambitious prospects, they have every chance to get ahead of the traditional leaders of the grain market — the so-called big “five”.

Today combining of the efforts of the CU countries on the grain market is prevented by a competition for the trade areas. Kazakhstan, not having seaports, experiences considerable difficulties in delivering grain by sea. Russia is also interested in expanding exports through Ukrainian Black Sea ports. Competition in Ukraine, Russia and Kazakhstan grain export in this perspective direction leads to losses of about \$10 per every ton of grain, which is certainly beneficial for other competing countries. [16]

Therefore, a possibility of creating a single grain pool has been negotiated on the different levels of the three countries for several years. For the present the issue is at the project level, Ukraine creates the most obstacles in this way.

Kazakhstan is actively engaged in promoting the idea of joint grain terminals with Russia and

Belarus. Some experience in this area is already received, in a short time the country was able to implement the project of a grain terminal in the Baltic States.

Together with Russia Kazakhstan proposes to establish a project of a grain terminal in the Far East with capacity of 200-300 thousand tons of simultaneous storage and handling. Effectiveness of such a terminal is not in doubt, as Japan and other countries in Southeast Asia are very promising consumers of grain and grain products from the Customs Union. The decrease in railway tariffs while shipping Kazakhstan's grain across Russia will greatly enhance the economic effect of the joint project.

Simultaneously Kazakhstan is making efforts to develop the European direction of Kazakhstan's grain export. In order to achieve this, the issue of creating a modern terminal for handling and storage of grain on the territory of Belarus is being worked out. This project is beneficial as for Kazakhstan, so for Belarus, which is now actively developing its logistics system, cooperating with many countries, integrated into the Common Economic Space of Europe.

Thus, the formation of a single grain policy of the CU countries based on the coordination of efforts in the field of production, exports, pricing, logistics, transportation, and taking into account the interests of each state party of the Union will allow implement all possible perspectives and become major players on the world grain market.

For this purpose, today it is necessary to create specialized grain clusters, conduct a coordinated export policy and implement supranational grain crops interventions. For the effective development of grain potential of the Customs Union participants the development of a distinctive “road map” that takes into account the natural agro-climatic advantages of each of the CU countries and equal competitive conditions would become a useful and pragmatic measure. The result of these measures implementation will be steady growth of grain producers in the CU countries and coordination of export policy will allow them to become guarantors of not only their own, but also for the world food security.

Discussion

Thus, the ranking of the countries in global grain production is as follows. Five leaders grain producers are headed by China, followed by the USA, the EU, India and Canada. Kazakhstan confidently integrated into the world grain market and each year is increasing its presence. In 2012, the country entered into the six largest grain exporters in the world and first place in the supply of flour.

RK is the third largest grain producer in the CIS and in the future may increase its ranking to the second place, as Kazakhstan's export potential is estimated at 20-25 million tons of grain a year. It should be noted that his role on the world grain market will grow not only in traditional markets, but also on new ones. Prospects for increasing the ranking of Kazakhstan on the world grain market can be implemented through general, and then united grain policy of the Customs Union countries.

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The State's Role in Ensuring Food Security: Kazakhstan's Realities (Practice) and International Experience

GULIM ZHUNUSSOVA

Food security is one of the most important elements of the national security system, which characterizes economic stability, political independence of the state, as well as its ability to provide the food requirements of its citizens, while maintaining the physical and economic access to food in a quantity and quality that are needed to sustain people's life activity, at the time preserving national interests and independence of the state from the food exports.

In other words, it is such a state of the economy, in which all people are possible to be provided by basic foodstuffs in majority due to its own country production, without infringing upon the national interests of the state, with the mandatory priority for its most vulnerable, the poorest layers. [1]

In accordance with the country's development strategy "Kazakhstan-2050", the third challenge in the contemporary world is the threat of global food security, high growth of the world population drastically exacerbate the food problem.

Kazakhstan in this challenge may find tremendous opportunities. Our country is one of the largest exporters of grain. We have huge eco-friendly areas and can produce organic food.

We are quite capable to make a qualitative leap in agricultural production. For this we will need a state thinking of a new type. [2]

In accordance with the law of RK "On National Security," food security is provided through the development and implementation of socio-economic,

scientific- technical, administrative and other measures aimed at preventing and neutralizing the threats to food security. According to results of the last global food crisis, an emergence of a new chapter in the mentioned law is likely to appear — about safety of food. The Kazakhstan people's ration today consists of almost half of foreign-made products, even though they could be produced in Kazakhstan. Scientifically proven, if import of a particular type of product is 20 percent of domestic production volumes, it is possible to talk about the stagnation of production. If the figure is 60 percent, the production ruins. Our import food index is in average 35-40 percent. That is, the domestic agricultural sector is close to ruination. [3]

Consideration of food security in Kazakhstan in terms of common economic security is an urgent problem, since this process reflects the real trends in the development of agricultural production, the state of the domestic market and the situation of the consumers on it; determines the degree of involvement and dependence of the national economy from the global food market, uses the mechanism of government strategy with regard to the internal and external factors in the development of the country.

Particular importance to the issues of the state's food security as a political- economic category, affecting the internal and external security of the country is given in the Kazakhstan legislation. The legal basis for food security are the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the universally recognized principles and norms of international

law and international treaties of RK, Civil Code of RK, the laws of RK and other legal acts, which set out the principles of legal regulation of agricultural production. It should be noted that in the developed countries in order to ensure food security special legislation is adopted. Kazakhstan is currently working hard in this direction. Thus, new laws on protection of the domestic market of Kazakhstan, on production of agricultural products of the world standard, on protection of selection achievements, on standardization of changes to the Customs Code of the country, etc, have been adopted in the republic. However, all these acts are not of quite direct relation to food security. Therefore, it is necessary to define legislatively a number of concepts, directly reflecting this problem.

Thus, the law of the Republic of Kazakhstan "On Grain" gives the following definition of food security: "Food security is the state of economy, including its agricultural sector, ensured by adequate resources, capacity and guarantees, regardless of the external and internal conditions, in which the requirements of the population in food in accordance with the physiological nutritional standards are being satisfied." Given in this statute definition does not capture the essence of the considered category.

To solve the existing problems within the worked out documents, in particular, the "State Agri-food Program of the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2003-2005", where three components of food security were declared to be a priority for Kazakhstan: physical and economic access of food, safety of food, and the "Concept of Sustainable Development of Agro-industrial Complex of the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2006-2010" also highlighted the issue of food security of the country. Special completeness of regulatory base could be given by the law "On Food Security." However, this is currently on the agenda. At the same time there are all methodological and practical implications for the adoption of this law in Kazakhstan. Almost 10 years ago, on the fourteenth plenary session of the Interparliamentary Assembly of the CIS on October 16, 1999, in St. Petersburg, a model law "On the food security of the CIS" was adopted. Mentioned document defines the main directions of the state policy for the CIS countries in the field of food security, which is part of their security, as

well as a prerequisite for fundamental rights and freedoms in accordance with the applicable rules of international law. [4]

Government pays great attention to food security of the country, using different methods and techniques, including, price regulation, promotion of agribusiness development, and creation of stabilization funds for grain and staple foods, regulation of foreign economic activity, and more. Each of the tools has submitted its interventions on food security (Figure 1).

In the context of globalization the state of food security of the country is strongly influenced by external factors that are managed at the international level.

According to author's opinion, the conditions of Kazakhstan's accession to the WTO are not favorable for the development of agribusiness in the country. Permitted by the organization amount of state support for agriculture and the level of customs tariff protection for the Republic of Kazakhstan is much lower than in European countries, making it is impossible for our country to produce competitive in the domestic and foreign markets agri-food products, and it casts doubt on the validity of the existing global agricultural order. [5]

Agro-industrial complex of Kazakhstan is one of the main reproduction sectors of the republic's economy. It produces about a third of the national income. The presence of a huge potential of AIC in the country is indicated by a significant amount of agricultural land, the total area of 223 million hectares, including arable land — 21 million hectares; high employment potential of the village (in the countryside live around 45 % of the population); favorable climatic conditions for the cultivation of grains and legumes, potatoes and vegetables; significant potential of rangeland for livestock classes (84% of total land area).

Kazakhstan grain production ranks third in the CIS after Russia and Ukraine.

Wheat export is one of the main sources of foreign currency inpayments in the economy of the Republic. Despite the fact that the country is in the zone of risky agriculture and grain harvesting may be different in different years by more than 50 %, Kazakhstan is fully self-sufficient in grain, and exports at least 70 % of the crop even in the lean years. For example, in February 2013 USDA

cut its forecast of wheat production in Kazakhstan in the current agricultural year (July 2012 — June 2013) to 9.84 million tons, noting that 6.5 of them will be exported, while Kazakhstan forecasts wheat

harvest to be of 14.3 million tons. In 2011 it was raised more than 25 million tons of grain, which set a record in the collection of agricultural products (Table 1). [6]




Figure 1. Diagram of a mechanism to ensure food security of the Republic of Kazakhstan [compiled by the author]


At the same time growth in the grain harvest in Kazakhstan can not be considered sustainable because in 2004, 2005, 2008, and 2010 there was a decline in production of the main export crop of the republic — grain (including wheat). After the

maximal in the last years the gross grain harvest in 2009, 2011, the threshold in terms of country's food security level of 1.4 tons of grain per capita was exceeded (Figure 2).

Table 1. The gross grain harvest in Kazakhstan in the period of ten years (tons)

№	Crops	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
1	The gross grain harvest (tons)	14777	12374	13781	16511	20138	15578	20831	12185	26961	12865
	including: wheat	11537	9937	11198	13461	16467	12538	17052	9638	22732	9841
2	The share of wheat in total grain harvest (%)	78,1	80,3	81,3	81,5	81,8	80,5	81,9	79,1	84,3	76,5

Note – compiled by the author based on the source [6]

**Figure 2.** Gross harvest of wheat in Kazakhstan (tons) [6]

During the years of independence, Kazakhstan has passed a difficult way of reforming in all areas of agribusiness. Today all branches of agricultural production and the associated scope of products processing develop in all regions with rather good pace. This was largely contributed by producers adaptation to new economic conditions, the development of other sectors of economy, rising incomes, which increased demand for agricultural products and its processing, conducted by the state agricultural policy.

JSC “National Company “Food Contract Corporation” plays an important role in implementing of this policy.

JSC “National Company “Food Contract Corporation” is an agent of the state in the face of the government’s management of public resources and the largest grain company of the Republic of Kazakhstan. The main task of the company is to

ensure food security of the country by regulating the grain market, to stabilize prices for milling wheat, bread and bakery products in the country. Furthermore, mentioned company is implementing investment projects aimed at the development of fruit and vegetable sector, the cotton industry and transport infrastructure of Kazakhstan grain export.

Corporation supports domestic agricultural producers through direct lending and funding under the guarantee of socio-entrepreneurial corporations. [7]

The current situation in the grain market, associated with high harvesting in 2011 and a record harvest, led to a drop in prices in regional and global markets. As a result, agricultural producers had difficulties with the realization of wheat. In addition, in connection with congestion of elevators, manufacturers of northern regions were faced with the problem of the harvest storing.

Under the conditions of excess in grain stocks that have held back the market and put pressure on prices, it was necessary to increase the export shipments of grain, thereby empty elevator capacity to preserve the total harvest.

In order to activate the export, the state has provided subsidies for reimbursement of transportation costs of Kazakhstan exporters during grain supplies through Russian territory in the direction of seaports and China. Also organizational issues on support of export have been solved, measures on increasing the number of grain carrying trains were timely taken, in fall 2011 KTZ attracted additional trains from neighboring countries, including Russia, Ukraine.

For recovery of the domestic market the task was to bring the pace of export shipments to 1 million tons per month.

In 2011-2012 marketing year reached a record figure for exports of grain and its products, from 1 July 2011 to 30 June 2012 for export were shipped 12.1 million tons of grain including flour in grain equivalent, which is 2.2 times more than level of marketing year 2010-2011, including in the form of grain — 8.4 million tons, in the form of flour — 2.6 million tons. Average monthly volume of shipments of grain for export (including flour in grain equivalent) amounted to more than 1 million tons. [6]

The main directions of Kazakhstan's exports in the current season began Central Asia (Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan), Iran, Afghanistan, Turkey, Georgia, moreover, foreign countries — China, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Sweden, Latvia, Lithuania.

Under the control of a subsidiary corporation — LLP "AstykKoymalary" there are 6 grain enterprises with a total storage capacity of grain — 572.6 thousand tons. In addition, the possibility of the project "Construction of new, and expansion of the existing, acquisition of existing silos" is under consideration. New silos with a total capacity of 700 thousand tons are to be built.

Currently, "Food Corporation" has a special program for the construction of silos for 1.5 million tons. Among them granaries capacity of 800 thousand tons will be built due to private investment. And the rest (granaries capacity of 700 thousand tons of grain) state commission on economic modernization of Kazakhstan requested to build by "Food Corporation".

The "Food Corporation" plans to build granaries on export routes in the southern and western directions.

They will include major large granary capacity of 200 thousand tons at Saryagash station (for grain exports to southern direction to Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Afghanistan), terminal in the Iranian port of Gorgan (for deliveries of grain to Iran and the Middle East). [7]

Investment projects are implemented by "Food Corporation" in three areas: grain, cotton, and fruits and vegetables.

As for the grain, here the company has implemented a number of projects for creation an infrastructure of Kazakhstan grain export. Grain terminal in the seaport Aktau has been reconstructed, along with the Azerbaijan and Iranian partners grain terminals in Baku and Amirabad (Iran) have been built and put into service.

Currently, a draft of deep processing of grain is being considered, for which purpose a plant with the production capacity of 100 thousand tons of wheat per year is being planned. The final product of this plant will be the production of gluten, which has great export potential, and glucose-fructose syrups, widely in demand in the food industry.

Intensive work is being held within the program for creation of a food belt around Astana and Almaty.

Development of fallow land continues using drip irrigation technology in Akdalinsky mountain group of South Kazakhstan region and Shengeldinsky mountain group of Almaty region. [7]

It is noted that the bread and bakery products are of essential commodities group and bakery is a socially important sector of the economy, from which the country's food security largely depends on.

International experience shows that each country seeks to protect its agricultural producer from the negative displays of the market.

First of all, regard must be paid to a country like India, which over the past six months has become a weighty figure on the world grain market. The country has seen a ban on wheat exports, which was introduced in 2007. Thus, in 2010/11, local authorities banned the export of grain production, despite the fact that stocks of products in the country reached their record levels. During

the season, the Government of India had started to consider the opening of exports several times, but every time a decision on the matter had been postponed. The problem of wheat oversupply in the domestic market has been solved by allocating 3 million tons of wheat as subsidies to ensure food security of the states in the country. Such changes appeared to be an obstacle for the government to resolve the problem of wheat exports. During this period the deliveries of wheat were made only within the framework of intergovernmental agreements with the countries such as Bangladesh and Afghanistan.

Change in export policy occurred in July 2011, when on the background of high inflation and shortages of storage capacity the government decided to allow shipping of an indeterminate number of wheat.

After being convinced that the wheat shipping does not harm the national food security, the Indian authorities decided to extend the export of wheat from the country for 2012. [8]

Since August 2012 India regularly holds tenders for wheat exports. The main reason is the necessity to empty the storage tanks for reception of a new harvest. In this regard, the Government of India has decided to increase the volume of quotas for wheat export in 2012/13 to 4.5 million tons against 2 million tons authorized to export previously. Strong global demand for wheat on a background of dry weather conditions in the U.S. and the Black Sea region can be a significant factor contributing to the increase in exports of Indian grain.

The policy, which is carried out on the market of such a significant importer of wheat, as Morocco, will now be considered. The beginning of season 2010/11 for this country was noted by zeroing of duties on imports of soft wheat. This decision was intended to ensure sufficient supply of grain on the domestic market. State Agency on grain imports of Morocco (ONICL) issued a license to import 1.2 million tons of wheat to twenty trading houses of the country. Therewith earlier in order to protect the domestic market from foreign competition, the authorities of Morocco, in contrast, initiated increasing of the duties on soft wheat from 90 to 135 % in the second half of 2010.

As per the results of this innovation during the first 6 months of 2010/11, imports of grain crops in

the country increased by 78.5% — to 2.49 million tons against 1.19 million tons a year earlier.

Nearly at the end of the season ONICL company extended the compensation system of wheat imports. Mentioned system considered the compensation of the cost of soft wheat imports by the state if its price at baseline of CPT-port exceeds \$303.5 per ton.

Since the beginning of 2012/13 import duty on flour milling grain production in Morocco has increased up to 17% due to the desire of the authorities to support local manufacturers of these products.

In mid-December 2012 the Ministry of Agriculture of Morocco extended the zero import duty on soft wheat until April 2013. The reason for this decision was a poor grain harvest in the country and the desire of local authorities to build up stocks of these products. [8]

Review of the foreign countries experience on ensuring food security of the country speaks out about the globality of the considered problem. In particular, giving crucial significance to the problem of food supply and food security, heads of states — participants of the CIS on the proposal of the Republic of Kazakhstan declared 2011 the Year of improving food security in the CIS.

The aim of food security of the CIS member states is reliable provision of basic foodstuffs for all people by producing states-participants of the CIS on the strict condition of physical and economic access to food in a quantity and quality that are necessary for human life activity, with the greatest possible independence from external sources of food supply.

Also, the capital of Kazakhstan will accommodate a new headquarter of the Institute of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), which will deal with issues of food security. This institute will have been operating since 2014. Thus, Kazakhstan takes over the work of analysis, monitoring the food security condition for OIC countries, development of recommendations.

Created at the initiative of Kazakhstan Institute of OIC on Food Security can be an effective tool to reduce the threats in this direction. It will allow the coordination of efforts between States-members of the organization on development of appropriate policies and measures of responding to challenges

such as hunger and malnutrition, as well as contribution to the physical and economic access to food. This institute will also develop strategies for the development of agro-industrial complex of the OIC, provide methodological and consultative support to ministries of agriculture of the states-members of the organization. The provision of food aid is included in its functions as well.

Leading economies — grain exporters such as Canada, USA, Argentina, Australia, and EU countries have achieved leading positions in the world owing to a dedicated government support. Huge potential of Kazakhstan's agriculture can also be implemented if only the long-term government policies are conducted to stimulate production and sales, attracting investment, creating a favorable legal and regulatory basis.

In order to ensure food security and environmental security of a human nutrition it is necessary to: raise the duty on imported products; implement guaranteed purchases of domestic agricultural prod-

ucts at fixed prices; strengthen quality control of domestic products, environmental protection measures; change the culture of farming; determine what mass production will be banking on in order to win the big export markets; increase state support for agriculture; develop a system of legislative and economic incentives for the creation of medium and large-scale agricultural production, focused on the use of new agricultural technologies; introduce higher tax rates on land not being reclaimed for a certain period after the provision; create conditions for agricultural workers to produce competitive products.

Thus, food security is an integral part of economic prosperity and the fundamental vector of any state's national security. It should be borne in mind that food security is a priority of the state policy, as it covers a wide range of national, economic, social, demographic and environmental factors. Thus, the socio-economic system of the state is implicitly linked to food security, based on the mobilization of domestic resources for its guarantees.

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Eurasian Integration in Research Tradition of the Customs Union — Common Economic Space Countries Participants

YELENA SYZDYKOVA

Integration processes at the Eurasian space have been the subject of a special study at the Academy of Science research subdivisions, higher educational institutions, governmental and independent analytical structures both in Kazakhstan and abroad. Specific focus areas as well as different research schools that use general and specific methods of study and original approaches have been established over past 20 years.

Historiography of Kazakhstan is reviewing an experience of the unifying processes on the territory of the Eurasian region, primarily, within the context of Kazakhstan foreign policy strategy formation. Along with the foreign policy key problems, E. Yertysbayev, M. Laumulin, A. Retivykh, B. Sultanov, K. Tokayev in their works determine the key factors of Astana participation in integra-

tion processes.* The main authors' thesis concerning the role of Kazakhstan leadership's integration initiatives in the system of foreign policy priorities refers to an establishment of foreign policy multi-vector course in the country assuming its specific role in the regional and international integration.

Numerous works of the President of Kazakhstan — the Leader of Nation, N.A.Nazarbayev, the initiator of the number of integration projects, hold a specific place.** In March 1994, N.A.Nazarbayev first suggested an idea on possibility of a deeper integration between the CIS countries. Since that moment the issue on the necessity and practicability of the new integration structures formation has being hotly discussed. Formation and practical activity of the Customs Union (CU) of the Eurasian Economic Society (EES) and Common Economic Space (CES) appear to be the practical implemen-

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tation of ideological structure developed by the President of Kazakhstan.

Basic principles of integration and consistency of committal assertion to integration possibilities by the Leader of the country have been fixed in the official documents. Strategic Message to the Nations "Kazakhstan-2050" states: "We will strengthen the Customs Union, the Common Economic Space... Herewith we say clearly that political independence of the country is inviolable, nobody shall encroach on it."^{**}

A separate research segment is represented in works, which highlight the role of the President of Kazakhstan in development of post-Soviet integration,^{**} the problems related to RK participation in

regional and global integration processes,^{***} the history of integration associations' establishment and development,^{****} bilateral relations between Kazakhstan and Russia in the context of integration.^{*****} Integration processes are considered to be an important factor, which promotes stable and sustainable development of countries participating in the integration process, their economic growth and provision of security.

Social and economic aspects of Eurasian integration processes development have been addressed in works of A. Koshanov,^{*****} K. Berentayev, A. Dzhumaseitova, A. Ikonnikov, A. Moldashev, G. Rakhmatulina, A. Tulepbekova, A. Baitulakov, A. Chebotarev.^{*****} The results

* Nazarbayev N.A. Poslaniye narodu Kazakhstana «Strategiya «Kazakhstan — 2050» Novyy politicheskiy kurs sostoyavshegosya gosudarstva // <http://www.akorda.kz>. Last data: 26.12.2012..

** Amrebayev A. Kontsept «otkryitoy evraziyskoy integratsionnoy modeli» Prezidenta Nazarbaeva i aktualniye problemy natsionalnoy identichnosti Kazakhstana // *Kazakhstan v globalnykh protsessakh*. — 2012. — # 2; Auanasova K.M. Perspektivy i razvitiye idei evraziystva v sovremennoy istorii Kazakhstana. Autoreferat of dissertation on Doctor of History. — Almaty, 2010; Evraziyskiy soyuz: novyye rubezhi, problemy, perspektivy: Materialy nauchno-prakt. konferentsii / Edit. G.V. Osipov. — M., 1996; Evraziyskoe prostranstvo: integratsionniy potentsial i ego realizatsiya. — Almaty: Kazakhstan, 1994; Institut prezidentstva v Respublike Kazakhstan: istoriya i sovremennost. Materialy mezhdunarodnoy nauchno-prakticheskoy konferentsii, posvyaschennoy podvedeniyu itogov 20-letnego razvitiya instituta prezidentstva v Kazakhstane. — Almaty: Kazak universiteti, 2010; Mansurov T. Evraziyskiy proekt Nursultana Nazarbayeva, voploschenniy v zhizn. — M.: Real-Press, 2011; Retiviyh A.V. Ibidem; Tokayev K. On delayet istoriyu: Sbornik statey i ocherkov / K. Tokayev. — Astana: Foliant, 2010. Also Russian authors work may be included: Dugin A. Evraziyskaya missiya Nursultana Nazarbayeva. — M.: ROF Evraziya, 2004; Medvedev R. Nursultan Nazarbayev. Kazakhstanskiy proryv i Evraziyskiy proekt. — M.: Izdatelstvo BBPG, 2008 and others.

*** Abdrakmanova G.K. Rol' Kazakhstana v regionalnoy integratsii na postsovetском prostranstve. Autoreferat of dissertation on Ph.D. of Political Science. — Almaty, 2009; Kazbekov B. Integratsiya Kazakhstana i Tsentralnoy Azii v mirovuyu ekonomiku. — Almaty: Dayk-Press, 2002; Kushkumbayev S. Sotrudnichestvo Kazakhstana so stranami Tsentralnoy Azii. Kazakhstan segodnya / Ed. by Sultanov B. — Almaty, 2009; Kitay i strany Tsentralnoy Azii v sovremennykh geopoliticheskikh realiyah. Sbornik statey / Ed. by L. Muzaparova. — Almaty: Tsentr po izucheniyu Kitaya pri IMEP, 2008; Faizova R.S. Rol' Kazakhstana v integratsionnykh protsessakh na postsovetском prostranstve // *Sovremennyye problemy mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniy i mirovoy politiki*. Materialy 5-y mezhvuzovskoy konferentsii studentov, aspirantov i molodykh uchenykh. — M.: Izd-vo RUDN, 2010. — p. 205-214.

**** Alessin V.I. Sodruzhestvo Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv: realii i perspektivy mnogostoronnego sotrudnichestva. — Astana: ENU after L.N. Gumilev, 2004; EvrAzES: ekonomicheskoe prityazhenie. — M.: Izd-vo Sekretariata integratsionnogo komiteta EvrAzES, 2005; Sodruzhestvo Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv: 10 let spustya; Isingar N.K. Problemy integratsii v SNG. — Almaty, 1998; Ibidem. 10 let SNG. Problemy, poiski, resheniya. — Almaty: OF «BIS», 2001; Kuanysheva A.A. Politicheskoye uchastie Respubliki Kazakhstan v deyatel'nosti EvrAzES v sovremennykh usloviyakh. Dissertatsiya na soiskanie uchenoy stepeni kandidata politologicheskikh nauk. — Almaty, 2007; Mansurov T. EvrAzES — ot ekonomicheskogo sotrudnichestva k Edinomuyu ekonomicheskomu prostranstvu. — M.: IPTs «Russkiy raritet», 2011; Nazarbayeva D. Sodruzhestvo Evraziya. — M., 2000; Rakhmatulina G.G. Problemy i perspektivy vzaimodeystviya ShOS i EvrAzES v Tsentralnoy Azii // <http://www.analitika.org/article.php?story>; Tamozhennyiy Soyuz Belarusi, Kazakhstan i Rossii: sostoyanie, problemy, perspektivy / Ed. by Sultanov B. — Almaty: KISI, 2009; Tamozhennyiy soyuz Belarusi, Kazakhstan i Rossii: realii i perspektivy // Materialy mezhdunarodnoy nauchno-prakticheskoy konferentsii (Almaty, 25 November 2009). — Almaty: KISI, 2010; Formirovaniye EEP: sostoyaniye, problemy, perspektivy. Sbornik materialov nauchno-prakticheskoy konferentsii (Almaty, 15 November 2011) / Ed. by B.K. Sultanov. — Almaty: KISI, 2012.

***** For example: Kazakhstan i Rossiya: ekonomicheskie i politicheskie aspekty strategicheskogo partnerstva: Mezhdunar. nauch. konf. (Moscow, 5 April 2007) / Ed. By B.K. Sultanov [and others]. — Almaty: KazISS under the President of RK,

***** Kazakhstan v sisteme mezhdunarodnoy ekonomicheskoy integratsii; *Ekonomika Kazakhstana v sisteme EvrAzES i imperativy globalizatsii* // Koshanov A.K. Trudnoe voshozhdenie. Na putyakh k rynku. Izbrannyye trudy. 2-nd ed. / A.K. Koshanov. — Almaty: Dayk-Press, 2010.

***** Berentayev K. Doklad na kruglom stole «Evraziyskaya integratsiya» v zerkale SMI // *Soyuz neizbezhnyy respublik svobodnykh?*... // <http://ostkraft.ru/ru/articles/63>. Date: 21.12.2012; Dzhumasseitova A.K. Regionalnoe sotrudnichestvo Respubliki Kazakhstan v kontekste globalnogo konkurentnogo prostranstva // *Evraziyskaya ekonomicheskaya integratsiya (EEI)*. — 2009. — # 5; Ikonnikov A. Mezhdum Tamozhennym Soyuzom i VTO // *Tsentr Azii*. — 2012. — September-October. — # 17-20 (75-78) // <http://www.asiakz.com/mezhdu-ts-i-vto> — Date: 19.12.2012; Ibidem. Tsena integratsii. Chast 1, 2 // Ibidem. — 2012. — April-May. — # 5-8 (63-66) // <http://www.asiakz.com/mezhdu-ts-i-vto> — Date: 19.12.2012; Ibidem. Tsenoobrazovanie s kazakhstanskim koloritom // *Tsentr Azii*. — 2013. — # 2 (84). — S. 2-40; Moldashev A. Agropromyshlenniy kompleks Kazakhstana v usloviyakh Edinogo ekonomicheskogo prostranstva // *Kazakhstan v globalnykh protsessakh*. — 2012. — # 2; Rakhmatulina G.G. Dinamika razvitiya

of Kazakhstan and partner countries joining are studied in terms of their economic efficiency. Real dynamics of domestic and foreign trade development in countries — participants of the Customs Union and cooperation in the certain economic sectors have been studied; positive consequences and topical sides of Eurasian integration projects implementation have been revealed.

Main parameters of regional associations' development in Eurasia in the context of a comparative analysis with the history of the world custom and monetary unions are addressed in works of K. Baizakova, E. Pastukhov, et al.^{*} For the first time ever, problems related to social-economic and political development of Belarus — one of the main partners of Kazakhstan at the Eurasian space — have become the focus of interest for Kazakhstan researchers.^{**}

Political aspects of cooperation between countries — participants of integration projects — have been addressed in numerous articles, authors' materials and interview.^{***} They include national construction issues, extent of integration processes penetration to domestic governmental policy of partner nations, an interrelation of sovereignization and internationalization issues are considered within the national interests of the country.

Scientists have formulated two main approaches. As follows from the first approach, integration

associations shall be formed only on the economic basis. On the other part, it has been argued that creation of such associations being based solely on economic cooperation is impossible in principle.

Certain areas of Kazakhstan scientists' researches touch upon the issues of Eurasian integration historical role as a formative, based on interethnic consent, restoration of a unique integrity of the Eurasian nations,^{****} as well as in the area of culture, science and education.^{*****}

Unequal economic consequences of the CUCES actions have predetermined the different perception of integration projects by experts and general public of the participating countries. Both social and political forces have become more active in Kazakhstan. Experts define the number of key factors of the current situation. First, they include low percentage of processing industry in the economy of the country and low level of import duties, which increase has resulted in growing of the prices for certain part of goods and negative response of the population.^{*****} Second, attention should be turned on special considerations relating to "historical memory" of the nation, which includes basic events of Kazakhstan contemporary history, namely, massive repressions, famine of the thirties, significant inflow of European population, which has resulted in demographic catastrophe. Joining the CU and CES associated with that

integratsionnykh protsessov v gosudarstvakh SNG i perspektivy formirovaniya Edinogo ekonomicheskogo prostranstva / Ed. by M.S. Ashimbaeva. — Almaty: KISI, 2004; Ibidem. Razvitie rynka nefteproduktov Kazakhstana v usloviyakh Tamozhennogo soyuza // EEI. — 2010. — # 4; Ibidem. Vliyanie Tamozhennogo soyuza na ekonomicheskoe razvitie Kazakhstana. Perspektivy integratsii v neftegazovom sektore // EEI. — 2012. — # 1 (14); Tulepbekova A.A., Baytulakov A.S. Perspektivy formirovaniya innovatsionnykh klasterov v prigranichnykh regionakh Kazakhstana i Rossii // EEZh. — 2013. — # 2. — S. 45-56; Chebotarev A. Evraziyskiy integratsionnyy proekt dlya Kazakhstana: za i protiv // Kazakhstan v globalnykh protsessakh. — 2012. — # 2.

* Bayzakova K. Perspektivy evraziyskoy integratsii i nekotorye aspekty opyta Evropeyskogo soyuza // Kazakhstan v globalnykh protsessakh. — 2012. — # 2; Pastukhov E. Uravnenie s neskol'kimi neizvestnyimi // Tsentri Azii. — 2012. — July-August / <http://www.asiakz.com/mezhdu-ts-i-vto> — Date: 19.12.2012; Ekonomicheskie aspekty integratsionnykh protsessov: opyt Evropeyskogo Soyuz: materialy mezhdunarodnoy konferentsii (Almaty, 5 March 2003) / Ed. by M.S. Ashimbayev. — Almaty: KISI, 2003.

** See: Laumulin M. Pyatoe koleso v telege Tamozhennogo soyuza // Tsentri Azii. — 2013. — # 2 (84). — p. 76-97.

*** Abdulin B. Zachem Rossii nuzhen evraziyskiy parlament? // http://www.asiakz.com/Evraziyskiy_parlament. Date: 19.12.2012; Nursha A. Kurs Kazakhstana na evraziyskuyu integratsiyu v dinamike vnutrennikh i vneshnikh protsessov // Kazakhstan v globalnykh protsessakh. — 2012. — # 2; Ikonnikov A. Evraziyskiy proekt: nasilno mil ne budesh // <http://www.asiakz.com/>. Date: 03.06.2013, and many others.

**** Abdrakhmanova R.K. Evraziyskaya tsivilizatsiya: proshloe i nastoyashee (istoricheskie i pravovye aspekty). — Gyl'm, 2010 // http://cnzmo.nauka.kz/download/zhurnal_st/st312. Date: 13.06.2013; Arshabekov N.R. Evraziyskaya ideya kak printsip postroeniya tolerantnogo obschestva. Avtoreferat dissertatsii na soiskanie uchenoy stepeni kandidata filosofskikh nauk. — Almaty, 1999. // <http://cheloveknauka.com/evraziyskaya-ideya-kak-printsip-postroeniya-tolerantnogo-obschestva#ixzz2W4c76EsI>. Date: 13.06.2013; Evraziystvo i Kazakhstan: Trudy Evraziyskogo nauchnogo foruma: «Gumilevskie chteniya» / ENU im. L.N. Gumileva, Tsentri gumanitarnykh issledovaniy «Evraziya»: T. 1-2. — Astana: Izd-vo ENU, 2003.

***** Auanasova A.M. Kulturniy aspekt evraziyskoy integratsii Kazakhstana na sovremennom etape // Gyl'm zhane bilim gasyry = Vek nauki i obrazovaniya / <http://repository.enu.kz:8080/bitstream/handle/123456789/3145/auanasova.pdf>. Date: 13.06.2013; Zhalimbetova R.B., Suzhikova Sh.M. Evraziyskoe ekonomicheskoe soobschestvo: aspekty formirovaniya sotrudnichestva v sotsialno-gumanitarnoy sfere // <http://www.kisi.kz/img/docs/932.pdf>.

***** Bakhtigareyev R. A natpaty — protiv // <http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1336510560>. Date: 18.12.2012.

period, has heighten new apprehensions and fears with regard to "USSR re-creation" and loss of the national sovereignty.

Among economic risks of the project mentioned by experts are the following: growth of inflation, fall of living standards, unhealthy competition, unprofitable conditions for business maintenance, and, as a result, the growth of unemployment and social tension in the society.* Shift in the role of Kazakhstan elite, aggravating problems due to changes in relations between property holders and authorities and also geopolitical shift, which will result in loss of "partners' area" by RK are considered as a consequences of jointing the CU-CES. Information regarding possible political integration in parallel with economic integration was taken by the Kazakhstan society very cautiously. That has led to increased opposition movements, which want to initiate conduction of a referendum on participation of Kazakhstan in the integration processes.

The peculiarity of the Kazakhstan content is a public and open nature of the current stage of discussing the issue, distinct positions of participants of the discussions, who have been able to form a unified platform for the exchange of views in conditions of critical opposition and who are followed both by integration structures' employees and leaders of partner countries.

Among other participants of research process Russia is presented by the significant number of scientific and expert teams specialized in the area of integration. Russian research idea is represented by the significant number of scientific and journalistic works on integration. A.M.Libman's work "Researches of Regional Integration in the CIS and the Central Asia: Literature Review" has been published in 2012. It generalizes results of Russian and international researches in the area of regional integration at the post-Soviet space. Full characteristic of the current English and Russian literature

prepared by the author eliminates the necessity to dwell on the characteristic of each work.

Important research area is represented by works, which consider integration in the context of geopolitical interests of Russia (A. Dugin, L. Ionin, N. Nartov, A. Panarin, K. Sorokin, A. Tzygankov, V. Tzymburski, and others).** Based on geopolitical rules authors believe that geopolitical strategy for Russia always related to the search of a way, which would correspond to its specific character as "some supranational and supragovernmental civilizational formation."***

Two approaches are identified within the framework of the above mentioned direction. In essence, they are a continuation of a long-standing ideological dispute between westerners and Slavophiles: Atlanticism and eurasianism (neoeurasianism). Adherents of Atlanticism (D. Trenin) criticise the post-Soviet integration. They often see Russia as an organizer of the Eurasian space, "sample of democracy" for the new independent states. In the Atlanticists' theoretical paradigm an aspiration to get closer to the West is manifested. At the same time, there are intimations on super power with regard to former USSR republics.****

Eurasianism (neoeurasianism) is not uniform as an ideology of Russian original way at the turn of the new millennium and falls into three components, at least: conservative, communistic and liberal (moderate). Conservative eurasianism (A. Dugin) proposes a refusal from westernization and rebirth of the former greatness of Russia. Communistic eurasianism (G. Zyuganov) proposes geostrategy with the key elements relating to return of traditional centuries-old role of Russia as "geopolitical balance" — "guarantor of the world geopolitical balance of forces and fair consideration of mutual interests". Moderate eurasianists (A.S. Panarin) propose to refuse of the isolationism strategy as that not corresponding to the modern

* www.profinance.kz. Date: 19.12.2012.

** Dugin A. *Osnovy geopolitiki*. — M.: Arktogetya, 2000; Ibidem. *Geopolitika postmoderna*. — M.: Amfora, 2007; Ionin L.G. *Sotsiologiya kultury: put v novoe tysyacheletie: Uchebnoe posobie dlya studentov vuzov*. — 3-e izd., pererab. i dop. — M.: Logos, 2000; Nartov N.A. *Geopolitika*. — M.: Yuniti, 2000; Panarin A.S. *Rossiia v tsivilizatsionnom protsesse (mezhdru atlantizmom i evraziystvom)*. — M., 1994; Sorokin K.E. *Geopolitika sovremennosti i geostrategiya Rossii*. — M.: ROSSPEN, 1996; Tsygankov A.P. *Mastering Space in Eurasia: Russia's Geopolitical Thinking after the Soviet Break-up // Communist and Post-Communist Studies*. — 2003. — # 36 (1); Tsyimburskiy V.L. *Ostrov Rossiia. Geopoliticheskie i geohronologicheskie raboty. 1993-2006*. — M.: ROSSPEN, 2007.

*** Ionin L.G. Mentioned work. — P. 367.

**** Trenin D. *The end of Eurasia: Russia on the Border between Geopolitics and Globalization*. — Carnegie Moscow Center, 2001; Trenin D. *Post-imperium: evraziiskaya istoriya*. — M.: ROSSPEN, 2012.

content and, at the same time, to take a creative approach to foreign experience borrowing.

V.L.Tzymburski's geopolitical concept holds a specific place. Neoisolationism, which lies at the root of its "Island of Russia", proposes a certain distance of the country from participation in international affairs. While offering to avoid the atlanticist, nationalistic and imperial temptations, he takes a stand in favor of recognition of its current borders and refusal of foreign expansionism. Priority shall be given to domestic geopolitical problems and the current territory development.

A separate area is presented in works where Eurasian integration processes are considered in the context of domestic political processes in Russia.* Some authors while specifying "imperial" character of the current Russian political system, offer ways for its geopolitical development. It is assumed that Russia, which is strong in domestic geopolitics and economy, can become a center for the neighboring states' attraction and the core of an independent civilizational block.

The number of works is devoted to analysis of USSR breakup, its influence on the further situation

in the new independent states and characteristic of the main economic and political models of overcoming the transitional crisis.**

In many studies Eurasian integration is considered as an economic project in the context of regionalization and globalization.*** A separate direction is represented by researches devoted to the European Union historical experience as the most successful integration model with projecting this experience on our countries.**** Numerous works are devoted to studying of the role and perspective of CIS development as the institution destined to promote development of integration processes, interrelation of economic and political integration processes and the place and the role of Russia in these processes.***** Researches include an analysis of the reasons of integration processes inefficiency at the post-Soviet space and prospects for their development.

We would like to make a pointed reference to the works of K. Borishpoletz, L. Vardomski, R. Grinberg, L. Kosikova, A. Kuznetsov, B. Kheifetz and other authors, which contain an analysis of the numerous empiric materials allowing conduct-

* Zamyatin D.N., Zamyatina N.Yu. *Prostranstvo rossiyskogo federalizma*. — Polis. — 2000. — # 5; Kaspe S.I. *Imperiya i modernizatsiya: Obschaya model i rossiyskaya spetsifika*. — M.: ROSSPEN, 2001.

** Grigorev L. Salikov M. *Virazhi perekhodnogo perioda // Rossiya v globalnoy politike*. — 2006. — # 6 / http://globalaffairs.ru/number/n_7771. Date: 13.06.2013; Makarenko B. «Tsvetnyie revolyutsii» v kontekste demokratcheskogo tranzita // <http://www.politcom.ru/2025.html>. Date: 12.06.2013; Makarkin A. *Sindrom zhestkoy ruki. Nezavisimo ot politicheskikh reform v stranakh SNG prezident prodolzhaet ostavatsya glavnoy figuroy // Nezavisimaya gazeta*. — 2007. — 21 January; Furman D. *Divergentsiya politicheskikh sistem na postsovetском prostranstve // Svobodnaya mysl*. — 2004. — # 10 / <http://ucheba.dlndat.com/docs/index-25484.html>. Date: 14.06.2013, and others.

*** Bykov A. *Geopoliticheskie aspekty evraziyskoy integratsii*. — M.: Institut ekonomiki RAN, 2012; Kosolapov N.A. *Globalizatsiya: territorialno-prostranstvennyi aspekt // MEiMO*. — 2005. — # 6; Shishkov Yu.V. *Dogonyayuschee razvitie v epohu globalizatsii*. — M., 2006, and others.

**** Alchinov V.M. *SNG — Rossiya — Evrosoyuz. Problemy i perspektivy integratsii*. — M.: Vostok-Zapad, 2008; Baranovskiy V.G. *Politicheskaya integratsiya v Zapadnoy Evrope*. — M., 1983; *Regionalnaya politika stran ES / Ed.by A.V. Kuznetsov*. — M.: IMEMO RAN, 2009; Sterzhneva M.V. *Evropeyskiy Soyuz i SNG: Sravnitelniy analiz institutov*. — M.: MONF, 1999; Shishkov Yu.V., Evstigneev V.R. *Valyutno-finansovaya integratsiya v ES i SNG. Sravnitelniy semanticheskii analiz*. — M.: Nauka, 1997; *Zaglyadyivaya v XXI vek: Evropeyskiy Soyuz i Sodruzhestvo Nezavisimyykh Gosudarstv / Ed. by Yu.A. Borko*. — M., 1998; Shurubovich A.V. *Opyt Evrosoyuz i vozmozhnosti razvitiya valyutnoy integratsii v EvrAzES i drugih subregionalnykh gruppировkakh na prostranstve SNG // http://rudocs.exdat.com/docs/index-189211.html?page=13*. Date: 04.06.2013, and others.

***** Barkovskiy A.N. *Modeli vneshneekonomicheskikh svyazey stran SNG i ikh vliyaniye na integratsionnyie protsessy v Sodruzhestve. Uchebnoe posobie*. — M., 2003; Blyakhman L.S., Krotov M.I. *Sodruzhestvo Nezavisimyykh Gosudarstv: uroki pervogo desyatiletia*. — SPb, 2001; *Problemy postsovetских stran / Ed. by L.B. Vardomskii*. — M., 2000; Godin Yu. *Rossiia i SNG: Geopoliticheskie vyzovy // Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyie otnosheniya*. — 2009. — # 4. — S. 90-94; Gustov V.A., Manko B.X. *Rossiia — SNG: Sotrudnichestvo vo imya razvitiya i progressa*. — M.-SPb.: Izd-vo AVOK Severo-Zapad, 2007; Evzerov R.Ya. *Rossiia v Sodruzhestve Nezavisimyykh Gosudarstv*. — M., 2002; Ziyadullaev H.C. *SNG: doroga v tretie tysyacheletie*. — M., 2002; Kozik L.P., Kokhno P.A. *SNG: realii i perspektivy*. — M., 2001; Kosikova L.S. (Otv. red., sovместно s Glinkinoy S.P.). *Strany SNG mezhdru Rossiei i ES (ekonomika i vneshnie svyazi gosudarstv «poyasa sosedstva»)*. — M.: IE RAN, 2007; Kosov Yu.V., Toropygin A.V. *Sodruzhestvo Nezavisimyykh Gosudarstv: Integratsiya, parlamentskaya diplomatiya i konflikty: Uchebник / Yu.V. Kosov, A.V.Toropygin*. — M.: Aspekt Press, 2012; Matsnev D.A. *SNG: mezhgosudarstvennoe regulirovanie ekonomicheskoy integratsii*. — M., 2003; Mihaylenko A.N. *Sodruzhestvo Nezavisimyykh Gosudarstv: faktory razvitiya*. — M., 2003; Furman D. *Ot Rossiyskoy imperii do raspada SNG // http://polit.ru/article/2005/10/05/furman/*. Date: 04.06.2013; Shishkov Yu. *SNG: poltora desyatiletia tschetnykh usilii // Voprosy ekonomiki*. — 2007. — # 4; Ibidem. *Kooperirovanie v mashinostroenii stran SNG // EEI*. — 2008. — # 1; Ibidem. *Rossiia i SNG // Rossiia i SNG: neudavshisya brak po raschetu*. — 2001. — Pro et Contra. — 2001. — # 1-2; Shurubovich A.V. *Nekotoryie teoreticheskie aspekty ekonomicheskogo vzaimodeystviya stran SNG: Nauchnyi doklad*. — M., 2000; and others.

ing serious researches in the area of economic development of the new independent state in conditions of integration.* Over the last years, the number of works devoted to certain issues of economic interrelation between partner countries has been increased significantly, including issues related to direct foreign investments, cooperation in the banking sector network, financial markets, nuclear energy industry, agricultural sector, communications, labor migration, and socio-cultural integration aspects.

Basic approaches framed by economists fall into two groups. One group proceeds from the necessity of post-Soviet integration in its data and hypotheses. Thus, its conclusions are predetermined and aimed to search for a positive dynamics in cooperation of participating countries. Representative of another group are trying to offer alternative scenario of the post-Soviet development (for instance, with participation of Ukraine and without it).

Study of integration processes within the Eurasian continent has become a new occurrence in scientific research.** Integration aimed at interpenetration and intertwining of all Eurasian regions — Europe, the Northern and Central Asia (post-Soviet space), Western, Eastern and Southern Asia is in the limelight of scientists.

Successful effort to analyze the opportunities of applying regional integration modern theories to Eurasian space military and political organizations — CSTO and SCO — has been undertaken

by Yu.A. Nikitina.*** The above mentioned and others works of the author contain a serious conceptual analysis of integration theories and methods of their study in the context of adaptability to territories outside the European region.****

Starting from the tenth years of the new century a scientific-research and expert-analytical interest to integration problems has been significantly strengthened in Russia. In 2011, on the eve of Presidential elections in Russia, the Prime-Minister V.V.Putin's article was published, where position of political leadership of the country with regard to Eurasian integration project has been heard.***** For the first time in a period of independent Russia existence, the Eurasian idea was recognized as guidance at the official level.

Several key points of view have been formed against the background of active discussion of the new project. A position that a country while joining integration association with former USSR countries will inevitable "shoulder" over "the burden of its partners' economic support" is still prevailing, although it is less common in public media. Individual representatives of the national-patriotic movements and political trends calling for preservation of European identities by Russia are opposed to integration.

Usually, adherents of integration draw attention to its necessity coming from general global economic processes and to the necessity for protection of the national interests effectively and rationally and by joint efforts, in conditions of growing

* Borishpolets K.P. Perspektivnye napravleniya vzaimodeystviya stran-uchastnikov TS i EEP v ekonomicheskom izmerenii // Vestnik MGIMO-Universiteta. — 2011. — # 6. — S. 42-46; Vardomskiy L. B. O problemakh i perspektivakh formirovaniya Evraziyskogo tsentra mirovoy ekonomiki // Evraziyskaya integratsiya v XXI veke / Ed. group: A.A. Klimov, V.N. Leksin, A.N. Shvetsov. — M.: LENAND, 2012; Grinberg R., Kosikova L. Integratsiya na raznykh skorostyakh // <http://viperson.ru/wind.php?ID=495236>. Date: 05.06.2013; Ibidem. Integratsionnyie proekty na postsovetском prostranstve: Idei i praktika. — M.: IERAS, 2008; Ibidem. Ekonomicheskaya politika Rossii v postsovetском regione (retroanaliz, otsenka itogov, predlozheniya) // Rossiyskiy ekonomicheskii zhurnal. — 2010. — # 2-3; Kuznetsov A.V. Investitsionnaya osnova evraziyskoy ekonomicheskoy integratsii // Evraziyskaya integratsiya v XXI veke. — M.: LENAND, 2012; Libman A.M., Heyfets B.A. Modeli regionalnoy integratsii. — M.: Ekonomika, 2011; Novye nezavisimye gosudarstva: sravnitelnye itogi sotsialno-ekonomicheskogo razvitiya / Ed. by L.B. Vardomskii. — M.: Institut ekonomiki RAN, 2012; Heyfets B.A. Rossiyskiy biznes v stranakh EvrAzES. Modernizatsionniy aspekt. — M.: Ekonomika, 2011; Novye nezavisimye gosudarstva: sravnitelnye itogi sotsialno-ekonomicheskogo razvitiya / Ed. by L.B. Vardomskii. — M.: Institut ekonomiki RAN, 2012, and others.

** See: Vinokurov E.Yu., Libman A.M. Evraziyskaya kontinentalnaya integratsiya. — SPb: EABR, 2012.

*** Nikitina Yu.A. ODKB i ShOS: modeli regionalizma v sfere bezopasnosti. — M.: Navona, 2009.

**** Nikitina Yu.A. Voenno-politicheskie integratsionnyie protsessy na postsovetском prostranstve problemy i perspektivy SNG, ODKB, ShOS i GUUAM / Aktualnyie problemy politicheskoy teorii sbornik nauchnykh trudov. Edition 2 / Ed. by T.A. Alekseyeva. — M.: MGIMO(U) MID Rossii, 2005. — p. 141-148; Ibidem. Ot integratsii k regionalizmu: evolyutsiya teorii regionalnogo mezhgosudarstvennogo sotrudnichestva // Vestnik MGIMO-Universiteta. — 2010. — # 1 (15). — S. 134-140, and others.

***** Putin V.V. Noviy integratsionniy proekt dlya Evrazii — buduschee, kotoroe rozhdaetsya segodnya // Izvestiya. — 2011. — 4 October.

instability and crisis developments in the world economy (G. Chufrin).^{*} Assertions, which state that "Russia needs post-Soviet integration as the first vector of long-term foreign policy in compliance with the national interests shall be considered in the same context. There is a need for it in order to form the new equivalence of Russia as a country able to "agglomerate" space based on principles of sovereignty, equality and market economy" (E. Vinokurov) shall be considered in the same context. Creation of capable and successful block will enable post-Soviet countries to make arrangements with foreign partners with more confidence.

According to some scientists the necessity for Eurasian integration depends on strengthening of fight for control over the Eurasian space, its resources, infrastructure and markets on the part of three geopolitical world centers — USA, China and Europe, at least, and for influence over the Central Asia with participation of Islamic World leaders, such as, Turkey Iran, Saudi Arabia (L. Ivashov, Yu. Solozobov, A. Malashenko). Other experts consider integration as the new opportunity for Russia to become a strong and great nation again (A. Phursov), a chance to renew an ideology (A. Vlasov), and a response for a challenge from China (S. Mikheev). Eurasian initiative in terms of national security protection appears to be essential (D. Vyatkin).

Study of theoretical issues related to creation of the new integration model at the post-Soviet space is seemed to be one of the perspective areas of both Russian and Kazakhstan researches. In this context, analysis of Japanese researchers' view on integration processes in EU and their projection on economic forms of integration type outside European continent, in particular in the Eastern Asia, seems to be of concern.^{**} There are also massive problems

in this region, both economic and political, which cause and even induce sharp contradictions but herewith give the appropriate results.

On the whole, Russian research tradition significantly prevails in a quantitative sense. As far as conceptual framework is concerned, they are mostly based on the former theoretical concepts. Issues related to correlation between integration potential and sovereignization extent, search for the new integration models adoptable for a post-Soviet space with its impassable history remain beyond special study. At the same time, creation of new research areas devoted to topical theoretical issues comes about gradually.

Belarus has gained a sound experience in studying the Eurasian integration processes. The peculiarity of Belarus situation is that Eurasian integration in this country is mainly associated with establishment and functioning of the Common State of Belarus and Russia (CSBR). Most works on integration history consider USBR development as the fundamental principle of the modern Eurasian integration.^{***} This aspect has been addressed in the article of A.G. Lukashenko, Belarus leader, where the President of Belarus has evaluated the USBR achievements as a solid footing based on which "a principle of split-tempo and split-level integration was formulated and tested".^{****}

Some Belarus scientists interpret integration of the former USSR republics as "a condition for their survival";^{*****} other researchers consider the existence of the union with Moscow to be the most consequent, recognizing a position of Russian Federation as the main political partner for all CIS countries, and its economic hard core.^{*****}

The number of works covers problems of Belarus participation in integration processes at the

^{*} Evraziyskaya integratsiya i politika Rossii: vzglyad iz Rossii. Ekspertnyy forum. Part 4 // <http://www.easttime.ru/reganalitic/1/286.html>. Date: 12.12.2012

^{**} See Balakin V. Evropeyskiy opyt regionalnoy integratsii dlya Vostochnoy Azii // Problemy Dalnego Vostoka. — 2012. — # 4. — p. 117-126.

^{***} See, for example.: Astapovskiy V.E. Integratsionnaya politika Belarusi i Rossii na postsovetском prostranstve // Belorusskaya politologiya: mnogoobrazie v edinstve. Politicheskoe znanie v sovremennom sotsialnom i obrazovatelnom prostranstve: Tezisy dokladov V mezhdunar. nauch.-prakt. konf. (Grodno, 17-18 May 2012). In 2 parts. Part 1. GrGU im. Ya. Kupalyi; Redkol.: V.N. Vatyil (gl. red.) [i dr.]. — Grodno: GrGU, 2012. — S. 6-9; Soyuznoe gosudarstvo v kontekste mirovyyih integratsionnyih protsessov. Nauchnyie materialy Mezhdakademicheskogo soveta po problemam razvitiya Soyuznogo gosudarstva. Vyipusk II / Pod red. S.M. Dedkova, V.K. Egorova. — Mn.: Tsentr sistemnogo analiza i strategicheskikh issledovaniy NAN Belarusi, 2011.

^{****} Lukashenko A. O sudbakh nashey integratsii // Izvestiya. — 2011. — 17 October. — <http://izvestia.ru/news/504081#ixzz2EjlcjEZ>. — Date: 11.12.2012.

^{*****} Melnik V.A. Respublika Belarus: vlast, politika, ideologiya. Prakticheskaya politologiya. — Mn.: Akademiya MVD Respubliki Belarus, Belorusskaya assotsiatsiya politicheskikh nauk, 1998.

^{*****} Sharapo A.V. Soyuz Rossii i Belarusi: problemy i perspektivy v svete globalizatsii // Belorusskiy zhurnal mezhdunarodnogo prava i mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniy. — 2001. — # 2.

Eurasian space in the context of general issues related to history of international relations, foreign policy and security of the RB.^{*} Herewith, integration processes appear to be a catalyst for foreign policy course of the country. The status of the nuclear-free and neutral state has been gradually transformed to a multiple-vector status which, in its turn, "give a lurch" to the West at some stages, and to the East at some other periods.^{**}

Views on integration processes in terms of direct Belarus interests are becoming one of the top-priorities of Belarus researchers.^{***} Multi-vector foreign policy is recognized as an optimum alternative for Belarus; its geopolitical interests shall involve a balance between European and Eurasian political, economical and military space.

One of serious studies related to a complex of problems associated with integration processes was made by a team of authors in monograph "Belarus in integration projects".^{****} Monograph is providing extended analysis of both traditional factors and the new complicated categories — intellectual sovereignty, economic freedom, danger of unilateral dependence of Belarus economy on energy sources and market for the goods and ser-

vices, possible diversification of foreign economic relations of the republic. One of key research conclusions concerns political and ideological factor decisive influence on integration development and that requires a serious analytical support of integration.

The number of authors considers issues of Belarus economic cooperation within the CU and CES, as well as economic security in terms of integration.^{*****} Development of institutional and macroeconomic aspects of integration processes, tendencies and perspectives of foreign economic activity, integration potential of the international scientific and technical cooperation seems to be the most relevant.

Belarus scientists did not build a consensus concerning the economic efficiency of Belarus participation in CES. Some of them draw attention to factors capable to lower economic integration effect (dependence of economic grants on position of Russian political elite, irrational expenditure of dividends being received, possible pressure on the part of import, etc.)^{*****} Other scientists consider that Belarus still "has not become... an innovation "bridge", connecting western technologies and

* Aktualnyye voprosy mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniy i vneshney politiki Belarusi: Materialy nauchnykh seminarov, yanvar-dekabr 2002 — Mn.: Tesey, 2003; Vneshnyaya politika Respubliki Belarus v 2000-e gody. — / Yu.I. Malevich [i dr.]; pod red. A.V. Sharapo. — Mn.: BGU, 2010; Vneshnyaya politika Belarusi v istoricheskoy retrospektive: Materialy mezhdunar. nauch. konf. — Mn.: Adukatyziya I vyihavanne, 2002; Karbalevich V. Vneshnyaya politika Belarusi: popytki samoopredeleniya // Natsionalnaya i regionalnaya bezopasnost. — Mn., 2001. — p. 163-185; Rozanov A. Respublika Belarus: vneshnepoliticheskie orientatsii // Belorusiya na perepute: v poiskah mezhdunarodnoy identichnosti. — Mn., 1998. — p. 33-61; Senko V. Vneshnyaya politika Respubliki Belarus: osnovnyye napravleniya i perspektivy razvitiya // Belarus v mire. — 1996. — # 1; Snapkovskiy V.E. Istoriya vneshney politiki Belarusi (na belorus. yaz.). V 2-h ch. — Mn., 2004-205; Tihomirov A.V. Belarus v mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniyah (1772-2002 gg.). Uchebno-metodicheskiy kompleks. — Mn.: Vedyi, 2003; Ibidem. Vneshnyaya politika Respubliki Belarus: itogi dvadtsati let / A.V. Tikhomirov // Aktualniya pytanni belarusk-polskikh adnosin: da 20-goddzya Dagavora pamIzh Respublikay Belarus i Respublikay Polshcha ab dobrasusedstve, syabroystve i supratsoynitstve ad 23 chervnya 1992 g.: materyialy belarus-pol. kruglaga stala / Redkal. : V. G. Shadurski (navuk. red.) [i Insh.]. — Mn.: Vyd. tsentr BDU, 2012; Hvostov M. Vneshnyaya politika Respubliki Belarus: pragmatizm v otstaivanii natsionalnykh interesov // Belarus v mire. — 2002. — # 3 (23); Chelyadinskiy A.A. Teoriya mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniy. — Mn.: BGU, 2004, and others.

** Ulakhovich V. Kontseptualnye podhody vo vneshney politike Respubliki Belarus (1991-2002) // Evropa. — 2003. — # 1 (6) // www.ceeol.com. Date: 06.06.2013; Ibidem. Formirovanie osnov vneshney politiki Respubliki Belarus (1991-2005). — Mn., 2009.

*** Aleksandrovich A. Integratsionnyye protsessy v SNG i ekonomicheskie interesy Belarusi // Ekonomicheskaya gazeta. — 2006. — 9 June; Natsionalno-gosudarstvennyye interesy Respubliki Belarus. Zaiko L.F., Karbalevich V.I., Abramova O.M. / Ed. by L.F. Zaiko. — Mn.: Izd. V.M. Skakun, 1999.

**** Belarus v integratsionnykh proektah / A.K. Akulik [i dr.]; nauch. red. V.A. Bobkov; In-t ekonomiki NAN Belarusi. — Mn.: Belaruskaya navuka, 2011.

***** Baynev V., Sayevich V. Perekhod k innovatsionnoy ekonomike v usloviyakh mezhgosudarstvennoy integratsii: tendentsii, problemy, belarusskiy opyt: Monografiya. — Mn.: Pravo i ekonomika, 2007; Verenich D.V., Verenich I.V. Integratsionnyye protsessy kak faktor obespecheniya ekonomicheskoy bezopasnosti Respubliki Belarus // http://www.ekonomika.by/downloads/Verenich_1.pdf. Date: 06.06.2013; Yenin Yu.I. Makroekonomicheskoe regulirovanie natsionalnogo hozyaystva v usloviyakh evraziyskoy integratsii. Seriya «Mirovaya ekonomika». — Mn.: Pravo i ekonomika, 2004; Ibidem. Mezhdunarodnyye integratsionnyye ob'edineniya: opyt, problemy, perspektivy: posobie / Yu.I. Yenin. — Mn.: MITSO, 2006; Formirovanie regionalnykh integratsionnykh ob'edineniy na postsovetkom prostranstve / Yu. Enin i dr. — Mn.: PK Soyuznogo gosudarstva, 2003.

***** Gerasimenko A. «Lichnoe mnenie» o EEP v tsifrakh i faktakh // Ekonomicheskaya gazeta. — 2012. — 3 February — # 10 (1529) / http://www.neg.by/publication/2012_02_03_15663.html. Date: 13.06.2013; Kolesnikova I. Obrechennyye na reformy // Direktor. — 2012. — 31 January. — # 1 / http://csl.bas-net.by/press-nan/2012/01/31_obrechennyye_na_reformy.pdf. Date: 13.06.2013.

eastern resources".* In this context a significant modernization of the national economy adjusted for the modern world trends and together with efficient foreign economic activity shall be deemed necessary.

The number of researches conducted by Belarus authors is devoted to legal aspects of cooperation between Eurasian integration partner countries,** and to the issues of cooperation in scientific-educational and cultural fields.*** Study of problem of Belarus participation in regional security integration structures can be defined as a separate area of focus.**** After Belarus gains a status of a dialogue partner in the SCO, the study of history of organization has made it actual in a scientific environment.***** A.A. Rozanov and O.M. Bychkovskaya address the issue of the role of regional structures in regional security system, and increase of their efficiency in counteracting the new threats.***** When describing leadership's approaches in CSTO and NATO, researchers put forward a thesis on the necessity of constructive interaction and cooperation with all many-sided security structures in the region without any exception, offering the concept of bottom-line interaction with NATO at the Western boundaries while emphasizing military cooperation with the Russian Federation as a top-priority.

Accession of Belarus to the CU and CES has specified new risks arisen as a result of involving the republic in the integration processes. Against this background discussions have become more active, within which the main trends and approaches

of the society to Eurasian integration problems have been clearly signified. The problem of the West and the East adversarial position became the major issue. Herewith, positions of integration adherents and opponents were clearly defined as consisted with their political predilections. The Belarus People's Front (BPF), the Belarus Social & Democratic Party "Gramada" (BSDP) and the United Civil Party (UCP) acted for opponents of the Union projects. Belarus Liberal & Democratic Party (BLDP), the Republic Party of Labor and Justice (RPLJ), the Belarus Party of the Left "Just Peace" (BPL "JP"), the Belarus Communist Party (BCP) declared their support of integration. The Belarus Social & Sport Party (BSSP) took up neutral position. There are forces in the country, which are directed against participation in any alliances with the Asian countries as it "contradicts to the European civilizational choice".

Representatives of the Belarus expert and analytical association are also at variance in their assessment of Eurasian integration status and perspectives. Some of them consider European integration to be the most acceptable for the country. Other ones consider a formation of breakthrough innovative and technological development space based on implementation of scaling trans-Eurasian perspectives to be the most significant. It explains the fact that Belarus insists on formula of integration by means of Eurasian transnational corporation's establishment not by means of privatization. The concept "integration of integrations" shall be deemed more perspective: participation in its

* Dayneko A.E. *Prioritety mezhdunarodnoy ekonomicheskoy integratsii Respubliki Belarus* // *Ekonomika Respubliki Belarus v integratsionnykh protsessakh: tendentsii, problemy i perspektivy*: Sb. mat-v Mezhdunarodnoy nauchno-prakticheskoy konferentsii (19-20 April 2012, Minsk) / In-t ekonomiki NAN Belarusi. - Minsk: «Pravo i ekonomika», 2012. - p. 9.

** Bosovets S. *Pravovoe regulirovanie integratsii mezhdunarodnoy Belarusy, Kazahstanom, Rossiei i Ukrainoy* (K voprosu o sootnoshenii EvrAzES i EEP) // *Zhurnal mezhdunarodnogo prava i mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniy*. - 2009. - # 2; Zabeyvorota A.I. *Integratsiya Rossii i Belarusi: problemy i perspektivy* // <http://www.ni-journal.ru/archive/56157ba6/bd5f9133/94ff535b/0a0595ee/>. Date: 03.06.2013.

*** Yenin Yu.I. *Formirovanie edinogo nauchno-obrazovatel'nogo i proizvodstvennogo prostranstva v usloviyakh Evraziyskoy ekonomicheskoy integratsii* // *EEI*. - 2012. - # 2 (15). - p. 43-50; Yenin Yu., Podobed N. *Innovatsii v obrazovanii: tehnopolisy kak perspektivnaya sostavlyayushchaya ekonomiki Belarusi* // *Innovatsionnyye obrazovatelnyye tehnologii*. - 2011. - # 4.

**** See: Dovgan E.F., Rozanov A.A. *Organizatsiya Dogovora o kollektivnoy bezopasnosti (2002-2009)*. - Mn.: Kovcheg, 2010 and others.

***** Voronovich V.V. *Evolutsiya Shanhayskoy organizatsii sotrudnichestva v kontekste formirovaniya aziatskoy sistemy bezopasnosti* // *Zhurnal mezhdunarodnogo prava i mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniy*. - 2007. - # 2. / <http://www.evolutio.info/content/view/1172/215/>. Date: 13.06.2013; Rozanov A.A. *Problematika bezopasnosti v ramkakh ShOS* / A.A. Rozanov // *Shanhayskaya organizatsiya sotrudnichestva i problemy bezopasnosti Evrazii* / M.V. Danilovich [and others]; ed. by A.A. Rozanov. - Mn.: Izd. Tsentru BGU, 2012. - p. 53-69.

***** Rozanov A.A., Bychkovskaya O.M. *Politika Respubliki Belarus v sfere obespecheniya bezopasnosti* // *Trudy fakulteta mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniy: Nauch. sb. Vyp. III* / Ed.: V.G. Shadurskiy (Chief ed.) [and others]. - Minsk: BGU, 2012. - S. 33-40.

development will move Belarus to the level of geopolitical process “subject”.

On the whole, for both Belarus and Kazakhstan research literature the CES image-building tendency is a typical one, in the first instance, as of an economic project with the main goal including the necessity of national economies modernization and worthy joining the international economic system. That is possible only in conditions of qualitative structural reforming of all economic spheres and implementation of comprehensive action framework.

Mainly regulatory character of works is a general peculiarity of historiography of Eurasian integration partner countries. At the same time,

the majority of researches contain a solid empiric material, especially with regard to economic aspects, which regrettably cannot be said about their theoretical aspects. For that matter, issues related to development of conceptual integration models falling beyond the scope of European experience shall be considered to be topical ones. In line with other factors, which may affect the quality of integration (formulation of common approaches and principles, inside and outside political consensus, transparent economic perspectives, onward stages etc.); the further development of integration theory is capable to predetermine successes or failures within the process of consolidation of the future Eurasian space.

Patriotism in the Value System of Kazakhstan: Political Analysis

VENERA BAIMURZAYEVA

Patriotism is particularly emotional experience of belonging to the country and own nationality, language and traditions. The concept of "Homeland" is formed in the mind of a person basing on a sense of belonging to the family home, town/village, a certain group of people, as well as to the system of values and ideals of the society. Patriotism assumes pride in the achievements and culture of homeland, the desire to preserve its character and cultural characteristics and identifying oneself with the other members of the people, the desire to protect the interests of the country and its people.

The problem of patriotism is the subject of researches in various areas of socio-humanitarian knowledge, including in political psychology, political axiology. As the feeling of love towards the motherland, patriotism is associated with the deep layers of the human psyche, with the archetypes of the unconscious, the archetype of the mother. Patriotism has significance, and is highly valued in the public consciousness, ie, its value is precise because the value of the object of patriotism — country — is well recognized and unconditional.

Value — this is what people's feelings dictate to recognize standing above all and what we can strive for, behold, and treat with respect and recognition. Value is the term used in the socio-humanitarian knowledge to refer to the human, social and cultural importance of certain objects and phenomena that refer to the world of the proper, the target, the semantic base, the Absolute. Values are treated as "generated by culture and (or) asked transcendently to content, weaved into versatile variety of social life as its invariants, allowing: to bind different time modes (past, present, and future); semiotize the space of human life, allotting all the elements in it

with axiological significance; set a priority system, methods of social recognition, evaluation criteria; build complex multi-level systems of orientation in the world; justify the meanings" [1, 798].

So, universal political values are the right to life, the right to happiness, freedom, social justice in all spheres, participation in government and public affairs, the preservation of peace, nature, culture and others. Common Kazakh values include free choice of someone's own destiny, participation in the construction of a new state, joint responsibility for the fate of the country and future generations of the citizens, which is internally linked to patriotism.

Patriotism is also defined as a moral and political principle, social sense, the content of which is the love for the Fatherland and the willingness to bring own interests into subjection. Patriotism assumes responsibility for the fate of the motherland, for its freedom and independence. This is the value side of patriotism. In the context of the nations' formation and the national states' formation patriotism becomes an integral part of public consciousness, reflecting common national moments in its development.

Although the idea of patriotism is associated with reverent attitude to the motherland, different people have different essence of patriotism. Depending on what the patriotism is aimed to, there defined such forms of patriotism as polis, imperial, ethnic and state ones.

In political analysis of patriotism as a value, in our view, the focus is on the political and cultural aspects of man's relationship to the fatherland. It is connected with the study of political culture, mass and individual political consciousness, political psychology, political and civic identity. Political culture is a system of historically established,

relatively stable, embodying the experience of the previous generations, attitudes, beliefs, perceptions, behaviors, being manifested in the activities of the subjects of the political process, and ensuring the reproduction of the political life of the society on the basis of continuity.

Civic identity, which means the individual awareness of belonging to the state, is intimately connected with patriotism. The Republic of Kazakhstan has recognized the man, his life, liberty and inalienable rights as the highest value. Exactly this position is the basis for the emergence of a deep psychological connection between the citizen and the state — civil identity. It manifests itself in a sense of patriotism. This is a deep social and psychological feeling of the citizens of the republic due to genetic, historical and legal ties with Kazakhstan, the feeling which expresses their attitude to Kazakhstan as their motherland, love and respect to which they are directly manifest in their deeds and actions for the benefit of its development and enhancement of authority in the world community.

As noted by Amandykova S.K., “currently Kazakhstan’s patriotism is one of the fundamental principles of the existence and development of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Mandatory elements of Kazakhstan’s patriotism are:

- careful and respectful attitude to the history of the people, which is expressed in the care after the preservation of monuments of culture and history (article 37 of the Constitution);
- respectful attitude to the natural resources of our country;
- feelings of love for the motherland, the devotion;
- awareness of the common interests of the people of different nationalities;
- new civilian thinking, free from national nihilism;
- peaceful nature of the relationship of the citizens of the republic towards the neighboring countries and external integration policy of Kazakhstan” [2].

The formula of patriotism, according to M. Seytenova — “is a sense of nationwide participation, civic responsibility and civic duty to the country, tolerance expressed by understanding and acceptance of the culture of all ethnic groups of Kazakhstan and the world” [3].

Political identity is a support for the existing government, combination of the ways and the means of implementation — political regime, which is also directly related to patriotism. Consequently, for the formation of patriotism there matters the public policy, as well as the relationship between man and power.

The comparative analysis of the results of social opinion polls, the relation of the population of Kazakhstan towards patriotism as a value changes in a positive direction. For example, in the 90s, the twentieth century, according to sociological researches conducted by scientists of the Institute of Philosophy and Political Science in Almaty, patriotism took sixteenth place in the system of daily values (0.7%). The first five positions (in descending order of priority, expressed as a percentage) were taken by such values as: family, life, prosperity, money, conscience (18.8% — 7.4%); in the second row there were such five positions as work, personal dignity, freedom, safety, morals (6.6% — 4.9%); in the third row there were located such five positions as: legality, independence, spirituality, equality, democracy (3.9% — 1, 0%) [4].

Economic difficulties (especially in the first years of reforms) stimulated emigrational sentiments among the population. From 1989 to 1999, the Kazakh population has declined from 16.46 million to 14.95 million (or 1.51 million). Processes of emigration and ethnic specificity of natural increase have changed the ethnic composition of the population. From 1989 to 1999 there was a significant decrease in the number of Europeans: German — by 2.6 times; Russian — by 1.3 times, Ukrainian — 1.6 times; Belarusian — 1.5 times.

The highest emigration rate accounts to 1994, followed by stabilization of the migration processes. As the result of migration, people of mainly active working age (30 — 45 years) have left Kazakhstan. The consequence was in an aging population, declining birth rates and increased mortality. Migration, as well as the negative demographic processes led to negative natural increase in representatives of the Slavic peoples: Russian, Ukrainian and Belarusian. Some reduction in natural increase was observed in all ethnic groups.

In May 1992, President N.A. Nazarbayev outlined the main areas of reform in generalizing atti-

cle "Strategy of Establishment and Development of Kazakhstan as a Sovereign State". [5] In mid-1994, the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan adopted "The Action Program for Deepening Reforms and Overcoming Financial Crisis" for a term up to 1996. Then this program has been extended for a further period as "Medium-term Program for Economic Reforms in Kazakhstan for 1996-1998" and "Government Program until 2000."

Terms of Kazakhstan's transition to a new state were specified in the Program "Kazakhstan-2030" [6]. President N.A. Nazarbayev outlined the following seven long-term priorities:

- national security;
- political stability and consolidation of society;
- economic growth, based on a developed market economy with high level of foreign investments. This priority is primarily concerned with the principle of limited government intervention in the economy with its active role;
- health, education and welfare of the citizens of Kazakhstan;
- energy resources;
- infrastructure, particularly, transport and communications;
- professional state, limited to basic functions.

Simultaneously with the extension and implementation of these priorities, the legal support by the Constitution of RK, the Constitutional Acts of RK, by presidential decrees, with the force of constitutional law has been ensured.

Present day implemented policy's success is primarily due to the fact that since the beginning establishment of economic basis of a new independent state has been prioritized, foundation for the Kazakhstan state model "from economy to politics" has been laid. Our country's choice after the acquisition of independence of the model for political development "from economy to politics" appeared to be correct.

According to the results of sociological research "Patriotism and Civic Consciousness of Akmola Region Population", held in April 2012 by the Office of the Domestic Policy in Kokshetau, Stepnogorsk and 17 districts, patriotism as a value in the eyes of the population has moved to the tenth place (for compared to a sixteenth place per results of a sociological poll in Almaty in the 90s). A dominant of social values and priorities constitute

the personal well-being (health — 67%, the family — 61%), material wealth — 49%.

In the second group there were such values as equity (44%), friendship (29%), legality (27%), human rights (26%), security (21%), a successful career (21%) and patriotism (20%).

Minimum number of "votes" received such values as spirituality (10%), creative self realization (8.3%), power (6.3%), and social recognition (5.6%) [7,2].

The purpose of the study was to identify the dominant values of Akmola region residents to indicate the place of patriotic settings in the rating of value orientations of the population in the region. The data obtained show that the priority in the system of values is given to common Kazakh everyday life values, and patriotism is placed in the second row of values.

Current stage of the political process development in the Republic of Kazakhstan is characterized by the dominance of socio-economic paradigm. As the deepening of a modernization process in the Republic of Kazakhstan, it is becoming clear that the socio-economic dimensions of development are not only some long-term goal of political reforms, but also have significant potential for integrating and consolidating as an instrumental value in politics. Values that are perceived and interpreted from the perspective of conventional pragmatics as purely economic and social ones, in the light of new policy priorities have acquired a distinctive political orientation.

The vast majority (92%) of respondents are proud of their country. In Akmola region residents' understanding, the true patriotism lies primarily in respect of traditions (44%), strengthening the family and education (36%), work at full capacity (35%) [7, 5].

For more than half (53%) of the surveyed area residents a source of pride for their country is foreign and domestic policies pursued by the President of Kazakhstan, the leader of the nation, Nursultan Nazarbayev.

"The successful construction of the Republic of Kazakhstan as a major Eurasian state is unquestionably evidence that during 20 years of Independence patriotism has been realized in practice, that the independence and patriotism are inseparable," — said I.Kornilov [8].

Raising up the patriotism is an integral part of public policy, as it is directly related to the strengthening of national security as a priority in the state. Particularly noteworthy is the youth, because the future of our country belongs to them. Value orientations of the political consciousness of the younger generation are more focused on political pluralism while respecting the democratic rules of the game. Political apathy among many young people is a form of distancing from the real processes in politics. At the same time, this exclusion can easily be transformed into active forms of political participation by self-organization; at the same time those organizations most likely will not have a political orientation. With regard to the main ideological and political currents the youth inclines to liberal-democratic direction.

In value orientations and the effort of their implementation the youth shows the direction of generation value systems changes that grew up in the context of market reforms. Collectivist-paternalist consciousness occurs scrapped and an individualistic utilitarian consciousness of the Western type is being formed. Content of life of today's youth is defined by dominance of private life predicates. Leading factors in this case are the attempts to consolidate one's position, which are complemented by active communication with friends, family problems, and entertainment. The main type of the modern youth in Kazakhstan is very close by the nature of their preferences for leisure and preferences to living standards of the middle class in developed countries.

Patriotic education system in the Republic of Kazakhstan provides for: the formation and development of socially significant values, citizenship and patriotism in the process of training and education in educational institutions of all types; conducting mass political character building work in labor collectives, army, public organizations; implementation of media activities aimed at the analysis, study and coverage of patriotic education for citizens.

Thus, the objectives of the State program of patriotic education of citizens of the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2006-2008 were: creation of organizational prerequisites and system of measures, contributing in creating a sense of civic solidarity and participation, interpersonal and inter-ethnic

understanding, ensuring the interaction between state and society in general, state and its citizens, in particular, while conducting a set of measures to breed Kazakhstan patriotism, tolerance and respect for human rights and freedoms; creation of social conditions and prerequisites for the formation of civil and civilized interpersonal relationships; promotion of the patriotism through the formation of positive behavior models and popularizing the image of the hero of our time among the youth.

Particular importance in the formation of patriotism bears the study of the state symbols of the Republic of Kazakhstan, as they are a source of a positive image of the state, national pride, are the object of the expression of patriotic feelings and desires. In 2007 the President of our country announced June 4 a State Symbols Day. Now every year on this day Forum of the Patriots is held, where the youth is actively involved in.

According to the opinion of Akmola region population interviewed in 2012, in the field of civil and patriotic education in the foreground it is worth learning the basics of political education (39%), followed by — the development of high social activity, civic responsibility, aimed at strengthening the state (37%) [7,6].

Within the state program of patriotic education of citizens of the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2006-2008, for raising up the civic awareness in different target groups of the population debates were held on the perception and awareness of the importance of national symbols, formation of common moral standards, such as honor, conscience, duty, responsibility for the future of the country.

The new State Program for Development of Education for 2011-2020 pays much attention to the patriotic education. As noted by the Minister of Education and Science of Kazakhstan B. Zhumagulov, "it is difficult to overestimate the role of consciousness in the formation of patriotic education — from pre-school to higher and postgraduate. Even today, through almost 50% of academic disciplines, students receive legal, historical, socio-cultural knowledge, skills to build spiritual potential, morality, and love for the Fatherland." [9]

In connection with the transition to the 12-year secondary education moral and spiritual, patriotic, civic aspects of the content of education and state

education standards will be strengthened. The transition from a process of patriotic values learning to their practical implementation is provided: the youth participation in the development and implementation of the programs and projects aimed at addressing critical social issues.

Youth patriotism was expressed in realization of the presidential program "Zhasyl Yel": 77 thousand hectares of land were processed and more than 40 million seedlings were planted. Young people also participated in the project "With Diploma — to Village." Over the past two years in the rural areas were attracted 9,055 teachers, 640 workers of culture, 2302 specialist among doctors, nurses and paramedics, 261 — organizer of sporting events, coaches and physical education teachers, and 134 — from the social welfare system.

There are a growing number of young people in representative authority at all levels — from the district and city Maslikhats to Parliament. In the coming years the task is given to bring the proportion of young people running for the representative bodies of at least 15%.

Dominant opinion (86%) of the interviewed in April 2012 Akmola region residents is to support the necessity for measures of civil and patriotic orientations [7,6].

A big hope is centered on the Kazakhstan's youth in the preservation and continuation of the tradition of inter-ethnic harmony and inter-religious tolerance in our country.

In axiological paradigm of modern Kazakhstan society political culture the following basic elements may be distinguished, in a row of which patriotism takes its place as a common Kazakh value:

- particular value hierarchy, a system of significant materialistic and post-materialistic values to solve vital problems of Kazakhstan people. Materialistic values, according to the statement of R. Englhardt, include preferences of physical, psychological, economic security, material prosperity. Postmaterial values — underlined significance of belonging to a particular social group, quality of life, self-expression, aesthetic motives, and intellectual self-actualization;

- common for the era of reached independence a symbolic row — set of keywords: "sovereignty", "The President of the Republic of Kazakhstan", "The Parliament of Kazakhstan", "multi-party", "ethnic harmony", and "Assembly of Peoples of Kazakhstan";

- paradigmatic (precedent or representative) texts as a leading myth of the modern era of Kazakhstan political development: "Declaration of Independence", "Kazakhstan-2030", and "National Unity Doctrine".

New efficient motivations in shaping the youth's patriotism are in N.A. Nazarbayev's work "Social Modernization of Kazakhstan. Twenty Steps towards a Society of Universal Labour." The President of RK gave a realistic assessment of illusory conceptions of consumer society, manifestations of social infantilism in modern Kazakhstan's society and encouraged to move to the paradigm of the "Society of Universal Labor." Specific instructions of the President to executive structures made in this context express references to strengthen the system of common Kazakh values, including patriotism.

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