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INTEGRATION IN CENTRAL ASIA AND THE POSITION OF UZBEKISTAN

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Abstract. There are many myths about the processes of Central Asian integration. In particular, there is a myth that Uzbekistan in the post-Soviet period has withdrawn from the integration processes in the region. But analysis shows that this is just a myth spread by insufficiently objective and informed authors.

Uzbekistan has always declared the development of regional cooperation and integration as the most important priority of its foreign policy. Uzbekistan acted as one of the initiators of the creation in 1994 of the Central Asian Economic Community (CAEC) and then its transformation in 2002 to the Central Asian Cooperation (CAC) of the CACO.

At the same time, the policy of Uzbekistan in the formation of certain integration associations in the region and around it can be formulated as strictly pragmatic. Uzbekistan in the medium term does not plan to participate in the integration structures formed today in the post-Soviet space. But its policy will be aimed at forming cooperation with the countries of the region and gradually building economic ties between the Central Asian countries in those areas and in the forms to which the countries of the region are ready.

Key words: *Central Asian integration, regional cooperation, Uzbekistan, foreign policy.*

ОРТАЛЫҚ АЗИЯДАҒЫ ИНТЕГРАЦИЯ ЖӘНЕ ӨЗБЕКСТАННЫҢ ҰСТАНЫМЫ

Бахтиер Эргашев

Аңдатпа. Орталық Азиядағы интеграция үдерістері туралы колданыста жүрген, соның ішінде, посткеңестік кезеңде Өзбекстан аймақтағы интеграция үдерістерінен өзін-өзі шеттеді деген дақырттар бар. Алайда талдау көрсетіп отырғанындай, бұл бар болғаны жеткілікті деңгейде объективті және хабардар емес авторлардың көпшілікке таратып жатқан дақырты екенін көрсетеді.

Сыртқы саясаттағы өзінің аса маңызды басымдығы ретінде Өзбекстан аймақтық кооперация мен интеграцияның дамуы туралы үнемі ресми түрде мәлімдеп келді. 1994 жылы Өзбекстан Орталық Азиядағы Экономикалық Қоғамдастықтың (ОАЭҚ) құрылуының, кейін

2002 жылы ОАЭҚ-тың Орталық Азиядағы ынтымақтастыққа өзгеруінің бастамашыларының бірі болды. Сонымен қоса Өзбекстанның аймақта немесе оның айналасында қандай да бір интеграциялық бірлестіктерді құру мәселелеріндегі жүргізіп отырған саясатын қатаң сындарлы саясат деп тұжырымдауға болады.

Орташа мерзімді болашақта Өзбекстан посткеңестік кеңістікте бүгінгі таңда құрылып отырған интеграциялық құрылымдарға қатысуды жоспарлап отырған жоқ. Әйтсе де оның саясаты аймақтағы елдермен ынтымақтастықты құруға, сондай-ақ ортаазиялық елдермен экономикалық байланыстарды аймақтағы елдер эзір бағыттарда және түрлерде біртіндеп орнатуға бағытталады.

Түйін сөздер: Ортазиялық интеграция, аймақтық кооперация, Өзбекстан, сыртқы саясат.

ИНТЕГРАЦИЯ В ЦЕНТРАЛЬНОЙ АЗИИ И ПОЗИЦИЯ УЗБЕКИСТАНА

Бахтиер Эргашев

Аннотация. Существуют расхожие мифы о процессах центральноазиатской интеграции. В частности, миф о том, что Узбекистан в постсоветский период самоустранялся от процессов интеграции в регионе. Но анализ показывает, что это всего лишь миф, распространяемый недостаточно объективными и информированными авторами.

Узбекистан всегда декларировал развитие региональной кооперации и интеграции в качестве важнейшего приоритета своей внешней политики. Узбекистан выступил одним из инициаторов создания в 1994 году Центральноазиатского экономического сообщества (ЦАЭС) и затем его преобразования в 2002 году в Центральноазиатское сотрудничество (ЦАС) ОЦАС. При этом политика Узбекистана в вопросах формирования тех или иных интеграционных объединений в регионе и вокруг него может быть сформулирована как жестко прагматичная.

Узбекистан в среднесрочной перспективе не планирует участвовать в интеграционных структурах, сформированных сегодня на постсоветском пространстве. Но его политика будет направлена на формирование сотрудничества со странами региона и постепенного выстраивания экономических связей между центральноазиатскими странами по тем направлениям и в тех формах, к которым готовы страны региона.

Ключевые слова: центральноазиатская интеграция, региональная кооперация, Узбекистан, внешняя политика.

Political and economic realities: limitations and opportunities for regional cooperation and integration

The development of regional cooperation and integration in Central Asia is an indisputable factor in the long-term sustainable economic growth of all countries in the region. Moreover, economic cooperation strengthening in Central Asia is one of the main conditions for ensuring the security of the region.

In addition to the general historical

prerequisites for the development of regional cooperation and integration, there are several important factors that will influence the Central Asian countries to build up multilateral cooperation among themselves:

- The presence of significant structural interdependence around the issues of maintaining the working capacity and development of water and energy infrastructure;
- The need to develop a regional-transport network to minimize the geographical

shortcomings of Central Asian countries, expand access to the region for large neighbors and enter global markets;

- The need to harmonize legal standards in the areas of finance, trade, transport, communications and other areas for private sector growth, overcoming the segmentation of national markets and increasing the attractiveness of the region for foreign investors;
- The need to develop cooperation in the border areas and avoid conflict situations in the border areas.

In addition, there are challenges and threats of a regional nature that can be neutralized only with a regional approach. In particular, the challenges and threats include pollution of the atmosphere; land degradation; the spread of infectious diseases and epidemics; the trafficking of drugs, weapons and people; and the spread of ideologies of religious extremism and terrorism.

The influence of these factors underscores the interdependence of Central Asian countries, makes regional cooperation and integration necessary for the future sustainable economic growth of all countries in the region.

The post-Soviet countries of Central Asia have experienced many attempts at integration, in various formats and with different goals, most of which now can be remembered only by specialists.

Among such attempts, one can recall the establishment of the Central Asian Economic Community (CAEC) and the Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO). There were other initiatives aimed at stimulating regional cooperation and integration in Central Asia. For example, the initiative of the Asian Development Bank – CAREC - and the TRACECA project, actively promoted by the European Union and a number of others.

However, the overall dynamics of regional initiatives in the Central Asian region over the years has largely remained rather sluggish. The multiplicity of regional organizations and various "multi-speed" integration entities (both regionally and at the level of the entire post-Soviet space) with almost identical goals and objectives led to fragmentation of the political

and economic space of the region, stretching, and ineffective use of limited management mechanisms in the Central Asian countries.

There can be a lot of reasons for the failure of regional integration projects. In our opinion, the main ones are the following:

The biggest reason of all is that in all countries of the region there have been processes relating to the formation of statehood; national identity; and the formation of a market economy and a new political system. The formation of statehood and close integration are two differently directed processes, which, in the opinion of the author, are simultaneously incompatible.

- Regional initiatives developed and promoted by national governments were more political than economic in nature, often leading to excessive politicization of issues of regional cooperation and integration;
- The already-created institutional and other formats for the development of interstate relations in the region suffered from a lack of "real substance";
- There was uncertainty about the distribution of income from regional projects and fears of possible losses (both economic and political).
- There was no confidence within the integration groups, which was expressed in the fears of small countries in the region towards larger ones, often fueled by large extra-regional powers in their own geopolitical interests.
- The existing discrepancy in the economic policies and levels of economic development of the countries of the region, which continue to grow.

But one of the main reasons was that in the previous stages the governments of the countries of the region monopolized the right to solve the issues of regional cooperation and the nomination of regional integration initiatives. In addition, the private sector, non-governmental organizations and the expert community were often placed before de facto events. This is understandable - in all countries of the region the private sector was weak and not developed. And so most regional projects bore the nature of bureaucratic initiatives - a kind of initiative for the sake of demonstrating political dynamics. At the same time, the national businesses of the

countries of the region did not see their place in the integration processes.

As a result, regional cooperation in Central Asia was mainly limited to joint consultations and statements on issues of mutual interest, "necessary" trade and economic relations, separate interstate projects and programs.

At the same time, the recognition by the leaders of the Central Asian countries (with the exception of the "special position" of the Turkmen leadership) the importance of regional cooperation, at least at the official level, has led to certain successes in the implementation of regional initiatives.

For example, notable results are the achievement of an agreement among the countries of Central Asia on respect for the state borders inherited after the collapse of the USSR, despite the existence of zones of compact residence of ethnic minorities.

Some progress was made in the sphere of joint struggle against terrorism, extremism and drug trafficking. The basis for the development of cooperation on security issues between the countries of the region was the Tashkent Treaty of 21 April 2000 between Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan on joint actions to combat terrorism, political and religious extremism and transnational organized crime.

In this way, the countries of the region can effectively cooperate to solve common problems in cases where possible profits and benefits, as well as losses in the case of unilateral actions, are distinctly clear.

At the same time, the general dynamics of regional initiatives - both multilateral projects and regional organizations - have remained largely sluggish for many years.

Despite the presence of sufficiently strong integration impulses in the region, the insufficient pace of regional economic integration and the constant threat of further growth of centrifugal tendencies pushed the countries of the region to search for extra-regional partners - some kind of "guarantors" for stability, a source of political, financial and economic support.

But, for the most part, extra-regional forces, primarily the large states bordering the

region, considered such regional initiatives as mechanisms for exerting their influence on the region.

In general, assessing attempts to form regional integration structures in Central Asia, it may be noted that the countries of the region have been unable to implement regional-integration projects and the formation of their own regional security system. They could unite neither on the basis of common opportunities and interests, nor on the basis of common threats and challenges. Transition to the market foundations of economic cooperation with a deeper level of cooperation between the countries of the region has not been accomplished.

The policy of Uzbekistan towards Central Asian integration projects

Since 2010, Uzbekistan has consistently declared the development of regional cooperation and integration to be the most important priority of its foreign policy. Uzbekistan acted as one of the initiators of the creation of the Central Asian Economic Community (CAEC) in 1994 as well as its transformation into the Central Asian Cooperation (CAC) of the CACO in 2002.

The ideological basis for the participation of Uzbekistan in regional integration projects was fixed by the First President of Uzbekistan in his work "Turkestan is our common home", published in 1995. [1] The main idea was the idea of the geopolitical unity of the territory, called Turkestan, and the need to strengthen the unity of the countries occupying this territory and the need for rapprochement of their peoples.

In other words, the position of Uzbekistan with its participation in the formation of integration associations in the region was that Uzbekistan did not deny the necessity and importance of forming and participating in various integration associations. But at the same time, based on national interests and the chosen model of economic reforms, it put more emphasis on the development of bilateral relations.

When analyzing Uzbekistan's attitude to the formation of certain integration associations in the region and around it, it can be formulated as strongly pragmatic. Uzbekistan has always proceeded from the principle that regional

integration institutions and mechanisms and Uzbekistan's participation in them are possible only when those processes correspond to the goals of the formation of a new Uzbek statehood; the formation of effective political and economic systems; and the creation of conditions for improving the well-being of the population. At the same time, short-term and long-term development benefits have always been the benchmarks.

In other words, foreign policy, decisions about participation/non-participation in certain integration structures and projects were dictated, first of all, by the long-term interests of internal development.

Thus, in the second half of the 1990s, economic policy was aimed at import substitution, the creation of new industries and the support of domestic producers. There was an urgent need to create the main points of economic growth.

Under these conditions, initiatives that imply liberalization of prices, simplification of regional trade and transit, and which are defined as priorities in the creation of integration associations, were unprofitable and unacceptable for Uzbekistan in terms of realizing its own economic strategy.

Abstract arguments about the benefits of regional integration and the expansion of regional trade lost all meaning in the conditions of Uzbekistan in the 1990s, which was in fact an agrarian country, with reformed government apparatus and economic management mechanisms, with predominantly rural low-income population and with a weakly competitive industry that needed restructuring. Special attention had to be paid to the urgency of security problems, both in the economic and military-political spheres.

Uzbekistan was focused on solving internal problems, the solution of which gave a new quality to the political and economic systems and already on this basis gave an opportunity to talk about more in-depth forms of regional integration in Central Asia.

For example, there is no doubt that the transport and transit potential of Central Asia is significant and the region may well become a bridge between a rapidly growing Asia and

Europe. But most of the initiatives aimed at implementing transport projects have ended, at best, with mixed results.

Within this framework, Uzbekistan concentrated on the gradual modernization and development of its own transport infrastructure, as it was the task of speedy reformatting the country's spatial framework through the formation of new transport highways that would "tighten" the space / regions of the country with new transport "clamps" and reduce Uzbekistan's dependence on transport corridors in the northern direction.

The implementation of railway construction projects along the routes Navoi/Uchkuduk/Sultanuizdag/Nukus and Tashguzar/Baysun/Kumkurgan created a basis for the formation of the meridian axis of the spatial framework of the country: "northwest of Uzbekistan to southwest of Uzbekistan". This transport corridor overlaps the latitudinal (east-west) traffic arteries already in place: Andijan/Tashkent/Samarkand/Bukhara, the key part of which was the construction of the motorway and the electrified railway line Angren/Pap through the Kamchik pass, which provided uninterrupted transport links between the Fergana Valley and the rest of the country. Uzbekistan's participation in the implementation of the Bukhara/Tejen/Serakhs/Bender/Abbas transport corridor ensured the availability of Uzbek goods to the ports of the Persian Gulf. Uzbekistan is an active participant in the formation of transport corridors connecting the countries of Central Asia with China (the eastern direction) and with the countries of the Black Sea basin (the western direction). In the long term, the importance of the multimodal logistics center in Navoi, as a transcontinental transport hub linking the countries of the East and South-East Asia with the countries of Europe, the Middle East and the CIS, will increase.

In general, Uzbekistan managed to solve the task of creating a unified transport network linking all regions, creating a basis for balanced spatial development of the country during the transitional period, through the implementation of a number of road and railroad projects inside the country. At the same time, Uzbekistan's active participation in the implementation of

several projects for the creation of international transport corridors has made it possible to diversify transport routes for foreign trade.

Uzbekistan within the framework of this policy, opposed various integration "projects" on principle and supported those initiatives that were pragmatic and realistic at the current stage of development.

In particular, Uzbekistan strongly opposed the idea of creating a Union of Central Asian states initiated by the leadership of Kazakhstan, since this idea represented another option for the formation of an integration association, which, for the time being, because of prevailing economic conditions, is premature and unviable. [2]

But at the same time, Uzbekistan has come up with the idea of creating a free-trade zone in Central Asia on the institutional basis of CACO. [3] This initiative of Uzbekistan was voiced at the CACO summit in Astana on May 28, 2004. At the same time, it was proposed to start the formation of this zone from the integration of the two largest economies of the region - Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. And here the logic of Uzbekistan's position is traced - one cannot rush and create integration associations for which the economy, the political and legal systems, the political and economic elites and the population of the countries of the region are not ready.

The following goals of CACO aimed at raising the living standards of the population and the intensive development of the economies of CACO member states have been determined in Uzbekistan:

- Optimization and rational use of the natural, water-energy and mineral resources and the human potential of Central Asia in the interests of each country included in CACO;

- The formation of a unified strategy to create a favorable investment climate and conditions for attracting foreign investment to the region.

The realization of this long-term initiative in practice in Uzbekistan was considered possible in three stages (for 10-15 years):

- 1) Formation of the Customs Union and the solution of transport and transit problems, which imply the adoption of a single unified mutually agreed tariff system.

- 2) Implementation of the provisions of the

Agreement on the establishment of the Free Trade Area.

- 3) Establishment of the Common Market of Central Asian countries.

Given the dynamics of the economic transformation processes, the implementation of this initiative could, according to Tashkent, become a real basis for convergence of the national economies of the Central Asian states, which were at different levels of development due to various rates of reforms.

At the same time, a strategic obstacle to the implementation of this initiative, as well as the development of regional cooperation and integration processes in Uzbekistan, was considered strategic uncertainty regarding the further development of Central Asia, largely due to the clash of interests of the world's major powers and countries neighboring the region. In this regard, Uzbekistan advocated the comprehensive development of relations with leading states and international organizations that, not being part of Central Asia, are interested in ensuring the security and sustainable development of the region.

A new stage in the policy of Uzbekistan regarding the implementation of integration initiatives in the post-Soviet space in general and the Central Asian space in particular came after 2010.

The crisis of the Eurasian Economic Community led to the idea of multi-speed integration in the post-Soviet space, actively promoted by the Russian Federation and the Republic of Kazakhstan at the end of the 2000s.

At the summit of the heads of the EurAsEC member states in Astana on July 5, 2010, it was announced that the Customs Union between Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus had started its full-fledged activity. [4] Within the framework of this Customs Union, a single Customs Code and tariffs will be in force. At the same time, TC members decided to accelerate the formation of the Single Economic Space of the three countries and the constituent documents should be prepared and agreed by January 1, 2011.

It was from this period that a new stage of the active transformation of the post-Soviet space began, and Russia began actively reformatting

this space, changing the alignment of forces between the post-Soviet countries, formed in the 1990s and zero years. Within the framework of the Customs Union, Kazakhstan and Belarus, through the Uniform Customs Code, were more clearly and structurally involved in the orbit of Russia's economic and political influence, transferring part of their economic and political sovereignty to supranational bodies.

The failure of the regional integration projects in Central Asia resulted in a split among the countries of the region on the principle of joining certain integration associations. The formation of the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan became the point that divided the countries of the region into two groups: the first group of countries includes Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan (and in the long term a dubious Tajikistan); and the second Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, which occupy neutral-expectant position on those integration associations where Russia is politically and economically dominant. This dividing line has a long-term character.

It therefore seems that, in the medium term, Uzbekistan will continue the policy of distancing itself from those integration projects dominated by extra-regional powers. This applies not only to Russia, but also, for example, China, which promotes the idea of forming the SCO Free Trade Zone, where, due to the size of its economy, it receives the predominant influence. [5]

To assert, therefore, that the policy of Uzbekistan regarding integration initiatives in the CA region has been one of inactivity does not correspond to the principles of historicism and objective analysis.

The analysis shows that Uzbekistan has been an active participant in integration projects in Central Asia. But it has always been cautious about the integration initiatives that the Russian Federation put forward and envisaged the formation of supranational bodies, with the transfer of certain powers to them in the customs, tariff, fiscal and monetary spheres.

Based on the current realities, the formation of a Central Asian regional integration association seems unlikely. The countries of the region have diverged too far in their foreign policy and foreign economic trajectories and priorities.

A new stage - economic cooperation

Today Uzbekistan is at a new stage of economic development. Uzbekistan has passed through the implementation phase of the policy of import substitution, selective support of individual industries, and rigid non-tariff regulation. We can now say that Uzbekistan is intensifying its policy aimed at export-oriented growth. In addition, institutional transformations in Uzbekistan are basically completed; and a multi-layered economy is formed with its inherent institutions.

Uzbekistan has already reached the stage of development of its economy where regional cooperation will not go against the economic interests of the country but, on the contrary, will allow it to receive benefits.

Efforts made over the whole period under discussion has prepared the country for future realization of larger integration initiatives where Uzbekistan can participate in conditions favorable to it.

In the medium term, one can already expect, if not breakthroughs, then major shifts in integration initiatives. On the one hand, all the countries of the region, and in particular Uzbekistan, have resolved the task of forming a new statehood. With, to a greater or lesser degree, the participation of the state, all countries have built market economies.

The economy of Uzbekistan today demonstrates high growth rates. [6] In the foreseeable future, Uzbekistan faces the challenge of moving to an export-oriented economy that is able to attract and effectively absorb investment, both internal and external. And for this, the national economy should be more open and integrated into the regional and world economy. The very logic of the economic reforms which Uzbekistan plans to implement in the coming years will stimulate the search for acceptable forms of regional integration.

At the same time, it is important to note the qualitative difference in the current situation in that, in one way or another, in all countries of the region the private sector / capital has taken shape and serious financial and industrial groups are being formed. Today, the "order" for regional integration, including that in Uzbekistan, will

come from business, the player who is able to give a qualitatively new content to regional initiatives. Today, a business, which creates a gross national product and jobs is interested in reducing barriers and transaction costs in regional-commodity turnover.

Successful implementation of the processes of regional cooperation and integration is impossible without ensuring the compatibility of the economic systems of the countries of the region, which first of all requires national governments to take several steps to harmonize legislation regulating economic activity, the convergence of macroeconomic indicators and the formation of institutions responsible for the implementation of regional projects etc.

Central Asia can become one of the fastest growing regions in the future. However, the opportunities and quality of this growth will be determined by the pace and formats of regional cooperation between the countries of the region.

The best way is to gradually build economic ties between the countries of the region in those areas and in the forms to which the countries of the region are ready. It may be the formation of the economic axis Uzbekistan-Kazakhstan. It may be a deepening of the economic ties between Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. [7]

The basis for the formation of new formats for regional economic cooperation at the current stage can be the harmonization and integration of the transport and communication potential of the countries of the region (primarily Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan).

These countries implement transport-sector development strategies and this sector invests heavily in investments. But today the task is to integrate these national transport strategies and form a single Central Asian transport-transit hub of continental importance. Proceeding from the fact that all countries in the transport-transit sense are dependent on each other, a unified approach is needed to unite country efforts. And why not make this request a basis for setting up intensive format cooperation ties?

Uzbekistan in the near and medium term will not participate in the integration structures formed today in the post-Soviet space. And here, first of all, the EAEU is needed.

But Uzbekistan is a key state in Central Asia. It has an interest in forging deeper ties with the EAEU countries. At the same time, the largest markets in the Central Asian region are of interest to the countries of the EAEU.

In these conditions, it seems expedient to formulate new initiatives in this direction, interesting and acceptable both for the EAEU and for Uzbekistan. In particular, one of the options may be the formation of a Free Trade Zone between the EAEU and Uzbekistan. Why not? The formation of such a FTA can become a serious foundation for deepening cooperation and the gradual harmonization of the legislative and regulatory framework, standards and norms of the EAEU and Uzbekistan. If the EAEU is ready to create a FTA with Vietnam, Israel and Turkey, then there is no less reason to consider a developing Uzbekistan as a partner.

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THE OUTLINES OF THE USA CURRENT STRATEGY TOWARDS CENTRAL ASIA

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Abstract. The results of the presidential elections in the USA provoked a very active reaction within political and expert circles, the mass media and public opinion. A question concerning future US policy under president D. Trump toward Central Asia is extremely important. The US (as well as the European Union) has no primary interests in Central Asia; but they have goals related to China, Iran and Russia. All this taken together leads to the conclusion that, on the political agenda of the West, more importance is attached in Washington and Brussels to Central Asia's neighbors than Central Asia itself. Thus, American strategy under the Trump administration will be formed according to the course of the US's current interests and priorities on the world stage, including financing limitations for the Pentagon and aid for foreign countries, rivaling the other international problems of the United States.

Key words: *Central Asia, USA, Russia, China, geopolitics, "Great Game", Afghanistan, security.*

ОРТАЛЫҚ АЗИЯДАҒЫ АҚШ СТРАТЕГИЯСЫНЫҢ ЖАҢА ҚЫРЛАРЫ

Мұрат Лаумулин

Аңдатпа. Америка Құрама Штаттарындағы президенттік сайлаудың қорытындысы әлемнің көптеген елдерінде саяси және сараптамалық ортада, БАҚ пен қоғамдық пікір тарапынан айтарлықтай белсенді талқылауға түсті. Біз үшін дербес және маңызды саналатын сұрақтар қатарында Д. Трамп әкімшілігі кезеңіндегі Вашингтонның Орталық Азияға қатысты саясатының қандай бағытта дамуы болмақ. Орталық Азияға қатысты АҚШ-тың бірінші кезекті мүдделері жоқ, бірақ Қытай, Иран және Ресеймен байланысты мақсаттары бар. Бұл мүдделердің жиынтығы Батыстың күн тәртібіндегі Орталық Азия көршілеріне берілетін мәннің Вашингтон мен Брюссель тарапынан өте жоғары екендігін көреміз. Д. Трамп әкімшілігі кезеңіндегі Американың Орталық Азияға қатысты саясаты Құрама Штаттардың әлемдік сахнадағы мүдделері мен басымдықтары, Пентагонның қаржыландырылуының

төмендеуі мен шет мемлекеттерге көмектесу, және де АҚШ назарын талап ететін басқа да мәселелермен бәсекелестік барысында қалыптасады.

Түйін сөздер: Орталық Азия, АҚШ, Ресей, Қытай, геосаясат, «Үлкен ойын» Ауғанстан, қауіпсіздік.

КОНТУРЫ СОВРЕМЕННОЙ СТРАТЕГИИ США В ЦЕНТРАЛЬНОЙ АЗИИ

Мурат Лаумулин

Аннотация. Результаты президентских выборов в США вызвали в политических и экспертных кругах, СМИ и общественном мнении многих стран мира достаточно активную реакцию. Отдельным, крайне важным вопросом остается для нас, какой будет политика Вашингтона при администрации Д. Трампа в отношении Центральной Азии. У США нет первостепенных интересов в Центральной Азии, но у них есть цели, связанные с Китаем, Ираном и Россией. Все это вместе приводит к тому, что в политической повестке Запада соседям Центральной Азии придается в Вашингтоне и Брюсселе куда большее значение, чем ей самой. Американская политика при администрации Д. Трампа в отношении Центральной Азии будет формироваться в контексте текущих интересов и приоритетов Соединенных Штатов на мировой арене, ограничений финансирования Пентагона и помощи иностранным государствам, в конкуренции с другими проблемами, требующими внимания властей США.

Ключевые слова: Центральная Азия, США, Россия, Китай, геополитика, «Большая игра», Афганистан, безопасность.

The results of the presidential elections in the US have provoked quite an active reaction in many countries in terms of politics, experts, the media and public opinion.

A separate, extremely important question remaining for us is which policy will Washington choose under the Donald Trump administration regarding Central Asia?

The US (as well as the European Union) has no primary interests in Central Asia; but they have goals related to China, Iran and Russia. All this taken together leads to the conclusion that, on the political agenda of the West, more importance is attached in Washington and Brussels to Central Asia's neighbors than Central Asia itself.

General geopolitical framework

By the middle of the 2010s, Central Asia faced a choice between three projects: a Russian-Kazakh project (as a regional development center); an American project (connecting

to non-Russian transport corridors); and a Chinese one (turning the region into a secure land transit zone for China in the direction of Europe and the Middle East).

According to the head of the Stratfor research fund, one of the most important strategic goals of the United States is to prevent the emergence of a superpower in Eurasia capable of uniting the population and resources of the continent. The appearance of such a heavyweight could radically change the global balance of power, undermining American leadership. In this regard, the ultimate imperative of the dominant power of the United States is to prevent the emergence of an opponent in Eurasia. To do this, the fragmentation of Eurasia has to be supported, with the existence of as many hostile powers as possible there. This long-term strategy is designed to oppose a revival of Russia. Russia and China are equally interested in ensuring that regional affairs are resolved without outside players, regardless of their origin.

Beijing stopped being caught in the middle between Moscow and Washington many decades ago. Now Beijing sees itself as the center of power, which is not yet equal to Washington, but is on the road to equality with it; and in the long term may take a higher position in the international system than the one currently occupied by the US. Russia is an important factor for China, although its role in Beijing is not overestimated. Russia is, above all, a reliable protector of the rear, which is very important for China. Russia opposes any third force - with the United States in mind - taking part in any kind of dispute between Moscow and Beijing or another country in the region.

The USA is a tangible presence in the immediate vicinity of the borders and important sites belonging to Russia and China. This partly makes the United States a regional superpower; and therefore they can force regional players to strive for their containment. At the same time, the United States, like Europe, does not bear the risks and costs associated with being directly within the problem region.

It is therefore assumed that there has been a marked decrease in the attention paid to Central Asia by the leading centers of power globally. Because of the Afghanistan mission, the growth of internal problems and the promotion of mega-projects by TPP and TTIP, the United States and the countries of the EU are becoming less interested in Central Asia. Because of the internal situation in the region, the geopolitical environment and the limited nature of American interests and resources, it is likely to remain outside the practical scope of American "reformative."

Washington faces an increasing number of problems in the process of implementing its foreign policy in many regions of the world against the background of an obvious shortage of resources. To continue the previous argument regarding the global significance of the Central-Asian factor in world politics, there is a certain intellectual inertia: there are stable and quite influential political, expert and

lobby groups operating within the framework of the "Big Game" paradigm.

As far as the preservation of exaggerated notions about the importance of Central Asia in the geopolitical picture of the world is concerned, regional elites are also interested in this, since all their foreign policy in the last quarter of a century of sovereign existence rests on the foundation of a multi-vector approach - playing on the contradictions of the external centers of world power and extracting from this process various material (investments, loans, assistance) and intangible (political support) dividends.

The political baggage of American presence in Central Asia

The Donald Trump administration will have a solid-enough inheritance in the form of the possibility of exerting political influence through various means. The administrations of Clinton, George W. Bush Jr. and Barack Obama purposefully, although not always consistently, implanted different "soft -power" institutions in the region to create an environment in which Washington could exert its influence on the political processes in each of the republics.

At the same time, American strategists have proceeded from the assumption that Central Asia has a high - maybe even underestimated - strategic value for the United States, due to its characteristics. Central Asia is located practically in the geographical center of the Eurasian continent. The processes occurring here affect the interests of the main international competitors of the United States and many major regional powers. The impact on the region's pressure-points opens up a wide variety of opportunities to influence the situation in neighboring countries. Hence, it is highly probable that Central Asia, if temporarily out of the focus of US foreign policy, will inevitably return to it again and again in the future, and Washington (although it is officially denied) will play the role of an opponent to the continental powers here, similar to that previously played by the British Empire.

After the collapse of the USSR, America initiated large-scale programs to eliminate Soviet WMD. The United States supported the extension of the NPT norms to the Central Asian states but raised objections to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone. In Central Asia, the United States made a breakthrough as a global military force after the opening of the "Afghan Front" in 2001. The Afghan campaign set the direction of US military cooperation with Central Asia for the subsequent fifteen and more years.

Technically, the Americans are already able, from their bases in Afghanistan, to conduct secret operations using UAVs on the territory of Central Asian countries without the agreement of the latter's leadership. Moreover, the list of possibilities for drones is quite extensive and includes exploration, analysis of the radiation, biological and chemical situation, bombing of ground targets, including the elimination of undesirable leaders. The United States formed a well-developed intelligence network in Kyrgyzstan and its external surveillance service, overseeing politicians as well as carrying out counter-monitoring of the CIA. [1]

According to several Russian experts, the efforts of the American side in Central Asia are concentrated in several directions. They include: military penetration in the Caspian region, where corporations from the United States are developing oil fields; The creation of professional units in Central Asia which follow NATO standards, capable of participating in joint operations with the Alliance abroad; encouraging the reform of local armed forces on a Western model; and the introduction of US military equipment in line with the doctrine that facilitates the setting-up of highly mobile parts of an operational response. Washington pays special attention to the Caspian area, motivated by the need to protect oilfields from terrorism. Kazakhstan's position on the "Caspian Guard" program is that its implementation is possible but this requires the consent of Russia. This delayed the prospect of launching a large-scale

Pentagon project in the Caspian Sea region.

In terms of Kyrgyzstan, researchers note that long-term work with the personnel of the Armed Forces and law-enforcement agencies allowed the Americans to fully disclose their structure and organize the collection of information on the state of affairs in the republic. Favorable conditions were created for the study and recruitment by the US special services of the representatives of the Kyrgyz security agencies. The atmosphere of full loyalty to Washington, which has developed among many higher officers, made it possible to nominate people oriented to US interests for leadership positions. Another consequence of the Americans' actions was the demoralization of law enforcement and special bodies. As a result, during the "color revolution" the militia moved to the side of the insurgents; and the army and the national guard declared neutrality.

The United States put forward an approach to the drug problem in the Central Asian region. Strangely enough, the efforts were actually focused on, on the one hand, further removing the barriers between Afghanistan and the neighboring countries of Central Asia, while, on the other, establishing patronage over the anti-drug structures created here. At the core of Washington's position, it seems that there were motives of the global confrontation with Russia and the desire to weaken its influence.

At the stage of rapprochement after September 11, 2001, the relations between Tashkent and Washington were not absolutely cloudless and were overshadowed by the desire of the White House to reform the regime in the republic by interfering in internal affairs through a network of NGOs, the media and contacts with secular and religious opposition. To support loyal politicians in Uzbekistan, resource centers have been established that provide various kinds of technical assistance. The Uzbek leadership was absolutely sure that the attack on Andijan was prepared with international assistance, including the American-sponsored NGOs. Experts note that today it is still not completely clear

what caused the crude inconsistency in the US policy towards Uzbekistan, which earlier demonstrated the greatest willingness in Central Asia to cooperate with America.

From outside, the situation in many respects appeared as if the desire of a part of the American elite to interfere in the internal affairs of the republic prevailed over the interests of the joint struggle against terrorism, leaving an imprint on the final official position of the White House. An important conclusion emerged from the Andijan conflict regarding the American strategy in Central Asia. It lies in the fact that to achieve their goals in the region, the United States considers it acceptable to use the Islamist factor here, interpreting it to suit its own interests and depending on the specific circumstances.

With the acquisition of independence by the Central Asian countries, the question of the channels for transporting hydrocarbons to foreign markets turned out to be beyond the commercial interests of American business and began to be considered in the United States as an instrument of geopolitical struggle. As a result, US foreign policy was oriented toward the creation of the so-called Southern-Energy Corridor, which in the future was supposed to allow the export of Caspian oil and gas in such a way as to bypass the territory of Russia and Iran by following the route Central Asia/Caspian Sea/Caucasus/Turkey. Such a scheme, in the event of its successful implementation, opened the way for Washington to solve several problems at once.

Thus, the instruments of influence on the CA countries, which are at the disposal of the United States, are very diverse. For the post-Soviet republics, the consequences of the imposed reforms in many cases have proved to be more than problematic. International financial institutions have found that the greatest weight in the process of making economic decisions among the states of Central Asia has lain with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. [2]

With regard to Kyrgyzstan, it is known that after the accession in 2005 of the new Kyrgyz

government, headed by Kurmanbek Bakiev, on a platform of democracy and with the direct support of the United States, the deterioration of the country's economic system was not only stopped, but the economy recovered to exceptionally high levels. The expected result of this policy was the undermining of Russia's economic interests, including the freezing of investment projects in the field of hydropower and military-technical cooperation. Using administrative resources and illegal raider schemes, commercial organizations affiliated with the President's son, Maxim Bakiev, took control of the majority of the most profitable assets, instigating the withdrawal of money from the country and their legalization in foreign accounts. The most important role in these processes was played by people from Maxim Bakiev's closest associates - financiers and lawyers from the United States and Europe.

On a more limited scale, the United States has applied traditional sanctions as well. This is illustrated by the example of the Central-Asian cotton market. Uzbekistan is sixth in the world in the production of cotton and third in terms of its export. The export of raw materials is monopolized by the state. The US authorities (and this country itself belongs to the world's largest producers of cotton and textiles) are systematically urged to restrict the entry of Uzbek raw materials into Western markets, accusing Tashkent at the diplomatic level of using child labour in the fields.

The key vector of the US economic strategy in Central Asia has been the fight against the Russian integration project. The White House failed to prevent the creation of the Customs Union of Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus in December 2012. Given the limited level of trade ties, Washington's intrusive desire to interfere in the processes of regional economic integration in Central Asia can be explained only by the desire to exercise geopolitical restraint over Russia.

Central Asia is on the periphery of US economic interests. Limited trade and

investment relations with the region are maintained, concentrated mainly around oil production in Kazakhstan. The main tools of American economic policy are infrastructural (primarily pipeline) planning; MFI programs; grants for liberal reforms; and sanctions. The main conclusion is that the strategy of the United States is focused not so much on expanding its own economic ties as on the ensuring the geopolitical containment of Russia and China. The White House promotes transit corridors and integration plans which are alternatives to the proposals of Moscow and Beijing and designed to reduce their impact on the economy of Central Asia.

Under forced expansion, the apparatus of US foreign policy is built and algorithms for planting one's will be worked out. Among the "secret operations" are propaganda, economic warfare, sabotage, anti-sabotage, sabotage and evacuation, subversive activities and assistance to clandestine movements, etc. Once in the orbit of US foreign-policy interests, Central Asia has also been forced to experience this unpleasant specificity of the American foreign-policy doctrine.

Within Central Asia, Kyrgyzstan continues to be the republic where American political strategists have a wide variety of tools for manipulating social and political processes, including branched institutions of "soft power". Administrators of grant funds, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and two institutions affiliated with it, the International Republican Institute (IRI) and the National Democratic Institute (NDI), which are officially non-governmental but tightly linked to the US government and co-financed from the state budget, established their offices. The above associations, to put it figuratively, made up the top floor of the "soft power" infrastructure, from where financial resources and project assignments descend to the lower levels.

The second echelon of the system is formed by transnational Western NGOs. They are based on network principles. At this level, most

of the funds allocated for "democratization" programs end up, and work is carried out to find, attract and cooperate with local civil activists. As a rule, each of them adheres to a certain specialization. At the bottom of the mechanism as described are local non-profit organizations, which are established by citizens of CA states and are engaged in the execution of projects "on the ground". This is the most numerous layer, although the funds reach it only partially.

Countries differ in the degree of influence of western umbrella patterns from the first and second echelons to national NPOs. If the representations of the most odious foreign organizations were squeezed out of Uzbekistan after the Andijan events of 2005; and in Kazakhstan the programs of the state social order and the single state operator for financing NPOs constituted competition to foreign grants, then the "third sector" in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan is almost completely focused on receiving Western financing from the moment of its appearance. Determining the extent of Washington's financial infusions into the "soft power" infrastructure in the region can only be approximate, since it absorbs funds from several sources at once. The Pentagon, the CIA and other paramilitary and special services of the US do not publicly make display of the details of their budgets, but they also traditionally sponsor the non-profit sector. Finally, American efforts are complemented and duplicated by various initiatives of the EU countries and interstate organizations.

In general, the system built over more than two decades covers the most diverse spheres of public and state life in Central Asia. Human rights associations are an element of protection of opposition figures and constant pressure on national governments. The United States has managed to create strong positions in the Central Asian information field. In addition, the US finances, and consequently influences, the editorial policy of many local "independent" media outlets. Another vector is education. Since the 1990s, a network of higher educational

establishments providing educational services in accordance with Western standards has been deployed in Central Asia.

In Central Asia, there are 13 centers that have such an official status (most of all in Kazakhstan). In total, tens of thousands of citizens of Central Asia have passed through educational projects run by the United States. As a more detailed acquaintance with them shows, it is often here that primary ideological processing takes place, ultra-liberal ideals are inculcated and the foundation of a negative-critical attitude to one's own power, tradition and history is laid. Here, the future foreign policy clients of the United States are being raised, like Mikhail Saakashvili.

Thus, a number of researchers conclude, the American establishment does not hide its goal - the global domination of the United States. To achieve it, it considers it permissible to interfere in the internal affairs of other states, up to the forced replacement of national governments. Among the tools for strengthening American domination, there appears "soft power", which in theory is described as cultural expansion, but in practice it is used as a well-functioning mechanism for manipulating the mass public consciousness of foreign countries.

Its system proved its ability in the course of the "tulip revolution" in Kyrgyzstan in 2005, but gradually its capabilities are weakened under the pressure of a number of objective factors. These include the shift of international priorities to other parts of the world and the related cuts in grants to Central Asia; remoteness of the region from the European allies of the United States and concurrently co-investors in civil society; increased distrust towards the White House from the Central-Asian regimes and their measures to control the "third sector"; and, finally, strengthening the positions of Russia and China on the socio-political scene of the region, including the adaptation of American experience to them.

In addition, Americans take little account of the traditions and characteristics of the mentality of foreign peoples, considering their ideology

universal. But, despite this, it is premature to write off the whole social class that arose with the support of America and unites tens of thousands of citizens of Central Asia. It will still have the opportunity to show itself at moments of political turbulence, which will almost inevitably arise during the forthcoming transit of power in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. In addition, it is not known how Donald Trump's administration will behave.

Finally, acting in a traditional style for themselves, the American side covered the region with an extensive network of NGOs, media, educational institutions and Internet groups involved in the manipulation of socio-political processes.

In general, watching the "campaign" of the United States in Central Asia, it is noticeable that their achievements were defeated by the inability to hold onto gains; and successful moves were replaced by blatant failures, a vivid example of which was the Uzbek Andijan.

At such critical moments, the strengths and weaknesses of American foreign policy are clearly discernible. Its unconditional advantages remain a clear priority of its own national interests: the ability to mobilize allies to solve their problems; adaptation to the diplomatic work of modern social, communication and digital technologies; and, of course, a clear ideological message attractive to many foreign citizens, despite the striking divergence of liberal rhetoric with the real deeds that it masks.

Among the weaknesses of the American approach, experts refer to inter-party and inter-agency competition in the US, which affects international relations; wasteful handling of material resources, which, even for the world's first economy, are not boundless; ignoring sometimes very well-known Asian cultural and political traditions, although many American experts know that, for example, projects promoting homosexual relationships are poorly perceived in the patriarchal Eastern societies. But perhaps the most obvious vulnerability to which the American establishment is inclined

is the predominant sense of superiority and exclusivity that not only breeds the desire for world hegemony but also dulls the perception of reality.

The United States has steadily reduced its visible presence in the countries of Central Asia due to a combination of several factors. Among them is the strategic departure from the region (the transit center in Manas was closed in 2014 at the request of Bishkek), the limited activity of American companies (which today has been further reduced due to a decrease in the demand for Caspian oil and gas and the continued deferral of the development of the oil and gas field in Kashagan) and lack of large investments. This is especially obvious in comparison with the large-scale Chinese program entitled 'One Belt: One Road'.

To the above, we should add in the factor of fatigue on both sides: the activity of US civil society in the region is declining; and the community of supporters for the continuation of this activity seems to have lost hope for political changes in this region. At the same time, local authorities and public opinion in these countries are increasingly critical or even hostile to American plans for the implantation of democracy and the protection of minority rights in the countries of Central Asia. More and more often, various theories are under discussion, according to which the US sometimes aspire to destabilize the Eurasian (like the Middle Eastern) countries. These theories are beginning to determine public opinion in Central Asia.

Interests and contradictions between the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China and the United States in Central Asia

The gap in the influence on Central Asia between Russia and the US continues to widen to the disadvantage of America. Washington is losing its status in this region and is actually being pushed into the second tier of countries in terms of its influence in Central Asia. The "big game" in the region today is between

Russia and China, and these countries seem to have found the right balance of influence as far as Central Asia is concerned. Local regimes doubt the US's commitment to the interests of the region, given that Washington has to work vigorously in other theaters of world politics; and they feel that the Americans have given up leadership in this region to Moscow and Beijing. [3]

Despite the 5 + 1 format created by Secretary of State John Kerry, the role of the United States in the region is slowly and steadily declining. Relations between Russia and the United States in Central Asia are determined precisely by this growing inequality of their status. Moscow closely follows any US actions in the region, but does not feel as uncomfortable as it is in the countries of the South Caucasus or in the buffer countries that separate Russia and Europe. Washington is also unable properly to take into account the influence of Russia's soft power. Nevertheless, Moscow and Washington may have much more common interests in the region than officially recognized. Looking at them in order of importance and priority, then both countries express concern about the following factors:

- Moscow and Washington tend to overestimate the role of Central Asian citizens who left to fight in Syria in terms of the potential impact of the propaganda of the "Islamic state" on Central Asian Muslims. For Russia this is a more pressing problem than for the United States, given how many residents of the North Caucasus and other citizens of Russia today are fighting in Syria.

- Both geopolitical players are worried about the risk of political destabilization in Central Asia, despite a completely different attitude towards local regimes. The smooth transfer of power in Uzbekistan after the death of Islam Karimov seems to give Moscow more reason to believe in the ability of local governments to maintain stability in their countries. This attitude of Moscow is very different from the view of the United States on the nature and ability of local regimes.

- Both powers hope for the successful conclusion of the reconciliation process in Afghanistan. They believe that it will be possible to avoid a new round of military confrontation, since a military conflict may spread over time to neighboring countries. But Russia is not particularly concerned about the political nature of the next Afghan government, while Washington is more sensitive to the preservation of the institutions it has planted since 2001.

- Both countries would like to see a more effective fight against drug trafficking in the region, but they differ in their attitude to the problem of corruption of state authorities.

Perhaps relations between the US and Russia in Central Asia are doomed to remain unbalanced for a long time, since it is difficult to imagine a more active participation of the US in the affairs of this region, which could intensify confrontation. However, the Central Asian countries themselves may be the initiators of the changes, or the changes may be the result of Moscow's more active participation in the affairs of the region, which will again open a window of opportunity for the United States. If this does not happen, Central Asia will remain on the periphery of relations between the United States and Russia, which are formed in many other theaters of world politics, where there is a more acute confrontation between the two countries.

In the context of the development of the political situation in Central Asia, American analysts pay special attention to the growth of China's influence in the region and the prospects for changing this influence in the future, after the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan. It should be noted that American experts in general are quite unanimous in assessing Chinese policy in the region, describing it as much more successful than a similar policy of Western countries. The main reason for this success experts see in its practicality.

US experts believe that the US is trying to balance China's activity in the region and find there are reliable politicians who are inclined to

multi-vector policy. Nevertheless, by 2015, in the US, both at the expert and political levels, they finally came to the conclusion that, on the whole, they would support the policy of the PRC in this region. Thus, US politicians and experts assess the PRC as a more "convenient" rival in the Central Asian region, which looks rather remarkable due to its external illogicality. It would seem that, given many objective criteria, China now seems much more realistic than Russia, a candidate to challenge the US domination both on the world stage in general and in Central Asia in particular in the historically close future. [4]

In general, both Russia and China are geopolitical rivals of America. In the foreseeable medium term, it is more likely that the US will perceive Russia as its main rival, while the US attitude toward China is mixed. China's development of infrastructure in Central Asia favors greater multipolarity in the geopolitics of the region, which in turn serves the purposes of the United States. At the same time, America is also concerned about the fact that Central Asia passes into the hands of China. America welcomes (or does not oppose) China's policy in Central Asia with the decisive condition that this policy will not call into question the strategic balance in the region. [5]

In this regard, we should mention the format of "C5 + 1", which is based on Washington's previously developed strategy of "The New Silk Road" and has the same objectives as the Chinese initiative, "The Economic Belt of the New Silk Road", which appeared in 2014. The essence of the American strategy, as D. Kerry said then, was to help the region integrate into the world economy through infrastructure development, increasing the competitiveness of economies, attracting investments and implementing new programs, in particular, on climate change and Smart Waters ("Smart Water»).

That being said, Washington pursues several goals at the same time. The first is the economy and how economically it is possible to connect

Central Asia with a wider region and with the USA; the second is the environment and the solution of the problem of climate change; and the third is security, with a special focus on the threat of terrorism and stability issues in Afghanistan. [6]

The United States, understandably and even justifiably, does not have a clear strategy for Central Asia, unlike China and even Russia. The Chinese have long tried the most pragmatic style - expansion into the region through bilateral agreements. However, gradually leaving Afghanistan, Americans cannot afford the luxury of completely forgetting about Central Asia, which was their backbone and main political toolkit during Operation Enduring Freedom.

For the United States, the presence in the region is caused by a desire to balance the activation of China, which fills the niche of the main player in the economic sphere and most likely in the future in the field of security. Sooner or later, Beijing will come to this, because investing in the region, they will have to protect their investments. This might even be within the framework of close military cooperation with the countries of Central Asia. This explains the US attempts to intensify in the region and, as far as possible, counteract the strategy of Beijing.

The US - unlike China - cannot offer anything concrete to the countries of Central Asia; certainly not from the point of view of direct investments, except for those that are made to the Kazakhstani energy sector; nor from the point of view of security. It is obvious that the direct presence of Americans in the region in the military and political sphere will greatly irritate both Moscow and Beijing in a way that the region cannot cope with. The US bid will end up on multilateral relations, trying to find pressure points in each of the countries and determining its priorities in relations with each of them.

USA and country specificity of the region

For Washington, each of the countries of

Central Asia has its own specifics. From the economic point of view, Kazakhstan is the key partner for the United States. The interests of large oil and gas companies in the United States are concentrated here. In the sphere of regional security for Uzbekistan, Uzbekistan is a priority. Taking into account the Afghan factor and the common border, separate attention is paid to Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. However, Washington, speaking of the fact that there is a single format for dialogue with the countries of Central Asia, as a pragmatic player understands that the region is not a single whole. Americans know that there are serious tensions between the countries of Central Asia. Therefore, it is not advisable to say that Washington has developed a unified strategy in relation to them. The format of "C5 + 1" is more like a PR project, to demonstrate that the US has not lost interest in the region. Multi-vector foreign policy is exactly what Washington is expecting from its partners in Central Asia.

Neighborhood with Afghanistan determines US interest in Central Asia. According to observers, Washington's activity in the region has always been situational and short-term. The United States reduced its presence in Central Asia immediately after reaching its goals. Now this goal is stabilization in Afghanistan. For this, Washington needs coordination with all regional forces, for which the C5 + 1 dialogue format was created. " In August 2016, in support of this format, five projects were developed, for which the US is ready to spend only \$ 15 million.

In all projects - "Greater Central Asia", "New Silk Road", "Greater Middle East" - the US involved Central Asian countries, but they were created mainly to improve the situation in Afghanistan. At the same time, through these projects, the US competed with Russia and China for leadership in the region. As predicted, after the US military contingent is completely withdrawn from Afghanistan, Washington's interest in the region will again decline.

American experts on CA express confidence

that the new president will continue to work closely with the Central Asian countries in the C5 + 1 format, "but the prospects for the project will depend on the states of the region themselves who should independently form the agenda of the C5 + 1 meetings. Thus, the long-term nature of the C5 + 1 project will depend not so much on the US as on the ability of the states of the region to solve the accumulated problems in their relations with each other. Experts emphasize the energy and border contradictions between the Central Asian republics.

Naturally, the White House has to take into account the specifics of each state in the region. [7]

It is Kazakhstan that is at the center of attention not only of the US State Department, but of analytical structures in general. This is evident in the numerous reports of various American think tanks dealing specifically with Kazakhstan. Most importantly, what interests them is the issue of preserving the same foreign-policy direction after Nursultan Nazarbayev's departure: what is called in Kazakhstan a multi-vector foreign policy. Of all the Central Asian countries, it is with Kazakhstan that the United States has established partnership relations, even in spite of Astana's participation in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAP) or the republic's participation in the CSTO. Naturally, the White House is extremely interested in Astana following an unchanging course with the likely change of power.

Analytical circles in the United States openly state that in the current situation Kazakhstan is the best candidate for cooperation in the region. This country has a concept of development, resources and institutional capacity necessary for the more active role of leader and to facilitate the transition of Central Asia into a positive direction. Kazakhstan has serious achievements in foreign and domestic policy, and, unlike other countries in the region, it sets itself major tasks for the future. Its leaders carry out a skillful, complex diplomatic strategy that allows for effective

use of ties with China, Russia and the United States. Support and stimulation from the US can help Kazakhstan move towards a more modern, open and diversified economy. Over time, it may be more like Dubai and Singapore – and it is the case that such a goal is posed by Kazakhstan's leadership, rather than Russia. [8, 9]

Washington takes into account the fact that Kyrgyzstan expresses a certain disappointment with membership in the EAEU, a decline in Russian investment activity. Americans have caught this change and are preparing for a new relationship with this country. In 2017, presidential elections should be held in Kyrgyzstan. Washington expects that a change of leadership in Kyrgyzstan will lead to a change in Bishkek's foreign policy. [10]

Kyrgyzstan, if it manages to stabilize its political situation, could become a useful partner of the United States, but because of its small size and meager resources, it is unlikely to be the backbone of America's interaction with the region. Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, in Washington's opinion, are problem countries; The United States does not have the resources or serious interests to try to change the path of their development, and relations with them should be built accordingly.

Uzbekistan can occupy a more significant place for US diplomacy in the region if the government that will be in power after Karimov's departure is less repressive and more reform-oriented. From the point of view of security and US actions in Afghanistan, this country, perhaps, is of the greatest importance. And while the United States seeks to reduce its participation in Afghan affairs, so long as Washington is interested in ensuring Afghanistan's security, Tashkent will remain its important partner.

US experts are convinced that after Islam Karimov's departure, Uzbekistan will not have a sharp course fluctuation, at least in the beginning. Acting President S. Mirziyev recently stated that he will continue the policy of his predecessor: Uzbekistan will primarily

defend its interests and will not enter any regional blocs. It is likely that for some period of time Uzbekistan will continue the whole Islam Karimov's line. But with time some minor changes can be expected. At the same time, it is necessary to take into account the factor of external pressure on Uzbekistan. China and Russia are interested in distancing Tashkent from Washington and in drawing Uzbekistan into its sphere of influence.

Expected US policy in Central Asia

In the United States, which forms a common "Western view" of the Central Asian region, there has recently been a marked increase in the "realistic" (more balanced than during Clinton and Bush administrations) approach to assessing the role and significance of the region for the national interests of the United States. Significantly greater weight is gained by assessments in which Central Asia is viewed in Washington as a region of limited interest. Most likely, with Donald Trump in power, this approach will prevail.

American analysts have recently come to the conclusion that significant geopolitical changes and an unstable situation in the Central Asian states create prerequisites for strengthening US rivalry with Russia and China for influence in the region. At the same time, Central Asia is becoming less and less susceptible to American influence and "spreading democracy" programs. Proceeding from this, experts suggest that a future administration should adapt its regional policy to the existing conditions, and coordinate Washington's goals in Central Asia with its resources. It is pointed out that the former approach, with its excessive promises and the setting of ambitious but unrealistic tasks, leads only to mutual irritation and causes further disappointment in the United States in the region.

The grounds for the revision of US policy, according to the analytical calculations of American strategists, are as follows.

As the US military presence in Afghanistan

decreases, the importance of Central Asia as a "gateway" to this country in Washington's strategic calculations will also decrease. For the first 25 years of independence, Central Asian states were geo-politically oriented to the West. Today Central Asia is moving in a different direction. In the region there is a major geopolitical shift, which will result in weakening ties with the Euro-Atlantic community and strengthening the influence and significance of China. In the foreseeable future, the main partners of the Central Asian countries in the spheres of politics, economy and security will be Beijing and Moscow: this is due to the prevailing economic influence of China in the region and the residual presence of Russia.

These changes will reduce the presence and influence of America in the region and complicate the task of transforming Central Asian countries into democratic states with a market economy, connected by regional economic integration. Under these new conditions, the implementation of important tasks for Washington will require significant changes in US policy.

Now, as in many other regions of the world, Central Asian countries are wondering what kind of character the new US president's foreign policy will have. Of course, with Donald Trump the United States will not leave the region completely, but in the medium term, we should expect further fading of interest from the new US president to the former Soviet republics in Central Asia. It is obvious that the new American president will not personally engage in the Central Asian direction, which could be expected from H. Clinton, but completely delegates work with the region to his assistants, and not those of the very first rank.

It is significant that the new president of the United States, apparently, does not completely differentiate the Central Asian republics, although this situation was typical for top officials in Barak Obama administration. To say that the United States has serious economic

interests in the region is not true even in the case of Kazakhstan, where American capital is present in the oil and gas industry. Accordingly, the main driving force for US participation in Central Asia will again be politics.

The shaping of the policy of the United States is also affected by the fact that at present they are forced to distribute their attention and resources at once between several important regions, each of which is now more priority for Washington than Central Asia.

As for Donald Trump's statements about the statements for the establishment of relations with Russia, perhaps we will see that his promises will be realized to some extent. At least in the Central Asian direction, there will not be a sharp surge of anti-Russian activity by the US, but there is no need to radically change the situation.

At the same time, the extinction of American influence in the region will be rather slow, because the continuity of American institutions is preserved. The network of diplomatic missions and various non-governmental entities will continue to operate, although its activities will not be so intense. There will also be structures related to the Democratic Party, which, as before, are focused on the globalist agenda and the promotion of so-called democratic values. However, changes can occur with the amount of funding available to promote this.

In the first place, Donald Trump's coming will hit various social programs and various grantees. This is not an ideological component. Just for their projects, American money will not be enough as before, when the Obama administration in an ultimatum ordered the structures of the State Department and the US embassies in the region to support and develop LGBT movements in the Central Asian states. These processes will not be accompanied by loud statements, just at some point, pro-Western NGOs and grantees will feel that the funds allocated by the Americans are beginning to be critically low.

Donald Trump's coming to power will

clearly help to reduce this heat of unfulfilled expectations. Trump's victory also means that all the ambitious American initiatives - Greater Central Asia, CASA-1000, C5 + 1 and TAPI - which have been declared in the region for a dozen years, will be in the semi-frozen state. It's no secret that these projects do not have a genuine economic component, but are in fact politically motivated and aimed at destroying old ties and redesigning the region in Washington's favor.

As the new US leadership seems more focused on domestic problems, regions such as Central Asia will be at one of the last places on the list of priorities in Trump's foreign policy. Therefore, the administration of the 45th US president will most likely not invest much money in these projects. No one will close these projects; but work on them will be sluggish, obviously insufficient to fully implement American goals.

In the case of Central Asia, it seems that Afghanistan will continue to play an important role in determining US policy in the region. Trump pointed out that the American troops in Afghanistan should remain "for a while", although he admits that this is rather a forced measure.

Speaking about the prospects of the Central Asian direction of US policy, it is necessary to take into account the fact that the 45th president will be surrounded by advisers and fellows in arms in the Republican party. Many of these people supported not only the campaign in Afghanistan, but also in Iraq, to which public opinion in the United States is even more hostile.

It can be concluded that US policy towards Central Asia in the post-Afghan perspective will be affected by many uncertain factors. Washington has set itself a fairly clear plan of action; but the success of this plan, at least partially, depends on the fulfillment of too many poorly forecast conditions. The basis for further American policy in the region will be the "New Silk Road" project. Obviously, this decision was made long before the

withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan; and was motivated mainly by the desire to secure American influence in this country and preserve channels for influencing the internal situation. However, it is for this reason that the prospects for US policy in Central Asia are very vulnerable due to its complete dependence on the future developments in Afghanistan.

American infrastructure projects are very risky, if not to say, doomed to failure. In turn, this circumstance threatens the prospects for Washington's policy in Central Asia, since after a while the US may lose any significant agenda in its relations with the republics of the region. Having subordinated its Central Asian policy to solving American problems in Afghanistan (besides Pakistan and India), the United States actually made it hostage to the development of the situation in this very complicated country. Such an approach seems completely illogical, but, most likely, it shows that in the present conditions, Central Asia is marginal for the United States.

At the same time, another seemingly exotic scenario of possible destabilization of the situation in Central Asia is being considered in the United States. Expert advice has been put forward, according to which there is a high (about 40%) probability in the region that an earthquake of catastrophic proportions will occur there in the near future. There is a possibility that in the case of an unfavorable development of events such a catastrophe could provoke major public unrest, for example, if an earthquake affects an overcrowded Ferghana valley. In addition to the natural disaster, Islamic extremists might try to take advantage of this situation.

Recommendations for Washington, which prepared the American analytical community on the eve of Donald Trump's coming to power, include the following elements:

- To build a hierarchy of cooperation; i.e. make cooperation with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan a priority.
- To recognize and accept the contribution and opportunities of other states; i.e. recognize

that the United States in the region has some common goals with Russia and China, and find a way to use the actions of Beijing and Moscow to realize American interests.

- Do not insist on reforms if they are not demanded: i.e. the demands of change must come from the citizens of the Central Asian countries themselves, and the US reform program should be aimed primarily at improving the socio-economic situation, rather than spreading democracy.

- To find a balance between security and values: i.e. do not make cooperation in the security sphere dependent on the situation with human rights.

- To avoid militarization of US policy as a response to the exaggerated threat of Islamic extremism. Washington should not exaggerate the US security threat posed by Islamic radicalism in the region, and, accordingly, react to it too painfully.

- It is more effective to use the available levers of influence, "to get yourself a price" and to undertake more realistic tasks, built in order of importance. [11]

Conclusions and prospects

Thus, the American policy under Donald Trump administration regarding Central Asia will be formed in the context of the current interests and priorities of the United States on the world stage, restrictions on the financing of the Pentagon and assistance to foreign states, in competition with other problems requiring the attention of US authorities. A number of crises that erupted at the same time in other regions are replacing the "Central Asian theme" from the western geopolitical agenda. The campaign against ISIL in Syria and Iraq, the crisis in Ukraine, the civil wars in North Africa, the entry into force of the agreement with Iran, and the confrontation between Russia and China far surpass the events in the region that Washington does not consider as direct threats to US security.

Central Asia is now and in the foreseeable future important for Americans not in itself, but

only as a means of influencing the continental centers of force competing with the West. In addition, Central Asia is surrounded by large powers, which have much more interests and connections with it. The US has no primary interests in Central Asia, but they have goals related to "containment" of China, Iran and Russia. All this together leads to the fact that on the political agenda of the West, the neighbors of Central Asia are given much more importance than to itself.

The United States does not have such geographical advantages and significant interests in Central Asia, like Russia and China. Given these realities, America seeks to adopt one of the variants of the strategy of "balancing from afar" - to use its tools in politics, economics, and, if necessary, security, to selectively act as a partner of the CA and to compensate for the geopolitical weight of the Russian Federation and the PRC. According to some American analysts, "balancing from afar" is a way to save the US from the burden of direct security, delegating the task of maintaining the balance of power in unstable regions to others.

In general, the forecast for the further development of American strategy and tactics regarding Central Asia and the dynamics of the development of Kazakh-American relations is based on the fact that the policy of the State Department will be determined and formed in relation to the region as a whole and the Republic of Kazakhstan in particular. As a result, Washington will persistently guide the leadership of the states of the region on the idea of the need to distance themselves from Russia and adhere to foreign-policy sovereignty.

There is every reason to believe that Trump will retain the US military presence in Afghanistan, albeit in a very reduced form, but this will not require the creation of new military bases on the territory of the Central Asian states.

Thus, it can be assumed that there will be no drastic change in US policy in Central Asia, but there will be a continuation of a slow decline

in American influence in the region.

However, against this background, the strategy of the United States will focus not so much on expanding its own economic ties, as on the tasks of geopolitical containment of Russia and China. The White House promotes transit corridors and integration plans, alternative to the proposals of Moscow and Beijing and designed to reduce their impact on the economy of Central Asia. In general, in recent years, the United States of America has been step by step losing ground in the regional integration "race." Apparently, this can only be changed dramatically by bringing loyal governments to power in the oil-and-gas producing and transit countries of Central Asia that will be the vehicles of the economic policy hostile to Russia.

With a certain degree of certainty, we can expect that Washington will retain a common strategic plan for Central Asia. At least, its vector was stable under three consecutive US administrations, alternating each other since the early 1990s. After the first tacit consultations with Central Asian leaders, even before the collapse of the USSR, the actions of all the owners of the White House in one way or another obeyed the logic of containing the US geopolitical competitors. First of all, they were aimed at breaking the region with Russia, and later also at stopping the growing influence of China and isolating Iran.

Historically, the imperatives of the American strategy include ensuring access to raw materials, including the creation of routes for their transportation to the West. These basic principles of US policy will remain unchanged in the foreseeable future, as long as the political class in Washington perceives its country as a superpower with interests in all, even the most remote corners of the world. The rigid, extremely cynical methods of conducting geopolitical struggle in the spirit of a big "dirty" game will remain unchanged, apparently.

The American-Russian "Great Game" will, of course, continue, and the rivalry between

Russia and the United States will remain key in its configuration. In the area of regional trade and economic development, the United States is also pursuing the goal of bringing Central Asia out of Russia's orbit of influence. However, due to geographical factors, Washington's capabilities in this are severely limited. With the preservation of normal conditions, the confrontation between the US and Russia will proceed in a "soft" regime. Under normal conditions, the absence of sharp negative changes in the countries of the region is implied. At the same time, the United States will be limited in its foreign policy course by certain factors. First of all, they recognized that it is difficult to conduct a political transformation of the region in conditions of limited diplomatic resources. In addition, the promotion of democratic change is detrimental to the real interests of the White House.

If the US relations with the Central Asian countries reach a deadlock, this will have a very detrimental effect on Washington's interests in the region. In addition, the sustainable development of Afghanistan and the region as a whole depends on cooperation with the Central Asian states, without the economic participation of which the American plan in the region will not be realized. Therefore, in the case of political instability in Central Asia, taking into account the lessons of the past and its real opportunities, the Americans will not be able to take the initiative to change the regime, will respect the status quo and wait for a more favorable environment.

In case of sharp changes in the internal political situation in Central Asia, Washington will be ready to actively intervene in the process. Taking into account the American way of conducting foreign policy, it can be assumed that they will be inclined to apply flexible methods of influence, including economic cooperation, cultural exchanges and impact through the channels of non-governmental organizations. The Central Asian states are far from the West: there is no Europe, no Japan, allies of the United States. The countries of

Central Asia still cannot exist without close ties with Russia and China. When there is no confrontation of the Central Asian states with Russia, the United States in the case of confrontation with Moscow does not stand a chance of success.

It is worth noting that the essence and form of the "Great Game" will significantly change. Having expelled the USA from the strong points of the region, Russia won a complete victory in this issue - military bases will no longer be objects of competition between the two sides. But this does not mean an end to the competition between Moscow and Washington in the military sphere. The US did not give up and did not quit the game: they will continue to develop military cooperation with the countries of Central Asia, working to expand the US military presence.

Energy pipelines are still part of geopolitical and geo-economic rivalry, but the degree of its intensity will gradually decrease. At the same time, strengthening the position of the United States has its own characteristics and a different pattern of behavior. In general, they showed flexibility in relation to Central Asia, strengthened cooperation, not waiting for changes in political regimes to new, more "friendly" ones. In other words, Washington is winning time to continue the struggle with Russia. If Washington's main geopolitical goal is to prevent the emergence of a Russian "empire" in the expanses of the former USSR, Central Asia is one of the most important outposts for deterring Russia. It is Moscow that views Central Asia as its "sphere of influence," while China has no plans to establish control zones. Therefore, in the near future, the US will consider Russia as its main competitor.

If the West, in theory, can take a position that is absolutely indifferent to Central Asia without much detriment to itself, then Russia and China, for obvious military-strategic reasons, cannot afford this.

Based on the discussions of the American scientific community on US interests in Central Asia, it can be concluded that the guarantee

of state sovereignty of the countries of the region remains the core of American interests in the region. China does not threaten the sovereignty of the Central Asian republics, so it is not a competitor to America. At the same time, Chinese influence manifests itself in the economic sphere. Thus, China is not able to achieve hegemony in Central Asia. Since Beijing will not pretend to be the dominant role in the region, the US is not inclined to perceive it here as its main competitor.

Unlike criticism of Russia, there was much less criticism from the US side of China's policy in the Central Asian region. The real actors of the "Great Game" in Central Asia are the United States and Russia. Therefore, the true meaning of the "Great Game" is the American-Russian geopolitical confrontation

in the region. American-Russian foreign policy maneuvering is holistic and systematic, has its own strategy, goals, course of development and is expressed in concrete actions. In general, if Russia wants to maintain the status quo, then the US, on the contrary, hopes to change it. As a result, Washington prefers a policy of supporting the change of power, while Moscow is determined to maintain regimes in the region. This can be seen in the diplomatic practices of the two countries in Central Asia.

Thus, it is hardly possible to expect a consensus of interests in the triangle "Russia-US-China" in the medium term. Most likely, with a favorable development of events, the status quo achieved in previous years will remain.

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HIGHER EDUCATION AS AN INSTRUMENT OF RUSSIA'S PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN CENTRAL ASIA¹

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Abstract. The article considers the involvement of Russian universities in the the Russian Federation's programs of public diplomacy in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The author analyzes the reasons for encouraging higher-education institutions from the Russian Federation to engage actively in the recruitment of applicants from these countries, and highlights the practical issues behind the interaction between the educational and diplomatic structures in the promotion of Russian interests in the other post-Soviet countries.

Despite the modest positions of the Russian system of higher education in world ratings, the universities of the Russian Federation compete successfully in the educational markets of the Central Asian countries - both with national universities and with universities (and their recruiting agencies) from the countries of Europe, North America and Asia as represented in the region. Alongside the twin practical issues of making a profit from the export of educational services and raising their rating positions, Russian universities actively participate in the promotion of Russia's foreign-policy interests in the post-Soviet countries, complementing the activities of the official institutions of public diplomacy.

Key words: *public diplomacy, higher education, Russia, Central Asia.*

¹ This article is a continuation of research started in author's previous publications: Fominykh A. *Projecting 'Soft Power': American and Russian Public Diplomacy in Post-Soviet Central Asia // Central Asia and the Caucasus. 2010. Vol. 11. № 3. pp. 66-77; Fominykh A. Russia's Public Diplomacy in Central Asia and the Caucasus: The Role of the Universities // The Hague Journal of Diplomacy. Issue 12 (2017), pp. 56-85.*

ЖОҒАРЫ БІЛІМ РЕСЕЙ ҚОҒАМДЫҚ ДИПЛОМАТИЯСЫНЫҢ ОРТАЛЫҚ АЗИЯДАҒЫ ҚҰРАЛЫ РЕТІНДЕ

Алексей Фоминых

Аңдатпа. Мақалада ресейлік университеттерді Ресей Федерациясының Қазақстандағы, Қырғыстандағы, Тәжікстандағы, Түрікменстандағы және Өзбекстандағы көпшілік дипломатияның мемлекеттік бағдарламаларына тарту мәселелері қаралады. РФ-ның жоғары оқу орындарының аталған елдерден талапкерлерді қабылдаумен белсенді түрде айналысуға түрткі болатын себептер талданады, білім беру және дипломатиялық құрылымдардың Ресей мүдделерін посткеңестік кеңістікте көтермелеудегі өзара әрекеттесуінің тәжірибелік мәселелері баяндалады.

Ресейдің жоғары білім беру жүйесінің жалпы дүниежүзілік рейтингтегі орташа позицияларына қарамастан, РФ-ның университеттері Орта Азияның білім беру нарықтарында ұлттық жоғары оқу орындарымен де, аймақта өкілдіктері бар Еуропа, Солтүстік Америка және Азия елдерінің университеттерімен және рекрутингтік агенттіктермен де табысты бәсекелесіп отыр. Білім саласындағы қызметтерді экспорттаудан және рейтингтік позицияларды көтеруден пайда табудың тәжірибелік мәселелерді шешумен қатар, ресейлік жоғары оқу орындары ресми институттардың қызметін көпшілік дипломатиямен толықтыра отырып, посткеңестік кеңістікте Ресейдің сыртқы саяси мүдделерін көтермелеуге белсенді түрде атсалысып отыр.

Түйін сөздер: көпшілік дипломатия, жоғары білім беру, Ресей, Орталық Азия.

ВЫСШЕЕ ОБРАЗОВАНИЕ КАК ИНСТРУМЕНТ ПУБЛИЧНОЙ ДИПЛОМАТИИ РОССИИ В ЦЕНТРАЛЬНОЙ АЗИИ

Алексей Фоминых

Аннотация. В статье рассматриваются вопросы вовлечения российских университетов в государственные программы публичной дипломатии Российской Федерации в Казахстане, Киргизии, Таджикистане, Туркменистане и Узбекистане. Анализируются причины, побуждающие вузы РФ активно заниматься набором абитуриентов из этих стран, освещаются практические вопросы взаимодействия образовательных и дипломатических структур в продвижении российских интересов на постсоветском пространстве.

Несмотря на скромные позиции российской системы высшего образования в общемировых рейтингах, университеты РФ успешно конкурируют на образовательных рынках стран Центральной Азии как с национальными вузами, так и с представленными в регионе университетами и рекрутинговыми агентствами стран Европы, Северной Америки и Азии. Одновременно с решением практических задач извлечения прибыли от экспорта образовательных услуг и повышения рейтинговых позиций, российские вузы активно участвуют в продвижении внешнеполитических интересов России на постсоветском пространстве, дополняя деятельность официальных институтов публичной дипломатии.

Ключевые слова: публичная дипломатия, высшее образование, Россия, Центральная Азия.

Introduction

Professor Joseph S. Nye of Harvard, who conceived the idea of “soft power”, wrote about the three dimensions of public diplomacy. [1] The Russian Federation now has all three in full. The first, most obvious and most well-illustrated dimension is the mobilization of a variety of media for constant daily communication with a foreign audience. The most striking example is the activity of the RT television channel and the news agency “Sputnik”. The second dimension is ambitious “mega-projects” with national branding, such as the Winter Olympics in Sochi in 2014 and the World Cup of 2018. The third dimension of Russian public diplomacy, as a rule, remains in the shadow of the first two, and does not attract much attention from researchers. This is the building of a system of long-term networking with the population of foreign countries through the channel of international cultural and educational exchanges.

Many Western authors, especially after the events in the Crimea and the east of Ukraine, tend to characterize the whole of Russian public diplomacy as an apparatus of propaganda and covert operations using the resources of “conditionally-non-governmental” (funded from the state budget) organizations of Russian citizens; and culturally-humanitarian funds and programs. [2; 3] Most of these publications focus on the analysis of Russian influence in the EU countries and the “Eastern Partnership”. Meanwhile, in the Central Asian republics, higher education plays a key role in Russian public diplomacy, along with the media and programs promoting the Russian language and culture. In relations to the states of this region, Russian programs of cultural and humanitarian cooperation are flexibly integrated into the context of Eurasian integration and development assistance. Here, manipulative methods of propaganda are used to a much lesser extent, and instruments of the “third dimension” of public diplomacy are much more widely represented, which, for a variety of reasons, cannot work effectively in Western countries.

Methodologically, this study is based

on statistical data concerning the flow of international academic mobility; the analysis of Russian political texts; and experience of practical activity in the field of cooperation in international education.

Background

During the Cold War, the superpower race for foreign students, especially from third-world countries, was as much an attribute of the global confrontation between East and West as the arms race. In 1990, more than 126,000 foreign citizens were studying in the Soviet Union, most of them in the universities of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (the future Russian Federation). [4] According to this indicator, the USSR ranked third in the world after the United States and France. After the collapse of the Union, the Russian Federation sharply curtailed large-scale assistance programs for developing countries. In only one year the number of foreign students in the Russian Federation dropped to 89,000 (1991); and by 1996 it had fallen to 59,600. [5, P. 1]

The slow restoration of the influx of foreign students began only in the mid-1990s. Mostly thanks to Russia’s Soviet heritage, Russia was gradually able to return to the top ten of the most popular destinations for study abroad. (6, P. 364) World leadership in foreign study is unassailably entrenched in the United States, where, in 2016, the number of foreign students exceeded one million. [7]

Overnight, independence for the countries of the former USSR turned every student from a former republic of the union who was studying at a Russian university into a foreigner. Neither the students themselves, nor the international services of the universities, were ready for such a radical change in status. It is notable that the only group of foreign students whose number in Russian universities grew in the early 1990s were Russian-speaking migrants from the former Soviet republics. According to some reports, the total number of ethnic Russians who resettled in the Russian Federation between

1990 and 2003 amounted to more than eight million people. More than half of this number were from the five republics of Central Asia. [8, P.1] A significant number of Russian-speaking students from Central Asian countries continue to enter Russian universities for the subsequent acquisition of Russian citizenship under a simplified scheme.

The first attempts at popularising higher education in the Russian Federation for the countries of Central Asia did indeed have the aim of facilitating citizenship in this way. At the official level, this was reflected in Article 17 of the Federal Law, "On State Policy of the Russian Federation with Respect to Citizens Abroad", adopted in May 1999. [9] In this case, the wording of Article 3 allowed for the granting of citizenship of the Russian Federation to any citizens of the former USSR, regardless of their ethnicity. In other words, a citizen for Russia is "any citizen of the disintegrated empire, even if neither he nor his ancestors lived in the RSFSR" [10]. Foreigners who claim their status as a citizen are entitled to have access to education on a par with Russians.

The reintegration of the educational space of the former USSR also contributed to the restoration of the inflow of students from post-Soviet countries to Russian universities. The process began with the signing of the relevant agreements between the Russian Federation, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in 1998. [11] In 2004, eleven CIS countries (with the exception of Turkmenistan) concluded an agreement in Astana on mutual recognition and the equivalence of educational documents at all levels of pre-university education. [12] In terms of coverage in the media or scientific publications, these phenomena did not equal the Bologna process; but at the level of the Commonwealth they were of great importance. Bureaucratic barriers were eliminated at the stage of admission requirements for applicants,

which greatly facilitated cross-border academic mobility. Currently, the Russian Federation has bilateral agreements on mutual recognition of educational documents, academic degrees and qualifications with virtually all the other CIS countries - with the exception of Uzbekistan.²

The foreign-policy imperatives behind educational cooperation

Russia's active return to the information, cultural and educational space of the "near-abroad" in the mid-2000s was associated with the reorientation of the vector of foreign-policy efforts regarding the CIS countries. In a message to the Federal Assembly on April 25, 2005, President V.V. Putin stressed, along with a statement supporting the rights of Russian citizens, the need to continue the "civilizing mission of the Russian nation on the Eurasian continent". [13] The concept of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation, adopted in 2008, mentions for the first time public diplomacy as a means of achieving "an objective perception in the world and influence, through information, on public opinion abroad". [14] During this period, most of the existing institutions of public diplomacy were being created - the Russkiy Mir Foundation (2007); Rossotrudnichestvo (2008)³; the A.M. Gorchakov Fund for Support of Public Diplomacy (2010); the Russian Council on International Affairs (2011); and others.

Gradually, the Russian political class realized the importance of education exchanges for the implementation of foreign-policy objectives. By the mid-2000s, the weakening of Russia's cultural influence and the decline of interest in the Russian language and Russian education in the post-Soviet countries began to be perceived in the context of Russia's national-security challenges. For instance, the de-Russification of Central Asia and especially the penetration of the region by educational organizations from the USA, the EU countries, China, Turkey, Iran

² Holders of secondary education certificates, issued in Uzbekistan, must undergo a procedure for the recognition (nostrification) of these documents, to obtain higher education in Russia.

³ Full name: Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States, Citizens Living Abroad and International Humanitarian Cooperation.

and Saudi Arabia was called a direct threat to Russian interests. [15] Over time, despite the obvious successes in promoting education in the Russian language in the countries of the former USSR, the alarmism of the Russian elites regarding competition in the cultural and educational environment of neighboring countries has only increased. In many respects, this happened under the influence of the events of 2014 in Ukraine, where the outcome of the "battle for the minds and hearts" of the population was clearly decided not in Russia's favor.

In the 1990's, indeed, new actors entered the market for educational services in Central Asia. Foreign-scholarship programs became available; and numerous joint universities and branches were established with the participation of Turkey, the United States, Great Britain, Germany and other countries, focusing on the educational standards of the sponsoring countries. China - which is carrying out active economic expansion through the Belt and Road Initiative - created a network of 10 Institutes and 12 Confucius classes in Central Asia, in which about 23,000 students and schoolchildren are studying. [16, P. 163] The new direction of student mobility from the countries of the region in the post-Soviet period was towards the Muslim states of the Middle East and South-East Asia: Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Malaysia. South Korea is actively promoting its scholarship programs (see Table 3).

The decline in interest in the study of the Russian language and its deliberate ousting from the socio-political sphere on the wave of the construction of new nation-states occurred in parallel with the growing popularity of English. The Kazakh leadership stated that up to 20% of the country's population should master English by 2020. [17, P.1098-1099]

The emergence of new actors in the market of educational services in Central Asia put an end to the monopoly of national educational systems retaining many features of the Soviet university model; and which were therefore

associated with the Russian academic tradition - with all its advantages and disadvantages. The promotion of Russian higher education in this region in the 2000s therefore took place in the face of tough international rivalry; and not always with the approval of local elites as far as Russian public-diplomacy initiatives were concerned.

Institutes and mechanisms for expanding the Russian educational presence

Following the worldwide practice of the organization of scholarship programs, relying on the experience of the era of the Soviet-Union and creating an alternative to foreign mobility programs, the RF government gradually increased the quota for admission of foreign citizens to free education in Russian universities. This quota was determined as three thousand budget places in 1995; and then increased to seven thousand in 2003. [18] In August 2008, it was increased to ten thousand people per year [19]; and in October 2013 to 15,000 [20]. At the same time, most new vacancies were redistributed in favor of entrants from the CIS, primarily Central Asia. Thus, in the 2015/2016 academic year, applicants from the Commonwealth countries received 36.9% of the budgeted places allocated under the quota (see Table 1).

Outside of Russia, activity on recruitment of foreign applicants has gradually been concentrated in the Russian Centers of Science and Culture (RCSC). The first director of Rossotrudnichestvo, Farit Mukhametshin (formerly the Ambassador of Russia in Uzbekistan), announced his intention to create a worldwide network of one hundred or more Russian centers and the desire to make the name of Rossotrudnichestvo an internationally recognizable brand, along with the British Council, the Spanish Cervantes Institute, the German Goethe Institute, the Alliance Française and the Chinese Confucius Institute. [21]

Thanks to the measures which have been taken, the share of students in Russian universities from the CIS countries, including the Central Asian Republics, is steadily increasing (see

Table 2). In the 2015/2016 academic year, 79% of all foreign students in Russian universities were citizens of post-Soviet states. [22, P. 4] For comparison, their share in 2008 was 36%.

The CIS countries and particularly Central Asia have become the main “suppliers” of foreign entrants to Russian universities, ahead of China, India and Vietnam.

Chart 1. The share of state scholarships (quotas) for the education of foreign citizens and citizens from various groups of countries and regions of the world in higher educational institutions of the Ministry of Education and Science of Russia funded by the Federal Budget in the 2015/2016 academic year (according to the plan of admission) [23, P. 286].




Table 2. The number of citizens of Central Asian countries educated in Russian universities in 2008/2009 - 2014/2015 academic years. [23, P. 43]

The name of the country	2008/2009	2009/2010	2010/2011	2011/2012	2012/2013	2013/2014	2014/2015
Kazakhstan	13,720	14,294	16,616	19,189	23,656	27,524	33,730
Kyrgyzstan	1,394	1,516	2,050	2,564	2,627	3,591	3,957
Tajikistan	2,226	2,657	3,356	4,835	5,660	6,561	8,789
Turkmenistan	2,315	3,783	5,297	7,661	10,954	12,114	12,192
Uzbekistan	3,710	3,289	3,466	3,996	5,605	6,288	8,831
Total CA	23,365	25,539	30,785	38,425	48,502	56,078	67,499
Total CIS countries	39,268	42,426	50,986	59,244	69,689	80,910	99,928
Total world	108,565	108,084	118,730	125,538	139,578	156,211	181,334

The education of the citizens of the post-Soviet countries has some features that are not common to those coming from Russia’s so-called “far abroad”. Thus, the proportion of persons from post-Soviet countries enrolled in extramural study is relatively large (44% in the 2015/2016 academic year). As for intramural study, it is largely subsidized by the Russian state: 46% of

all full-time students are enrolled at the expense of the RF budget, and 82% of their number come from the republics of the former USSR. [22, P. 4] Considering the long common border and long-term stable channels of academic mobility, many students from Kazakhstan choose the geographically close Russian regions for study - often the neighboring regions.

Table 3. The main countries of origin (top 10) for study abroad for the countries of Central Asia (2016). [24]

No.	Kazakhstan	Kyrgyzstan	Tajikistan	Turkmenistan	Uzbekistan
1.	Russia (59,295)	Russian Federation (4,430)	Russian Federation (10,825)	Russian Federation (16,990)	Russian Federation (16,162)
2.	Kyrgyzstan (4,828)	Turkey (1,819)	Kyrgyzstan (1,423)	Ukraine (10,893)	Kazakhstan (3,607)
3.	USA (2,006)	Kazakhstan (1,101)	Turkey (624)	Turkey (9,092)	Ukraine (2,061)
4.	Turkey (1,799)	Germany (486)	Kazakhstan (498)	Belarus (8,634)	Germany (727)
5.	United Kingdom (1,596)	Saudi Arabia (348)	Saudi Arabia (392)	Kazakhstan (998)	South Korea (700)
6.	Czech Republic (1,446)	Tajikistan (307)	Ukraine (344)	Uzbekistan (296)	Latvia (625)
7.	Malaysia (1,252)	United States (212)	United States (263)	Tajikistan (263)	Kyrgyzstan (620)
8.	Germany (738)	South Korea (147)	Belarus (258)	Azerbaijan (236)	Turkey (556)
9.	Poland (519)	Malaysia (122)	Egypt (210)	United States (218)	United States (481)
10.	United Arab Emirates (455)	Egypt (104)	Germany (164)	Kyrgyzstan (129)	Malaysia (469)

Thus, the countries of Central Asia have become the main foreign market for the educational services of Russian universities, largely due to geographical proximity; the economic, historical and cultural and political ties of the region with Russia; the widespread use of the Russian language; and the similarity of educational systems.

Motivation of universities

The reasons that prompted many Russian universities to create a presence in the countries of Central Asia were often far removed from “big” politics. One of the most important factors was the demographic one: a sharp decline in the birth-rate in Russia in the 1990s led to a reduction in the number of graduates of secondary schools and thus of future students, which meant that the problem of economic survival became an urgent one for state universities which were faced also with inevitable cuts in state funding and the closure of unclaimed or unprofitable educational programs. With these conditions, admission campaigns became a

fierce competition for each applicant. At the same time, most Central Asian countries with their high natural population growth have been unable to cope with the increasing pressure on their national higher-education systems. This has inevitably led to the movement of young people abroad. Over the ten years from 2003 to 2012, according to UNESCO, the number of citizens from five Central Asian republics traveling to study abroad has more than doubled, from 67,000 to 156,000 people. [25] In this respect, educational movement from the region to Russia has a lot in common with the movements of labor migration.

To understand the reasons behind the activity of the Russian universities, it is important to understand the current transformations in the higher-education system of the Russian Federation. The creation in 2008 of nine powerful federal universities (through the merger of regional universities) and the allocation of a special category of national-research university forced “ordinary” universities to pay increased attention to maintaining the positive

dynamics of development, including through strengthening the international reputation and export of education. The introduction of a system of annual monitoring of the effectiveness of universities' activity since 2013 has become another tool for the internationalization of universities "from above", since the percentage of foreign students became the main indicator of international activity.[26]

Finally, profit is one of the main motivations. In addition to state subsidy of "budget" foreign students, universities are interested in the recruitment of applicants for paid programs. In 2016, 69% of foreign students in Russia were educated on a fee basis. [22, P. 4] According to some estimates, the income from the study of foreign citizens within the country's economy increased seven times over the 10 years from 2007 to 2016. In 2015, for example, it amounted to 73 billion rubles. [23, P. 25]

Under these conditions, the recruitment of students (most of whom speak Russian) from the countries of the former Soviet Union seemed to be the only affordable response to demographic, economic and domestic political challenges. It opened up opportunities to use the resources of Rosstrudnichestvo; to make a fairly free interpretation of the legislation on citizens; and, finally, to exploit the willingness of foreign clients to interact with Russian universities, even small ones, operating successfully in the countries of Central Asia.

An important competitive advantage of Russian universities is the Russian language. Despite the negative dynamics of its prevalence in the countries of Central Asia, many local universities actively use Russian as the main language of learning; or as a language complementary to the main state language. Education programs in the Russian language account for more than half of the content in universities in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. [27] Teaching tutorials in Russian are actively used, including by students, studying in the national languages. [17, P. 1085] Typical of approaches throughout the region is the fact that universities from Ukraine and Belarus, recruiting students

across Central Asia, offer their educational programs in Russian (in Belarus, Russian is one of the state languages; and in Ukraine it is the language of learning "by choice"). [28]

Universities as subjects of public diplomacy

Russian universities have developed several basic ways of working with the Russian Centre of Science and Culture (RCSC) in the CIS countries to promote their education programs and recruit foreign students.

First, the RCSCs represent their own working areas, with personnel and the technical means for organising information events and enrolment campaigns. Many universities hold extra-mural examinations and Olympiads through the RCSC. RCSCs play the role of resource centers, where universities send their advertising information for distribution to the target audience. Since 2012, Rosstrudnichestvo has concluded bilateral agreements on cooperation with individual universities, including plans for joint work on specific countries.

Second, the regional offices of Rosstrudnichestvo organize collective expositions of Russian universities as part of commercial educational exhibitions ("International Education", "Education and Career", etc.), held in the capital cities or major regional centers. This is especially advantageous and convenient for the poorer regional universities, for which participation in such events along with the stronger players is organizationally, financially and logistically difficult.

Third, the RCSCs help universities establish contact with public associations of Russian citizens. In some cases, work on the recruitments of applicants is possible only through contact with Russian societies, clubs and associations.

Fourth, Russian universities, along with foreign colleagues, establish their branches in the countries of the region. In 2016, there were 19 branches of Russian universities operating in Central Asia (with the exception of Turkmenistan). Most of them have duplicate licenses, issued by the Ministry of Education

and Science of the Russian Federation and the national education authorities in the country where they are located (see Table 4).

A relatively new phenomenon during the last decade has been the intensification of a network of interuniversity cooperation programs, implemented under the auspices of regional international organizations. The countries of Central Asia are represented in a project of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization University, which, in fact, is an attempt to borrow the best practices of the well-proven European program “Erasmus”, which is designed to fund students studying abroad. Joint education programs are planned on the basis of 77 participating universities (24 in China, 20 in Russia, 14 in Kazakhstan, 10 in Tajikistan, 8 in Kyrgyzstan and 1 in Belarus) [29]. In April 2016, a group of Russian universities (the Tomsk State University, the Moscow State University and the St. Petersburg State Economic University) initiated the creation of a network of Eurasian universities for the EAEU member states. [30]

The trend in recent years has been the creation of organizations of graduates of Russian universities. In addition, there are many similar communities of an informal nature (including social networks on the internet).

The degree of involvement of universities in public programs of public diplomacy is very high. Every day, work on the organization of the education of foreign applicants makes

it necessary to coordinate the activities of the international services of the universities with Russian diplomatic missions abroad. The Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia (PFUR) annually holds an all-Russian seminar on international education, which has become the main expert forum for discussing issues of foreign students learning in Russia. Representatives of the Russian Foreign Ministry and Rossotrudnichestvo usually take part in its work. [23, P. 22]

Conclusions

The educational expansion of Russia in the post-Soviet countries is thus characterized by a combination of market and political motives. This expansion shows a tendency to growth, which is constrained by external factors. In 2015, therefore, a draft government resolution was discussed to increase the quota of budget places for foreigners in Russian universities from 15 thousand to 20 thousand, which was supposed to allocate 206 million rubles in 2016. The goal of the quota expansion was “to increase the effectiveness of Russian ‘soft power’”; and “the formation of pro-Russian national elites”, which should "more effectively promote Russian interests in their homeland including those which are long-term". However the crisis in the economy, largely caused by Western sanctions, forced the Russian leadership to abandon these plans. [31]

Table 4. Branches of Russian universities in Central Asia [32].

Kazakhstan		
	Name	City
1.	Almaty Branch of the Academy of Labor and Social Relations	Almaty
2.	Almaty branch of the St. Petersburg Humanitarian University of Trade Unions	Almaty
3.	Kazakhstan Branch of M.V. Lomonosov Moscow State University	Astana
4.	Kostanay branch of Chelyabinsk State University	Kostanay
5.	Ust-Kamenogorsk branch of state-owned vocational college Moscow State University of Economics, Statistics, and Informatics (MESI)	Ust-Kamenogorsk
6.	Branch "Voskhod" Moscow Aviation Institute (State Technical University) in Baikonur	Baikonur
7.	Branch of Tyumen State Oil and Gas University in Pavlodar	Pavlodar
Kyrgyzstan		
1.	Branch of the Moscow Institute of Entrepreneurship and Law	Karakol

Kazakhstan		
	Name	City
2.	Branch of the Moscow Institute of Entrepreneurship and Law	Bishkek
3.	Training Center of the Baltic State Technical University ("VOENMEKH")	Bishkek
4.	Branch of Moscow State Social University	Osh
5.	Branch of the International Slavic Institute	Bishkek
6.	Branch of the Moscow State University of Economics, Statistics and Informatics	Bishkek
7.	Kyrgyz-Russian Academy of Education	Bishkek
8.	Branch of the Russian State University of Trade and Economics	Bishkek
Tajikistan		
1.	Russian-Tajik (Slavonic) University	Dushanbe
2.	Central Asian Branch of the Russian New University in Khujand	Khujand
Turkmenistan		
There are no existing branches		
Uzbekistan		
1.	Branch of G.V. Plekhanov Russian Academy of Economics	Tashkent
2.	Branch of M.V. Lomonosov Moscow State University	Tashkent

The political class of the Russian Federation still perceives competitiveness in the markets of international education as a manifestation of geopolitical rivalry. This vision was reflected in the "Strategy of National Security of the Russian Federation", signed by President V.V. Putin on the eve of 2016. Among the priority tasks it sets out are: "increasing the export of quality educational services, first of all to the member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States; increasing the attractiveness of education in the Russian language in the world market of educational services." The document also records the status of the Russian language as one of the foundations for the development of integration processes in the post-Soviet space ("a means of satisfying the linguistic and cultural needs of citizens abroad"); and as a tool for accelerating the processes of Eurasian integration. [33]

While *Rossotrudnichestvo* and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs mobilize the educational resources of public diplomacy, guided by the goals of promoting Russian

influence in a strategically important region, universities use the capabilities of the RCSCs and citizens' organizations to market their educational programs and gain direct access to foreign audiences. This pragmatism is quite understandable, since the number and diversity of countries of origin of foreign students directly affect the income from educational activities and the ratings of universities, and, consequently, the amount of state subsidies.

Thus, the participation of Russian higher education in the implementation of foreign policy tasks in Central Asia is an example of the symbiosis of diplomatic and educational structures. The opportunities for higher education, provided by Russia, as well as the establishment of direct partnership with national universities, including in the context of schemes for students to study abroad, form the basis for Russia's long-term presence in the cultural and humanitarian space of the region and make a significant contribution to its economic and socio-cultural development.

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МРҒТИ
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KAZAKHSTAN'S TRANSITION TO A "GREEN ECONOMY": AIMS AND PROBLEMS

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Abstract. The peculiarities of Kazakhstan's geographical location, in conjunction with the niche it occupies in the international division of labor, create, on the one hand, risks for Eurasian ecological safety and on the other hand, an environmental vulnerability for the Republic itself. Analysis of the results of the implementation in Kazakhstan of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) show that, against the impressive results achieved, improvement of the climate is still of current interest. In 2013, in an effort to reduce environmental risks and the reliance of the national economy on fossil-energy resources, Kazakhstan began its transition to a "green economy". One of the key directions of "green economy" development is the introduction of renewable energy sources (RES). At the same time, the involvement of RES in the process of supplying power for meeting Kazakhstan's demands raises a number of challenges, addressing which is the task in the short to medium-term.

Key words: "green economy", RES, energy efficiency, environmental risks.

ҚАЗАҚСТАНДА «ЖАСЫЛ ЭКОНОМИКАҒА» АУЫСУ: ҰМТЫЛЫСТАР МЕН ПРОБЛЕМАЛАР

Леся Каратаева

Аңдатпа. Дүниежүзілік еңбек бөлінісіндегі алатын орнымен қоса алғанда, Қазақстанның географиялық орналасуының ерекшеліктері, бір жағынан, еуразиялық экологиялық қауіпсіздік үшін тәуекелдер туғызса, екінші жағынан, республиканың өзінің экологиялық осалдығын қалыптастырады. Қазақстандағы Мыңжылдық даму мақсаттарын (МДМ) жүзеге асыру нәтижелерін талдау қол жеткізілген әсерлі нәтижелердің аясында климатты жақсарту міндеті осы күнге дейін өзінің өзектілігін сақтап отыр. Экологиялық тәуекелдерді және қазып алынатын энергия қорларына деген қажеттілікті төмендету мақсатында, Қазақстан 2013 жылдан бері «жасыл экономикаға» ауысуды қолға алды. «Жасыл экономиканы»

дамытудың ең негізгі бағыттарының бірі – бұл жаңғыртылатын энергия көздерін (ЖЭК) енгізу. Сонымен қатар Қазақстанның қажеттіліктерін энергиямен қамтамасыз етуге ЖЭК-ін тарту бірқатар күрделі мәселелерді тудырады. Олардың шешімін табу – қысқа және орташа мерзімді келешектегі міндет.

Түйін сөздер: «жасыл экономика, ЖЭК, энергиялық тиімділік, экологиялық тәуекелдер.

ПЕРЕХОД К «ЗЕЛЕННОЙ ЭКОНОМИКЕ» В КАЗАХСТАНЕ: НАМЕРЕНИЯ И ПРОБЛЕМЫ

Леся Каратаева

Аннотация. Особенности географического расположения Казахстана, в совокупности с занимаемой в мировом разделении труда нишей, формируют, с одной стороны, риски для евразийской экологической безопасности, с другой – экологическую уязвимость самой республики. Анализ итогов реализации Целей развития тысячелетия (ЦРТ) в Казахстане показал, что на фоне достигнутых впечатляющих результатов задача улучшения климата до сих пор сохраняет свою актуальность. Стремясь снизить экологические риски и потребность национальной экономики в ископаемых энергоресурсах, с 2013 года Казахстан начал переход к «зеленой экономике». Одним из ключевых направлений развития «зеленой экономики» является внедрение возобновляемых источников энергии (ВИЭ). В то же время вовлечение ВИЭ в процесс энергообеспечения потребностей Казахстана порождает ряд вызовов, поиск ответов на которые является задачей кратко- и среднесрочной перспективы.

Ключевые слова: «зеленая экономика», ВИЭ, энергоэффективность, экологические риски.

Assessment of the current situation.

The peculiarities of Kazakhstan's geographical location, in conjunction with the niche it occupies in the international division of labor, create, on the one hand, risks for Eurasian ecological safety; and on the other hand, an environmental vulnerability for the Republic itself. Analysis of the results of the implementation in Kazakhstan of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) show that against the impressive results achieved, improvement of the climate is still of current interest.

Climate change is recognized as one of the major environmental problems in Kazakhstan. In particular, among the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia, the Republic is in second place for the total level of organic pollution produced. There is a high level of air pollution in the cities and the level of concentration of solid particles is dozens of times higher than the same indicators in

the European Union. [1] In 2014, the total greenhouse gas emissions in CO₂-equivalent terms amounted to 338.5 million tonnes. CO₂ emissions amounted to 243.8 million tonnes per year; N₂O emissions were 17.0 million tonnes per year; and CH₄ emissions were 50.7 million tonnes per year. [2] The biggest air pollutants in Kazakhstan are the stationary sources of heating; nonferrous metallurgy; ferrous metallurgy enterprises; and the oil and gas industry. In 2015, the emissions of pollutants from the stationary sources into the atmospheric air amounted to 2180.0 thousand tonnes per year. Automobiles also have a serious and negative impact on the quality of air in the Republic of Kazakhstan. Because of this, the volume of consumed ozone-depleting substances (ODS) in 2015 was 13.5 tonnes. But it should be noted that this indicator had reduced 44.3 times compared to 2000 (597.9 tonnes in 2000). [3]

An inefficient model of the management of

recycling processes remains one of the most urgent problems of Kazakhstan's ecology. The main sources of industrial-waste generation are mining; the metallurgical industry; oil and gas; and the thermal-power industry. The volume of generated industrial waste increases year by year. In 2015, the hazardous waste per unit of GDP amounted to 588.8 kg/1,000 USD. [4] The management of household waste is also poor. 97% of solid municipal waste finds itself on the uncontrolled dumps and landfills that fail to meet the requirements of sanitary standards. [1]

A very urgent environmental problem in Kazakhstan is the contamination of the environment with oil and its refinery products. More than 1.5 million hectares are contaminated with oil and oil products. [5] Land pollution is also influenced by the fact that the main rivers in Kazakhstan rise largely in the territories of neighboring states, so the quality of water is influenced by pollutants originating in those states. In 2015, water losses amounted to \$2,949 million m³, equating to a 12.86% loss. [6]

A study conducted in 2012 recorded the following problematic aspects and risks for Kazakhstan in the field of eco-economic development: [1]

- ✓ Inefficient use of resources in all major sectors of the economy leads to a loss of profit of between 4 and 8 billion USD per year.

- ✓ Economic losses incurred as a result of low land-productivity amount to between 1.5 and 4 billion USD per year, which has negative social consequences for the agricultural sector.

- ✓ Inadequate system of setting tariffs and prices for energy resources fails to incentivise technological improvement in the industry.

- ✓ Almost one third of agricultural land is degraded or under threat.

- ✓ There is forecast to be a deficit by 2030 of between 13 to 14 billion m³ of sustainable water resources, necessary for meeting the needs of the economy.

- ✓ Negative impact of environmental pollution on human health. According to

estimates, air pollution is the cause of up to six thousand premature deaths per year.

- ✓ There is no integrated waste-management system.

The available data suggests that long-term lack of attention in Kazakhstan to the need to construct an ecologically oriented economy has led to the formation of a vicious cycle of negative interference along the "ecology – economy" axis.

Strategic approach and a conceptual understanding of the problem

Despite the absence of a section devoted to the environment in 'Strategy 2030', the country's primary strategic document, it was expected that as a result of that document Kazakhstan would become a "clean and green country with fresh air and clean water". [7] Greater attention was paid to the issues of building an ecologically oriented economy in 'Strategy 2050', adopted in 2012. In addition to issues of national security, economic and social development, which are all traditionally covered by the President's annual Addresses to the People of Kazakhstan, the Strategy underlines the necessity for creating an ecological mindset. This applies in particular to such sectors as agriculture and resource use.

Agriculture is tasked with becoming global player in the field of cleaner production. Solving this problem is possible only under conditions of sufficient water availability, which in the context of the arid climate zones of Kazakhstan requires a transition to moisture-saving technologies, etc. This strategy involves a change in the mindset of Kazakhstani society. "We must stop wasting water which is one of our most precious natural resources. By 2050, Kazakhstan must once and for all solve the problem of water supply". [8] In accordance with the strategic development plan, the problem of providing the population with drinking water must be solved by 2020; and the problem of irrigation by 2040.

As for the energy sector, the 'Kazakhstan – 2050' strategy document highlights the issue of the gradual increase of the share of alternative energy in total energy consumption. The

challenge has been issued to actively introduce technologies that use energy from the sun and wind. By 2050, alternative and renewable energy in the country should constitute at least half the total energy consumption. Moreover, the idea of an accelerated transition to a low-carbon economy has been suggested. Providing an impetus to the country's transition to the "green" path of development has become one of the tasks of the EXPO-2017 exhibition in Astana.

In May 2013, Kazakhstan adopted the Concept of transition to a "green economy", which is a logical extension of the adopted strategic guidelines of the country's development.

The Concept outlined the following as the main tasks of the transition to a "green economy":

- improving the efficiency of resource use (water, land, biological, etc.) and management;
- modernization of the existing infrastructure and construction of the new;
- improving the wellbeing of the population and the quality of the environment through cost-effective methods for mitigating the pressure on the environment;
- improving national security, including water security.

The Concept identified the following target indicators of a "green economy": [1]

Table 1. Target indicators of "green economy"

Sector	Target	2020	2030	2050
Water resources	Elimination of water resources deficit at national level	To provide people with water	To provide agriculture with water (by 2040)	Once and for all to solve the problem of water supply
	Elimination of water resources deficit at the basin level	The most rapid coverage of deficit by basins in whole (by 2025)	No deficit by each basin	
Agriculture	Labour productivity in agriculture	To increase three times		
	Wheat yield (tonnes per hectare)	1,4	2,0	
	Waste of water for irrigation (m ³ per tonne)	450	330	
Energy efficiency	The decline in GDP energy intensity compared to 2008	25% (10% by 2015)	30%	50%
Electric-power industry	Share of alternative sources ^[1] in power generation	Solar and wind: at least 3% by 2020	30%	50%
	Share of gas power plants in electricity generation	20% ^[2]	25% ²	30%
	Gassification of the regions	Akmola and Karaganda regions	North and East regions	
	Reduction of CO ₂ emissions in electricity-power industry as compared to current level	Level of 2012	-15%	-40%
Air pollution	Sulphur and nitrogen oxides emissions into the environment		European level of emissions	
Waste disposal	Percentage of population who have domestic waste uplifted		100%	
	Sanitary garbage storage		95%	
	Share of recycled waste		40%	50%

Source: The concept of the Republic of Kazakhstan for the transition to a green economy, 2013. [1]

It is planned to complete the transition to the “green economy” in three phases:

The first phase: 2013-2020. During this period, the main priority of the Government is optimizing the use of resources and enhancing the effectiveness of environmental management, as well as the development of a “green” infrastructure.

The second phase: 2020-2030. Transition of the national economy is to be focused on careful water usage; encouragement and stimulation of development; and dissemination of renewable energy technologies, along with construction of facilities on the basis of high standards of energy efficiency.

The third phase: 2030-2050. Transition of the national economy to the principles of the so-called “third industrial revolution” requiring the use of natural resources, provided they are renewable and sustainable. [1]

Taking into account the fact that, without international cooperation, none of the national efforts can be completely successful and produce the desired effect, Kazakhstan has been promoting its environmentally sensitive initiatives at international level. The ‘Global Energy-Ecological Strategy of Sustainable Development in the 21st century’ and the proposal to develop an international program ‘Water and Right’ for those countries which suffer water shortages [9] are among those initiatives. The “Green Bridge” initiative which was proposed at the APR forum in 2010, and included in the Rio+20 Declaration, was also successful. This initiative is aimed at the creation of a political framework for the transition to a “Green Economy” in the Eurasian area; and in various regions of Europe, Asia and the Pacific Ocean. The program focuses on the need to maintain transnational and cross-sectoral collaboration in the area of technology development and transfer, in fields such as renewable energy resources, water conservation and resource management, waste management and pollution control. [10]

Being focused on the improvement of partnership relations between the Asian-

Pacific Region countries and Europe, the “Green Bridge” is aimed at the transition from the current, traditional development models to the “green” growth concept. [11]

Kazakhstan has also assumed its obligation to implement the UN Sustainable Development Goals. [12]

Problematic issues

In the overall context of the challenges which countries will have to face during the process of national economies transitioning to economic growth which is “green”, it is possible to identify a number of problematic issues which can be both universal and specific to each individual country. This article outlines the narrow range of challenges which are significantly important to Kazakhstan.

The main challenge is universal and derives from the essentials of physics. The discussion on physical limitations and the financial inexpediency of the use of RES with the purpose of obtaining high-capacity energy, which was initiated by P.L. Kapitza in 1975 [13], remains relevant. The imputed core of the problem may be situated within two dimensions – the physical-limitations dimension; and the financial-inexpediency dimension.

On the one hand, within a constantly expanding industrial sector the need for energy supply is also increasing. On the other hand, there are objectively created restrictions to the value of the flux density of energy received from RES. Failure to ensure the energy-flux density required for the industrial sector is, to varying degrees, common to all RES. Despite all the achievements of science and the progress of technology, this fact maintains the current trend of an extensive approach to the increase of volume of energy from RES and this issue moves into the area of financial and economic feasibility.

Today, initial predictions that the capital cost of the establishment of power stations which receive energy from RES would not be reimbursed by the energy generated are being questioned. In particular, the issue of

finally overcoming the energy crisis caused by the hydrocarbon fuels runoff is expected to be resolved by the end of this century. [1] Nevertheless, at the current stage of technological development, the cost of the establishment of power stations which take energy from RES is still high; and that reduces their profitability significantly. Moreover, the establishment of “green” power stations and the creation of the components necessary for their operation require high energy costs. At the current stage of technological development, only traditional fossil fuel can provide the necessary volume of energy necessary to establish power stations of the new generation. Thus, in an environment of low density of energy flux produced by RES, finding the scientific and engineering solutions to carry out the process of establishing new-generation power stations becomes a very real problem.

At the same time, it is logical to assume, that the achievement of the target indicators of the Concept on transition of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the “Green Economy” will mostly depend on the establishment of mechanisms for the conversion of household energy to “green” technologies. On the one hand, the volume of electric power we use every day increases constantly because of the industrial sector; and, on the other hand, household energy does not require high-energy flux density. However, urbanized space is marked by a high concentration of the elements, consuming electrical energy. This

means that the needs of cities for energy flow density will continually increase.

Conclusions

The following points should be taken into account in order to find solutions to the challenges mentioned above.

First, invention is strongly encouraged in Kazakhstan by virtue of the recognition of its importance for the country’s innovative development. At the same time, it should be taken into account that generated ideas should be built on a serious scientific foundation. This fact makes more pressing the need for more scientific centers and institutions in Kazakhstan, researching such processes as the production, conversion and conservation of energy. In the meantime, the State has an interest in the development of not only applied but of theoretical physics.

Second, at the moment one of the most important objectives is to build an effective scheme of gathering and bringing inventions (ideas) to manufacturing. The absence of a prescribed mechanism acting along “inventor – constructor – technologist” lines prevents synergy.

Third, Kazakhstan’s transition to a “green” economy with growth depends not only on technological progress but also effective management. The development of environmental thinking among the country’s population is an important component of the process.

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HISTORY OF KOREAN DIASPORA IN KAZAKHSTAN: FOCUSING ON THE DEPORTATION OF KOREANS IN 1937

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Abstract. This article considers the history of the Korean diaspora in Kazakhstan, in that they can be a valuable bridge between Korea and Kazakhstan. In order to know the Korean diaspora properly, this article starts by examining their history, from the periods of the Russian empire and the Soviet Union to the present and an independent Kazakhstan. Historically, ethnic Koreans have migrated into the present post-Soviet space for various economic and political reasons since the 1860s. This article focuses in particular on the deportation policy of Stalin in 1937, which is the main reason for their existence in Kazakh territory. Specifically, this article will examine the process of deportation and attempt to analyze the reasons behind this by examining the external and internal position of the Soviet Union.

Key words: *Korean diaspora, Korean, Deportation, Ethnic Koreans in Kazakhstan.*

ҚАЗАҚСТАНДАҒЫ КӘРІС ДИАСПОРАСЫНЫҢ ТАРИХЫ: 1937 ЖЫЛҒЫ КӘРІСТЕРДІҢ ЖЕР АУДАРЫЛУЫ

Ян Мин Чу

Аңдатпа. Мақалада Қазақстан мен Корея арасындағы өзіндік бір «көпір» сипатындағы қызмет атқарып отырған Қазақстандағы кәріс диаспорасының тарихы қарастырылған. Кәріс диаспорасын толық және терең түсіну мақсатында Ресей империясы кезеңінен бастап

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Қазақстан тәуелсіздік алғанға дейінгі кеңестік дәуір уақытындағы тарихи үдерістерге талдау жасалынған. Кәріс ұлт өкілдері шамамен 1860 жылдардан бастап қазіргі посткеңестік территориялар саналатын аймақтарға бірінші кезекте экономикалық және саяси себептерге байланысты қоныс аудару бастады. Мақалада кәрістердің Қазақстанда пайда болуының негізгі себептерінің бірі саналатын 1937 жылғы Сталиннің жер аудару саясатына баса назар аударылған. Сонымен қатар жер аудару үдерісі мен оның себептеріне сол кезеңдегі Кеңес одағының сыртқы және ішкі жағдайын қалыптастырған факторлар тұрғысынан талдау жасалынған.

Түйін сөздер: Кәріс диаспорасы, кәрістер, жер аудару, қазақстандағы кәріс ұлт өкілдері.

ИСТОРИЯ КОРЕЙСКОЙ ДИАСПОРЫ В КАЗАХСТАНЕ: ФОКУС НА ДЕПОРТАЦИЮ КОРЕЙЦЕВ В 1937 ГОДУ

Ян Мин Чу

Аннотация. В статье рассматривается история корейской диаспоры в Казахстане, которая может рассматриваться в качестве своеобразного «моста» между Кореей и Казахстаном. Для глубокого понимания корейской диаспоры в статье анализируются исторические процессы начиная с Российской империи и советского периода до обретения Казахстаном независимости. Исторически, начиная с 1860-ых годов этнические корейцы переселялись на современные постсоветские территории по разным причинам, прежде всего, экономическим и политическим. В статье особое внимание уделяется политике депортации Сталина в 1937 году, что явилось основной причиной их присутствия на территории Казахстана. Также рассматривается процесс депортации и анализируются его причины через призму факторов, определяющих внутреннюю и внешнюю ситуацию Советского Союза.

Ключевые слова: Корейская диаспора, корейцы, депортация, этнические корейцы в Казахстане.

Introduction

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan became an independent country 26 years ago; and the relationship between Korea and Kazakhstan continues to develop. From my point of view, one of the reasons that means that Korea can make a closer relationship with Central Asian countries than other European countries is the existence of the Korean diaspora (Koryo-Saram). At the present time, about 100,000 Koreans live within Kazakhstan's borders. Their existence is the result of deportation in 1937 during the time of Stalin. During this period, serious tension was building up between the Soviet Union and Japan. Because of the mounting tension, the government of Soviet Union made an excuse that Koreans might be


spying for Japan; and they deported the Koreans who lived in the Maritime Province (Yonheaju), located in the Far East of Russia, to the Central Asian region. From that time, Koreans were scattered far and wide throughout the Central Asian region. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, when all the Soviet republics became independent countries, the Korean people confronted the newly emerged environment and they adjusted to the country they lived in.

Among the members of the Korean diaspora in the CIS (Commonwealth Independent States) countries, numbering about 500,000 people, Korean exiles in Kazakhstan feel that they have adapted well to their host country compared to other Koreans in the CIS region. [1] In the case of Uzbekistan, even though most Koreans

were relocated to this country, there are fewer examples to support the idea that the Koreans entered into Uzbek society. This is because the Uzbek government had implemented a policy of ‘Uzbek nationalism first’ and emphasized the Uzbek language. In other words, they put up a barrier to minority groups such as the Koreans, who can only speak Russian, entering Uzbek society. Meanwhile, Kazakhstan has emphasized several related concepts such as ‘multi-ethnic coexistence’, ‘tolerance’, and ‘multi-culturalism’ as part of the Kazakh nation’s identity. This is

because, since the nation’s independence in 1991, non-titular nationalities have outnumbered the titular nation, the Kazakhs: the country is in fact made up of about 130 different ethnic groups. Although the Kazakhstan government adopted Kazakh as a state language, they also officially adopted Russian as an inter-ethnic language. Through this policy, the Kazakhstan government allows minority ethnic groups in Kazakhstan to live as part of their society and opens up the possibility of them taking up major posts within the local community.

Figure 1: Ethnic Composition of Central Asian Countries in 1993



(Source: A Study on Formation of a ‘Kazakhstani’ Nation: Focusing on the Assembly of People of Kazakhstan, Young Min Choo. – 2013.)

For Korea, the existence of the Korean diaspora in Kazakhstan provides an opportunity to educate Kazakhstan in Korean. Likewise, for Kazakhstan, the Korean diaspora provides a starting point for Kazakhstan to know the country of Korea as well as ethnic Koreans. The image of the Korean diaspora is positive as far as other ethnic groups in Kazakhstan are concerned; and the Koreans are renowned as a hardworking group since the era of the Russian empire and indeed Soviet times. On the strength of this positive image, it is true that most Koreans are seen in Kazakhstan as friendly. With this in mind, the Korean people in Kazakhstan can have an important role and a symbolic function in terms of being a bridge between Korea and Kazakhstan. In particular,

they are actively working in diverse fields regardless of being a minority in their society. They are familiar with the local culture and the overall situation. In addition, they also have professional knowledge and experience in their various fields of work. It means that they can be a valuable human resource who can suggest the right way to bring about cooperation between two countries: Korea and Kazakhstan. For these reasons, I am going to research the Korean diaspora in Kazakhstan. In this article, I will study ‘the history of Korean diaspora in Kazakhstan’ as a first step in my research.

The timespan of my research is divided into three parts: 1. 1980 - before the deportation in 1937; 2. the deportation period in 1937; 3. from 1937 to the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Moreover, this study will also examine the process of and reasons for the deportation in 1937. My research is mainly based on literature researches using sources from Korea and Kazakhstan. I will also use the term Soviet Korean, meaning Koreans in the Soviet era.

The History of the Korean Diaspora in the Post-Soviet World

Early period of the ethnic Koreans in the Far East of Russia

There is no exact data or information regarding the initial migration period of the Korean diaspora in Russian territory. However, according to a document in a Russian archive, which was written by the person in charge of Novgorod’s border post, ‘several Koreans entered Russian territory and built 5-6 thatch-roofed houses in

Korean style, and they requested permission for 20 Korean households to live there.’ [2] From this document, we can surmise that the first migration period was around the 1860s. The background to their migration consisted of economic difficulties caused by the corrupt Choseon feudal dynasty and harsh exploitation from the ruling class, in addition to other causes. At that period, an influx of people was necessary for Russia in order to solve the problem of a shortage of labor after they had taken the Maritime Province territory from China. [3] Korean migrants, therefore, who were mainly peasants, were considered suitable groups for cultivating the wilderness of the Far East, including the Maritime Province. According to Russian local-government statistics, 185 households and 999 people from Korea were living in the northern-Ussuriysk region in January 1967.

Table 1: The Population of Koreans in Russian territory in 1867

Region	The Number of households	Population number		
		Male	female	subtotal
Tizinkhe(地新虛)* riverside Rezanovo	124	368	293	661
Sizini riverside	11	30	24	54
Rezanovo Temporary residents	48	134	45	249
Mongugai riverside	8	21	14	35
total	185	553	376	999

(Source: remake based on Park B., Bugai N. 140 years in Russia – History of Korean migration in Russia. - Embassy of the Republic of Korea in Russian Federation, Overseas Koreans Foundation, Association of Russian Koreans. – 2004.)

In the autumn of 1869, due to the major flood and great famine in the Northern Province of Choseon, Hamkyung-do, more Koreans started to move to Russian territory. Following that, the population of Korean residents in Maritime

Province increased to 12,857 in 1891; and they continued to increase to 23,000 in 1899. In 1902, the population was 32,380, which meant that the population had increased by two and a half times in eleven years.

Table 2: The population of Koreans in Maritime Province from 1891 to 1902

Year	The population of Koreans
1891	12,857
1898	23,000
1899	27,000
1902	32,380

(Source: Park B., Bugai N. 140 years in Russia – History of Korean migration in Russia. - Embassy of the Republic of Korea in Russian Federation, Overseas Koreans Foundation, Association of Russian Koreans - 2004.)

After that time, migration from Korea was re-ignited because of the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905); the Japan-Korea Treaty of 1905; and Japan's forced occupation of Korea (Daehan Empire). In this period, anti-Japanese feeling spread widely among the Koreans. Due to the situation, not only Korean peasants but also Korean independence activists flowed into the Far East region of Russia and the population of Koreans was increased. After that, the Far East region became a center of the anti-Japanese movement for Koreans. According to the records from that time, Posyet district was the area most heavily populated by Koreans in Russian territory. In 1917, for example, there were 30,000 Koreans living there and only 3,000 Russians. The style of the houses and the living environment were also overwhelmingly Korean; and therefore records mention that it was hard to distinguish whether it was a territory of Russia or Korea. [4] Koreans' anti-Japanese movement continued and meanwhile the revolutions of February and October 1917 took place and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was established in 1922. Koreans in the Far East actively supported the revolution and the establishment of the Soviet regime because they wanted to see the end of the Tsarist government, which had imprisoned Korean anti-Japanese activists due to the relationship with Japanese government. To get support from the Koreans in the war against Japanese, the Bolsheviks made a promise regarding land distribution for the Koreans. However, even with the Koreans' active participation in the civil war and loyalty to the Bolsheviks, the Bolsheviks were instead planning the resettlement of the Korean diaspora to other regions. During a speech at the first party congress, I.A. Kubyak, who was the General Secretary of the Far East region of the Communist Party Central Committee, denounced the Koreans as being the same as Japanese colonialists and said that therefore the Koreans should be expelled from the Far East. Because of this situation, the Soviet government deported about 700~800 Korean laborers to Japan. [2] As a result, the

Koreans endured an unjustified situation as a minority ethnic group without the promised compensation from the Bolsheviks and Soviet government. Consequentially, Koreans were denied the opportunity to be recognized as a mainstream group in Russian territory. After that, when the Soviet government enforced a collectivized agricultural policy in 1928, dozens of Korean households relocated from Maritime Province to the Kyzhylorda region of Kazakhstan and organized 'Kazris (Казрис)' and 'International (Интернационал)' to start rice farming.

The deportation of the Koreans in September 1937.

1. Process of the deportation

Before the deportation, there was a sign of what was to come; and it was not a good sign. The Soviet government arrested Korean leaders on suspicion of participating in an illegal organization; and they imprisoned and executed them just before the deportation was enforced. In this affair, about 2,500 Soviet Korean leaders were sacrificed. These Koreans were mainly chiefs of Communist party, military officers and intellectuals who had shown loyalty to the Soviet Government. Ironically, however, they were executed by the Soviet Union. From a common-sense point of view, this affair is incomprehensible. However it is possible that the Soviet government decided to eliminate the Korean leaders, as they had the potential to lead 200,000 Koreans and organize opposition movements against the deportation policy and the Soviet government. [5]

In August 1937, the decision of deportation of Koreans from Far East to Central Asia was adopted by the Council of People's Commissars and the Communist Party Central Committee. In September of the same year, the first deportation started in Posyet district; and in October the Korean households were deported to Kazakhstan. The deportation was carried out on three separate occasions. The process was very urgently enforced. Koreans did not therefore have enough time to prepare for it; and they

were simply put on trains heading for Central Asia. Even they did not have exact information about their destinations, they just were notified of the day and time of departure. Only about 1,000 people, included in the elite group, could have seats on the train; and the others were in poor conditions for more than a month on the train. For example, most Koreans were taken on to trains intended for transporting freight and livestock. The estimated number of deaths of Koreans during the deportation amounts to 554 people. [4] We can check the result of the deportation through the report to I.Stalin and

V.Molotov by N.Yezov, who was in charge of Korean's deportation policy.

‘The migration of the Soviet Koreans has almost been completed by October 25, 1937. A total of 36,442 households and 171,781 Koreans have been moved by train. About 700 Koreans remain in the Far East region; and it is planned that will be moved on November first this year by train. The number of Koreans allocated to the Uzbek SSR (Socialist Soviet Republics) is 16,277 households (76,525 people); and to the Kazakh SSR is 20,170 households (95,256 people). [5]

Figure 2: Deportation Route of Soviet Koreans in 1937



(Source: <http://news.join.com/article/2926712>)

The Koreans arrived in Ushtobe, located in the southern part of the Kazakhstan territory, after travelling along the following route: Vladivostok-Khabarovsk-Chita-Irkutsk-Krasnoyarsk.

2. Reasons for the deportation.

It should be considered that the deportation of Koreans in the Soviet Union was caused by the combination of the Soviet Union's internal and external situations. In this article, I will look at the various reasons for the deportation by separately considering the internal and external factors affecting the Soviet Union at the time.

When it comes to the Soviet Union's external situation at the time of the deportation, the Koreans were forced to move due to a political reason. The Soviet Union's national security was threatened by Germany from the West and Japan from the East. Hitler's government was increasing expenditure on armaments. In addition, the Soviet Union had been threatened by the East. They were defeated in the Russo-Japanese War; the Japanese kept infiltrating into the Far East region in 1918-1922; and the Manchurian Incident occurred in 1931. The Soviet Union wanted to avoid a war with the Eastern front, with Japan, in order to concentrate

on the Western front, Germany, when war broke out. About that time, the Far East region including Maritime Province was an economic (financial) and human supply route for anti-Japanese movement among Koreans. Looking at the situation, the Soviet government probably judged that if Japan tried to suppress the Koreans in the Soviet territory by force, serious problems could arise between the Soviet and Japanese governments. [6] Furthermore, the Japanese government had already interfered frequently in the Far East region because the Japanese had continued to insisting that the Koreans in the Soviet territory were part of the Japanese nation. [5] For these reasons, the Soviet government wanted to take some measures to reduce friction with Japan. They therefore made the decision to relocate Soviet Koreans from the Far East to Central Asia, far away from the Eastern area and Japan. In order to justify the relocation plan, the Soviet leaders purged the Soviet Korean leaders on suspicion of activities as Japanese spies; and then they executed the deportation policy. In the 'Pravda' newspaper, an article which is entitled 'Foreign spies in the Far East region of Soviet Union' reflects the distrust concerning Soviet Koreans all across the Soviet Union. This article described Japanese spies and Koreans who were hired by them; and it made the Soviet nation anxious on this subject. [6] In fact, the Soviet Koreans fought for the independence of Korea against Japan at that time. The situation was the opposite of the one depicted in the newspaper. In reality, the possibility for Koreans to become Japanese spies was not very feasible at all.

The internal factors leading to the deportation can be divided into three parts. The first claim is that the dire economic situation made Soviet leaders relocate Soviet Koreans to the Central Asia region. This is the view mainly of Russian researchers. According to their argument, the Soviet government needed to stabilize the agricultural industry first in order to be able to feed the Soviet nation and to improve agricultural productivity; and the expertise of the Soviet Koreans in rice farming was a way to achieve that. This is because Soviet Koreans

combined high levels of agricultural expertise and diligence, something proven in their ability to farm well in the barren Far East region. However it is hard to see this as the main reason for the deportation. If anything, if the government had tried to improve agricultural productivity in Far East region, where the Koreans had already made an environment for farming, they could have achieved their purpose more easily and faster without a waste of time, costs and labor. For these reasons, the economic situation cannot be considered as the logical reason for the deportation of 170,000 Koreans. The second reason is to prevent a poor demographic situation in Central Asia. Stalin's government desired to achieve the real meaning of the socialist revolution by industrialization through extensive nationalization and collectivization. According to this desire, the policy of collective farming was implemented forcibly all over the Soviet Union in 1929-1933. As the result, the Kazakh ethnic group, who has lived as nomads traditionally, lost their territory and means of living. Also, a part of them left for China to revolt against Soviet policy and make a new life. In addition, the Kazakh ethnic group experienced two periods of great famine: in 1919 and in the 1930s. 38% of the Kazakh population was lost because of these events. From the Soviet point of view, the population gap (vacuum) was to be made up by other nations in order to stabilize the Soviet Union's economy and society. However this reason also cannot be considered as a main reason for the deportation. If anything, it is possible that the population loss in Central Asia would be mentioned when the Soviet government discussed the place where Koreans could be relocated after they had already decided the deportation policy. Third, it was necessary for the Soviet leaders to have political and social scapegoats to lessen the nation's opposition to Stalin's nationalization and collectivization policy.

As I mention above, Stalin's Soviet government had implemented an exclusive and forceful nationalization and collectivization policy; and they could anticipate strong

opposition from the nation. In order to prevent it in advance, the government purged the potential opposition forces around the deportation date in 1936-1938; and they used the minority Soviet Koreans as a mutual enemy. Through sacrificing Soviet Koreans and issuing a strong punishment to them, the Soviet government intended to repress any dissatisfaction from the Soviet nation by demonstrating the disastrous consequence for any group aligning itself the Soviet government. [5] All things taken together, the Soviet government used nationalization and collectivization to construct one-state socialism. For this, they needed to solve several foreign and domestic problems. In this process, the government exploited Soviet minority groups, including the Soviet Koreans.

Soviet Koreans in Kazakhstan territory

After the Soviet Koreans arrived in Kazakhstan, they were relocated to other regions of Central Asia, such as Kostanai, Karaganda and Kyzylorda in Kazakhstan; and Tashkent and Samarkand in Uzbekistan. Among the Soviet Koreans who arrived in Kazakhstan, the largest number of them settled in southern part of Kazakhstan (12,031); others moved to the northern part (41,425); and the western part (8,986). [2] The Soviet Koreans faced a difficult situation during the winter in Central Asia. They dug underground shelters and built temporary huts to survive by themselves without proper compensation and support from the Soviet government. In other words, they were abandoned in the vast steppe of Central Asia without a proper place to live. Friction between the Soviet government and the Kazakh SSR was continuous regarding the way in which the deportation was carried out. Nothing was done promptly to solve these problems; but over time an attempt was made to make various plans for the Koreans' relocation. As a result, 28 of the Koreans' own Kolkhozes were created. However, in some cases, about 500 households of Koreans who were located in Kazakhstan were ordered to move again to the Stalingrad region to work in the fisheries by order of the

Soviet government. [7] The Soviet government instructed the Kazakh SSR government to form a Kolkhoz in consideration of the Soviet Koreans' abilities in the agricultural sector.

The chairman of Council of People's Commissars in Kazakhstan asserted that the Soviet Koreans should be located in the place where rice farming took place because they were outstanding in the agriculture sector. According to his assertion, the Koreans mainly re-migrated intensively to the southern part of the Kazakhstan territory where rice farming and grain production is possible. Also, the local government dissolved existed Kolkhozes and reorganized it for the Soviet Koreans. [7] To survive in the new destination, the Soviet Koreans had tried to develop agricultural technologies appropriate for Kazakhstan's climate and increased productivity. Through this process, the Soviet Koreans started to become increasingly settled in Kazakhstan.

Nonetheless, they were not granted Soviet citizenship because they were seen as a hostile ethnic group in the Soviet Union as a whole. The Soviet government therefore restricted their freedom for residential mobility, namely they could move only by plans and approval from Soviet government. In addition, when Germany invaded to Soviet Union in 1941, the Soviet Koreans could not participate in the war because they were not accepted as official citizens in Soviet society. If anything, the Soviet army expelled the Koreans. Instead of direct participation in the war, the Soviet government put the Koreans in charge of a labor army, working in the background. According to the records, in 1943, 7,765 Soviet Koreans were transferred to the Tula coalfield in Russia and to the Karaganda coalfield in Kazakhstan. [2, 7] It was not a massive migration movement like the deportation in 1937 but it shows that Soviet Koreans had been moved repeatedly not because of their will but because of the Soviet Government's plans. The Soviet Koreans had the right to freely move only after 1957, thanks to Khrushchev's government.

Table 3: Koreans population in Soviet Union in 1939, 1959 and 1989

	1939	1959	1989
Kazakhstan SSR	No data	74,019 (23.59%)	103,315 (23.55%)
Whole Soviet Union	182,339	313,735	438,650

(Source: Remake based on Korean Experience Chronology in Russia and Central Asia, National Institute of Korean History, 2009)

According to a census of the Soviet Union, shows that the population of Koreans was the population of Koreans was 314,000 in 103,315; there had been a great increase during 1959. Among them, the number of Koreans 30 years; and this figure is similar to the current in Kazakhstan was 74,000. The 1989 census Kazakhstani Korean population.

Table 4: Distribution of Soviet Koreans by the census for Soviet Union in 1959, 1970 and 1979 (according to the border at that time)

Regions	1959	1970	1979
Almaty oblasti	20,501	4,391	4,720
Almaty city	2,474	6,908	11,423
Zhambyl oblasti	5,474	8,228	12,215
Kyzhlorda oblasti	14,300	13,429	12,503
Taldykorgan	*	12,514	12,215
Shymkent	8,728	9,872	11,071
Gurev	2,504	2,988	2,946
Karaganda oblasti	12,034	13,391	10,638
Kostanay	2,346	2,730	3,066
Chelinnograd	**	1,872	1,958

* incorporated into an Almaty city/ ** incorporated into different cities

(Source: Kim G. The Development of Korean Immigrants Culture and Society in Kazakhstan. - 1995.)

Conclusions

The Korean diaspora in Kazakhstan is very important in developing a relationship between Korean and Kazakhstan. The existence of the Kazakhstani Koreans can bring the two countries closer together in that they can be a sturdy connecting link. In particular, Korean elite groups are well adapted to Kazakhstani society and at the same time they have high levels of professionalism in their fields too. They are therefore competent to play a key role in the two countries' relationship. This article has studied the history of the Korean diaspora in Kazakhstan and has looked at their roots by first examining how they first arrived in Kazakhstan.

The Korean diaspora first arrived in Russian territory in the 1860s. They had left their territory of Choseon; and migration had been increased for several reasons: economic

difficulties first; and then the anti-Japanese movement advocating the independence of Korea from Japan. The existence of the Korean population in Kazakhstan, more than 100,000 people, is directly attributable to the deportation policy of Stalin's government in 1937. This is a main reason of the existence of Koreans in Kazakhstan territory from the beginning of 20th century.

There are several reasons for the deportation of Koreans from the Far East of Russia to Central Asia. The first reason is a political one thanks to the external situation of Soviet Union. The Soviet government sent the Soviet Koreans to Central Asia in order to avoid conflict with Japanese government which was threatening the Soviet Union's national security from the East side and the Soviet government blamed the Koreans in the Far East, saying that they were

Japanese spies, and sent them far away from the East to Central Asia. In addition to this, there are other reasons for the deportation of Soviet Koreans such as the domestic economy, the demographic situation in Kazakhstan SSR and the Soviet Union's domestic politics. To be precise, to further the Soviet Union's economic revival to balance a demographic loss in Kazakhstan and for creating a 'scapegoat' for relieving social discontent among Soviet citizens. When these reasons are put together, the Soviet Koreans dreamed of a new life with hope under the umbrella protection of the Soviet Union – but they were abandoned and used by the Soviet government due to political reasons.

For these reasons, the Soviet Koreans were forcibly moved from the Far East region to Central Asia. Without proper support and direction, they were placed on a train and sent to Kazakhstan and then sent again to local cities

and other parts of the Central Asia region. They were abandoned to freeze in a strange land and lost the freedom of residential mobility. Nevertheless, the Soviet Koreans kept trying to work in order to survive and to be recognized as Soviet citizens. At present, 100,000 Korean diaspora live in Kazakhstan. They show high levels of participation in Kazakhstani society and work as professions in various fields. The difference after the collapse of Soviet Union is the country in which they live. They are still a minority group in Kazakhstani society but their role in society is not a minor one. They are the evidence of the Koreans' painful history. At the same time, they are proud Koreans who have shown vitality and the power of the Korean nation. That is one reason we should not only keep researching their lives in history and the present time but also making connections with them.

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